Corinna Dahlgrün,
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André Zempelburg (Hg.)

Overcome Evil with Good

Interdisciplinary Reflections from Theology, Conflict Science, and the Military

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Overcome Evil with Good – an Impossible Undertaking?

"Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword."
(Matthew 10:34)

"Blessed are the peacemakers: For they shall be called the children of God."
(Matthew 5:9)

In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus blesses the peaceful, *and* says about himself that he has not come to send peace, but a sword. What does this entail for our handling of evil? What does it mean for our pursuit of peace? In which way are Christians obliged to fulfil Apostle Paul's ethical commands from Romans to overcome evil with good? Taking seriously Martin Luther's thought that the justified man always remains a sinner, how can Paul's command be implemented? (lecture on Romans 1514/1515, WA 56,347,3f et al)

While these questions have been at the heart of theological thought, discussions on the interweaving of good and evil, war and peace also reach back to ancient philosophy. They have shaped Enlightenment thought, political theory, have been key motif of popular literature and art, and are nowadays – from an increasingly utilitarian perspective – at the core of psychology, behavioural and neuroscience (cf. Bregman 2020; Hogg, Vaughan 2010).

Endless examples of world literature have discussed the dichotomy of evil and good, upon which religions have built the hope for ultimate salvation. In Dante's *Divina Commedia* and Goethe's *Faust,* for instance, both protagonists eventually rise up to spiritual enlightenment and heavenly peace, while in *Faust* Mephistopheles openly calls himself as "*Teil von jener Kraft, die stets das Böse* will und *stets das Gute schafft*" [part of that force that always wills the evil and always produces the good] (Goethe 2017: 1334–1336). In both grand narratives the happy end comes with God's grace and forgiveness – in line with Goethe's other famous phrase: "Wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen" [For he whose strivings never cease is ours for his redeeming] (ibid.: 11936–11937).

Within the worldly sphere, many dictums on human nature have been rather bleak. Plautus' famous phrase *Homo homini lupus* first mentioned in "Asinaria" 195 BC seems as timeless as St. Augustin's *non posse non peccare* (Joseph v. Barbel 1960). Scientific endeavours to grasp the intricate essence of human have been numerous. In Modernity, Thomas Hobbes (De Cive 1642)

in taking up Plautos conviction motivated its lasting impact on the (Western) image of man. So, is humanity (entirely) bad, as this phrase suggests?

For many great thinkers, such as Rutger Bregman (2020), it seems a realistic starting point, while the Dutch historian also underlines that human actions are very often ambiguous in their intention and effect, nebulous to oneself, and resistant to simple categorisation. After all, he is convinced about man's potential of being good.

Desmond Tutu (2010), former South African archbishop, Nobel Peace Prize winner and member of the *Truth and Reconciliaton Commission* and his daughter, Episcopal priest Mpho Tutu, even more clearly express this conviction in their book "Made for Goodness. And Why this Makes all the Difference". In their spiritual reflections and accounts of Apartheid and their quest for healing and reconciliation they claim that despite the horrors man has caused, goodness will eventually triumph, if man chooses to live up to what he was truly made for.

Given the above, under which circumstances does the good, indeed the best side of our nature flourish, which social order, which freedoms and self-constraints are best suited to keep its bad, its worst sides at bay and why?

While Liberalism is based on the somewhat idealist conception of the rational, self-responsible individual, its economic complement – as first outlined by Adam Smith in his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* – draws on self-interest, greed and the impulse of competition. By way of contrast, Marxism sees human consciousness and behaviour determined by social relations (more specifically the mode of production). Consequently, for Marx the best society is the one that frees humanity from the alienation, the estrangement of its own nature and helps it flourish in its vital, creative drives. This idea was later criticised for downplaying the human inclination to power. Echoing Thucydides or Machiavelli, the latter understanding of human nature, for instance, paved the establishment of International Relations after 1945. It was based on the assumption of classical realism that the primary human drive was domination.

So, is it our inherent contradictions that impede us from making this world a paradise of wealth, and happiness? Are we afraid, after all, to realize our freedom, as Kierkegaard (1957, 55 as cited in Tolliday in this volume, p. XX) suggests? "Anxiety", he says, "is the dizziness of freedom, when freedom gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself". By juxtaposing freedom and fear, he alludes to only one of the universal tensions of human nature that have been illuminated by evolutionary psychology, psychoanalysis, or anthropology. In each of these disciplines the wishful image of the benign, rational, self-determined and self-sufficient individual is one way or another found to be contrasted with his ambiguities.

In accord with many psychology and conflict theories, our freedom is curtailed by our unleashed (animal) impulses of self-preservation and aggression, by our contradictory needs of freedom and security, individualization and belonging, by our fascination for the challenging, the unfamiliar and unknown as opposed to our comforting enmeshment in daily routines, by

our oscillation between egoism and self-sacrifice, by the limitations of perception through projection, repression, stereotyping, and group-think, or by the veils of ideology, nationalism and exclusive identities. For we are not only subject to our contradictory nature, but are also motivated, guided and constrained by our social roles, the communities and institutions we belong to and the respective perceptions, interests and ideas of evil and good that accompany them.

Last but not least, the definitions of evil and good, as well as perceptions on how to tackle the evil are heavily context related. Thus clearly, the dictum to 'overcome evil with good' might acquire a different meaning in combat, than in peace; it might be understood differently by a soldier, a theologian, a psychologist or a peace mediator, who in turn will employ different ways of achieving the good.

The fundamental insights that these findings bring, point to the way in which human nature appears suspended between the polarities of good and evil, or perhaps more worringly to Primo Levi's 'grey zone' between them. The insights point also to the painful acceptance of our own limitations, and not least to the ultimate contradiction that doing evil might feel good or appear as the better choice between two options. In the words of German philosopher Richard David Precht: Man prefers being perceived as evil rather than as loser (Precht 2010).

In view of the above mentioned, the present volume combines a series of theoretical reasonings with different case studies in a deliberately interdisciplinary perspective. Drawing on the Apostle Paul's (Rom 12:21) ethical appeal to never answer evil with evil, instead to spread the good, leave the ultimate judgement to God and as such "overcome evil with good" the present volume offers a variety of relevant reflections from various disciplines with a focus on theology.

They are based on the unusual encounters of theologians, members of the German Military Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr), conflict scientists and peace activists.

In four seminars held in Hamburg, Jena, and in the old city of Jerusalem, participants discussed the trajectories of human evil and good in the context of peace and conflict, violence and repression to open up to unknown perspectives, profit from the synergies of different approaches and engage into lively discussions on the pitfalls and challenges of overcoming the bad with the better.

As Corinna Dahlgrün, professor for practical theology, dean of the faculty of theology at Jena University and co-editor of the present volume, explains in her introductory article "Offiziere und Theologiestudierende. Die Geschichte einer Kooperation" the distinctive encounters were inspired by the decades-long cooperation between her and Volker Stümke, Professor at Rostock University and senior lecturer at the Military Staff College.

Since 2015 this connection has paved the way for a vibrant and fruitful exchange between members of the armed forces, students of theology, as well as participants from political science and social psychology. Divided into workshops based on various case-studies and followed by

group discussions these settings, Dahlgrün argues, allowed for a change of perspective that, for instance, led students to be concerned with the ethical challenges of military (conflict) setting and officers with pastoral care and theology.

The exchange started at the Military Staff College in Hamburg with three seminars in 2012, 2015 and 2016 discussing the topics of human nature and man at borderline situations, and encompassed military and theological approaches and their diverse options of action as for example in dealing with war crimes.

In 2018 participants met at Jena University to exchange their perspectives on the quest of overcoming evil with good as related to the difficulty of recognizing and defining evil and good, and applied to diverse times and settings, crossing nations and ethnicities.

Eventually, participants came together in Jerusalem in 2020 to resume and specify their reflections on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and beyond within a broader global context of growing political and religious cleavages and the rise of right-wing populism. With the overall aim of these encounters, as Dahlgrün underlines, being the quest for a common language, and the promotion of multi-perspectivity, interdisciplinarity, intercultural sensitivity, and interreligious dialogue, it is particularly within the latter encounter in Jerusalem that these notions acquired both a theoretical and empirical meaning.

Complementing the above, Major Leonhad Fritz and Major Felix Hinz in their article "Seminarbericht zum Seminar 'Versöhnung' der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr" provide a detailed account of the Jerusalem seminar in 2020 from the perspective of the military. Prior to the meeting in Jerusalem, the officers prepared by discussing interdisciplinary conceptual layers of crime, guilt, punishment and forgiveness, justice, truth and reconciliation for post-conflict transformation, including different case studies, such as inner-German, and German-Polish reconciliation, the reprocessing of the Rwandan genocide, and the trajectories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Jerusalem encounter was based on case-studies presented by the different groups and discussed in plenary, as well as on presentations by local scientists and peace practitioners.

The officers focussed on a recent German debate triggered by former German defence minister's criticism of the German armed forces. In reference to accusations regarding inter alia defects in the training of recruits and the employment of an officer with extreme right-wing attitudes von der Leyen raised the question of weak leadership and a general problem of attitude of the *Bundeswehr*.

The students of Jena University presented the story of the monks of Tibhirine based on the movie by Xavier Beauvois' "Of Gods and Men". It recounts the life and death of seven Trappist monks in Algeria who in 1996 were killed by Islamic terrorists.

Eventually, researchers from University of Leeds gave a presentation on Quaker reconciliation engagement in post-war Rwanda.

The seminar was complemented by key-notes given by Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals from diverse backgrounds. Prof. Sami Adwan from the *Peace Research Institute in the Middle East* and Dr. Michael Sternberg from Ben-Gurion-University of the Negev presentd a best-practices approach to peace education from an inter-religious and inter-ethnic perspective. Psychoanalyst and teacher of Judaism Dr. Gabriel Strenger spoke about the ultra-orthodox Jewish community in Israel and perspectives of conflict resolution. Dr. Salim Munayer, peace activist and executive director of Musalaha concluded the presentations with a socio-psychological account on reconciliation from an inter-religious and Christian perspective. In their article the authors highlight the value of the vibrant discussions and the trans-disciplinary and inter-institutional exchange of the seminar.

Theory: The Role of God and Man in the Eternal Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation

Illuminating the eternal question of good and evil as convoluted in the human heart and soul, the theory-based section of the present volume starts out with an interdisciplinary reflection of human nature at the interface of theology, anthropology, and existential philosophy. Drawing on the idea of original sin as a reflection of the twofold nature of humankind in "Overcoming Evil with Good – A Theological Perspective" Prof. Phillip Tolliday discusses the images, ideals, desires and limitations of being good. Tracing prominent thinkers in their theological and philosophical reflection on human nature from Sartre, to Niebuhr, Macquarrie, Kierkegaard and Ricoeur he underlines that there cannot be a pure, unalloyed good, nor an absolute evil, for human nature is essentially contradictory. While, as he holds, particular social or historical contexts seem to have born different impulses, incentives and motivations for the human to be carried away by either good or evil deeds, human action cannot be explained neither entirely extrinsically nor completely intrinsically. Reverting to Protestant Theology and its conception of the human as *imago dei* and original sin as inherent part of human nature, he discusses the eternal interweaving of humanity torn between its constructive and destructive forces, between egoity and the other, isolation and belonging, temptation and virtue, between its seemingly unlimited creative freedom against the universal constrains of its basic needs for security, its agony of choice, the perils of passions, unaccomplishable longings for immortality, and the fear of responsibility and fault, suffering and ultimate death. As Tolliday beautifully concludes, it is the basic desire to hold what one cannot, to immortalize, eternalize what is ephemeral, to imbue ideas and substance with meaning, that lead to "idolatry, which is not, as some may imagine, a primitive predilection

for the worshipping of stones and rocks, but a dogged attempt to invest the mundane, the tangible, the particular and the provisional with a significance, meaning and trust that it cannot possibly bear" (p. 50).

So, our path towards genuine goodness – if there is such a thing – is replete with obstacles inherent in our nature and desires. But what about our ethical responsibility to being, promoting and defending good in the light of conflict, suppression and violence and consequent questions of punishment and justice? If we shall do only good, will god avenge the wrong? If we are not allowed to avenge injustice for God will do that on doomsday, is revenge then not simply postponed? And if so, what is the role of forgiveness, and reconciliation? Deeply engrained in theological thought and at the same time an expression of a very essential human need the notions of divine justice and reconciliation have also shaped the ethics of peace. Coming from the Apostle Paul's original instruction to the Christians of Rome to overcome evil with good, Prof. Volker Stümke discusses related perspectives on conflict and peace that result from this imperative. In his article "Wege zur Überwindung des Bösen: Friedensethische Erwägungen" he draws on theology, political theory, and Enlightenment philosophy in asking about the interweaving of religion and violence, and of our obligation and God's role in the fulfilment of ultimate justice. From a primordial perspective, as he states, violence appears as inherent in religion. Instrumentalist approaches, however, underline that religious conflicts may often be an expression of deeper economic disparities. Constructivism in turn, as the author explains, sees this relation as characterized by the intersubjective dynamics of theological sources, their interpretation and human action. In this latter sense, Luther's reflection on the heavenly and worldly regiments challenges the notion of absolute truth. While acknowledging the state's monopoly on the use of force, Luther encourages the Christian as open and self-critical searcher to seek a balance between reason and faith in this quest for the good.

Seeking and maintaining good is particularly difficult in response to war and terror, when horror and pain break into daily life. On that note, Alistair McFadyen in his article "Theology, Torture, Terror, Policing: How not to have Enemies or to overcome Evil" underlines that only sensitive and ethical approaches to acts of massive violence will minimize the risk of creating new violence in the long run. Drawing on his professional background as both theologian and police officer he brings theological thought and secular practice into dialogue in the context of disquieting events, such as the terrorist attacks of 7/7 in London and 9/11 in New York. As the author underlines, especially those who are confronted with extreme evil on a regular basis in their daily professional reality, but also societies that collectively need to react to shocking events, run a risk of meeting the evil in a way that might not be fruitful for overcoming it – particularly when the confines of evil and good seem clear, and good is pursued with self-righteousness and pride. As he underlines:

> "This is what presents the moral & spiritual risk: situations inviting the label 'evil' tend to be exactly those that invite a response in us that shows itself to be at some point, in some way and to some extent overcome by the evil we seek to combat. Where extreme evil does not traumatise us into passivity, it can incite in us extreme and violent forms of response that often look as though they are also caught up in (bound to) the traumatising effects of the evil they seek to extinguish, overcome and be free from" (pp. 78).

So, how to answer evil without succumbing to it? This question is closely related to the injunction of love for the enemy. But does love necessarily mean the annihilation of the concept of enemy and the renunciation of justice? Forgiveness and reconciliation, as the author underlines, could appear as an idealistic negation or practical avoidance of evil or – from a genuinely Christian perspective – as an expression of one's refusal to succumb to evil. In this sense, McFadyen is well aware that talking of overcoming evil from a Christian perspective often sounds, as he states, "facile and glib" (p. 79). The connection of enemy-love, forgiveness and reconciliation that contribute to the concept of "self-sacrificial love" could easily appear as an idealized construct, a suspension of reality, "especially the reality of evil" (p. 79).

Thus, how can evil be answered on a collective scale for contexts such as 9/11 – a day that has come to represent the dawning of a new era of war, violence and torture, and the announcement of the new enemy to "the West", to freedom and democracy? What are the ethical implications of violence as a response to terror? Can evil here be overcome by love? Being inspired by Paul's Epistle to the Romans McFadyen combines "enemy-love with the goal of overcoming evil by refusing to be conformed with the world". This combination gives him a hermeneutical key to interpret the meaning of overcoming evil in the post 9/11 world. As he concludes, the need to (if necessary, forcefully) oppose evil, while at the same maintain the humanity and dignity of the enemy is a sensitive but important balance to strike.

The imperative of being good appears as a common denominator of all world religions and times. While most articles in this volume have, due to the host Faculty (Theology) and frame of the conference as their starting point a Christian approach or background, André Zempelburg approaches the overall topic in his article "Aspects of Dealing with Evil in Israelite-Jewish Tradition" from a related but different perspective. The *leitmotif* of this piece is to question the fundamental assumption of this volume and therefore the Paulinian statement in the Epistle to the Romans (12:21): Is Evil (solely) to be overcome by Good? Zempelburg refrains from making universal assumptions about "evil in religions" in general or in Ancient Israel and in Judaism in particular. Instead, he takes his starting point by the fact that "evil" as theme and concept in the Jewish religion does exist. In three very different approaches he shows how evil can be overcome *without good*, i. e. by analyzing evil in Ancient Israelite ritual, then by referring to Daniel Boyarin he shows how the Rabbis of antiquity transformed the idea of the evil instinct or inclination and

finally he draws on the Hebrew Bible, reading one myth, partially in a rather philosophical way and puts it in relation to *the* Jewish tragedy of the 20th century: The Shoah, i. e. the Holocaust. According to Zempelburg's argumentation the tragic Biblical tale of two brothers, Cain and Abel—one is killed by the other—, is in fact a myth. But this is not to be understood in the sense of the Hobbesian idea of the eternal homicidal conflict between man, *a struggle of all against everyone*. Instead, he reads it as "the true primordial struggle", which is the one about blood, soil, culture and identity. Accordingly, the true state of nature is not *a struggle of all against everyone* as Hobbes claimed in the 17th century, but the existence of a particular form of civilization or rather forms of different civilizations at conflict with each other.

Myths, the idea of divine providence and kinship have, as modern times show, also been the binding glue for the construction of nations and as such for the present world order. Smith (1999) in "Myths and Memories of the Nation" and particularly Benedict Anderson (2005) in his ground-breaking work "Imagined Communities" have aptly shown how the *nation* turned into the most powerful idea humanity has deployed to imbue the physical world with transcendent meaning. Particularly the exclusive, primordial version of it appears to be an inspiring substitute for the loss of transcendence caused by the bourgeois revolution and secularization, a spurring projection screen of ultimate sense, belonging, martyrdom and eternity.

So, one can pointedly say: Nations could essentially evolve as a powerful uniting instrument because they make humans feel powerful, united, guided, and good – their dangerous reverse of course often having been the extinction, exclusion and discrimination of "the other", the internal repression of diversity and social dynamic, and the invention and aesthetic construction of glorious historical narratives.

As Eric Hobsbawm (2005) and Anderson (Ibid.) show, almost all national secessionist, independence or reunification movements that drew their impetus on the idea of primordialism, were born out of war and serve as powerful founding myths. In today's international landscape many open and simmering conflicts appear to resonate with these myths and their appeal to kinship and glory. This is particularly the case for intractable, ethno-nationalist conflicts, like Israel-Palestine or Cyprus that appear to be haunted by the eternal shadows of their past, by passionate appeals to conformity and sacrifice for the national cause and aggressively polarized group relations.

Drawing on findings from social psychology and political science Carolina Rehrmann's article "Protracted Evil: Emotions in Enduring, Ethno-National Conflicts" discusses the causal influence of emotions on conflict structures – an aspect that has for long been neglected in traditional conflict analysis. Starting out with a discussion of emotions' various manifestations in human nature as impulses, basic needs, and normative judgements, the paper traces the influence of (particularly conflict relevant) emotions as the binding glue of social relations, their impact on intergroup polarization, on cognition and memory, social norms, and collective identities, as

well as their power as the aesthetic basis of national narratives and positive self-images for the ethno-national community. Emotions, the author concludes, are causal for both aggravating and prolonging ethno-nationalist conflicts primarily because they appeal to the needs of human nature for meaning and community. As such, conflicts – particularly frozen and protracted ones – may make the bad appear as good and necessary and can thus ironically be perceived as pleasant states of self-assigned goodness, even if it comes at the high price of daily sacrifices and depravations.

Case Studies: The Challenges and Prospects of Dealing with Evil in Post-Conflict and Crisis Settings

Perceiving oneself as being "the good" is the precondition for considering one's action as legitimate. Some of these actions might appear as necessary for the ultimate good, even if they have unpleasant, or painful side effects.

For military contexts, the legitimacy of international interventions for the sake of pre-empting, or overcoming conflict – for example within the declared *Responsibility to Protect* (RtP) – has been a controversial topic and deeply connected to the two preceding aspects (positive self-image and legitimacy of own's action). But can violence be overcome by violence? This question appears as a recurring, timeless theme in ethical, military and political discourse on world politics. It has also heavily shaped political debate in post-war Germany. "The security of the Federal Republic of Germany is being defended in the Hindu Kush, too", said German defence minister Peter Struck in 2002. His remark caused a big stir and broad rejection. This reaction is part of a bigger controversial debate on the role of the Bundeswehr and the military in general. On a global level, given the growing number of interstate and civil wars, terrorism, expulsions, and migration flows, in the last decades conflicts seem to have grown more complex and dynamic, blurring traditional state boundaries, and displaying a variety of actors and intricate challenges.

Against this backdrop, some demand more and stronger military presence, others following a broader conception of security demand military withdrawal in favour of sustainable civic and diplomatic endeavours for conflict resolution. The latter comprise what can be perceived as a growing public rejection of military operations, for they are considered as causes of new conflicts, critical debates on human rights violation committed by the military, criticism on perceived impunity and a lack of democratic accountability, as well as on the risks of privatising the military sector and thus conflating military with economic interests.

In view of the above mentioned, how does the German soldier reflect upon his identity, his role and obligation between the two polarized images of himself as defensive "miles protector"

and offensive "miles bellicus"? How does he balance his profession and guiding position between ethical, respectively legal maxims and the necessities of war action? Is a soldier allowed, does he even have to be "evil", if his actions are guided by moral standards and, eventually, lead to the better? Officers Marcello Clemenz, Kai Nickeldorf, Alexander Strelau, Franz Voißel and Steffen Wortmann follow these questions in their article "Die Bundeswehr – Böses tun um gut sein zu können." They trace the German debate on military operations and the Bundeswehr, and in the process also reflect Germany's attempt to confront its national socialist heritage. Right from the early post-war period, the cautious, restrictive stance towards the military brought about the ideal image of a "civilian in uniform". This served as a guide for non-military German foreign policy, was apparent in the broad indignation about Germany's very first post-war military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and lately led to the official abolition of compulsory military service in 2012. The role of the German military and the dealing with its dark heritage, thus, appears as a highly controversial and dynamic issue until today.

Also, beyond German borders this remains a central issue that underlines how the shadows of the past appear in present day conflicts. This has been blatantly and most recently visible, when in the European financial crisis, the rejection of Germany's dominant role brought about historical analogies with its National Socialist past. Particularly in countries deeply hit by the crisis, such as Spain, Cyprus and Greece, depictions of chancellor Merkel with Hitler's moustache were a popular image in the yellow press and to be found on demonstration banners. Although, many observers criticized this as a cheap attempt to channel populist sentiment, Greece is a peculiar example. Since 2010 media in both countries have engaged in a mutual blame game for the responsibility of the current crisis that was heavily permeated by historical analogies. In some Greek media Germans were depicted as the eternal aggressor with fascist traits, Greeks in parts of the German press as economic scroungers (Blickes et al. 2012). The widespread anti-German resentment was also motivated by and in turn triggered a revival of reparation-claims for German occupation (1942–1945). The reparation dispute, which has reached high political and legal echelons including legal charges against the German federal government at the ECHR, seems far from reconcilable at the moment (Fleischer 2003). Rather it appears that German-Greek relations show *en miniature* how an unresolved, troubled past may heavily affect present day European relations. This is particularly visible in the still ongoing dispute on the (beyond Greek borders) largely unknown so called "Martyr Communities" – numerous villages that have been witnessing atrocities by the German Wehrmacht. These villages have an important share in shaping Greek public memory discourses of World War II, and present-day reparation claims. Historians have pointed to the lack of reprocessing, the absence of material or symbolic gestures of goodwill and a genuine apology from the German side, while the lack of symbolic and material acknowledgment seems to have paved the way for resentment, populism and alienation between the two countries.

Against this backdrop, Charalampos Karpouchtsis in "Silent echoes of good deeds. The Example of Kalavryta" traces one of the few early engagements that can be considered the first gesture of reconciliation from the civil society sphere. In 1952, Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden visited the town of Kalavryta on the Peloponnese, which is one of the most prominent martyr communities. According to different estimates almost 700 civilians had been murdered by the Wehrmacht in 1943 in what was declared as a retaliation act for the killing of German soldiers by Greek partisans. When Schramm von Thadden found out about the atrocity, she decided to point the way to reconciliation by supporting 33 Kalavrytan youths to be sent to Germany for vocational training. In illuminating this special engagement, the author underlines the importance of genuine recognition in building trust between members of former enemy groups and how this can lay the foundation of rapprochement and closure. He also illuminates how the darkest chapter of Greek-German past still affects communities and relations today, and how gestures of reconciliation may have a lasting effect.

Thus, the extent that the past haunts the present also reflects the quality of post-conflict transformation towards healing and reconciliation. This issue appears *en miniature* in the challenge of dealing with people that are reported missing until today. Forced disappearance – doing away with regime critics or other "inconvenient" people – has been defined as one of the most dramatic violations of human rights, a drastic, horrifying way to exhibit absolute power and to cover up one's own crimes by avoiding formal accountability or the trouble of show trials. Paved by a theoretical and comparative reflection on the chances and challenges of transitional justice as related to the worldwide phenomenon of missing persons in her paper "Protracted Evil: Missing Persons and the Case of Cyprus" Carolina Rehrmann discusses the case of Cyprus, where following the interethnic violence and the islands partition in 1974 about 2000 persons were considered missing until recently. Due to the endeavours of the UN-administered Cypriot *Committee on Missing Persons* (CMP) the remains of about half of all the missing have been uncovered to date.[1] However, the CMP that includes both Greek and Turkish Cypriot government representatives appears to operate in a hostile, at best indifferent environment, for the fate of the missing is deeply entangled with unresolved questions of guilt and inconvenient challenges to the monolithic conflict-narratives of both communities and their power political interests. No public apology, no political act of genuine rapprochement towards the other side has been undertaken by either government in this matter. However, beyond the official, political sphere, individual and NGO-engagement has helped promote reconciliation on a personal and social level. One such example is the decade-long commitment of journalist and peace activist Sevgül Uludağ, nominee of the Peace Nobel Price 2019, to uncover the fate of the missing, the supressed and silenced knowledge of perpetrators and confidants, and soothe the agony and pain of the

[1] http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/.

missing's relatives. Another example is the booklet-series of the bi-communal NGO *Association for Historical Dialogue and Research* (AHDR) aimed at transforming the binary, mutually exclusive narratives on missing persons by reaching out to students from both sides of the Cypriot divide. Both represent a humanist, transnational approach to the consequences of loss and suffering and show the timeless struggle of man in dealing with the afflictions of violence.

While forced disappearance remains one of the most sensitive and silenced issues, also child abuse appears as one of the most challenging crimes with a high number of unreported cases. Amongst the latest figures available, according to the World Health Organization's statistical data up to one billion minors have fallen victim to violence in 2017 – be it physical, emotional or sexual. Particularly the latter remains one of the most tabooed and sensitive issues. For 2013 an estimated 18 million children in Europe – more girls than boys – have suffered sexual abuse (WHO), in Australia according to the Institute of Health and Welfare between 2015–2017 one out of five women and one out of nine men have reported to have been abused physically or sexually before the age of fifteen. Most reported cases happen within the family, or in their institutional – educational or recreational context.[2] Thus, they are mostly committed by persons of trust and authority that abuse their emotional, power and trust relationship with the child causing devastating, lifelong wounds and disturbances in their minor victims.

Here, sexual abuse of children committed by the church has been a particularly sensitive issue that has recently caused outbursts of indignation amongst publics in a wide range of different countries, motivating political and legal actions against clergy and other church members. It has led to such prominent trials as the one in Australia against cardinal George Pell, former inaugural prefect of the Secretariat for the Economy of the Vatican, resulting in six years of prison. But does the trial of an individual affect the broader culture and structures that have allowed for and might also today allow for child abuse?

On that note, Phillip Tolliday in "Responding to Institutional Abuse in the Anglican Church of Australia: Ambiguities in Overcoming Evil with Good" critically reflects on the Anglican Church of Australia that in 2013 was charged with accusations of child abuse in the preceding decades. In that year prime minster Julia Gillard instituted the *Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse* that included the Anglican Church. Following a series of charges made by victims the church was scrutinized for reported abuses committed back in the 1980s and 1990s by clergy and other church members and accused for its silence and inaction. As Tolliday reports, under the eye of the public, as well as in view of the risk of suffering legal and financial consequences the church responded with the adaption of screening and training programmes for education and consciousness that dioceses would adopt voluntarily, and with charges against individual clergy. However, as the author argues, finding itself under broad political

[2] https://www.pbc2019.org/protection-of-minors/child-abuse-on-the-global-level.

and media pressure, the church appeared to have acted primarily to maintain its reputation, while using individuals as scapegoats, while failing to respond on a holistic level to the systemic, and deep structures of abusive relationships within the church and avoiding an open debate that would include the views and needs of the victims.

So, how can these needs be approached thoroughly, given that particularly the healing of abused children calls for an utmost sensitive conduct? Dealing with traumatized children might push a helper to the very edge, for he or she will become a resonance chamber of a victim's negative emotions of powerlessness, disgust, guilt or hate. From a theological perspective genuine help entails spiritual guidance and healing and thus relates to a helper's relation with God.

Within her broader research on traumatised children in her article "Overcome Evil with Good. Der Fall Kornelius" Miriam Schade presents the case study of Kornelius from the perspective of a pastoral worker. The ten-year-old boy had been tortured by his satanist parents. In tracing ways of grasping and soothing his pain where psychological help is stretched to its limits, while meeting the faithful child's spiritual needs, the author touches the confrontation of evil from a genuinely theological perspective. As Schade holds, this is a largely marginal topic in contemporary Protestant Theology. Pointedly summarizing the discussion of the case study at the mentioned group's meeting in Jena 2018, she underlines the importance of i.a. acknowledgement of pain, healing rituals, as well as the chances and challenges of forgiveness and closure. Being perfectly clear about the difficulty of conceptually grasping evil, Schade offers a case-study related dogmatic reflection of evil and ways to overcome.

How can, how shall not only councellors but a society as a whole respond to massive human rights violations and reprocess heritages of violence given the risk that pain, loss, trauma and impulses of revenge might bring? Two case studies by theologians from the University of Leeds discuss this question.

Rachel Muers in her article "Claiming Blessings: Theological Reflections with Quaker Peacebuilders on Overcoming Evil with Good" illuminates the pivotal challenge of a non-violent post-conflict transformation and justice on an individual as well as social level and their significance for Christian theology. Here, she focusses on peacebuilder testimonies that are both victims of violence and peace activists in reconciliation, community mediation and dialogue with a focus on post-genocide Rwanda. Many of these peace builders belong to the Quaker Peace Network Africa. In her analysis Muers draws i.a. on Julian of Norwich, a theologian considered an "apostle of reconciliation" for her reflections on the upheavals caused by plagues and the suppression of political and religious uprisings in fourteens-century Britain and brings her into dialogue with twenty-first-century Africa and questions of forgiveness and reconciliation after massive violence. "Reconciliation", as the author underlines, referring to Quaker theologian and practitioner Esther Mombo, "is not a skill to be mastered (…) it comes as a stance assumed before a broken world rather than as a tool to repair that world" (p. 240). In this sense, reconciliation should be

understood not as the implementation of a pre-defined plan, but as an infinite process of healing and blessing that ultimately relies on god's role in forgiveness and justice. From this perspective peacebuilding from the limited attempt to merely fix a problem becomes "the promise of blessing" as it is stated in the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the peacemakers" (Matt 5:9).

Also, Alistair McFadyen in "Overcoming Evil without Succumbing to It: The 7/7 London Bombings in 2005" tackles the difficult question of sustainably overcoming the trauma of massive violence caused by a terrorist act. As he aptly points out, the Islamist attacks carried out by individuals that had been living in Great Britain, did not only cause shock and anxiety, but sparked Islamophobia, and racism and raised the risk of violent responses against the Muslim communities of the country. Without jumping to conclusions, the author raises a number of rather open, ethical questions that relate to both the treatment of the perpetrators' remains, as well as to how to approach their families – questions that were controversially discussed in plenary amongst the participants of the third seminar at Jena University. Should the bodies of the perpetrators be treated as the bodies of the victims? Should their "families be regarded primarily as survivors, traumatised and bereaved? (p. 253)" In how far can the bombers be considered to have acted out of their own volition, respectively within the context of their religious convictions? And could they in the latter sense also be considered as victims of ideology and fanaticism? In presenting these queries he both admonishes the risk of immediate impulses of dehumanisation on the one hand and of absolving the perpetrator from his guilt by a sole focus on his social environment. As he states:

> "If the attempt to understand the bombers' human situation leads us to believe that they were not thinking and acting freely and so are victims, then in an odd way we have stripped them of their humanity in the very act of seeking it. Significantly, we might then feel relieved of the difficult task of seeing their motivations and actions as human responses to their view of the world, not least how they see Britain in particular and the West in general" (p. 255).

Deriving the necessity of a reflected approach that responds to individual guilt without collectivising it, he underlines the importance of upholding dignity and humanity towards both perpetrators and their families as a collective response to the attacks that mirrors the societies own values. McFadyen who, as initially mentioned, works as police officer in Leeds, were some of the perpetrators had been living, concludes by recounting how the police's overall approach beyond criminal investigations encompassed the protection of the perpetrators' families and dialogue with white communities, whom the police feared might radicalise as a response to the attacks.

Carolina Rehrmann (on behalf of the editors), Berlin, April 2021

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Offiziere und Theologiestudierende – Die Geschichte einer Kooperation

Corinna Dahlgrün

Das vorliegende Buch mit seinen zahlreichen sehr unterschiedlichen Beiträgen in englischer und deutscher Sprache ist der Ertrag einer vermutlich einzigartigen Zusammenarbeit, derjenigen zwischen der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg und der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Jena – samt allen Partnern, die sich im Laufe der Zeit beteiligt haben. Dieser Beitrag will das Unternehmen beschreiben: Wie ist diese Kooperation entstanden? Wie sah die Zusammenarbeit im Einzelnen aus? Welche Ziele hatten sich die Beteiligten in den verschiedenen Seminaren gesetzt und was ist der Gewinn, den Studierende, Offiziere und Lehrende daraus ziehen?

Die Idee

Der an sich ja nicht unmittelbar naheliegende Gedanke, Offiziere und Theologiestudierende gemeinsam an theologisch und anthropologisch relevanten Fragen arbeiten zu lassen, entstand aus einer jahrzehntelangen Kooperation zweier ehemaliger Hamburger Vikare. Nachdem wir Hunderte von Seiten des / der jeweils anderen gelesen und kommentiert hatten, was zuweilen in lebhafte Diskussionen mündete, hatten Volker Stümke und ich den Eindruck, dass diese Art von Diskurs – aus unterschiedlichen beruflichen Hintergründen und unterschiedlichen theologischen Disziplinen heraus – auch für andere sehr fruchtbar sein könnte. Dies wurde mir bei einem Gespräch mit Offizieren eines Hamburger Lehrgangs nach einem Vortrag über Harry Potter eindrücklich bestätigt, und Volker Stümke hat neben seiner Arbeit an der Führungsakademie immer auch an der Ausbildung von Theologinnen und Theologen mitgewirkt, zunächst in Wuppertal, inzwischen in Rostock, und dabei stets von neuem versucht, Studierende mit der

Wirklichkeit (unter anderem der Bundeswehr) und Offiziere mit (unter anderem) den Gedanken Luthers in Berührung zu bringen.

Die Themen mussten dazu so formuliert sein, dass für beide Diskurspartner etwas Substantielles berührt war, zu dem es, je nach weltanschaulichem Hintergrund und Herangehensweise, unterschiedliche, gern auch kontroverse Positionen und Lösungen gab. Und sie sollten Fragen aufgreifen, die Grundsätzliches ebenso wie Aktuelles bedachten.

Bei den Überlegungen zur Durchführung war uns schnell klar, dass die Gespräche – natürlich in möglichst durchmischten Gruppen – möglichst konkret geführt werden sollten. Theoriediskurse sind interessant und oft auch fruchtbar, aber sie können wirkliche Begegnungen eher bremsen als befördern, weil die Gesprächspartner auf einer Metaebene verweilen. Insofern war der Theoriehintergrund aus unterschiedlichen Fachperspektiven im Vorfeld zu erarbeiten, für die Offiziere in zwei Kurswochen vor dem gemeinsamen Blockseminar, für die Studierenden in einer eigenen Lehrveranstaltung, der das Blockseminar als zweite Veranstaltung im nächsten Semester folgte. In den gemeinsamen Tagen des Blockseminars sollte es dann um spezifische Situationen gehen, die den Erfahrungsbereichen der Beteiligten entnommen wurden. Also hatten sich Studierende mit ihrer Fachexpertise auf die Konflikte in militärischen Settings einzustellen, während die Offiziere veranlasst wurden, sich in seelsorgliche und pastoraltheologisch herausfordernde Situationen hineinzudenken.

Die Seminare

Allen Seminaren ging also eine individuelle Vorbereitungsphase an den jeweiligen Standorten voraus, in der das gemeinsame Thema fachspezifisch erarbeitet wurde. Die Arbeit in der gemeinsamen Woche konzentrierte sich – oft nach kurzen Referaten über das bisher getrennt Erarbeitete – auf Fallstudien, die von den Teilnehmenden vorgestellt wurden. Die „Fälle" wurden in gemischten Gruppen diskutiert, die Ergebnisse anschließend dem Plenum vorgestellt. Am Rande der eigentlichen Arbeitszeit kam es häufig zu privaten Unternehmungen der Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer, die – fast noch mehr als die gemeinsame Arbeit – dazu dienten, die Menschen hinter den Funktionsbezeichnungen (Major, Kapitän, Theologiestudentin) wahrzunehmen.

Die Hauptveranstalter waren jeweils Prof. Dr. Volker Stümke (Sozialethik / Führungsakademie Hamburg) und Prof. Dr. Corinna Dahlgrün (Praktische Theologie / Theologische Fakultät Jena). Zu den einzelnen Seminaren und deren Themen seien jeweils einige Sätze festgehalten, im Falle der letzten beiden, die die Grundlage dieses Buches bilden, in etwas größerer Ausführlichkeit.

Macht und Ohnmacht (November 2012 in Hamburg)

Während Offiziere die Erfahrung von Machtlosigkeit – Ohnmacht war für sie ein vor allem medizinisch bestimmter Begriff – meist durchweg als „worst case" einschätzen, mehr noch als etwas, das mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit ein posttraumatisches Belastungssyndrom auslöst, weil ihr Beruf ebenso wie ihr Selbstbild von ihnen verlangt, weitreichende Entscheidungen zu treffen und irgendetwas zu tun, neigen Studierende der Theologie nicht selten dazu, mit Macht lieber nichts zu tun haben zu wollen, obwohl ihr künftiger Beruf diese natürlich mit sich bringt. Entsprechend spannungsreich war die Arbeit an den verschiedenen „Fällen", beispielsweise das Problem der Verhandlung mit Geiselnehmern auf einem gekaperten Schiff vor Afrika und die Herausforderungen in der Seelsorge im Zusammenhang einer Sterbebegleitung. Die Studierenden ließen sich in der Bundeswehr-Fallstudie sehr weitgehend auf militärisches Denken ein und wollten die Geiseln schließlich (zum Entsetzen ihrer Dozentin) durch Kampfschwimmer befreien. Die Offiziere rangen mit dem Problem, in der Seelsorge-Fallstudie keine Handlungsoptionen ausmachen zu können, obwohl sie doch ihre Stärke im „Machen" sahen. Die Studierenden benannten im weiteren Gespräch über diesen Fall die Möglichkeit, die eigene Hilflosigkeit vor Gott zu bringen und sie so ertragen zu lernen. Für die Offiziere war das ein neuer Gedanke, der etliche stark beschäftigte: dass es im Bereich der Religion Formen des Handelns gibt, auch dort, wo man nichts machen kann. Beide Gruppen wurden jedenfalls, so eines der Resultate, dazu angeregt, den eigenen Umgang mit der von ihnen gefürchteten Alternative zu reflektieren.

Was ist der Mensch – Menschen an Grenzen (November 2015 in Hamburg)

Das Thema des zweiten Seminars stellte sich als weniger ergiebig heraus, obwohl wir uns, wie im ersten Seminar, in den Fallstudien mit Konkretionen beschäftigten, beispielsweise einer problematischen Beerdigung und einem für die beteiligten Soldaten höchst riskanten Befehl und dem geforderten Gehorsam.

Das Konzept war durchaus schlüssig, denn gerade in Grenzsituationen ist vieles über den Menschen zu erfahren, aber vielleicht war die Frage zu allgemein und zu sehr von einer Metaebene aus gestellt.

In menschlicher Hinsicht freilich kann das Seminar durchaus als ein Höhepunkt eingeschätzt werden, da es zu besonders vielen und besonders intensiven Kontakten der teilnehmenden Gruppen kam. Das hatte logistische Gründe, insofern Studierende und Offiziere in dieser Woche in einem Kasernengebäude untergebracht waren, was die informellen Begegnungen erheblich

erleichterte. So konnten die Studierenden den Alltag in einem Lehrgang miterleben, in gemeinsamen Mahlzeiten, im Rechtsunterricht, und, sofern sie wollten, in den vier wöchentlichen Sportstunden. Auch Kneipengänge gehörten natürlich dazu.

Das Böse (November 2016 in Hamburg, in Kooperation mit dem Fachbereich Theologie / Erlangen)

Die Frage nach dem Bösen begegnet Offizieren ebenso wie Theologen und Theologinnen, allerdings aus sehr unterschiedlichen Perspektiven und mit sehr unterschiedlichen Handlungsoptionen. Die Offiziere können sich Warlords, Terroristen, Piraten, Geiselnehmern und Kindersoldaten sowie unterschiedlichen Verstößen gegen die Menschenrechte gegenübersehen, die Theologinnen und Theologen lesen in der Bibel von Dämonen und „eurem Widersacher, dem Teufel" (I Petr 5,8), sie hören in Beichtgesprächen von bösen Handlungen und können gelegentlich mit dem Phänomen der Besessenheit zu tun bekommen. Die entsprechenden Fallstudien lösten vielfach Erschrecken und Ratlosigkeit aus. Für die Offiziere wirkte insbesondere die Arbeit an Psalm 137 verstörend. Dass in Vers 9 der Wunsch formuliert wird, dass die Kinder des Feindes an Felsen zerschmettert werden sollten, passte nicht in ihre Vorstellung von Religion. Für die Theologiestudierenden kam der härteste Moment im Ansehen eines Videos des IS, das Hinrichtungen zeigte. Genauer gesagt wurden die Männer durch Genickschuss hingerichtet, die Frauen wurden geschächtet. Die Offiziere, die im Vorfeld über die Zumutbarkeit dieses Beispiels nachgedacht hatten, kündigten den Inhalt des Videos an – allen war freigestellt, ob sie hinsehen, wegsehen oder den Raum verlassen wollten. Die meisten sahen hin und waren geschockt. Interessant am folgenden Gespräch war, dass die kontroverse Beurteilung quer durch die Gruppen ging: Einige Offiziere und einige Studierende waren der Überzeugung, dass das hier Gezeigte als „böse" zu qualifizieren sei, das Tun, die Täter, die filmische Darstellung. Andere Offiziere und Studierende sahen die Rede vom „Bösen" als eine eskalierende Kriegsrhetorik, die die Lage verschlimmern werde. Zu einer Einigung kam es zwischen den gemischten Koalitionen nicht – der Diskurs stößt im Umgang mit dem Bösen offensichtlich irgendwann an Grenzen, unabhängig davon, ob das Böse als eigenständige und eigenständig wirksame Macht oder als „Fehlen des Guten" definiert wird.

Obwohl – oder weil – wir dementsprechend viele Fragen offen lassen mussten, wollten einige der Teilnehmenden aus Hamburg und Jena ausdrücklich eine Fortsetzung der thematischen Arbeit an dieser Frage. Daraufhin planten wir ein weiteres Seminar mit einem deutlich erweiterten Mitwirkendenkreis, zu dem diesmal Jena einlud.

Overcome evil with good (April 2018 in Jena, in Kooperation mit der School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science / University of Leeds[1] und St. Barnabas Theological College / Adelaide[2])

Um nicht eine bloße Wiederholung in anderem Kontext durchzuführen, wurde das Thema modifiziert und erweitert: Anstelle einer alleinigen Auseinandersetzung mit dem „Bösen" (einschließlich der Versuche von Definitionen) wurde nun die Frage nach Möglichkeiten der Überwindung des Bösen gestellt. Dies sei, wie angekündigt, etwas ausführlicher dargestellt.

Die Frage nach Wegen, das Böse in seinen vielfältigen Formen zu überwinden und Möglichkeiten des Umgangs damit zu finden, ist omnipräsent und für das Zusammenleben von Menschen (Generationen-, Nationalitäten-, Ethnien-, Schichten-übergreifend) von hoher Relevanz, gerade angesichts der zunehmenden Feindseligkeit und Gewaltbereitschaft als beunruhigendem gesellschaftlichen Phänomen unserer Zeit.

Das Seminar wollte angesichts dieser Gegebenheiten zum sprichwörtlichen „Blick über den Tellerrand" motivieren. Die Interdisziplinarität sollte die kritische Reflexion und Infragestellung der eigenen Erfahrungswelt und selbstverständlicher Denkweisen anregen und damit Horizonte erweitern und Brücken der Verständigung zwischen unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und Menschen verschiedener Nationalitäten schlagen. Gemeinsam sollten Handlungsoptionen entwickelt werden, aus der fruchtbaren Verbindung theologischer, ethischer und gesellschaftspolitischer Perspektiven heraus.

Wir hatten hochgesteckte Ziele:

- *Die Sensibilisierung für die Vielschichtigkeit der Thematik.* Nicht immer ist das offensichtlich Böse auch tatsächlich das Böse oder das vermeintlich Gute auch wirklich das Gute. Ein differenzierterer und differenzierender Blick ist von sozialem, gesellschaftlichem und politischem Interesse, da eine genaue Einschätzung und die daraus folgenden handlungsleitenden Entscheidungen das öffentliche wie private Leben jedes Einzelnen tangieren können.

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[1] Der Kontakt mit der Universität Leeds entstand aus einer Studienfahrt eines praktisch-theologischen Seminars im Sommersemester 2017. Der Austausch mit Prof. Alistair McFadyen (der seine Professur für Systematische Theologie auf einer halben Stelle versieht, während er mit der anderen halben Stelle als Polizist arbeitet) und mit Prof. Rachel Muers (Systematik, Gender, Feminismus, Ethik; sie gehört zur Religiösen Gesellschaft der Freunde) legten vielversprechende thematische Synergien nahe.

[2] Die Zusammenarbeit mit Prof. Phillip Tolliday ergab sich, als er im Rahmen einer Lehrstuhlvertretung im Sommersemester 2016 aus persönlichem Interesse am Jenaer Vorbereitungsseminar „Das Böse in pastoraltheologischer Sicht" teilnahm; er kam zu diesem Seminar eigens aus Australien.

- *Die Reflexion der Teilnehmenden hinsichtlich des eigenen Umgangs mit dem Bösen.* Dies wollten wir, wie in den bisherigen Seminaren, durch die Konfrontation mit Fallstudien aus unterschiedlichen Kontexten erreichen. In der Beschäftigung mit diesen Fallstudien sollte wiederum die bewusste Wahrnehmung der eigenen Gedanken, Emotionen, Haltungen und ethischen Urteile ebenso angeregt werden wie die kritische Auseinandersetzung damit. Denn die Aufgabe, das „Gute" zu suchen, das das Böse überwindet, stellt eine moralische, emotionale und psychologisch nicht zu unterschätzende Leistung dar, die ggf. fundamentale Auswirkungen auf die eigene Einstellungen und auf künftige Entscheidungen haben kann.
- *Eine überindividuelle Wirkung über den Kontext der Tagung hinaus.* Da die Teilnehmenden ganz unterschiedlichen sozialen und gesellschaftlichen Hintergründen entstammten, erhofften wir uns, dass sie als Multiplikatoren die gemeinsamen, auf der Tagung gesammelten Erfahrungen und neuen Erkenntnisse in ebenso unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Bereiche hineintragen und so dazu beitragen würden, das „Böse" – in seinen unterschiedlichen Facetten – in seiner gesamtgesellschaftlichen und transdiziplinären Relevanz, wahrzunehmen und ihm zu begegnen.

Ein weiteres wesentliches Anliegen war schließlich *die Förderung einer grenzüberschreitenden Sprachfähigkeit*. Für eine schwer greifbare Thematik Worte zu finden, ist oft bereits in der Muttersprache und innerhalb des eigenen Sprachspiels eine Herausforderung. Dies in andere Sprachspiele und überdies in fremde Sprachen zu übersetzen, um Verständigung zu befördern und befriedende Impulse zu setzen, ist eine zusätzliche Hürde und erfordert damit ein hohes Maß an Lernbereitschaft.

Das Seminar sollte die Teilnehmenden dazu befähigen, die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse ebenso wie die ungelösten Fragen nicht nur in Worte zu fassen, sondern sie auch erfolgreich zu kommunizieren und – eine Herausforderung insbesondere für deutsche Studierende – in englischer Sprache in die Kontexte der anderen Teilnehmenden zu transferieren. Diese Kontexte sind zunächst kulturell, sozial und gesellschaftspolitisch definiert, doch war zudem eine Übertragungsleistung in die unterschiedlichen professionellen Hintergründe erforderlich.

In der abschließenden Auswertung wurde das Seminar von allen Beteiligten als höchst ertragreich und unbedingt zu wiederholen eingeschätzt. Die Kontakte zwischen Offizieren, Studierenden, Pfarrerinnen und Pfarrern, wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern waren intensiv, fruchtbar und horizonterweiternd, zumal in den Kleingruppen, die sich in unterschiedlicher Zusammensetzung zu den verschiedenen Fallstudien bildeten. Der Abbau von wechselseitig vorhandenen Vorurteilen und die zunehmende Sensibilisierung hinsichtlich der Komplexität der Thematik waren von Tag zu Tag zu verfolgen, die Atmosphäre der Diskussionen war am Ende entspannt, höchst konzentriert und an Lösungen in-

teressiert, wobei die verschiedenen Ausgangspositionen zunächst bewusst wahr-genommen werden mussten.[3]

Das Fazit aller war, dass sie ihre Vorurteile nicht bestätigt gefunden, sondern die anderen Gruppen als höchst schätzenswert kennengelernt hätten. Die Studierenden kamen zu dem Schluss, dass die Bundeswehr ein wichtiger Bestandteil des gesellschaftlichen Gefüges sei. Die englische Gruppe formulierte ihre Wertschätzung deutscher Theologie und des Niveaus der deutschen Studierenden und würdigte die Haltung der Offiziere, die sich von denen der englischen Armee deutlich unterschiede. Die Offiziere erklärten, dass – entgegen ihren Erwartungen – in ethischen Fragen die Fachexpertise von Theologen unbedingt heranzuziehen sei.

Conflict and Peace (Februar 2020 in Jerusalem, in Kooperation mit der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Bonn, dem St. George's College / Jerusalem, der School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science / University of Leeds sowie Referenten aus Israel / Palästina)

Die Frage, wie Frieden zu schaffen und zu bewahren bzw. wie Versöhnung[4] möglich sei, beschäftigt in Zeiten des Rechtspopulismus und einer immer weiter voranschreitenden Radikalisierung Menschen in allen Kontexten. Jerusalem gehört zu den Orten, an denen diese Thematik in besonderer Weise spürbar ist – neben den verschiedenen Kooperationsmöglichkeiten ein wichtiger Grund für die Wahl des Seminarortes, der jedoch keine thematische Beschränkung auf die

[3] Sehr aufschlussreich war zum Beispiel die Einsicht in konfessionelle Unterschiede, etwa dass in der Church of England das Beichtgeheimnis im Falle von Fragen des Landesverrats oder terroristischer Anschläge nicht gilt, während in der EKD die Pfarrerinnen und Pfarrer an ihr Ordinationsgelübde gebunden sind, in dem sie das unverbrüchliche Wahren des Beichtgeheimnisses versprechen. Aus früheren Seminaren bereits bekannt war die Ausrichtung der Offiziere auf zielführendes Handeln und auf die gesellschaftliche Handlungslogik – dies wurde besonders deutlich bei der australischen Fallstudie über die Ahndung eines aus finanziellen Rücksichten nicht öffentlich verfolgten Missbrauchsfalles (s. dazu den Beitrag von Phillip Tolliday). Den Pfarrerinnen und Pfarrern war dies unmittelbar einsichtig, weil die Kirche andere Werte zu schützen habe als das bloße finanzielle Überleben der Diözese. Die Offiziere und einige der Studierenden meinten dagegen, dass im Falle eines Bankrotts der Diözese den Missbrauchten nicht geholfen sei, der Schaden für die Kirche hingegen sei größer. Für die Offiziere bestand ein wesentlicher Ertrag in der Kenntnisnahme fremder Handlungslogik und der Einsicht, dass es viele Situationen gibt, in denen Machtlosigkeit ertragen werden muss. Die Studierenden wiederum lernten den Wert zielführender Überlegungen schätzen.

[4] Dies war der Titel, unter dem die Vorbereitung der Offiziere stattgefunden hatte.

Konflikte im Nahen Osten bedeutete[5], auch wenn diese immer wieder zu den verschiedenen Fallstudien in Beziehung gesetzt wurden. Die Erfahrungen, die auf den Straßen Jerusalems alltäglich zu machen sind, fordern wache Wahrnehmung und sorgsame Reflexion heraus. Doch sollte eine solche Reflexion nicht nur aus einer Außenperspektive heraus geschehen. Darum wurden für einzelne Einheiten Gäste in das Seminar eingeladen:

- der muslimische Professor für Erziehungswissenschaften sowie Mitgründer und Co-Direktor von PRIME[6] Sami Adwan (Bethlehem University) gemeinsam mit dem jüdischen Doktoranden Michael Sternberg (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)[7];
- der jüdische Psychologe und Orthodoxie-Kenner Gabriel Strenger (Jerusalem);
- der christliche Direktor des Versöhnungszentrums Musalaha Dr. Salim Munayer (Bethlehem).

Allein von diesen vier Gästen wurden uns höchst unterschiedliche Deutungen der Situation und ebenso unterschiedliche Lösungsvorschläge vorgetragen, die für die Studierenden und die britischen Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer zum Teil durchaus anstößig waren.[8] Auch die im Seminar vorgestellten Fallstudien führten in keinem der Fälle zu einer einheitlichen Idee einer aussichtsreichen Konfliktlösung, wobei sich allerdings die Offiziere durch das Beispiel aus Ruanda sehr beeindruckt zeigten. Sie hatten in der Vorbereitung in Hamburg den Kirchenpräsidenten der Eglise Presbytérienne au Rwanda, Pascal Bataringaya, zu Gast gehabt, der die Position vertreten hatte, dass Versöhnung verlange, dass Schuld in einem Sündenbekenntnis vor einer Gemeinschaft ausgesprochen und gesühnt werde (Ubuntu). Das von Rachel Muers vorgestellte Vorgehen der Quäker setzt demgegenüber auf Verzeihen als Voraussetzung für Versöhnung.[9]

Die Einsicht in die hohe Komplexität von Konflikten und in das Erfordernis der genauen Kenntnis der verschiedenen Interessen und Sichtweisen ist auf jeden Fall als ein wichtiger

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5 Die Fallstudien befassten sich mit einem bundesdeutschen Konflikt über eine pauschale Kritik der damaligen Verteidigungsministerin von der Leyen an der Bundeswehr, den ermordeten Trappisten in Tibhirine und dem Testament des Christian de Chergé sowie der Versöhnungsarbeit der Quäker in Ruanda.

6 Peace Research Institute in the Middle East.

7 Sternberg arbeitet bei Shifra Sagy (Professor emeritus an der Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Direktorin des Graduiertenprogramms „Conflict Resolution Studies") am Thema „Conflict Management and Resolution". Die jüdisch-muslimische Zusammenarbeit geht auf Dan Bar On zurück, und setzt in der aktuellen, von allen als höchst verfahren wahrgenommenen Situation auf die Arbeit mit den Jüngsten, im Kindergarten und in den Schulen.

8 Hier ist die jeweilige Nationalgeschichte immer mit zu reflektieren, da sie Verständnis, Sympathien und konkretes Gesprächsverhalten beeinflusst – für die Deutschen ist es nach wie vor der Holocaust, für die Briten das Völkerbundsmandat für Palästina und die Rolle im Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern.

9 Weitere Überlegungen dazu in den Beiträgen von Volker Stümke, Leonhard Fritz und Felix Hinz.

Ertrag des Seminars anzusehen. Sie ist dazu angetan, in den Beurteilungen der Situation wie auch der Akteure Demut walten zu lassen. Ein weiteres, sehr anschauliches Ergebnis ist die Einladung der Quäkerin an das Seminar aus Offizieren und Studierenden, beim nächsten Mal nach Leeds zu kommen.

Ein vorläufiges Fazit

Der Gewinn dieser Kooperation zwischen Theologiestudierenden und Offizieren der Bundeswehr ist für beide Seiten hoch. Denn die Auseinandersetzung mit ethisch, politisch und gesellschaftlich relevanten Fragen aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven ermöglicht die Erweiterung des eigenen Horizontes durch die Begegnung mit fremden Fachexpertisen und ein Sich-Einlassen auf deren Logik. Dies führt zur Überwindung von fachspezifischen Begrenzungen und Vorurteilen, und nicht zuletzt fördert es die eigene Sprachfähigkeit durch die Übersetzung eigener Gedanken in andere Kontexte.

Die noch recht kurze Geschichte der Kooperation zeigt dabei ein Wachstum in drei Hinsichten:

- *Interdisziplinarität*. Die Seminare verbanden von Anfang an Studierende der Theologie aus Jena mit Offizieren des Lehrgangs Admiralstabs- / Generalstabsdienst National. Bei diesen Offizieren handelt es sich, beispielsweise, um Majore und Korvettenkapitäne. Die Offiziere haben unterschiedliche Studienabschlüsse, wie etwa im Ingenieurwesen, oder der Politik- und Staatswissenschaft. Inzwischen sind Studierende und häufiger auch berufstätige Geistliche aus anderen Orten hinzugekommen, dazu weitere Seminarteilnehmerinnen und -teilnehmer sowie Gäste unterschiedlicher Nationalitäten aus verschiedenen Berufen (Psychologie, Politikwissenschaften, Religionswissenschaft etc.). – Das Zusammentreffen und Zusammenarbeiten dieser verschiedenen gesellschaftspolitischen Akteure dürfte in dieser Form einzigartig sein.
- *Internationale und interkulturelle Dimension***.** Die Teilnehmenden kommen aus verschiedenen Ländern mit ihren eigenen pluralen Lebenswelten und aus unterschiedlichen Kontexten. Die Fallbeispiele erfordern von allen Teilnehmenden eine Einstellung auf den jeweiligen lebensweltlichen Hintergrund. Im Falle des Seminar „Overcome evil with good" wurden sie gestaltet von einem australischen Theologen, der sich intensiv mit der „Stolen Generation" beschäftigt hat, einer palestinänsischen Soziologin, die unter anderem palästinensischen Studierenden die Geschichte des Holocaust näherbringt, einem britischen Theologen und Polizisten, einem Korvettenkapitän der Bundeswehr mit Erfahrung in Auslandseinsätzen und einer deutschen Theologin, die sich in ihrer Promotion mit traumatisierten Kindern beschäftigt hat.

- *Interreligiosität.* Das Seminar bringt Menschen der verschiedensten christlichen Denominationen (Anglikaner, Reformierte, Lutheraner, Katholiken, Unierte, Orthodoxe, Angehörige der Pfingstkirchen, Quäker) und verschiedener Religionen untereinander und mit Agnostikern und Atheisten ins Gespräch.

Doch unabhängig von diesen Horizonterweiterungen ist mir wichtig, dass immer wieder der menschliche Kontakt in besonderer Weise ertragreich ist. Wenn am Ende einer Seminarwoche ein atheistischer Offizier feststellt, dass er jetzt sehe, dass Theologen eine Daseinsberechtigung hätten und das Gespräch mit ihnen sinnvoll sein könne, und wenn Theologiestudierende konkrete sympathische Menschen (statt „Soldaten") sehen, deren weiteres Ergehen ihnen künftig am Herzen liegen wird, dann hat sich, unabhängig von allen fachlichen Erträgen, die Arbeit gelohnt.

Seminarbericht zum Seminar „Versöhnung“ der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr

Maj Leonhard Fritz / Maj Felix Hinz

Allgemeines

An der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg beginnt jeden Herbst ein zweijähriger Lehrgang – der sogenannte „Lehrgang General- / Admiralstabsdienst National“ („LGAN“) – in dem Offiziere in Seminaren, Reisen und Übungen auf eine höhere Laufbahn vorbereitet werden. Die Bundeswehr legt Wert darauf, dass die Lehrgangsteilnehmer dabei nicht nur in militärischen und politischen Themen, sondern auch in aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Debatten weitergebildet werden. Ein solches zweiwöchiges Seminar zum Thema „Versöhnung“ fand im Februar 2020 unter der Leitung von Prof. Dr. Volker Stümke statt. Hierbei hat sich die zwanzig Personen umfassende Gruppe auch an dem einwöchigen Weiterbildungsseminar „Conflict and Peace“ in Jerusalem vom 24. bis 28. Februar 2020 beteiligen dürfen.

„Inputphase“ vom 17. bis 21. Februar in Hamburg

Die Inputphase in der Hansestadt wurde im Rahmen von kompetenzorientierter Erwachsenenbildung, das heißt in Form von Kurzpräsentationen und moderierten Diskussionen, durch die Seminarteilnehmer durchgeführt. Grundsätzliches Ziel war die Analyse des Begriffes Versöhnung sowie eine kritische Untersuchung aller Facetten der Versöhnung vor dem Hintergrund von Gesellschaft, Politik, Religion und Militär mittels Fallbeispielen.

Am Anfang stand die thematische Annäherung an das Thema Versöhnung über die theologische, ethische und politische Perspektive.

- Die theoretische Einbettung durch den Theologen J. Denny Weaver umfasste im Wesentlichen die Verortung, Herleitung und Diskussion der Begriffe Erlösung, Sühne und Verzeihung.[1] Viel diskutiert wurde zum Beispiel die theologische Rede von der Versöhnung, die drei Verstehensmodelle mit den unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten der politischen Befreiung, der rechtlichen Aufarbeitung und der persönlichen Milde bietet. Dies warf im Seminar die Frage auf, ob diese Modelle auch von der Beziehung zwischen Gott und Mensch in die gegenwärtige politische Praxis übertragen werden und dann Hinweise für den Wideraufbau nach einem Krieg in Postkonfliktgesellschaften geben können.
- Aus der ethischen Sichtweise wurde die Konzeption von Schuld mit ihrer inneren und äußeren Dimension nach Karl Jaspers analysiert.[2] Für viel Gesprächsbedarf sorgte vor allem die Unterscheidung zwischen krimineller, politischer, moralischer und metaphysischer Schuld. Diese Kategorien waren nicht nur für die Aufarbeitung der Kriegsverbrechen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland nach 1945 hilfreich, sondern zeigten auch, welche Bereiche die Aspekte von Schuld und Vergebung oder Versöhnung umfassen können bzw. wo die Trennlinien und Überschneidungen liegen – wobei insgesamt der Aspekt der metaphysischen Schuld im Seminar nur bedingt überzeugte.
- Weiterhin wurde das Konzept des Prozesses der Versöhnung auf zwei Ebenen analysiert. Die praktische Versöhnungsarbeit wurde im Anschluss an Stephanie van de Loo – mit Schwerpunktaspekten wie Umgang mit Verletzungen, Empathie oder Übernahme von Verantwortung – diskutiert.[3] Als besonders spannend wurde der Ansatz der grundlegenden Unterscheidung zwischen dem persönlichen und dem sozialen Paradigma gesehen, der als wechselseitiger Prozess beschrieben werden und sich höchst unterschiedlich entwickeln kann, so dass nicht feststeht, ob und wie Versöhnung gelingt. Der politische Ansatz von Ralf K. Wüstenberg hat demgegenüber die Optionen „von oben" aufgelistet und gewichtet. Dazu zählen für ihn vor allem juristische Mittel, Amnestieregelung, Wahrheitsfindung, Entschädigung sowie Elitenwechsel.[4] Auch Wüstenberg betont, dass

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1 Weaver, J. D. (2016), *Gewaltfreie Erlösung. Kreuzestheologie im Ringen mit der Satisfaktionstheorie*, Berlin: LIT.

2 Jaspers, K. (2019), *Die Schuldfrage. Von der politischen Haftung Deutschlands*, 3. Aufl., München: Piper.

3 van de Loo, S. (2009), *Versöhnungsarbeit. Kriterien – theologischer Rahmen – Praxisperspektiven*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

4 Wüstenberg, R. K. (2010), *Gibt es eine Politik der Versöhnung? Theologische Anmerkungen zu den Aufarbeitungsanstrengungen in Südafrika und Deutschland*, In: Bongardt, M. / Wüstenberg, R. K. (ed.), *Versöhnung, Strafe und Gerechtigkeit: Das schwere Erbe von Unrechts-Staaten*, Göttingen: Edition Ruprecht, 79–98.

es keinen „Königsweg“ im Prozess der Versöhnung gebe, sondern dass unterschiedliche Optionen geprüft werden können und sollten.

Ausgestattet mit diesem methodischen Rüstzeug, folgten die Erörterung, Auseinandersetzung und Diskussion anhand verschiedener Fallstudien. Hierbei standen einerseits der deutsch-deutsche sowie deutsch-polnische Versöhnungsprozess, andererseits der südafrikanische und ruandische Versöhnungsprozess mit den Besonderheiten der Wahrheitskommission und der Gacaca-Gerichte im Vordergrund. Zum Abschluss der Blockwoche erfolgte eine umfassende Aufarbeitung des Reiseziels Israels und die Analyse der inneren und äußeren Konfliktdimensionen, die dort herrschen, sowie die Erstellung und Abstimmung eines eigens aufbereiteten Bundeswehrfallbeispiels zur Vorstellung der anderen Seminarteilnehmer von „Conflict and Peace“ für die anstehende Seminarreise in der Folgewoche.

Bereits in dieser vorbereitenden Woche konnten einige Highlights gesetzt werden. Insbesondere die deutschen Offiziere konnten von den Eindrücken ihres teilnehmenden polnischen Kameraden an der thematischen Aufarbeitung des Fallbeispiels der deutsch-polnischen Versöhnung profitieren. Als Beispiel wurde der Kniefall Willy Brands in Warschau 1970 am Ehrenmal des Ghettos diskutiert: Dieser zeigte eindrucksvoll den Effekt eines Symbols – das sowohl als Demutsbekundung als auch als Bitte um Vergebung gedeutet werden kann – auf politischer Ebene sowie die Funktion zur Einleitung eines gesamtgesellschaftlichen Versöhnungsprozesses.

Ganz besonders hervorzuheben ist, dass für die Thematik „Ruanda und Gerechtigkeit“ der Gast Dr. Pascal Bataringaya gewonnen werden konnte. Dieser ist Projektleiter der Dietrich Bonhoeffer Friedensarbeit und Bischof der Presbyterianischen Kirche in Ruanda. Er konnte von persönlichen, tiefgreifenden Eindrücken zur nationalen Versöhnung berichten und plakative Erfahrungswerte zum Ablauf und der Eigenart von Gacaca-Gerichten liefern. Zu den bereits erfahrenen theologischen Dimensionen von Versöhnung, war insbesondere die Darstellung des spirituellen Konzepts *Ubuntu* aufschlussreich, einer Lebensphilosophie, welche eine Grundhaltung bezeichnet, die sich vor allem auf wechselseitigen Respekt und Anerkennung, Achtung der Menschenwürde und das Bestreben nach einer harmonischen und friedlichen Gesellschaft stützt. Gerade vor dem militärischen Erfahrungshorizont der Seminarteilnehmer, waren diese persönlichen Eindrücke von der Art und Weise der Versöhnung in Ruanda und dem gesellschaftlichen Zusammenleben nach einem so verheerenden Genozid hoch spannend und sehr bewegend. Beeindruckend war vor allem die Frage: Woher nehmen Teile der ruandischen Bevölkerung die Kraft, mit Blick auf die erlebten Verbrechen, tatsächlich vergeben zu können? So berichtete Dr. Bataringaya von einem Projekt bei dem ruandische Mütter den Mördern ihrer Kinder bzw. Familien begegneten, gemeinsam Zeit mit diesen verbrachten und sich letztlich versöhnen konnten. Dieser Versöhnungsprozess wurde von den Lehrgangsteilnehmern bewundert,

da einigen Teilnehmern schlichtweg die Vorstellungskraft fehlte, jemals den Mördern der eigenen Familie verzeihen, geschweige denn vergeben zu können.

Seminarreise vom 24. bis 28. Februar nach Jerusalem

Die Seminarreise nach Jerusalem bestand aus den Hauptteilen Anreise, Vorstellung und Diskussion der jeweiligen Fallstudien, Vorträgen durch Key-Note-Speaker mit anschließender Diskussion, Besuchen von ausgesuchten kulturellen Stätten sowie der Rückreise ins Heimatland.

Die Anreise erfolgte für die Teilnehmer der Bundeswehr am 24.02.20 von Hamburg, via München nach Tel-Aviv per Flugzeug und anschließend mit öffentlichem Nahverkehr nach Jerusalem. Nachdem in der Ben Jehuda Street kurzum das Lager bezogen wurde, fand am Abend in der Tagungsstätte in der Erlöserkirche eine Einweisung in die folgenden Seminartage sowie eine Vorstellung der anderen Delegationen – die theologische Fakultät der Universität Jena unter Leitung von Prof. Dr. Corinna Dahlgrün, der School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science der University of Leeds unter Leitung von Prof. Dr. Rachel Muers sowie die Universität Bonn vertreten durch Prof. Dr. Hermut Löhr – statt.

Am Dienstag stand das Fallbeispiel der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr im Mittelpunkt. Thema war ein Interview der ehemaligen Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen zu einem von ihr beschriebenen Haltungsproblem bzw. Führungsschwäche innerhalb der Bundeswehr sowie die damit verbundenen disziplinaren oder strafrechtlichen Ermittlungen in verschiedenen Fällen. Insbesondere die Thematiken von Schuld, Vergebung und Versöhnung innerhalb der Organisation, aber auch im Kontext von Militär und der politischen Führung standen im Fokus der Diskussionen.

In Gesprächen mit den zivilen Seminarteilnehmern stellte sich heraus, dass das Modell Jaspers sich als sehr hilfreich erwies eine Differenzierung zwischen politischer, krimineller und moralischer Schuld bzw. Verantwortung zu treffen. Als wichtige Erkenntnis trat vor allem zum Vorschein, wie hoch in einer militärischen Organisation die Bedeutung des wechselseitigen Vertrauens in die übergeordnete Führung (politisch und militärisch) zur Truppe eingeordnet wird und wie empfindlich das Gefüge auf als ungerecht empfundene Generalisierung reagiert.

Weiterhin gab es am Abend einen Vortag der Keynote Speaker Prof. Dr. Sami Adwan und Dr. Michael Sternberg zum spannenden Thema Peace Education und „Muslim-Jewish reconciliation work“. Diese Veranstaltung mit anschließender reger Diskussion stellte den ersten direkten Einblick in das Thema Versöhnung aus israelischer Sicht dar und war vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der gleichzeitigen Vertretung sowohl der muslimischen als auch der jüdischen Perspektive absolut gewinnbringend für alle Seminarteilnehmer.

Am Mittwoch fand sich zunächst das Fallbeispiel der Universität Jena auf dem Programm wieder. Thematisch wurde das Trappisten-Kloster Notre-Dame de l'Atlas in Tibhirine während des algerischen Bürgerkriegs (1991–1999) vorgestellt. Im Kern wurde das Verhältnis der christlichen Mönche zu ihrer Umwelt und die 1996 erfolgte Tötung von sieben Mönchen durch Rebellen betrachtet und nach ethischen sowie religiösen Kategorien diskutiert. Im weiteren Tagesverlauf trug der Keynote Speaker Dr. Gabriel Strenger zum Thema ultra-orthodoxes Judentum sowie politischen Dimensionen der Konfliktlösung vor. Gefolgt wurde dieses Highlight von einem geführten Besuch der Lerngruppe in der Knesset.

Der Donnerstag begann mit dem Fallbeispiel der Universität Leeds, das den Versöhnungsprozess unterstützende Maßnahmen in Afrika durch die Quäker umfasste. Im Fokus standen Interviews mit Betroffenen des Völkermords in Ruanda und deren Perspektive auf Versöhnung. Da die Gruppe der Führungsakademie noch die Ausführungen von Dr. Bataringaya aus der Vorwoche vor Augen hatte, waren insbesondere die Perspektive der Friedenskirche von Rachel Muers auf diese Thematik spannend: Zu beobachten war, dass ihre Sicht auf die Versöhnung in Ruanda sich deutlich mehr um den Begriff Verzeihen drehte, während Dr. Bataringaya auf Sühne und die Funktion der Gacaca-Gerichte abhob.

Im Anschluss an die Diskussion der sehr persönlichen und bewegenden Einzelschicksale und deren höchst individuelle Perspektive auf Versöhnung, wurde Zeit eingeräumt Sehenswürdigkeiten und kulturelle Stätten in der Altstadt Jerusalems auf eigene Faust zu erkunden. Den Abend gestaltete der Keynote Speaker Dr. Salim Munayer zum Thema „Musalaha“, also die Versöhnung zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern.

Am letzten Tag besuchte die Reisegruppe der Führungsakademie das Mahnmal und Museum Yad Vashem inklusive geführter Tour. Im Anschluss an diesen sehr bewegenden Besuch erfolgte am Nachmittag die Abreise von Tel-Aviv zurück nach Deutschland.

Bewertung und Eindrücke aus Sicht der teilnehmenden Soldaten

Grundsätzlich muss hervorgehoben werden, dass für die Seminarteilnehmer der Bundeswehr die eingangs geschilderte Einarbeitungswoche in das facettenreiche Thema Versöhnung – vor allem aus ethischer und theologischer Sicht – absolut gewinnbringend und zielführend war. Gerade die Erschließung von für Soldaten nicht alltäglichen oder neuen Perspektiven sowie Denkansätzen im Vorfeld, ermöglichte eine Diskussion auf Augenhöhe mit den in Israel anwesenden Theologiestudenten und Theologen, für die diese Thematik das „täglich Brot“ darstellt. Zudem trugen die sehr guten und fruchtbaren Diskussionen im Vorfeld dazu bei, die eigenen Erfahrungshorizonte aus dem Berufsleben oder gemachte Einsatzerfahrungen in Krisenregionen

dieser Welt zu sortieren und somit den zivilen Teilnehmern des Seminars in der zweiten Woche besser zu vermitteln.

Die Fallbeispiele der anderen Universitäten wurden durchweg als äußerst interessant und gewinnbringend empfunden. Beispielsweise das im Kontext der Trappisten-Mönche intensiv diskutierte Konzept der vorbehaltlosen „Feindesliebe" oder die Erörterung der Frage, ob Religion tendenziell Versöhnung ermöglicht oder den Konflikt verschärft. Es ist hervorzuheben, dass die Fälle spannende Denkanstöße gaben – beispielsweise inwiefern Versöhnung zwischen Gesellschaften mit höchst unterschiedlicher kultureller und spiritueller Ausprägung gelingen kann oder dieser Prozess ausschließlich politisch initiiert oder inter-personell gedeihen kann – und andere Argumentationslinien zu Tage förderten.

Die authentischen Gastvorträge samt spannender, teilweiser kontroverser Diskussionen in Verbindung mit dem hautnahen Erleben der Stadt Jerusalem, führten insgesamt dazu, dass während der Zeit in Jerusalem Konfliktforschung „zum Anfassen" geboten wurde. Gerade die lokalen Experten konnten mit spannenden Innenansichten zum israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt aufwarten. Aufgrund der Heterogenität der Referenten konnte nochmal eindrücklich die Komplexität der Problemstellung, die Historizität und Verschränkung bzw. Blockade verschiedener Grundhaltungen sowie teilweise hoffnungsvolle Ansätze der Versöhnung, aber auch ernüchternde Realitäten illustriert werden.

Nach einhelliger Meinung der Offiziere, war insbesondere der persönliche Austausch mit den theologischen Fakultäten – auch über die „Pflichtanteile" hinaus – neben den eindrücklichen Erfahrungen durch Besuche und Gastredner, erhellend und gewinnbringend. Gerade die Kommunikation zwischen Theologen und Soldaten und den damit verbundenen Erfahrungswelten, förderten wechselseitig eine spannende Debatte und die Reflexion zu eigenen Denkansätzen. Am Ende wurde vor allem klar, dass trotz zahlreicher Unterschiede doch viele Anknüpfungspunkte bestehen und sich alle Beteiligten qua Beruf äußerst intensiv mit ethischen Grundfragen beschäftigen. Gerade die Diskussionen zu Themen wie Verantwortung, Schuld, Vergebung, Tod und Verwundung oder das Gute beschäftigen die Seminarteilnehmer und der Dialog hielt für alle einen klaren Mehrwert bereit.

Fazit

Insgesamt bleibt festzuhalten, dass es sich bei dem Seminar „Versöhnung" um ein sehr zielführendes, äußerst interessantes und absolut hochwertiges Seminar gehandelt hat. Die Seminarteilnehmer der Bundeswehr haben tiefe, wissenschaftlich fundierte Eindrücke mitgenommen und insbesondere der Austausch und die Gespräche, vor allem auch in Kleingruppen und am Abend, mit den Theologen vor Ort haben zu einer Horizonterweiterung beigetragen und ein

absolut einmaliges Erlebnis dargestellt. Für alle Offiziere waren die zwei Wochen ein prägendes und eindrückliches Highlight und die Hoffnung besteht, dass für nachfolgende Lehrgänge diese Reise erneut durchgeführt wird.

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Overcoming Evil with Good: A Theological Perspective

Phillip Tolliday

Introduction

Our attempts to overcome evil with good are not made without considerable difficulty. While it is manifestly true that we have in the past and continue in the present to make great strides against evil on both the macro and micro levels, it is also true that even our best efforts are hampered by unforeseen and unintended consequences that tend to blunt our attempts to attain the good. Faced with this state of affairs, we may claim that this is due to the complexity of many of the situations with which we have to deal. This is almost certainly true. Where it is not possible to see the end from the beginning—and that is so often the case—it is not surprising that our best intentions will carry unintended consequences, some of which may be very unfortunate consequences.

But is it simply a matter of complexity? In what follows I will suggest that an approach based in Christian theological anthropology can offer a suggestion as to why the attempt to overcome evil with good is a task that is fraught with perennial difficulty. In order to make this case I will turn to the ideas of sin and in particular what some may regard as the rather quaint and perhaps old-fashioned idea of original sin. I intend to claim that Christian theology has employed these concepts of sin and original sin in order to point to the paradoxical nature of humanity. I shall argue that their import is that there is no *unalloyed* good in the world. In other words, for all the good in the world, and for all the hope that evil will be overcome by good; there will nevertheless be the trace of evil that continually haunts the good throughout history. This does not mean that there cannot be an eschatological resolution in which evil is finally overcome by good, but it does mean that in our proximate historical circumstances we will always be vacillating between the good, the less good and sometimes the really bad. It seems to me that this is the lesson that has

filtered through the various case studies that have sought to illuminate the trajectory of overcoming evil with good.

The Human Being in Theological Perspective

Gerhard Ebeling remarked that it was only the human being who was capable of acting in a way that is inhuman (Macquarrie 1982, 2). This suggests that 'being human' is not simply a descriptive term in the way that being a cat is being feline; it is also an evaluative term. The ethicist Paul Lehman (1963) used to speak about 'making and keeping human life human' (1963, 85). Reflecting on Lehman's observation, theologian John Macquarrie wrote:

> "On the first occasion of its use, the word 'human' is descriptive: 'human life' is the life of all those who are biologically classifiable as human beings, as belonging to the species *Homo sapiens*. But on the second occasion of its use, the word 'human' has taken on an evaluating sense; it now means something like 'truly human,' or 'authentically human,' or 'fully human.' Moreover, the use of the verbs 'making' and 'keeping' would seem to suggest that 'human life' (in the descriptive sense) is a variable or perhaps unfinished project which may or may not become 'human' (in the sense of 'truly human') and therefore must be *made* so, or, if it has already become 'truly human,' then it is in danger of becoming something else, and therefore must be *kept* so." (Macquarrie, 1982, 1–2)

Perhaps 'being' is too static a term to describe accurately what we mean when we refer to a person. If it were not so stylistically clumsy and awkward, we might instead speak of a human *becoming*.

The notion that we as human beings evaluate who and how we are in the world has long been noticed. Saint Augustine in his *Confessions* makes reference to his awareness that 'I had become a problem to myself.' And a theologian from the first half of the twentieth-century, Reinhold Niebuhr (1941) pointed out, in similar vein that we were 'our most vexing problem' (1941, 1). He went on to observe that every affirmation we make about our stature, virtue or place in the cosmos becomes involved in contradictions when fully analysed.

> "If we insist that we are children of nature and that we ought not to pretend to be more than the animal we obviously are, we tacitly admit that we are, at any rate, a curious kind of animal who has both the inclination and the capacity to make such pretensions. If on the other hand we insist on our unique and distinctive place in nature and point to our rational faculties as proof of our special eminence, there is usually an anxious note in our

> avowels of uniqueness which betrays our unconscious sense of kinship with the brutes … If we take our uniqueness for granted, we are immediately involved in questions and contradictions on the problems of our virtue. If we believe ourselves to be essentially good and attribute the admitted evils of human history to specific social and historical causes, we involve ourselves in begging the question; for all these specific historical causes of evil are revealed, upon close analysis, to be no more than particular consequences and historical configurations of evil tendencies in ourselves. They cannot be understood at all if a capacity for, and inclination toward, evil in humans themselves is not presupposed. If, on the other hand, we come to pessimistic conclusions about ourselves, our capacity for such judgements would seem to negate the content of the judgements. How can we be 'essentially' evil if we know ourselves to be so? What is the character of the ultimate subject, the quintessential "I", which passes such devastating judgements upon itself as object?" (Niebuhr 1941, 1–2).

These words, penned almost eighty years ago, remain just as arresting today as when they were first written. Clearly the human is enmeshed in nature and history, but it is equally apparent upon reflection, that the human is also in some sense able to transcend nature and history; at least insofar as one has the capacity to reflect upon oneself. We are indeed a curious, indeed, a paradoxical phenomenon to ourselves.

In Protestantism theological anthropology traditionally dealt with two themes: the human being as *imago Dei* on the one hand, and the human being as sinful on the other. So, a primary task of a theological anthropology was to consider the destiny of humanity, and a second task was to discuss the accompanying reality of that destiny's seeming frustration. However, by the early twentieth century, theological anthropology had been expanded by its engagement with many of the social sciences. We see this for example in the some of the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg where he looks at both the natural sciences and also at history. A complementary approach is via phenomenology and existential philosophy, and is taken by John Macquarrie, to which I now turn.

In his book *In Search of Humanity: A Theological & Philosophical Approach*, Macquarrie outlines many of the qualities that constitute our humanity. Some of them are obvious: they include such dimensions as language, sociality, freedom, embodiedness, suffering and death. Others, however, are perhaps not so obvious and might not have figured in an initial list if we had had to construct it. These include such aspects as: having, transcendence, egoity, alienation and hope. Each of these would form a fruitful basis for discussion and it is both a reflection on and demonstration of the paradoxical nature of humanity to which I have earlier referred that each dimension that Macquarrie discusses also contains within itself its opposite. We may observe this in his discussion of the nature of freedom.

Freedom

Macquarrie poses the question of whether human freedom is a 'something' or a 'nothing.' We might think that, of course, freedom must be *something*. Yet, 'freedom is the absence of constraints, it is an open space, not yet filled up, it is an empty horizon where nothing blocks the way' (Macquarrie 1982, 10–11). Stated in this way, it seems that freedom has, or perhaps is, a negative quality. Paradoxically, we come to know freedom only through our exercise of freedom, that is to say, by doing things. It is at such times, writes Macquarrie that

> "… we bring out of the abyss of freedom some definite act or policy or idea or intention. The fluid, abyssal, plastic nothingness that was freedom is given a definite shape, and something new enters the world and the stream of happening. Then the moment of freedom is past, and what it has produced becomes part of history and cannot be revoked" (Macquarrie 1982, 13).

Freedom, understood in this way, might be described as metaphysical freedom. It is something deeper than and at the same time the basis for that choice between alternatives that we call the 'freedom of the will.'

Macquarrie's language of the 'abyssal' suggests that in a way analogous to the process by which God is said to have created the world out of the chaos of nothingness, so too, the human person exercises his or her freedom out of a correlative nothingness of indeterminate potentialities. 'Out of the nothing that is not yet determined, they bring forth something to which they have given a definite shape. In doing this, they are experiencing creativity' (Macquarrie 1982, 14). So, humanity, creativity and the freedom that engenders it now seem to be positive things. The human being has a share in creating a human essence or nature. We are not an unfinished product but *in via*. Not only do we create and shape ourselves; we also shape our world. But freedom has a bedfellow, so to speak, and its name is anxiety. One thinker who gave voice to this was Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard made a connection between freedom and anxiety when he wrote:

> "This anxiety may be likened to dizziness. He whose eye chances to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy … Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, when freedom gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself" (Kierkegaard 1957, 55).

Human existence is hedged around by limits and these limits crimp our freedom on every side. The dialectic between freedom and the limits or boundaries by which human actions are circumscribed, sets up within us an overwhelming sense of responsibility—so great that it prompted Sartre to speak of the human as the one who is 'condemned to be free' (Sartre 1956, 129).

Whenever—as happens from time to time—we apprehend existentially a little of what Kierkegaard and Sartre have to say about freedom, we may be inclined to think that freedom is a good that is better placed in hands other than our own. Nowhere have I found this sentiment better expressed than by Jacques Ellul.

> "Whenever we have made a beginning of liberty, we have taken fright, retreated, renounced our freedom and sighed with relief at being able to put our destiny finally in the hands of someone else … In our vanity and boasting, we pretend that we want to be free. Once a little freedom is offered us, however, we start back at the sight of the void which we must now fill, the meaning we must now provide and the responsibility we must now carry." (Ellul 1976, 91).

It is a sad but sober truth, most recently reinforced by the recent high levels of compliance with Government advice across most of the world to go into 'lockdown' in response to the virus Covid-19, that people prefer security more than they prefer freedom. It is most likely to be the poets who hew against the seductive siren calls of security and its accompanying mediocrity. The Russian writer Nicholas Berdyaev noted regretfully that 'people love slavery and authority,' and that 'the mass of humankind has no love of freedom, and is afraid of it' (Berdyaev 1952, 216).

Reflecting further upon freedom, Macquarrie concludes that it is a 'strange contradiction' though he might just have readily referred to it as paradoxical.

> "It [freedom] begins as a nothing which becomes very real and precious. It is earnestly desired and yet at the same time people shrink from it and avoid it. It is creative and life-enhancing, but it can equally well be disruptive and even destructive. It brings to those who exercise it a feeling of enlargement and exhilaration, and yet, if they pause to think for a moment and gaze into the depth of freedom, they experience anxiety. These are tensions that cannot be removed. They belong to the very essence of our human condition, as finite beings thrown into a factical existence where much has already been determined." (Macquarrie 1982, 21).

These considerations may give us pause to wonder whether freedom is the unalloyed pleasure that we have imagined it to be. Certainly, freedom cannot be dissociated from risk. The invitation to freedom is simultaneously a summons for us to embark upon a journey that is fraught with danger and anxiety, which may explain why so many people prefer security. We 'unconsciously yearn for a return to the untroubled irresponsibility of the womb' (Macquarrie 1982, 22). This yearning for a return to an Edenic beginning, which is a paradise of sorts, encourages us to

turn our attention to another paradise—this time, in a mythical Garden, and the events alleged to have unfolded within it.

Once Upon a Time

Turning our attention to the story of the Garden of Eden permits us to focus on what Christian theology refers to as the 'Fall.' It evokes the associated ideas of sin and, in particular, the well-known if rather notorious idea of original sin. Like all good stories this one begins with its 'Once upon a time …'. In this case, 'once upon a time' there was a perfect garden in paradise and two perfectly innocent human beings, but something went tragically wrong with this ideal picture, and through temptation and human disobedience—or the misuse of freedom—sin entered the world. Humans were expelled from the Garden of paradise and instead of enjoying a life of Edenic leisure, hard labour and mortality became their lot.

The fate of human beings is for us to be no longer able to dwell in the Garden of Eden, nor to be able to return to it, but instead to aspire to the Heavenly City as it is outlined in the Book of Revelation. However, the voyage to this City is fraught with many and great perils, not the least of which are freedom and responsibility. Moreover, humans are incapable of making this journey by themselves, for the events in the Garden have somehow transmitted themselves down through the generations, so that there can be no escape from the consequences of that primal disobedience: or at least no escape due to our own causal efficacy. Indeed, this becomes the reason for the Incarnation, the purpose of redemption; or so the story goes.

The events in the Garden mark the moments 'before' and 'after' in the theological tale of human nature; 'before' it was possible for humans not to have sinned, but 'after' it was not possible for humans not to sin. Theologians claimed that all humans were enmeshed in this sin from which it was impossible for them to extricate themselves by their own efforts. It must be frankly admitted that this is not a particularly cheery picture of the human situation and it is therefore not surprising that we have sought to distance ourselves from it. In her study of the doctrine of original sin, Tatha Wiley noted that:

> "… modern persons that we are, this talk about what Adam and Eve did, a time before the fall and after, and a sin transmitted from the first of our kind down to each of us today elicits a feeling of disconnect between the world known through the natural sciences, history, and other modern disciplines and the world known through religious doctrines. The plethora of questions raised about the doctrine—exegetical, historical, philosophical, theological—signals the rough fit the traditional doctrine has in the modern world. We no longer *can* take the doctrine for granted in the same way as our predecessors did.

> That its meaning is opaque and not transparent, as it was for Christians of earlier ages, points to a vastly changed social and intellectual context." (Wiley 2002, 1, emphasis in the original).

However, all of these considerations point also to the possibility of a hermeneutical reconstruction of the doctrine—or so I shall argue. I realise that in making this argument I am, as it were, rowing against a strong tide of contemporary theological opinion. Nevertheless, I think it is important to see whether the doctrine of sin—shorn of some of its unhelpful accretions—may not yet commend itself to our contemporary experience, and in particular, help to explain why the task to 'overcome evil with good' throws us the sort of curve balls that have been illustrated by many of the cases studies in this volume.

An Attempt to Reconstruct an Ancient Idea

Since the time of the Enlightenment, it has become customary for humans to see ourselves as self-possessing, self-disposing subjects. As we began to branch out into manifold fields of endeavour; discoveries in geography, the physical sciences and medicine, just to name a few, it seemed that we were being carried by an untrammelled wave of progress, not to mention success. Many of the things that humans willed—in shaping society and culture, for example—came to pass. Hence the idea that we could be empowered—or indeed empower ourselves—to achieve beyond our wildest dreams became part of our psychological furniture, so to speak. In and for such a world—made in no small part by ourselves—we were responsible. Thus, we were responsible for the good things but also for the things that were not so good. How do responsibility and one's capacity to will and effect the good fare in the contemporary world?

> "In society and in everyday life many at the end of the twentieth century and in the first decade of the twenty-first have felt *vulnerable and disempowered any longer to control the forces that minister to their welfare or to bring about their downfall*. People experience frustration and resentment at their own inability to pit their strength against forces beyond their control. Anger then leads to a *culture of blame*, which in turn generates a proliferation of *litigation*. Yet the constant cry for 'compensation' in the face of what thirty years ago we should have called 'just life' presupposes a cultural perception—real or imagined—of wrongdoing or wrongbeing on the part of other persons or of corporate institutions. Doctors, teachers and local authorities, are more at risk of being accused at law than ever before. More often however, people rage against an anonymous 'them';

> 'they' have set up a state of affairs in which the vulnerable perceive themselves as disadvantaged victims." (Thiselton 2007, 193–4. Emphasis in the original).

The notion that for every action there is an identifiable agent who can be held responsible, is an idea that dies slowly. And yet reflections on the nature of power throughout the twentieth century—from Niebuhr to Foucault—have indicated that as humans we often find ourselves in thrall to powers that are beyond our ability to identify readily or to control. The society in which each of us lives is at once the basis for, and the nemesis of that fullness of life which each one of us seeks. Moreover, we often find ourselves colluding—unwillingly, perhaps—with some of the forces or powers that our 'better self' would criticise in our better moments. Doubtless we could bring to mind our own examples. In any event we would, I suspect, accept that the world in which we live is not a simple contrast of black and white, but instead, upon closer scrutiny, a world of interminable shades of grey.

It is, I think, a reasonable surmise and a measure of where we stand in history, that if the last two paragraphs have struck a resonating chord with the reader, it will be in part because I have not used the word 'sin' to describe the situation. By the time of the mid-twentieth century, if not earlier, the word 'sin' had become trivialised. It was for this reason that when Paul Tillich was writing his systematic theology in which he sought to correlate the Christian message with the secular situation, that he preferred instead to use the word 'estrangement' when talking about sin. Some decades later John Macquarrie used the word 'alienation.' However, in both cases the theologians in question moved away from the word 'sin' because they detected a trivialisation of its meaning in the popular mind, and also because they wished to illuminate something more basic than an action. They hoped they might communicate that sin was not simply an action but more fundamentally, a *state* or a *condition* in which we found ourselves immersed.

When contemporary people speak of sin—which they do but rarely—they are thinking in terms of individual acts. Either the language of sin is trivialised, as in the old-fashioned phrase 'living in sin', or it is reserved for purely religious, i. e., liturgical settings, where its meaning is often very far from being clear. If modern people think about sin at all, it is probably with distaste for what they see as an outdated Victorian morality. And in this judgement, they would not be wholly wrong.

The loss of meaning that the word 'sin' has suffered in the modern consciousness does not, of course, mean that our contemporaries are no longer aware of the reality of evil. On the contrary—we are only too aware! But the reality of evil and the blame for it is typically put on others; on more or less specific others, as I noted above in the observation made by Anthony Thiselton. Preferably we put the blame on anonymous structures and pressures in the social system. But this mentality that localises evil in others or in groups—and is called by Girard, 'scapegoating'—easily leads to violent upheavals. Of course, it is true that evil is to be found in these other people

and external structures, and yet Christian theology would say that this truth is a superficial truth. A point of distinction from a Christian theological perspective is that it finds the root of evil in the human individual, and indeed in each individual as such, not in someone else.

No other theme in Christian anthropology has been so obscured for us today than that of sin and our approach to it. In an incisive essay Wolfhart Pannenberg remarks that 'the decay of the doctrine of original sin led to the anchoring of the concept of sin in acts of sin, and finally the concept was reduced to the individual act' (Pannenberg 1994, 234). This, he argues, has led to a moralising of sin, which is evident in our propensity to scapegoat others.

> "The universality of sin forbids the moralism that will not accept solidarity with those who become the instruments of the destructive power of evil. Sin's universality shows such a moralistic attitude to be hypocrisy. The Christian doctrine of the universality of sin has the specific function of helping to preserve solidarity with evildoers in whose conduct the sin that is latently at work in all of us finds expression. This anti-moralistic function of the doctrine has often been underrated." (Pannenberg 1994, 238).

If there is no solidarity in sin (or alienation or estrangement, if those terms are preferred) then there is no possibility of solidarity in redemption: that has been the classical Christian position. Here it must be kept in mind that Christian theology does not create the fact of sin but presupposes it.

Shorn of its Augustinian worldview and its preoccupation with sexuality, what is the essence of original sin? It is the claim that what Luther called the 'bondage of the will' and what we have already referred to under the name of a 'metaphysical freedom,' which leaves intact the power to choose, that is, the formal act of self-transcendence, but reduces its range, points to a motivational structure that precedes and underlies individual decisions and actions. It is this structure that Christian theology identifies as original sin.

The first point to note about this structure is that human beings do not first become sinners (or alienated or estranged) through their own actions and by imitating the actions of others; they are already estranged (or sinners) before any action of theirs. The second point is closely connected to the first and it is this: it has to do with the radical nature of sin. Sin is located at a deeper level than the individual act, deeper than any transgression. And the third point is the universality of sin, which theology sees as a presupposition for the universality of redemption. Thus interpreted, the concept of original sin is not about actions but rather more like a tragic state of being in which we all share. But if the concept of original sin is somewhat akin to 'white noise' against which all our actions are framed, can we say anything about its nature? One thinker who may assist our thoughts here is Kierkegaard, who outlined an analysis of the paradoxical duality of human existence.

Asking the question 'what makes sin possible?' Kierkegaard regarded the Genesis story of the Fall as describing an event or development in the life of *every* human being. In *The Concept of Anxiety* he traced the trajectory from innocence to sin. This was, he said, the passage from an 'unbroken wholeness of a merely given existence to the felt tension between a given state and an unrealized possibility' (Kierkegaard 1957, 38). At the beginning, the state of innocence there is 'peace and repose—but not quite. There is a stirring, a malaise, a sense of instability' (Kierkegaard 1957, 19). We might perhaps call this 'alienation.' It is that sense of 'anxiety attendant on being launched out of the given into the insecurity of freedom' (Macquarrie 1982, 114).

This anxiety is not yet sin, but it is the pre-condition for its possibility. Paul Ricoeur speaks of the fallible human being as the one who is 'fragile and liable to err.' But he also notes that

> "… but to be fragile is not yet to break: the impetus plunging us into moral evil is not generated by the structures of our humanity *per se* – and thus cannot be blamed upon them. Finitude is not to be identified with guilt" (Ricoeur 1986, 133).

According to Ricoeur, humans are characterised by a fault at the very core of their being. Nevertheless, this fault is not like a moral failing; instead, it is more akin to a geological fault, that is to say, 'a discontinuity, a break in the wholeness, the presence of otherness in identity' (Macquarrie 1982, 114). The emphasis falls not upon agency and action, but rather upon nature and being. It is, as Farley observes 'the tragic character of our condition that is the primary motivating background of sin's origin' (Farley 1990, 121).

It was Sartre who wrote that 'man is a useless passion.' I disagree, but I would readily endorse the proposition that the human being is a tortured or tormented passion. Reflecting upon what he calls the 'elemental passions' Edward Farley notes their paradoxical nature. They are our deepest motivating inclinations and yet they cannot be fulfilled.

> "They must ever remain hungry and thirsty. Yet they are not empty wishes, idle fancies. They do obtain realizations of sorts in everyday life, but realizations are always disproportionate to the passions themselves. … a gulf yawns between the elementary passions and their references. However much they find fulfillment, the flame of desire still burns. Something about these provisional realizations disqualifies them as the real and final referent of the passions. The agent passionately yearns for whatever would secure and guarantee its own existence and meaning" (Farley 1990, 111).

And so it is that we arrive at idolatry, which is not, as some may imagine, a primitive predilection for the worshipping of stones and rocks, but a dogged attempt to invest the mundane, the tangible, the particular and the provisional with a significance, meaning and trust that it cannot

possibly bear. There are many reasons why we do this and one of them is our vulnerability. In an attempt to escape this situation of vulnerability which, in truth is inescapable, we try to manage, or to secure our existence.

> "And the more deeply and comprehensively a good offers satisfaction, protection, meaning, and the like, the more it is a likely candidate for being the displacer of chaos. Thus the perennial candidates for things that remove our vulnerability and provide a securing foundation are religions, sciences, nations, social movements, comprehensive interpretive schemes, methods that enable criticism of or interpret the world, value-preserving institutions, and even revolutions to procure freedom and justice" (Farley 1990, 133).

It is worth noting that none of these goods is necessarily a bad thing, quite the contrary. But when we invest any of these with a meaning, the weight of which it cannot bear, then we simultaneously find ourselves striving to fend off the pain of an unsecured existence. The quest for security, which Macquarrie examines under the heading of 'having', proves to be illuminating not least for its lack of total fulfillment within the conditions of our historical existence. Learning to accept this, being aware of the niggling promise of a total presence, while nevertheless remaining alert to its deferment is a mark of one's growing integrity and maturity.

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to give expression to the rather unpopular notions of sin and, in particular, original sin, in order to provide some sort of rationale to explain why the task to overcome evil with good is one that resists simple and straightforward achievement. As I was finishing this paper news arrived of the death of George Floyd, killed by a Minneapolis police officer. The video evidence of this event was truly shocking and was the impetus for many people taking to the streets in order to vent their anger and disgust. They wanted, at the very least, reforms made to policing. In my view these were reasonable actions, and an attempt was being made, in the context of an undoubted evil—the unlawful killing of George Floyd—to overcome evil with good. But very quickly many of the protests turned into riots. Looters stormed into shops, stealing whatever they could carry and, in some cases, destroying the shops, sometimes injuring people as wild scenes were played out. Activists spoke of 'smashing the system' and took pleasure in the destruction of public and private property, unless, of course, it happened to belong to them as was occasionally the case. Most recently the 'Black Lives Matter' (BLM) protests have spread across the world resulting in the removal and destruction of various statues of historical figures and the vandalism of many others in European cities. It is difficult to know just what good is

being prosecuted here and what evils are being overcome. It will be evident to the reader that I don't agree with these actions which have now far out-grown the original legitimate protests but I mention them here not to register my reaction to them, but rather to indicate that actions which begin with good intent can produce unintended and unforeseen consequences. Of course, this does not disoblige us from discerning the good and seeking to follow it, but it should serve to make us more modest in regard to our ability to achieve it. The sobering theological reflection is that we need to be mindful of the radical nature of the understanding of the universality of sin which, as Pannenberg reminds us

> "… has the specific function, for all the need to check manifest evil and its consequences, of helping to preserve solidarity with evildoers, in whose conduct the sin that is latently at work in all of us finds expression" (Pannenberg 1994, 238).

We once had a rather quaint expression to sum up this idea; we said, 'there but for the grace of God, go I.' Attributed to John Bradford 1510–1555, he is said to have uttered these words when he saw people about to be executed on the scaffold—a similar fate that would later be his. Nowadays, however, the saying means something like, 'lucky that wasn't me.' But in an age when there was a greater consciousness than now of the providential, it meant something much more akin to Pannenberg's claim about that which is latent in us all. As such it may serve to encourage us not only to seek to overcome evil with good, but also to remind us that we may not always be so sure of what the 'good thing' is, or of our motivations in prosecuting it.

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Wege zur Überwindung des Bösen: Friedensethische Erwägungen

Volker Stümke

Die ethische Anweisung des Apostel Paulus an die christliche Gemeinde in Rom, das Böse mit Gutem zu überwinden (Röm 12,21, vgl. 1Thess 5,15), klingt nach einem überzeugenden Prinzip auch für eine gegenwärtige Friedensethik. Paulus beschreibt im 12. und 13. Kapitel des Römerbriefs mit eher allgemeinen Worten und prinzipiellen Anregungen, wie ein „vernünftiger Gottesdienst" (Röm 12,1) aussehen könne. Nachdem er zunächst Regeln für das Miteinander innerhalb der christlichen Gemeinde skizziert, weitet er nach und nach seinen Blick und unterbreitet nunmehr auch Vorschläge zum Umgang mit anderen Menschen, zu denen seine Empfehlungen zur Überwindung des Bösen zählen (Röm 12,17–21), um dann noch weiter auszuholen und das Verhältnis der Christen zu den Amtspersonen in den staatlichen Behörden („Obrigkeit") ebenfalls zu normieren (Röm 13,1–7). Alle paränetischen Ausführungen, so fasst er zusammen, seien Ausdruck der Nächstenliebe (Röm 13,8–10), die das Verhalten der Christen in der „Zwischenzeit" bis zur Wiederkunft Christi bestimmen solle (Röm 13,11–14).[1] In diesem Kontext stehen also die paulinischen Vorgaben zum Umgang mit dem Bösen:

> „Vergeltet niemandem Böses mit Bösem. Seid auf Gutes bedacht gegenüber jedermann. Ist's möglich, soviel an euch liegt, so habt mit allen Menschen Frieden. Rächt euch nicht selbst, meine Lieben, sondern gebt Raum dem Zorn Gottes; denn es steht geschrieben (Dtn 32,35): ‚Die Rache ist mein; ich will vergelten, spricht der Herr.' Vielmehr, ‚wenn deinen Feind hungert, so gib ihm zu essen; dürstet ihn, so gib ihm zu

[1] Vgl. Wolter 2018, 243–345; er spricht von der Liebe als der neuen ethischen Leitkategorie in diesem Abschnitt des Römerbriefs, die damit *„eine übergeordnete verhaltensnormierende Bedeutung"* erhalte (245). – Herzlich bedanken möchte ich mich bei Corinna Dahlgrün und Hartwig von Schubert für ihre hilfreichen Anmerkungen.

> trinken. Wenn du das tust, so wirst du feurige Kohlen auf sein Haupt sammeln' (Spr 25,21–22). Lass dich nicht vom Bösen überwinden, sondern überwinde das Böse mit Gutem" (Röm 12,17–21).

Schaut man sich diesen Abschnitt näher an, so hinterlässt er jedoch einen ambivalenten Eindruck. Auf der einen Seite ist die Abkehr vom Reziprozitätsgedanken ein starker friedensethischer Impuls. Wer auf Gutes bedacht ist und dementsprechend auf Böses nicht mit gleicher Waffe reagiert, kann, soweit es an ihm liegt, Frieden stiften oder befördern. So markiert ein Verzicht auf Rache und Vergeltung einen Ausstieg aus der Gewaltspirale – und das kann dem Gegenüber erleichtern, ebenfalls der Gewaltanwendung zu entsagen.[2] Auf der anderen Seite wird aber auf Rache und Vergeltung nicht verzichtet, sie werden nur aufgeschoben und an Gott als einen zornigen Richter delegiert – und das kann sogar als Steigerung der Gewalt gelesen werden, sofern die (ewige) Strafe Gottes noch härter ausfallen könnte als die (irdischen) Vergeltungsmaßnahmen der Menschen. Dazu kommt, dass die Motivation zu gutem Handeln ebenfalls den Rachegedanken aufgreift: Wer den anderen metaphorisch mit feurigen Kohlen überhäuft, verbleibt in der Steigerungslogik der Gewaltspirale und setzt nur andere Machtmittel ein.[3]

Diese Ambivalenz ist nach gegenwärtigem Diskussionsstand ein Merkmal wohl aller Religionen in ihrer Stellung zu Gewalt und Frieden.[4] Grundlegend für gegenwärtige politikwissenschaftliche Debatten zu dieser Thematik ist immer noch die Systematisierung, die Volker Rittberger und Andreas Hasenclever erstmals 2000 vorgelegt haben.[5] Sie unterscheiden drei Positionen bei der Verhältnisbestimmung von Religion und kriegerischer Gewalt:

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[2] Für Dieter Senghaas zählt die Affektkontrolle neben dem Gewaltmonopol, der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, der demokratischen Partizipation, der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und der konstruktiven Konfliktkultur zu den sechs miteinander vernetzten Kriterien des zivilisatorischen Hexagon, die Frieden befördern. Vgl. Senghaas 1995, 196–223.

[3] Sicherlich ist diese aggressive Lesart von Röm 12 exegetisch umstritten, kann man doch auch darauf verweisen, dass Gott als Richter gerechter und unvoreingenommener sein wird als involvierte Menschen, und dass die feurigen Kohlen als Bildwort für „Beschämen" gemeint sein können. Aber genau darum geht es in der Ambivalenzthese, die Zweideutigkeit von metaphorischen Texten als zumindest wirkungsgeschichtliche Realität herauszustreichen. Zudem gibt es im Neuen Testament auch sehr deutliche gewaltaffine Texte, beispielsweise die apokalyptischen Visionen und 1Kor 6,9f., wo Paulus klare normative Vorgaben für das Gerichtsurteil Gottes formuliert: „Oder wisst ihr nicht, dass die Ungerechten das Reich Gottes nicht ererben werden? Täuscht euch nicht! Weder Unzüchtige noch Götzendiener noch Ehebrecher noch Lustknaben noch Knabenschänder noch Diebe noch Habgierige noch Trunkenbolde noch Lästerer noch Räuber werden das Reich Gottes ererben".

[4] Vgl. zum folgenden Stümke 2019b, 40–95 & Stümke 2019b, 105–157, besonders 57–59.

[5] Rittberger / Hasenclever 2016, 45–78.

1. Die Primordialisten betonen, dass Religionen als „eigenständige Wirkmächte in der Weltpolitik" eine direkte Ursache kriegerischer Gewalt seien.[6] Näherhin kann man im Anschluss an Douglas Pratt differenzieren, dass entweder Gewalt ein Bestandteil jeder Religion sei, oder aber, dass es bestimmte Religionen gebe, die besonders gewaltaffin seien.[7] Die Stärken dieser Position liegen darin, dass sie zum einen die Dynamik von Religion erfasst haben und zum anderen festhalten, dass es Religionen nicht ohne Glaubensaussagen gibt: Religiöse Gewissheiten seien eine den Glaubenden prägende und somit auch sein Handeln leitende Kraft – man denke bspw. an einen religiös legitimierten Aufruf zum „heiligen Krieg". Gegen die Primordialisten spricht erstens, dass manche Konflikte schwerlich mit Religion zu tun haben. Zweitens muss eingewandt werden, dass Religion als der eine Kultur oder einen Staat dominierende Faktor zu undifferenziert gesehen wird; schließlich gibt es kaum noch Staaten, die von nur einer Kultur oder Religion dominiert werden.
2. Für die Instrumentalisten ist demgegenüber die Religion in kriegerischen Konflikten nur ein Epiphänomen, die wahre Ursache für politische Gewalt sei ein Verteilungskampf um knappe Ressourcen, der von Eliten ausgefochten werde. Mit der Rede vom Instrument kann man näherhin ausdrücken, dass Religion nur ein Vorwand sei, man kann aber auch der Religion die Funktion als Katalysator zuschreiben und schließlich kann man sie wirklich als Werkzeug verstehen, das direkt in die Machtkämpfe involviert werde. Diese Lesart kann weitaus besser erklären, warum es auch nicht religiös konnotierte Gewalt gibt und warum Menschen auch in pluralistischen Konstellationen friedlich zusammenleben können: Erst politische Aufwiegler beginnen den Konflikt. Daher sind auch viele religiöse Menschen von diesem Ansatz angetan, stellt er doch klar, dass die Religion an sich friedlich sei und nur von „bösen Menschen" missbraucht werde. Schließlich spricht für diesen Ansatz, dass er die Konfliktursache geerdet hat. Gegen die Instrumentalisten spricht, dass die Rolle des Anführers zu einseitig betont wird. Zudem wird das eigene Profil eines Instruments nicht bedacht: Weder ist jedes Instrument zu jedem Zweck einsetzbar (man kann mit einer Wasserwaage kein Loch in die Wand bohren), noch beherrscht jeder Player jedes Instrument (nachdem Saddam Hussein jahrelang Muslime drangsaliert hatte, verhallte sein Aufruf, alle Muslime müssten ihm gegen den amerikanischen Kreuzzug beistehen, weitgehend wirkungslos).
3. Um die beiden monierten Einseitigkeiten zu vermeiden, hat der Konstruktivismus gleichsam eine Synthese versucht. Die meisten Friedensforscher vertreten inzwischen

[6] Rittberger / Hasenclever 2005, 136–156 (Zitat: 136).

[7] Pratt 2017, 4.

diese Position, so auch V. Rittberger und A. Hasenclever. Entscheidend für sie ist der Rekurs auf die intersubjektiven Strukturen von Religion. Zwar könne man Religionen durchaus mit Werkzeugen vergleichen, aber dieser Vergleich sei begrenzt, denn erstens hätten Religionen als solche ein eigenes Profil und zweitens könnten sie im Verlauf eines Konflikts eine Eigendynamik entwickeln, sie könnten also einen Streit entfachen oder beruhigen; ebenso könnten sie später den Streit verschärfen oder friedliche Auswege aufzeigen und am Ende könnten sie am Hass festhalten oder für Versöhnung einstehen. Das einfache Schema von Ursache und Wirkung ist demzufolge für Religion in Konflikten unpassend, weil adynamisch. Hans Gerhard Kippenberg beschreibt in vier Schritten, wie sich der Bezug auf Religion im Konfliktverlauf steigern kann: Zuerst werde die Situation religiös (und nicht politisch) wahrgenommen. Solche Situationsdefinition ebne dann den Weg für reale Konsequenzen (Thomas-Theorem), indem zweitens die Protagonisten ihr Handeln ebenfalls religiös erläuterten, was drittens durch die religiöse Gemeinschaft bestätigt und verstärkt werde. Nun sei es so weit, dass viertens die religiöse Gewaltsprache eine kriegerische Handlung religiös weihe; es entstehe eine performative Sprachhandlung.[8] Vergleichbar stellt Mariella Ourghi fest, dass auch der Jihad als religiöse Rahmung und Sinndeutung von Gewalt sich entwickle: „Religiöse Gewalt ergibt sich weder aus den religiösen Texten an sich noch aus politischer, sozialer oder ökonomischer Unterdrückung allein, sondern erst aus den Wechselwirkungen der Faktoren“[9]. Damit hat sie nicht bestritten, dass es gewaltaffine Texte im Islam und solche Formen der Unterdrückung in der Welt gebe, sehr klar aber festgehalten, dass erst der (von Menschen konstruierte) Verlauf des Konflikts zu einem Religionskrieg (oder zu einer religiösen Ablehnung der konkreten Gewalt) führen werde. Schließlich spricht auch der empirische Befund, dass nicht alle Religionen zu allen Zeiten und an allen Orten gleichermaßen gewaltaffin gewesen seien, dafür, Religionen als eine dynamische Kraft mit eigenem Profil wahrzunehmen.

Die unterschiedlichen Reaktionsmöglichkeiten der jeweiligen Religion und ihrer Protagonisten auf politische Konstellationen und auf „Böses“ hängen also einerseits wesentlich mit ihren religiösen Quellen und Überzeugungen zusammen, andererseits eröffnen diese Quellen unterschiedliche Optionen und Lesarten – und damit sind wir wieder bei der Ambivalenz der Textpassage aus Röm 12, die man sowohl als friedensethischen Impuls wie als raffinierte Gewalttaktik interpretieren kann.

[8] Kippenberg 2015, 61–82.

[9] Ourghi 2015, 97–109 (Zitat: 109).

Dem Thema der Tagung und des nunmehr vorliegenden Buches folgend möchte ich nun im Ausgang von Röm 12f. auf die friedensethischen Implikationen der christlichen Religion eingehen: Welche Argumente und Überzeugungen finden sich, die präzisieren, wie man das Böse mit Gutem überwinden kann?[10] Näherhin möchte ich dabei zwei Gedankengänge unterscheiden. Zuerst möchte ich auf drei prominente wissenschaftliche Differenzierungen in der christlichen Theologie rekurrieren, die einer Selbstverabsolutierung des Christentums entgegenstehen, vielmehr zu einer Selbstrelativierung anraten und damit friedensethisch als Deeskalationsstrategie gewürdigt werden sollen. Im zweiten Abschnitt möchte ich dann die christliche Rede von der Versöhnung auf ihre friedensethischen Implikationen hin befragen. Beides wird im Rahmen eines Aufsatzes nur als Überblick möglich sein.

1. Selbstrelativierungen des christlichen Glaubens

Sich selbst relativieren zu können ist eine Gegenreaktion auf die Gefahr einer Selbstverabsolutierung. Man bestimmt seinen eigenen Ort und räumt damit ein, dass andere ihren Ort ebenfalls einnehmen können. Charles Kimball hat aufgewiesen, dass die christliche Religion dann gefährlich wird, wenn sie sich selbst verabsolutiert.[11] Wenn ihm folgend die politische Gefahr der christlichen Religion also darin besteht, dass sie aus Treue zu dem einen und wahren Gott als der alles bestimmenden Wirklichkeit alles mit eschatologischer Dringlichkeit und soteriologischer Relevanz belegt und dementsprechend keine Kompromisse und keine Zwischenschritte mehr akzeptiert, dann besteht die primäre Gegenreaktion in einer Selbstrelativierung der Religion, die andere und anderes neben sich stehen lässt und damit bereit ist zu Ausgleichsverhandlungen und Kompromissen. Allerdings kann solche Selbstrelativierung nicht von außen kommen, weil wir als Christen (ebenso wie Angehörige anderer Religionen) es uns verbitten würden, von

[10] Andere Religionen werden also nicht einbezogen – aus den folgenden Gründen: Erstens bin ich kein Fachmann für andere Religionen und ein oberflächliches Urteilen wäre unangemessen. Zweitens legt der Hinweis auf die grundsätzliche Ambivalenz aller Religionen es nahe, vor der eigenen Haustür zu kehren und nicht über nachlässige Nachbarn zu schimpfen (Mt 7,3–5). Damit hängt drittens zusammen, dass eine kritische Analyse der Stärken und Gefahren der eigenen Religion eine Diskussion auf Augenhöhe mit Vertreter*innen anderer Religionen (und Weltanschauungen) hoffentlich erleichtert – auch wenn ich an dieser Stelle stärker auf die positiven Impulse (und nicht so sehr auf die Gefahren) eingehen werde. Das Gefahrenpotential der christlichen Religion habe ich bspw. dargelegt in dem Aufsatz „Religion als Kriegstreiber oder Friedensstifter. Theologische Perspektive", der in einer Veröffentlichung der Eugen-Biser-Stiftung erscheinen wird.

[11] Vgl. Kimball 2002. Näherhin unterscheidet er fünf Faktoren, die anzeigen, wann und wie ein solcher Prozess zu befürchten ist: (1) absolute truth claims; (2) blind obedience, (3) establishing the „ideal" time, (4) the end justifies all means und (5) declaring holy war.

anderen gesagt zu bekommen: Nimm Deinen Glauben und Deinen Gott doch nicht so wichtig. Doch es gibt auch Gedankengänge aus unserer eigenen Tradition, die vor einem gewaltaffinen religiösen Eifer warnen; aus meiner Sicht sind drei besonders stark:

1) Der eschatologische Vorbehalt: Der bereits zitiert Vers Röm 12,19 enthält, wenn man ihn mit Röm 14,10–13 zusammenliest, einen friedensethischen Impuls:

> „Rächt euch nicht selbst, meine Lieben, sondern gebt Raum dem Zorn Gottes; denn es steht geschrieben: ‚Die Rache ist mein; ich will vergelten, spricht der Herr'. […] Du aber, was richtest du deinen Bruder? Oder du, was verachtest du deinen Bruder? Wir werden alle vor den Richterstuhl Gottes gestellt werden. Denn es steht geschrieben: ‚So wahr ich lebe, spricht der Herr, mir sollen sich alle Knie beugen, und alle Zungen sollen Gott bekennen'. So wird nun jeder von uns für sich selbst Gott Rechenschaft geben. Darum lasst uns nicht mehr einer den andern richten; sondern richtet vielmehr darauf euren Sinn, dass niemand seinem Bruder einen Anstoß oder Ärgernis bereite."

Die notierte Ambivalenz in Röm 12 wird durch die folgenden Verse abgemildert, indem Paulus (gleichsam konstruktiv) den friedensethischen Aspekt entfaltet: Der Verweis auf den richtenden Gott dient demnach nicht dazu, nur die Vollstreckung des letztlich von mir gefällten Urteils an den Allmächtigen und seinen Zorn zu delegieren, vielmehr wird Gott wirklich als der Richter anerkannt, der selbst das Urteil über jeden Menschen sprechen wird. Und das schließt den Sprecher bzw. Autor ein – diese Selbstreflexion auf „meine" Stellung vor Gott und neben den anderen Menschen enthält die friedensförderliche Selbstrelativierung. Allein Gott wird über den rechten Glauben und das ewige Leben aller Menschen (mich eingeschlossen) befinden und entscheiden – und zwar erst im Jüngsten Gericht.

Diese theologische Einsicht ist keine Relativierung des exklusiven Wahrheitsanspruchs christlichen Glaubens, wohl aber eine Vertagung der endgültigen Verifikation oder Falsifikation dieser Wahrheit. Und vor allem ist es eine Selbstrelativierung des Glaubens, der sich nicht mit Gott und dessen Urteil identifiziert: „indem ich die Grenze des jüngsten Tages setze, steige ich selbst vom Stuhl des letzten Richters herab"[12]. Die Selbstreflexion führt also dazu, die eigene Vergottung, die Verabsolutierung meiner Überzeugungen zu relativieren, ohne ihren Anspruch zu nivellieren. Das Resultat ist keine Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den Übeln dieser Welt, sondern die Begrenzung meiner Zuständigkeit, und die impliziert eine kritische Rückfrage an die Berechtigung meiner Rachegefühle. Paulus hält am Endgericht fest und unterstreicht damit, dass

[12] Ricœur 1974, 35.

die Täter nicht das letzte Wort haben und auf ewig über ihre Opfer triumphieren werden.[13] Das Endgericht verleiht der Hoffnung Ausdruck, dass die Opfer ins Recht gesetzt und die Schuld der Täter benannt werden[14] und widerspricht damit einem zynischen Atheismus.[15] Aber Paulus betont auch, dass dieses Gericht allein durch Gott vollzogen werden wird und diese Subjektstellung Gottes verhindert eine eschatologische Aufladung menschlichen Handelns: Nicht wir werden die Gerechtigkeit für Täter und Opfer realisieren. Wer das Böse mit Gutem überwinden will, der muss sich dementsprechend die Begrenzungen des eigenen Handelns vor Augen führen. – Diese Einsicht steht nun aber in Spannung zur politischen Aufgabe, für Frieden und Gerechtigkeit zu sorgen, Täter zu bestrafen und Opfer zu schützen oder zumindest zu entschädigen. Das leitet über zur zweiten Selbstrelativierung des christlichen Glaubens.

2) Die Zweiregimentenlehre: Nicht nur Gott, ebenso die weltlichen Herrscher üben Macht auch in der Form von Gewalt aus, regieren die Menschen, erwarten Gehorsam und wollen (ihre Vorstellung von) Gerechtigkeit verwirklichen. Wie verhalten sich diese beiden Machthaber nun zueinander und wie sollen sich die Christen zu ihnen positionieren? Im Neuen Testament gibt es drei Antworten auf diese Frage: Während Jesus ein Nebeneinander (Mt 22,21: „So gebt dem Kaiser, was des Kaisers ist, und Gott, was Gottes ist“) skizziert und die apokalyptischen Texte (wie Lk 21) ein Gegeneinander bis hin zum Endkampf schildern, hat Paulus in Röm 13,1–7 ein Miteinander von Gott und weltlicher Obrigkeit entfaltet:

> „Jedermann sei untertan der Obrigkeit, die Gewalt über ihn hat. Denn es ist keine Obrigkeit außer von Gott; wo aber Obrigkeit ist, ist sie von Gott angeordnet. Darum: Wer sich der Obrigkeit widersetzt, der widerstrebt Gottes Anordnung; die ihr aber widerstreben, werden ihr Urteil empfangen. Denn die Gewalt haben, muss man nicht fürchten wegen guter, sondern wegen böser Werke. Willst du dich aber nicht fürchten vor der Obrigkeit, so tue Gutes, dann wirst du Lob von ihr erhalten. Denn sie ist Gottes Dienerin, dir zugut. Tust du aber Böses, so fürchte dich; denn sie trägt das Schwert nicht umsonst. Sie ist Gottes Dienerin und vollzieht die Strafe an dem, der Böses tut. Darum ist es notwendig, sich unterzuordnen, nicht allein um der Strafe, sondern auch um des Gewissens willen.

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13 Vgl. Bayer 1991, 68–99.

14 Vgl. Moltmann 1991, 74–88. Moltmann unterscheidet näherhin die „Recht schaffende Gerechtigkeit Gottes für die Opfer“ (77) von der „rechtfertigende[n] Gerechtigkeit Gottes für die Täter“ (80).

15 Einen sehr pointierten Beleg für solchen zynischen Atheismus bietet Georg Büchner in der Ersten Entwurfsstufe zu Woyzeck im Munde eines Barbiers: „Was kann der liebe Gott nicht, was? Das Geschehne ungeschehn mache. Hähähä!“ (zitiert nach: Büchner 1999, 202). Das hämische Gelächter drückt eine aktive Form des Atheismus aus, in dem Gott durch die von Menschen geschaffenen Taten widerlegt, überflüssig gemacht wird.

> Deshalb zahlt ihr ja auch Steuer; denn sie sind Gottes Diener, auf diesen Dienst beständig bedacht. So gebt nun jedem, was ihr schuldig seid: Steuer, dem die Steuer gebührt; Zoll, dem der Zoll gebührt; Furcht, dem die Furcht gebührt; Ehre, dem die Ehre gebührt."

Während die Schlusssätze das jesuanische Nebeneinander entfalten, bieten die vorangehenden Verse eine theologische Einrahmung: Die weltliche Staatsgewalt hat nicht nur ihren Bereich, den die Christen akzeptieren sollten, sondern dieser Bereich sei samt den damit verbundenen Aufgaben von Gott so gewollt. Daher sollen sich die Christen hier unterordnen und gehorsam sein (Tit 3,1f.). Dieses Miteinander impliziert wiederum eine Relativierung nunmehr des Gehorsams: Nicht nur Gott, sondern auch der weltliche Herrscher darf Befehle erteilen, die der Christ befolgen soll, solange sie nicht im Widerspruch zu Gott stehen (Apg 5,29). Der „vernünftige Gottesdienst" der Christen in der Welt (Röm 12,1) umfasst also auch den politischen Bereich, in dem Christen mitwirken können – wobei diese Mitwirkung von Paulus angesichts sowohl des erwarteten Weltendes wie der antiken Herrschaftsformen noch wenig profiliert worden ist.

An dieser Stelle hat Martin Luther mit seiner Zweiregimentenlehre eine weiterführende Konzeption vorgelegt[16]. Der Reformator hat zwei Regierweisen Gottes auf dieser Welt (und im Kampf gegen die widergöttlichen Kräfte) unterschieden: das geistliche (Kirche) und das weltliche (Staat) Regiment. Nicht mehr der Christ (von Röm 13), sondern die Institutionen, die ihm Befehle erteilen, sind also nun im Fokus. Dementsprechend stehen nicht mehr Gott und der Kaiser, sondern die Kirche und der Staat nebeneinander.

Luthers Zweiregimentenlehre

[16] Vgl. dazu Stümke 2015, 215–241.

Die Unterscheidung von zwei Herrschaftsweisen ist an sich noch nichts Neues. Innovativ ist allerdings die genaue Zuordnung und Verhältnisbestimmung, die Luther vornimmt: Beide Regimente seien erstens gleichermaßen von Gott eingesetzt worden und sie stünden zweitens mit eigenen Aufgaben und mit unterschiedlichen Mitteln nebeneinander. Die Kirche wie der Staat dürfen sich selbst demzufolge weder als absolute Größe noch als totalitäre Instanz setzen, denn sie sind beide von Gott eingesetzt (also nicht absolut) – und zwar nebeneinander (also nicht totalitär), so dass der Streit (im Mittelalter zwischen Kaiser und Papst) um die Führungsrolle gegenstandslos wird. Auch hier wird also eine Selbstrelativierung nunmehr der Kirche vollzogen. Sie steht nicht nur unter Gott (was wir bereits aus Röm 12,19 entnahmen), sie steht dort zusammen mit den weltlichen Machthabern, also auf einer Stufe mit dem Kaiser, denn beide haben göttliche Aufgaben zugesprochen bekommen. Desgleichen wird auch dem weltlichen Herrscher ein Platz unterhalb Gottes und neben der Kirche zugewiesen; der Staat ist eben nicht der sterbliche Gott (Hobbes)[17], sondern gleichsam (also unter den historischen Bedingungen Luthers) der weltliche Papst.

Die Verbindung der Einsetzung beider Regimente mit jeweils bestimmten Aufgaben und dementsprechenden Mitteln zielt auf ein funktionales Nebeneinander der beiden Mächte: Die Kirche soll mit Wort und Sakrament die Menschen zu Jesus Christus führen, der Staat soll durch das Recht und notfalls auch mit Gewalt ein friedliches und geordnetes Zusammenleben der Menschen sichern; bei Luther finden sich also deutliche Impulse für das staatliche Gewaltmonopol und für einen Rechtsstaat. Mit Blick auf die Kirche besagt diese Relativierung: Sie ist weder Gott noch der Staat. Sie entscheidet weder über das Seelenheil, noch darf sie zu einem heiligen Krieg aufrufen. Wohl aber hat sie auch dem Staat gegenüber die Aufgabe, Gottes Wort als Evangelium und Gesetz zu verkündigen. Wer das Böse mit Gutem überwinden will, muss daher präzisieren, ob er das friedliche Zusammenleben in der Welt oder die innere Zufriedenheit des Menschen befördern möchte und sich damit verbunden klar machen, dass er unterschiedliche Mittel und verschiedene Akteure dafür einbeziehen sollte. Der friedensethische Impuls besteht dementsprechend darin, dass die Kirche ihre Botschaften keinesfalls als Begründung für politische Gewaltanwendung verfälschen darf, vielmehr an die Begrenzung legitimer Gewaltanwendung erinnern soll. Ein Krieg ist erstens eine weltliche Angelegenheit und steht zweitens weltlich zumindest in Spannung, wenn nicht im Widerspruch zum Friedensauftrag der Politik.[18]

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[17] So beschreibt Hobbes 1998, 134f. im 17. Kapitel den absolutistisch regierenden Souverän. Bei aller Nähe, die man sonst zwischen Luther und dem politischen Realismus finden kann, markiert Luthers klare Unterordnung der Obrigkeit unter Gott doch eine wichtige Differenz.

[18] Zumindest angemerkt werden soll, dass die Zweiregimentenlehre gleichermaßen eine Relativierung der Staatsmacht beinhaltet. Der Staat und seine Protagonisten stehen ebenso unter Gott und neben dem geistlichen Regiment. Ihnen ist es demzufolge erstens untersagt, sich selbst zu verabsolutieren, der Gehorsam, den er von seinen Bürgern verlangen kann, ist klar begrenzt durch seine Unterordnung

Dazu kommt noch eine dritte faktische Relativierung: Die Kirche steht nicht nur unter Gott und neben der weltlichen Obrigkeit, sie steht zudem auf dem Feld der Religion in faktischer Konkurrenz zu anderen Religionen. Das mögen zwar aus Luthers Sicht klarer als für uns heute Irrlehren sein, aber für die Kirche besagt dies damals wie heute, dass sie diese Irrlehren weder rächen (das bleibt Gott vorbehalten) noch bekriegen (das Schwert gehört in die Verfügungsgewalt des Staates) darf. Sie hat allerdings den Auftrag, diese „Irrlehrer" mit dem Wort zu widerlegen – und das gilt Luther folgend für „Irrlehrer" aller Art, also für christliche Ketzer, für Angehörige aller nicht-christlichen Religionen (für ihn namentlich Juden und Muslime) und auch für Atheisten und Philosophen. An dieser Stelle wird die dritte Selbstrelativierung weiter differenzieren.

3) Der Dialog mit der Philosophie: Auch hier findet sich der Anknüpfungspunkt im Römerbrief, nämlich in der Aufforderung des Paulus in Röm 12,1–2, einen vernünftigen Gottesdienst zu gestalten:

> „Ich ermahne euch nun, Brüder und Schwestern, durch die Barmherzigkeit Gottes, dass ihr euren Leib hingebt als ein Opfer, das lebendig, heilig und Gott wohlgefällig sei. Das sei euer vernünftiger Gottesdienst. Und stellt euch nicht dieser Welt gleich, sondern ändert euch durch Erneuerung eures Sinnes, auf dass ihr prüfen könnt, was Gottes Wille ist, nämlich das Gute und Wohlgefällige und Vollkommene."

Der Apostel erteilt den Christen einen Prüfauftrag, sie sollen den Willen Gottes erkennen, der nicht identisch sein muss mit dem, was in der Welt gilt. Allerdings wird dieser Wille auch nicht mit dem biblischen Befund oder der evangelischen Botschaft identifiziert, sondern vielmehr als Ausrichtung auf das Gute, Wohlgefällige und Vollkommene profiliert, wodurch sich faktisch eine Schnittmenge mit dem Bestreben der Philosophie ergibt, die klassisch als Suche nach dem Guten, Schönen, Wahren und Einen verstanden worden ist. Das eröffnet zumindest die Möglichkeit, auch philosophisch zu eruieren, worin der Wille Gottes liegen kann. Allerdings bleibt eine gewaltige Hürde: Zunächst muss der Christ dazu seinen Sinn erneuern, sich also inhaltlich auf das Evangelium einlassen. Der christliche Glaube wird also nicht zu einer philosophischen Schulmeinung relativiert, wohl aber wird die Möglichkeit eines Dialogs implizit angedeutet.

unter Gott. Er steht zweitens neben dem geistlichen Regiment und muss daher akzeptieren, dass es Bereiche oder Belange menschlichen Zusammenlebens gibt, die nicht er zu bestimmen hat; er ist also kein totaler Staat. Darüber hinaus hat er Vorgaben von Gott erhalten, ist also kein Selbstzweck, sondern dient bestimmten Zielen, nämlich dem Erhalt von Frieden, Ordnung und Gerechtigkeit.

Dieser Dialog zwischen christlichem Glauben und Philosophie ist von Benedikt XVI. grundlegend gewürdigt worden. In seiner Regensburger Rede hatte der damalige Papst 2006 betont, dass historisch wie sachlich für die Kirche wie für alle Christen der kritische Diskurs mit der Vernunft unverzichtbar sei. Schon historisch sei bemerkenswert, dass sich die Christen in den ersten Jahrhunderten intensiver mit der Philosophie als mit anderen Religionen oder mit der Politik auseinandergesetzt hätten. Und sachlich sei ein solcher Diskurs damals wie heute für beide Seiten weiterführend: Der Glaube votiere mit der Rede von Gott gegen eine Verkürzung der Vernunft um metaphysische Fragen, die Vernunft wiederum verhindere durch kritische Argumente fundamentalistische Selbstabschließungen des Glaubens.[19] Solche Fundamentalismen seien nicht nur für das Zusammenleben, sondern auch für den Glaubenden selbst gefährlich.[20] Daher sollte der Glaube auch von sich aus interessiert sein, dieses Risiko zu minimieren. Glaube und Vernunft bräuchten sich also wechselseitig, um die jeweiligen „Pathologien"[21] zu überwinden.

Die durch das Gespräch mit der Philosophie implizierte Selbstrelativierung des Glaubens besteht darin, dass man als Christ nicht mehr beansprucht, alles (besser) zu wissen. Denn ein Diskurs unterscheidet sich von einer Belehrung oder einem Befehl eben genau dadurch, dass er die wechselseitige Möglichkeit der Modifikation, des Erkenntniszugewinns und auch des Abbaus von Irrtümern oder Kurzschlüssen einschließt. Und diese Modifikationen können einerseits auf kritischen Rückfragen beruhen, andererseits aber auch aus neuen und gemeinsamen Herausforderungen erwachsen. Einerseits müssen wir uns also fragen lassen, wie bestimmte Glaubensaussagen sich zu wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen in Position setzen lassen. Andererseits stehen die vielen unterschiedlichen Wissenschaften gemeinsam vor neuen Herausforderungen und müssen sich jeweils fragen lassen, welche Lösungsimpulse sie beisteuern können. Wer das Böse mit Gutem überwinden will, sollte sich (diskursiv) bewusst machen, inwiefern das von ihm als böse oder gut Bezeichnete auch für andere Menschen mit diesen starken Wertungen verbunden ist.

Der Christ nimmt demnach zur Welt und ihren Einsichten, Fragen und Problemen eine Stellung ein, die bereits Friedrich Gogarten als fragendes Nichtwissen um das Ganze bezeichnet

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19 Vgl. Benedikt XVI. 2007, 15–26 und Benedikt XVI. 2012, 17–26.

20 Söding 2015, 89-123 verdeutlicht am Apostel Paulus, welche gewaltaversen Kräfte im christlichen Glauben stecken. Paulus steht erstens für eine Selbstkritik am religiösen Eifer; sein Versuch, religiöse Überzeugungen mit Gewalt zu erzwingen, wird von ihm selbst als Sünde erkannt. Zweitens setzt er (seit dem Damaskuserlebnis) auf Aufklärung, er vermittelt das Evangelium (ohne Gewalt) durch das Wort und er argumentiert dabei oft mit „Schriftbeweisen". Schließlich besteht seine Theologie in der Lesart der Macht und der Gerechtigkeit Gottes als Liebe; das Kreuz Christi stehe für ihn gegen jede Legitimierung politischer Gewalt.

21 Ratzinger 2005, 39–60, 56.

hatte:[22] Der Christ fragt also einerseits nach Gott als der alles bestimmenden Wirklichkeit und andererseits gibt er zu, dass er nicht Gott ist und eben nicht alles weiß. Benedikt führt diesen Gedanken weiter, indem er positiv das Fragen als eine diskursive Suche versteht, so dass er keiner selbstzufriedenen Abschottung von Christen das Wort redet.

Weiterführend wäre aus gegenwärtiger Perspektive eine Erweiterung des Kreises der Gesprächspartner über die Philosophie hinaus auf nicht-christliche Religionen, sofern auch diese in einen kritischen und (angesichts der eigenen Ambivalenz als Religion) selbstkritischen Diskurs einsteigen mögen – aber das kann und muss ich hier nicht ausführen, weil sich die dritte Form der Selbstrelativierung durch die Akzeptanz von „Konkurrenten" auf demselben Themenfeld mit der Einbeziehung der Religionen als Diskurspartner nur deskriptiv erweitern, nicht aber grundlegend ändern würde. Allerdings darf solche Erweiterung nicht dazu führen, dass die Religionen sich nur noch untereinander verständigen; die Ambivalenz aller Religionen, von Benedikt XVI als Gefahr der fundamentalistischen Selbstabschließung bezeichnet, kann durch die Philosophie als externen Gesprächspartner weitaus besser wahrgenommen und kritisch hinterfragt werden als in einem internen Austausch religiöser Menschen.

Drei Selbstrelativierungen des christlichen Glaubens und der Kirche habe ich damit als friedensethische Impulse im Anschluss an Röm 12f. entfaltet. In der Selbstunterscheidung von Gott, die präzise eine Unterordnung besagt, in der Selbstunterscheidung von der weltlichen Macht, die neben der Kirche steht, und in der wechselseitigen Angewiesenheit auf die philosophische Analyse Gottes und anderer metaphysischer Begriffe nimmt der christliche Glaube seinen Ort in der Welt ein. Der Gefahr in Röm 12, den Rachegelüsten angesichts der Erfahrung von Bösem freien Lauf zu lassen, wird somit eine dreifache Absage erteilt: Erstens ist es allein Gott, der endgültige Urteile fällen und vollziehen wird – und zwar im Jüngsten Gericht und nach seinem Maßstab. Zweitens gehören auch weltliche Gewaltmaßnahmen nicht zu den Handlungen der Kirche, Rache (bspw. in der Form der Fehde) ist vielmehr durch das staatliche Gewaltmonopol und seine Rechtsprechung ersetzt worden. Drittens wird die Philosophie warnen, dass solche Rachegelüste keineswegs dem Guten, Wohlgefälligen und Vollkommenen entsprechen, und dass ihr Ausleben vielmehr unbeherrscht wäre. Damit wird die andere Lesart des Paulus gestärkt, in der Nachfolge Christi das Böse mit Gutem zu überwinden.

[22] Gogarten 1958, 139. Vgl. dazu die Empfehlung, über die letzten Fragen im Modus eines wissenden Nichtwissens zu reden, von Reder 2014, 408.

2. Versöhnung als friedensethischer Impuls

Dass ein Christ, der das Böse mit Gutem zu überwinden sucht, in der Nachfolge Christi steht, wird von Paulus zwar in Röm 12f. nicht explizit gesagt, findet sich aber ansonsten als biblische Aussage. Dabei ist Nachfolge nicht nur ethisch zu verstehen, also als Auftrag, dem Weg Jesu Christi zu folgen und seine Anweisungen zu beachten, sondern auch soteriologisch als Partizipation an seinem Heilswerk, was schon basal durch die Selbstbezeichnung als Christen zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Als Christen sind wir durch den Sohn Gottes freigekauft worden aus der Herrschaft des Gesetzes und haben damit selbst die Sohnschaft erlangt, sind also nicht mehr unmündig, sondern mündig geworden (Gal 4,4–7). Dieses Heilswerk Gottes kann Paulus nicht nur als Loskauf beschreiben, sondern bspw. auch als Sündenvergebung (Röm 5,12–19), als Sühne (Röm 3,25f.) und als Versöhnung (2Kor 5,19–21). Die ethische Konsequenz wird dann in derselben Redeweise dargelegt: Der befreite Sohn (und die befreite Tochter – Gal 3,28) soll in dieser christlichen Freiheit leben und sich nicht wieder selbst versklaven oder versklaven lassen (Gal 5,1). Wem die Sünden vergeben worden sind, der soll nun auch anderen vergeben (Kol 3,12f.). Wessen Sünden durch Christi Blut gesühnt wurden, lebt in einem durch Frieden, Geduld und die Liebe Gottes gekennzeichneten Raum (Röm 5,1–5). Wer das Wort der Versöhnung gehört und angenommen hat, der wird es weitertragen, damit auch andere an dieser Versöhnung Anteil gewinnen (2Kor 5,18–20). So wird die Versöhnung als Werk Gottes zu einem friedensethischen Impuls für Christen, der nun noch in zweifacher Hinsicht etwas näher dargelegt werden soll.[23]

1) Die persönliche Ebene: Die Konsequenzen der Versöhnung Gottes für einzelne Christen und ihr Zusammenleben in der Gemeinde werden im Neuen Testament mehrfach entfaltet. Immer geht es darum, dass man Christus folgt und sich für andere Menschen einsetzt (Phil 2,3–8), dass man entsprechend der erfahrenen Vergebung nun auch anderen die Schuld vergibt (Mt 6,12), dass man als Friedensstifter den erfahrenen Frieden mit Gott auch weltlich realisiert (Mt 5,9) und dass man auch als Gemeinde mit den unterschiedlichen Begabungen einträchtig zusammenlebt (1Kor 12) und Grenzen der Herkunft überwindet (Eph 2,13f.). Die erfahrene Versöhnung mit und durch Gott ist das Movens, das zur Zufriedenheit und damit zu einem selbstlosen Handeln des Christen führt. Auch wenn die biblische Idealschilderung in der Realität nicht ohne Brüche und Rückfälle umgesetzt worden ist, wofür ja schon die Ermahnungen und Aufforderungen im Neuen Testament selbst sprechen, so lässt sich andererseits ebenso

[23] Vgl. Friese 2010, 87f., der auf die Unterscheidung zwischen einer sozialen reconciliatio und einer persönlichen expiatio verweist.

wenig leugnen, dass „religionsbasierte Akteure“ diesen christlichen Impuls umgesetzt haben.[24] Gerade in den gegenwärtigen Diskussionen zur Etablierung einer Friedensordnung nach Beendigung der Waffengewalt (post conflict) wird immer wieder betont, dass auch die Gesinnung (Herzen) der Menschen transformiert werden müsse, um nachhaltig vom Krieg zum Frieden zu gelangen – und das leistet (vielleicht nicht nur, aber jedenfalls auch) die christliche Versöhnungsbotschaft.[25] Da hier derzeit Konsens besteht, muss ich diesen Aspekt nicht weiter vertiefen, sondern wende mich der politischen Ebene zu.

2) Die politische Ebene: „Ein ungelöstes Problem der Ethik besteht allerdings darin, daß Versöhnung zumeist stillschweigend nach dem personalethischen Modell der Versöhnung zweier Personen gedacht wird, welches sich aber als unzureichend erweist, wenn es auf der sozialethischen Ebene um die Bewältigung von Konflikten zwischen Gruppen, Völkern und Gesellschaften geht“[26]. Denn bei dem Verhalten größerer Gruppen zueinander sind auf allen Seiten immer mehrere und unterschiedliche Personen betroffen. Das beginnt beim Verzicht auf Gewalt und dem Erdulden von Leiden, das der einzelne Christ für sich (idealiter) akzeptieren möge, das er aber nicht einfach auf eine Gruppe von Menschen, der er angehört, übertragen kann. Dieser Unterschied zwischen persönlicher Notwehr und sozial eingebetteter Nothilfe ist auch für die Friedensethik höchst relevant.[27] Zudem lässt sich die Rede von Tätern und Opfern in einer

[24] Vgl. Weingardt 2007, 379ff. – Erwägungen zur Umsetzung der Versöhnung in konkretes Versöhnungshandeln finden sich bei van de Loo 2009. Sie gliedert ihre Ausführungen durch die Unterscheidung zwischen dem personalen und dem sozialen Paradigma.

[25] Vgl. Lohmann 2020, 15–42. Er referiert als einen (berechtigten) Kritikpunkt an der Friedensdenkschrift der EKD von 2007, dass sie zu einseitig auf das Recht als den Königsweg zum Frieden fokussiert sei und die „Transformation der Herzen“ (32) durch kirchliche Bildungsarbeit hin zu einer „Friedensspiritualität (34) vernachlässigt habe. Keineswegs solle mit diesem Einwand die Friedenspolitik gegen diese Bildungsbemühungen ausgespielt werden, vielmehr müssten beide Ansätze „miteinander kombiniert werden“ (37).

[26] Körtner 1999, 133.

[27] So sind Luthers Ausführungen im 28. Abschnitt der Freiheitsschrift von 1520 zum Umgang mit einem Tyrannen, der unrechte Forderungen an den Christen stellt, für den einzelnen Christen wegweisend, für ein politisch verantwortliches Verhalten von Christen hingegen nicht: Der Christ solle diese Forderungen erfüllen, solange sie nicht gegen die Clausula Petri (Apg 5,29) verstoßen, weil das seinem Seelenheil nicht schaden könne (vgl. WA 7, 36f.). Die Sachlage würde sich jedoch ändern, wenn diese tyrannischen Forderungen das Wohlergehen seiner Mitbürger beschränkten. Sehr klar formuliert Luther diese Haltung in der Obrigkeitsschrift von 1523 mit Bezug auf die Anwendung von Gewalt: „Das Schwert soll kein Christ für sich und seine Sache führen noch anrufen; doch für einen anderen kann und soll er es führen, damit der Bosheit gesteuert und die Rechtschaffenheit geschützt werde“ (WA 11, 260, 17–20). Ob das Schwert das erste und das beste Mittel für solche Nothilfe ist, soll hier nicht diskutiert werden, an dieser Stelle gibt es Differenzen innerhalb der christlichen Friedensethik. Aber Konsens sollte (mit Luther) darin bestehen, dass man die politische Ebene nicht auf persönliche Verhältnisse reduzieren und sie auch nicht nach diesem Paradigma analysieren kann.

personalen Konstellation zumeist deutlicher, vielleicht sogar eindeutig, zuordnen, bei Gruppen hingegen gibt es weitere Differenzierungen (innerhalb der Tätergruppe bspw. zwischen Anstifter, Ausführender, Mitläufer, Gezwungener und Zuschauer), und es kann auch Täter in der Opfergruppe (bspw. Kollaborateure) und umgekehrt (bspw. Kollateralopfer eines Verteidigungsschlages) geben. Schließlich sind weder die Zuschreibungen noch die Ratschläge eindeutig adressiert; man kann eine Gruppe nicht gleichermaßen, also undifferenziert, als Christen oder als Schuldige ansprechen, desgleichen kann man nicht von allen Protagonisten dieselbe Motivation erwarten.[28]

Körtners Problemanalyse ist daher zuzustimmen, und auch ich kann keine Lösung anbieten. Wohl aber möchte ich Überlegungen vorstellen, ob man nicht im Anschluss an die christliche Typologie der Versöhnungslehre Impulse für das versöhnende Handeln von Gruppen, politischen Institutionen oder sogar Staaten empfangen kann. Angeregt worden bin ich zu diesen (vorläufigen) Erwägungen durch den sehr instruktiven Aufsatz „Ethik und Politik der Versöhnung. Prinzipielles zu einem aktuellen Thema" von Hans-Richard Reuter.[29] Er gewinnt einen Zugang zur Verhältnisbestimmung von Politik und Versöhnung durch eine Abgrenzung von Dietrich Bonhoeffer einerseits und Hannah Arendt andererseits. Während Bonhoeffers Rede von einer „Vernarbung der Schuld im politischen Leben der Völker" den Aspekt der Versöhnung naturalisiert und damit unterbestimmt habe, erhebe Arendt das Verzeihen allzu ungebrochen zum Modus politischen Handeln und werde damit der konstitutiven Bedeutung des Rechts für die Politik nicht gerecht. Reuter sucht nun gleichsam eine Schnittmenge zwischen Versöhnung und Politik und findet sie im Ziel der „Erneuerung der moralischen Ordnung durch Wiederherstellung reziproker Anerkennungsverhältnisse", für das vor allem Respekt bzw. Achtung nötig seien – und das gelte sowohl für die moralisch-religiöse wie für die rechtlich-politische Dimension.

Diesen hilfreichen Ansatz möchte ich leicht modifizieren, indem ich nicht eine Schnittmenge feststelle, sondern nach politischen Impulsen Ausschau halte. Der Begriff stammt aus der klassischen Physik und wird inzwischen auch im übertragenen Sinn verwendet. Er bezeichnet eine externe Anregung (mechanisch: Kraftstoß), aus der eine Veränderung resultiert – wobei die Veränderung nicht identisch ist mit der Anregung, sondern die Eigenheit (mechanisch: Beharrungskraft) des Angeregten einbezieht. Impulse sind dementsprechend dynamischer und flexibler als eine Schnittmenge. Zudem suche ich nach Anregungen in der Typologie christlicher

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[28] Nach wie vor instruktiv ist die Unterscheidung von vier Formen der Schuld bei Jaspers [3]2012 [1946]. Seine Differenzierung zwischen krimineller, politischer, moralischer und metaphysischer Schuld sowie der jeweils erforderlichen Reaktion (Strafe, Haftung, Buße und Selbstverwandlung) verdeutlicht, dass ein rein theologischer Schuldbegriff weder die kriminelle noch die politische Dimension umfasst, die aber im Bereich der politischen Ethik (namentlich im Umgang der Alliierten mit den Kriegsverbrechen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland nach 1945) unverzichtbar sind.

[29] Vgl. zum folgenden: Reuter 2002, 15–36, Zitate 23 (Vernarbung) und 29 (Erneuerung).

Versöhnungslehren, begebe mich also auf das Feld der Dogmatik. Denn diese Typen sind Reflexionen auf die erfahrene, zugesprochene Versöhnung, abstrahieren also schon von sich aus von den unmittelbaren, persönlichen Aspekten und suchen (in ihrer lebensweltlichen Umgebung) nach Begriffen und Modellen, um die evangelische Botschaft zu erläutern.[30] Dass also Gott in Christus die sündigen Menschen mit sich versöhnt, sie von ihren Sünden und vom Tod als der Sünde Sold befreit, sie gerecht spricht oder macht und sich damit als liebender und barmherziger Gott offenbart, gehört zu den Kernaussagen des Neuen Testaments. Dabei finden sich bereits in der Bibel unterschiedliche Lesarten dieser Heilstat Jesu Christi, die im Verlauf der Theologiegeschichte zu drei Interpretationen geronnen sind, die ich nun kurz vorstellen und auf ihre friedensethischen Impulse hin analysieren möchte:[31]

a. Befreiung und Erlösung: In der antiken Erlösungslehre wird der Tod Jesu Christi als Befreiungstat interpretiert. Der sündlose Gottessohn kann durch seinen Herabstieg in das Reich des Todes die Menschen aus der Macht des Teufels und des Todes befreien, weil diese bösen Mächte sich nicht an ihm und auch nicht an den Seinen vergreifen können. Ob man sich das als Betrug des Teufels oder als Auslösung der im Tode Gefangenen vorstellt, bleibt zweitrangig, in jedem Fall ist Gott der Sieger über die bösen Mächte und die Christen partizipieren an diesem Sieg – und das heißt: an der Auferstehung der Toten. Problematisch an dieser Lesart ist allerdings, dass Tod und Teufel gleichsam als Geschäftspartner Gottes anerkannt werden.

Eine friedensethische Implikation dieser Theorie ist beispielsweise von J. Denny Weaver entfaltet worden, indem er sie zu einer „narrative[n] Christus-Victor-Theorie“ weiterführt. Demnach sei die Gewaltfreiheit bei der Überwindung des Bösen das markante Merkmal dieser Christologie. Jesus Christus sei dem barmherzigen Gott treu gewesen bis zum Tod, er habe die politischen und religiösen Machthaber und ihre Vereinnahmung Gottes kritisiert, dagegen das Reich Gottes als hereinbrechende Größe gestellt, aber er habe dabei keine Gewalt angewendet, sondern lediglich passiven Widerstand geleistet. Durch die Auferstehung Christi seien die Mächte des Todes bloßgestellt worden, sie „macht den Unterschied zwischen der Gewaltherrschaft des Bösen und

[30] Grätzel 2018 hat die Rolle der Sprache als Weg zur Versöhnung betont. Durch die Macht der Sprache könne menschliche Entzweiung überwunden werden, indem Verzeihung zugesprochen (192) werde, ohne dass die Taten vergessen oder gar verdrängt würden.

[31] Ich folge dem Schema von Gustav Aulen. Inzwischen hat Mühling 2005 präzise aufgelistet, dass es mehrere Klassifikationsschemata gibt, die er dann anhand von zwanzig Fragestellungen systematisch darstellt. Da mein Fokus auf den (sozialethischen) Implikationen liegt, die von Mühling am Ende und recht kurz analysiert werden (354–356), reicht mir das klassische Schema von 1930 (Aulen 1931, 501–538).

der Gewaltfreiheit der Gottesherrschaft deutlich“[32]. Christen seien dazu eingeladen, dem gewaltfreien Weg Christi nachzufolgen und die Versöhnung als Befreiung von den bösen Mächten und ihrer Gewaltverstrickung zu leben. Versöhnung ist in dieser Lesart ein aktiver Impuls für Christen, sich für ein gewaltfreies Zusammenleben zu engagieren in der Gewissheit, dass genau das der Wille des biblischen Gottes ist.

b. Vergeben und Verzeihen: Die moralische Lesart bspw. bei dem Theologen Albrecht Ritschl im 19. Jahrhundert versteht Jesus Christus als Offenbarung der Liebe und Barmherzigkeit Gottes. Seine Verkündigung des Gottesreiches und sein gelebter Glaube, der unerschütterlich bis zum Kreuzestod am nahen und liebenden Gott festhielt, würden dem Menschen im Licht der Auferstehung eröffnen, dass dessen bisherige Vorstellung von einem zornigen und richtenden Gott falsch gewesen und Gott vielmehr barmherzig sei. Auch die nahezu dingliche Vorstellung von der eigenen Sündhaftigkeit würde durch solche Verinnerlichung eine Korrektur erfahren. Die Auferweckung des Gekreuzigten sei demzufolge die Verifikation seiner Verkündigung durch den von ihm verkündigten Gott. Diese falschen Vorstellungen von Gott und von sich selbst als Sünder seien gleichsam die innere böse Macht, die den Menschen blockiere und ein dementsprechend falsches Handeln evoziere. In dieser Lesart dominiert jedoch die ethische Perspektive so sehr, dass die eschatologische Dimension der Rede vom Gottesreich in den Hintergrund gerät. Die Verinnerlichung der bösen Mächte geht zu Lasten der Rede von der Überwindung des realen Todes.

Eine friedensethische Implikation, die mit dieser Lesart in Berührung kommt, ist die Entlarvung des gewaltaffinen Sündenbockmechanismus, die René Girard folgend im christlichen Glauben vollzogen wurde. Demnach würden Menschen sich einen Sündenbock suchen, um von der eigenen Gewaltverstrickung, die in der mimetischen Gewalt wurzele, abzulenken und die aufgestaute Gewalt bei ihm zu entladen. Die Kreuzigung habe genau dies offenbart, dass wir Menschen es seien, die einen Sündenbock für nötig erachten würden, nicht aber Gott, der vielmehr durch die Auferweckung diesen Mechanismus ad absurdum geführt habe. Nachdem der Sündenbockmechanismus durch das Kreuz Christi durchschaubar geworden, damit aber auch die durch ihn gewährleistete Gewaltbegrenzung weggefallen sei, bleibe nur die Botschaft von der Vergebung, die diesem Mechanismus vollständig widerspreche: Bei der Vergebung gehe es nicht um Rache für vergangenes Unrecht, nicht um Schuldzuweisung an andere und auch nicht um die Suche nach einem Sündenbock, sondern um die Freiheit, sich die eigene Endlichkeit, Fehlbarkeit und die eigenen Verfehlungen einzugestehen, sich also von der Selbstvergottung zu

[32] Weaver 2016, Zitate: 37 (Theorie) & 76 (Unterschied).

verabschieden und damit sich selbst zu relativieren.[33] Hier geht es also um die Befreiung nicht von äußeren Mächten, sondern von inneren Blockaden, von Feindbildern und Ideologien – und die Möglichkeit dazu ist die in Christus eröffnete Wahrheit Gottes, die uns von solchen Verstellungen befreit (Joh 8,31f).

c. Versöhnung und Satisfaktion: Die lateinische Lesart, prominent durch Anselm von Canterbury vorgestellt worden, betont, dass die Sünde der Menschen gesühnt werden müsse, weil nur so die Gerechtigkeit Gottes als Ordnung ernst genommen werde.[34] Wer Sünde als Verstoß gegen die Ordnung des Zusammenlebens ohne Weiteres und das heißt auch ohne Wiedergutmachung verzeihe, nivelliere damit auch die Relevanz dieser Ordnung. Jesus Christus als der Menschensohn habe die Sünde der Welt getragen, indem er die Strafe dafür am Kreuz erlitten habe – und zwar stellvertretend für die Sünder, weil er als sündloser Sohn Gottes den Tod der Gottesferne gerade nicht verdient hätte. Der dreieinige Gott habe auf diese Weise an sowohl seiner Gerechtigkeit wie seiner Barmherzigkeit festgehalten und die Sühne selbst vollzogen.[35] Kritisiert werden sollte an dieser Lesart vor allem die Akzeptanz der Todesstrafe und damit der Gewalt als göttlicher Reaktion auf die Sünde.

Eine friedensethische Implikation wird bei Pascal Bataringaya entfaltet, der die Aufarbeitung des Völkermords in Ruanda durch die Gacaca-Gerichte würdigte. Nur indem die Wahrheit der Täter wie der Opfer ans Licht gelange und rechtlich gewürdigt werde, werde ein versöhntes Zusammenleben der Überlebenden erreichbar. Die gesellschaftliche Integration der Täter sei ohne eine rechtliche Würdigung ihrer Verbrechen nicht denkbar, denn sonst würden ihre Verbrechen nivelliert und würden die Opfer nicht ins Recht gesetzt werden.[36] Versöhnung ist in dieser Perspektive nicht ohne Gerechtigkeit für Opfer und Täter und damit nicht ohne eine Bestätigung

[33] Girard 1994. Vertiefend dazu Petkovšek 2016, 35–48.

[34] Es gibt auch eine privatrechtliche Lesart der Satisfaktionslehre, wonach die Ehre Gottes durch den Sünder beleidigt worden sei, aber diese Variante soll nur angemerkt werden, weil sie für die friedensethischen Debatten nicht weiterführend ist. Eine pointierte Kritik dieser Lesart findet sich bei Friedrich Nietzsche: „Wie? Ein Gott, der die Menschen liebt, vorausgesetzt, daß sie an ihn glauben, und der fürchterliche Blicke und Drohungen gegen den schleudert, der nicht an diese Liebe glaubt! Wie? Eine verklausulierte Liebe als die Empfindung eines allmächtigen Gottes! Eine Liebe, die nicht einmal über das Gefühl der Ehre und der gereizten Rachsucht Herr geworden ist! Wie orientalisch ist das alles!“ (1976, 149).

[35] Die Betonung einer trinitarischen Lesart dieser Versöhnungslehre findet sich bei Wenz 2015, 258–277. Damit werde dem biblischen Befund entsprochen, wonach Gott selbst der Akteur der Versöhnung (und nicht das gnädig zu stimmende Objekt) sei.

[36] Bataringaya 2012.

der göttlichen und / oder rechtlichen Ordnung des Zusammenlebens realisierbar. Mit der Strafe geht zugleich die Reintegration in die Gesellschaft einher, so dass Täter und Opfer vor die Herausforderung gestellt werden, die Strafe als Sühne zu akzeptieren.

Aus der Typologie der Versöhnungslehre haben sich drei ethische Impulse ergeben. Zur Versöhnung zählen demnach die Gewaltfreiheit, das Aussprechen der Wahrheit als Befreiung von Feindbildern und ideologischen Verblendungen und die Gerechtigkeit als Bestätigung und / oder Wiederherstellung einer staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Ordnung.[37] Diese begrifflichen Präzisierungen sind aber in jedem Fall eingebunden in Narrative, so dass Versöhnung immer als Prozess und immer als situative Suche nach einer Verständigung zu denken ist.[38] Wer auf dem Feld der Politik das Böse mit Gutem überwinden möchte, möge sich also an der christlichen Versöhnungsbotschaft orientieren, aber sie ist – mit Charles Kimball gesprochen – eher ein Kompass und eine Landkarte als ein Befehl.[39] Sie zeigt uns einerseits unseren Aufenthaltsort an und weist uns andererseits eine Richtung hin zum Frieden – aber jeweils, ohne uns zu bevormunden.[40]

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[37] Daher stimme ich Wollmann 2007, nicht zu. Er hat Versöhnung lediglich als eine Verbindung von Ordnung (Gerechtigkeit, Strafe) und Freiheit (Kontingenz, Zusage) konzipiert, wobei der Freiheit die Priorität zukomme (172). Gewaltfreiheit und Wahrheit als Befreiung von Feindbildern und Ideologien als weitere Merkmale der Versöhnung werden damit aber zu gering veranschlagt.

[38] Kastner 2019, 29–44 eruiert, dass Transitionale Gerechtigkeit als Aufarbeitung einer ungerechten Vergangenheit weniger auf Recht, stattdessen auf Dialog zwischen Täter und Opfer sowie traditionelle, religiöse Bearbeitungsformen (32ff.) setze. Durch Agenten der Weltkultur (36f.: vor allem NGOs, die auf Menschenrechte setzen) sei das Versöhnungsparadigma globalisiert worden, so dass immer mehr Staaten trotz fehlender Durchsetzungskraft auf moralischen Verfahren wie friedliche Konfliktbeilegung, Wahrheitskommissionen, Erinnerungsorte setzen, um national (Garant einer gerechten Ordnung) wie international (good governance) anerkannt zu werden (41f.).

[39] Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil. Five Warning Signs, New York 2002, 189–191 mit allgemeinerem Bezug auf die Religion.

[40] Weiterführend ist die Auflistung von Handlungsmöglichkeiten, die Wüstenberg 2010, 79–98 vorgelegt hat. Um die von ihm analysierten Optionen der Strafverfolgung, der Generalamnestie, der Aufklärung (Wahrheitskommission), der Wiedergutmachung und des Elitenwechsels bewerten zu können, muss man einerseits die konkrete Situation analysieren und kann andererseits auf die drei aufgewiesenen Kriterien (Gewaltfreiheit, Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit) zurückgreifen.

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Theology, Torture, Terror, Policing: How not to Have Enemies or to Overcome Evil

Alistair McFadyen

I was very deeply honoured to be invited to give this public lecture on loving enemies as part of a programme of conversations under the theme of 'Overcoming Evil with Good'. As an academic theologian who works also part-time as a police officer,[1] this is a theme very close to my heart. It is a theme, in fact, close also to my body: sometimes uncomfortably so! This kind of conversation is also close to my heart: one that draws Christian faith and theology into dialogue with communities of secular, professional practice and the secular academic discourses that shape, reflect on and critique such practice. I am especially drawn to conversation with public institutions, professional practitioners and secular discourses that deal with human beings where we are most damaged and damaging; indeed, where we might speak of humanity itself as damaged or under threat of being deconstructed: where therefore we might feel compelled to speak of 'evil'.

So I was immensely excited to be in Jena with, amongst others, members of the *Bundeswehr*, colleagues from the *Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies* and from the *Theologische Fakultät*. But I am also more than a little humbled to be speaking about God overcoming evil precisely with you as my listeners. In my short time in Jena, my expectations were quickly and repeatedly confirmed about how much I have to learn from the military, from reconciliation work and from pastoral work: about what evil is in situations where it has taken extreme forms, deeply embedded in complex histories; about how it might be overcome; about what, indeed, it might mean to overcome evil; what the risks and costs might be of trying to overcome it. To put it more expansively, I know how much theology and Christian faith have to learn from secular practice, practitioners and discourses that engage the complex reality of evil, the brokenness and fragility of human beings and of the human good in the concrete realities of specific situations. There is much wisdom distilled through the other pages of this book that evidences and

[1] Opinions expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of either organisation I work for.

can help develop deep practical and theoretical understandings of at least the following four aspects:

- what evil is in concrete human reality;
- how difficult and costly it is to overcome;
- the danger of finding ourselves instead overcome by evil;
- that this danger is at its most profound and deceptive precisely where the evil we battle against seems so clear; where the purity and goodness of our mission might appear correspondingly unambiguous. (There is a reason why, despite justified feminist critique about its place in the tradition, pride remains a highly toxic sin for Christians, precisely when we are or think we are at our best and doing good.)

Like colleagues members of the *Bundeswehr*, pastors and those working on reconciliation in situations of conflict, police officers are professional practitioners whose work sometimes confronts them with situations of extreme, profound pathology: where human beings are both at their most damaged and damaging; where humanity itself – and not only particular human beings – seems to be at risk. These are situations where they might well find themselves reaching for the language of evil and also for strategies to oppose it – to be enemies of the evil, one might say. Commonly, in my experience, practitioners' use of the language of evil is prompted only in part by the perceived level of severity of wickedness, harm and damage they encounter. Alongside that is often an equally strong and deep sense of situational (and indeed also institutional) complexity and ambiguity that in its turn poses a different kind of risk, one that faces practitioners trying to tackle the 'evil' and damage in the situation as well as those in it. This is a risk that is both moral and spiritual (although that word itself might be avoided, especially in secular professions). That complexity and ambiguity makes it difficult either to discern or to do the good in a way that is not in turn misshaped by, bound up with or limited by the evil. This is what presents the moral & spiritual risk: situations inviting the label 'evil' tend to be exactly those that invite a response in us that shows itself to be at some point, in some way and to some extent overcome by the evil we seek to combat. Where extreme evil does not traumatise us into passivity, it can incite in us extreme and violent forms of response that often look as though they are also caught up in (bound to) the traumatising effects of the evil they seek to extinguish, overcome and be free from.

In other words, professional practitioners working in situations of evil know why the instruction, 'be not overcome by evil' is necessary: they are often keenly aware that being overcome by the evil they seek to combat is a real and present risk and danger in their work. I find they have often developed a special insight into what it means in reality to 'offer your very selves as a living sacrifice' (Rom. 12:1), a phrase that begins the same chapter of Paul's letter to the Romans that

closes with the imperative that leant our series of meetings its title: 'be not to overcome by evil but overcome evil with good' (12:21).

I point all this out because I want to ask (especially but not only) secular practitioners how you hear this Christian talk of overcoming evil with good. When you hear this verse from Romans, do you hear it as a sign that Christians have a firm grip on the complex, ambiguous reality of evil known to professional practitioners? Or does it sound to you like an example of Christian otherworldliness, of our being out of touch with reality, especially the reality of evil? Does it sound instead rather superficial, facile, trite, to think that we can know and do what is pure good and that evil will quit the field of battle as soon as the good shows up?

Any such suspicions or reservations you might have that Christian talk of overcoming evil tends too often to sound facile and glib is likely to be reinforced by its association with some of its core ethical tropes and the way in which they are commonly rendered. Loving enemies (the topic of this paper) is not least amongst these, but I include also the related tropes of forgiveness and reconciliation. In popular Christian discourse, it is common to find all three interpreted in a way presented as self-sacrificial love: an orientation towards offenders or enemies that creatively opens space for the construction of a new kind of relationship freed from the determinants of past actions or intentions. That orientation and commitment can and has led Christians to talk of and require forgiveness as though it does not involve judgement, and to speak of forgiveness as something that could and should be transacted immediately by victims. Correspondingly, reconciliation is sometimes interpreted in ways that require returning to or restoring a relationship without addressing power dynamics and associated patterns of victimisation. Combined with an emphasis on self-sacrifice and the sin of pride construed as any form of self-assertion, these ways of interpreting forgiveness and reconciliation have proved profoundly dangerous, most obviously in relation to victims of domestic violence. More generally, the urge to love, to forgive and to reconcile seem ungrounded in the realities of the situation, oblivious to the severity and nature of evil in it. Forgiveness and reconciliation on these popular interpretations invite suspicion that Christian love is not so much the creation of an alternative, creative possibility as the construction of a fantasy that dispenses with reality, especially the reality of evil: forgiveness appears easily as acting as though nothing bad has happened and no damage has been done; reconciliation, as the urge to return to an abusive relationship, as though the victim has power in the situation to reconstruct it through her witness of self-sacrificial love and humility, rather than that further embedding the pattern of victimisation. Similarly, loving enemies is interpreted often as a refusal to relate to the enemy as an enemy, such that enemies and enmity both disappear as soon as they are targeted by love. (Spoiler alert: I shall say more about this later and offer an alternative suggestion as to what loving enemies might mean that is more realistic and holds love and enmity together.)

On the other hand, for reasons I have already suggested, many Christians will celebrate precisely this apparent 'lack of reality' as a determined refusal to conform to the standards of 'the world': the positing of a counter-cultural option that creates genuine possibilities for positive transformation towards good in the face of evil by refusing to bow down to or be conformed to its inner logic. I suppose the question between these two ways of evaluating Christian opposition to evil is whether it will grip and transform reality. Or is it instead simply wishful thinking that fails to grasp how evil, evil really is and how ambiguous and fragile is our grasp on the good when facing it down, seeking healing and transformation.

The verse in Romans immediately before the instruction to overcome evil with good directly connects the strategic goal of overcoming evil with tactics that might further embed the position of both sides here. For there we hear an echo of the sermon on the mount's injunction to love our enemies and to pray for our persecutors; an injunction preceded by a direction to refuse to be conformed to 'the world'. The connection in Romans (written before the gospels) of enemy-love with the goal of overcoming evil by refusing to be conformed with the world evidences strongly that here we have values close to the heart of the earliest and enduring core of the Christian gospel. This is key to understanding God's ways with the world from a Christian perspective. Loving enemies occupies a central, even exemplary, position in this. I hope that spending a little time thinking about what it might mean to love enemies, and doing so in relation to a specific context (a context that we all share: the post 9/11 world) might provide a way for us to work at what Christian talk of overcoming evil might mean.

In the post-9/11 world, terror, torture and issues around the practice of enmity are very evidently intertwined. Terrorists enact enmity towards the states and communities they target (which they justify or rationalise as response to acts of enmity initiated by those states and communities). Especially under the Bush administration, torture was both widely discussed and also implemented as a legitimate tool against terrorist enemies in the so-called 'war on terror'. This advocacy of torture as a way of practising enmity against terrorists radicalised the suspicions held by some Christians against the practice of any form of enmity, whilst deepening their sense that the command to love enemies be understood as an alternative to enmity. So, love and enmity are then interpreted as zero sum choices: either love or enmity.

Torture as a response to terrorism looks very much like a case of being overcome by the evil that you declare your enemy. What looks like the intentional destruction of the humanity of a human being does, indeed, seem impossible to reconcile with any possible rendering of the word 'love'. That I completely accept. However, I want in this lecture to question the assumption that the command to love enemies be interpreted as a prohibition against having enemies or in any way practising enmity. The assumption that love is an alternative to enmity is evidently not universal amongst Christians. It is, however, in my experience very widespread. It perhaps will not surprise you to learn that a police officer is resistant to this interpretation and to abandoning the

attitude and practice of enmity. Possibly, you suspect that here the theologian has capitulated to the policeman. I hope that is not true. What is true, however, is that it was my own immersion in the practice of British policing that alerted me to the need for a rich, nuanced and complex theological understanding of enmity that might match, support and critique what I had come to understand through there (where the themes of torture and terror also acquired a specific significance). In particular, I had learned how two apparently contesting active orientations (love and enmity) could be held together, not only in policy but in practice: opposing others (sometimes forcefully), whilst at the same time maintaining a commitment to their humanity and dignity (I offer some examples of this at the end of the lecture). This seemed to me to be a concrete expression of what Christians might mean by loving enemies and invites an interpretation of the command, not so much as prohibition *against* having enemies, but as a theologically inflected way of *having* enemies, a reconfiguration of enmity by love.

Whilst I had been thinking along these lines already, the need to sharpen and develop a theologically grounded understanding of the confrontational aspects of policing became more urgent following the terrorist attacks on the London transport system 7 July 2005. For me as a police officer, as a Christian and as a theologian working and living in the city where the bombs were made and from whence the bombers came made my search for theological understanding, support and critique of policing more urgent and more sharply focussed on the theme of enmity. In perhaps a more obvious and more thoroughgoing way than is the case in relation to other forms of criminality, police action and orientation towards terrorists warrants characterisation as a form of enmity. Police officers adopt an uncompromising stance of active opposition to terrorists, who seek, not only to commit murder, but to disrupt the penultimate good of a reasonably just, decent, diverse and good social order. Terrorists are amongst those whose plans and purposes police work to thwart, disrupt and defeat; those we plan and prepare against and work to protect the public from; the effects of whose actions we aim to minimise; those we investigate and pursue, intending to bring to justice; whom we seek to divert from violence to democratic forms of articulation, engagement, protest, action (which police might then facilitate). Police officers are positioned unambiguously in a stance of enmity in relation to the terrorist.[2]

[2] To be clear what I mean by enmity here: a relationship of hostility at least in part constructed and consciously entered into from our side for certain specific and circumscribed purposes (preservation of life, prevention of damage, protection of the social order, bringing to justice), fundamentally hostile. That hostility includes preparedness to act against them using force, including under limited circumstances where others' lives are in immediate danger, lethal force (where loving enemies is most obviously set in the broader context of loving the neighbourhood – see further McFadyen, A. (2020) 'Loving the Neighbourhood, Loving Enemies: Towards a Theology for (and from) Policing' in Millie, A., ed., *Criminology and Public Theology: On Hope, Mercy and Restoration*, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 221–250.

However, when I turned for support to the theological literature on loving enemies, it was both striking and, I think, revealing how little sustained attention has in fact been paid in Christian theology or theological ethics (at least in English) to the question of what it might mean to love enemies, either before or after 9/11 or 7/7. Certainly, love of enemies makes frequent appearances in theological literature, but most often where the interest is more than with exegesis or the history of ideas (e. g., Horsley 1986; Kirk 2003), it serves as a gateway to discussion of other themes that then occupy the centre of attention and receive focal, substantive and substantial discussion: for example, non-violence, forgiveness, reconciliation (see, e. g., Swartley 1992; Cahill 1994; Bretherton 2011; Forest 2014). Typically, we pass through the portal of enemy-love too speedily to have paid any attention either to enmity or enemies (but note the exception of Piper 1980, 128–33). Both disappear from view as the discussion relocates to questions of principle around the use of force or violence or strategies for practising forgiveness or seeking reconciliation. Enemy-love tends immediately to be translated into and colonized by these other themes, so the questions around them (and indeed the nature of love) no longer appear framed consciously by the issue of enmity. It is difficult to avoid the impression that something is actively inhibiting Christians from maintaining attention on enemies and enmity, even where a discussion of these other themes is framed by the command to love enemies. Enemies and enmity seem to disappear discursively as enemies as soon as they are loved, as though Christians have some difficulty with making either love of enemies or enemies themselves the focal theme of discussion. At any time, it would seem curious that such a central, defining trope in Christian faith and ethics has not received more substantive and more frequent attention. It is more than curious that theologians and Christian ethicists writing in English seem not to have reached for 'love your enemies' to help us interpret and respond to the ways in which our world has been comprehensively reshaped since 9/11 by both terrorism and the response of our governments to it. (Johnston 2005 remains I believe the one focal discussion of enemy love in the context of terrorism.)

And so I turned to other theological discussions self-consciously situated in a post-9/11 and 7/7 context with the question of enmity to the fore. Having these specific questions and interests in mind raises questions and suggests answers about the absence of significant explicit discussion of enmity in Christian theology or Christian ethics, post-9/11. As I will discuss later in the paper, it might also help us understand the shape and underlying orientation of theological discussion of terrorism and torture in this context. Illuminated by the questions, concerns and interests that arose for me in a policing context, I shall suggest that dis-ease around enmity has shaped theological responses to terror and the so-called 'war on terror' in ways that are generally implicit and hidden, but which nonetheless sign the way towards Christian ways of having enemies and practising enmity.

Not only the world of British police officers, but – in common with everyone else – the world of Christian theologians and theological ethicists has changed since 9/11 and 7/7. Indeed, given

the explicitly religious identity-ascriptions and justifying rhetoric adopted by both Islamist terrorists and the United States' 'war on terror' (at least in its early iterations), one might expect Christian theology and ethics to have been repositioned and reshaped in their public responsibilities more directly, more urgently and more obviously than some other academic and practice-oriented discourses.

One might, therefore, expect to find a significant body of literature directly addressing the attacks of 9/11 or 7/7 in English-language Christian theology, theological ethics or theological engagement with public life. However, more than a dozen years after 9/11 had produced very little by way of direct reflection on terrorist attacks themselves: a scattering of perhaps half a dozen article-length responses in English; one full-length book (Chinnici 2002; Williams 2002; Cavanaugh 2004; Sobrino 2004; Johnston 2005; Davies 2006; Daponte 2009; Jones 2009).[3] The paucity of theological engagement with terrorism seems to me to be sufficiently striking to provoke a question. Is there a reason that theological attention has been turned so infrequently towards terrorists and acts of terror?

Pausing before framing an answer to compare the terror literature with that on torture in the same period is instructive. One difference between the two is immediately evident: in comparison with the literature discussing 9/11 and 7/7 in the same period, that on torture is larger (Elshtain 2003; Johnston 2005; Keller 2005; Bishop 2006; Cavanaugh 2006; Elshtain 2006; Gushee 2006; Hunsinger 2006; Ortiz 2006; Waldron 2006; McCready 2007; Cavanaugh 2008; Denton-Borhaug 2008; Gushee 2008; Hoffmeyer 2008; Hunsinger 2008; Porter 2008; Schweiker 2008; Daponte 2009; Cates 2010; Reeder 2010; Gudorf 2011; Gushee 2011; Biggar 2014).

Is that difference in quantity significant? A statistician would likely be unpersuaded: the numbers in both cases are small. However, if one reads into both literatures, it is clear that the difference between them is not only quantitative, but qualitative. The torture literature has a coherence absent from the discussions of the terrorist attacks. Almost every publication is explicitly threaded into a single conversation. Theological discussion of torture has a very long lineage, going back at least to Tertullian. Post-9/11, we see not only more works published on torture than on terrorism. We see also an increase in the density of discussion on torture compared with previous decades, which in fact makes very little reference to the previous history of the topic in Christian thought. With but one exception (Cates 2010) the post-9/11 English language discussion of torture has a single focus: the use of torture by the US against terrorist suspects. That sense of coherence is further amplified by the unity of purpose exhibited by all but two contributions (Elshtain 2003; Biggar 2014): theological critique of US policy and practice in relation to terrorist suspects and of the rationales and justifications that have been offered in

[3] The non-Islamist Oklahoma bombing is discussed just once, as are the 7/7 bombings. Other attacks or disrupted plots receive no attention at all.

support. Consequently, this literature is not a set of otherwise disparate individual contributions that happen to focus on the same topic and adopt a similar stance. This is an actual conversation, where authors cite one another and sometimes publish in the same place in direct engagement with one another.

That is a very different picture from the array of responses to the terrorist attacks. Those appear to be written in isolation, to be ignorant of one another (Daponte 2009 is the exception in citing Williams) and to be diverse in focus and intent.

Whilst our sample in both cases is small, I think the disparity in terms of the size of the two literatures might, nonetheless, be taken to be significant when read in light of the disparity in their levels of coherence. Read together, these disparities raise a question: why might academic theologians write more and with greater sense of coherence and unified purpose about torture as a response to terrorism, than about the terrorist attacks themselves? Why might we find it easier or more compelling as an act of situated, public theological responsibility to write critically about torture (of enemies) and torturers (and about the 'war on terror') than directly about terrorists and their acts of terror? I believe the answer to this question is related to widespread Christian unease about acknowledging enmity in general; unease which the practice of enmity in the post 9/11 and 7/7 world intensifies.

This might go some way to explain why torture (of enemies) has been both a more frequent topic of discussion amongst theologians and Christian ethicists than have terrorists or terrorist acts. It might also explain why so few of us have written about either.

Approaching the post-9/11 torture literature expectantly looking for enmity as an explicit theme in the discussion will disappoint. For, with just two exceptions in the theological literature on torture in the decade since 9/11 (Johnston 2005; Cavanaugh 2006), it makes no appearance. Is that an insignificant absence of a theme marginal or irrelevant to the main focus and purpose of discussion? Or is it what might be called the 'presence of an absence' (or the absence of something really present in trace, yet determining ways)?

A crucial clue that it might be the latter is provided by that one of only two exceptions: William Cavanaugh's 'Making Enemies: The Imagination of Torture in Chile and the United States' (Cavanaugh 2006). Significantly, the burden of its argument concerns the use of (and discussion of, development of policy and practice around) torture as a tool in the social imaginary: the discursive construction of enemies which serves an ideological function.

> Torture is part of this theatre of fear. … It is not simply that the demonization of people as terrorists allows us to justify their maltreatment (why should we bother with human rights when the enemy is subhuman?). Torture also helps create the enemies we need. Torture is a kind of theatre in which people are made to play roles and thereby reinforce a certain kind of social imagination. (Cavanaugh 2006, 313)

Here, the discursive justification for the torture of actual or suspected terrorists is resisted by applying a hermeneutic of suspicion towards the rhetoric of enmity on which it depends. The terrorist threat assessment – hence, the identification of enemies – is portrayed as either fictional or exaggerated. Consequently, terrorist suspects liable to torture tend to appear, not as actual, but as falsely identified, enemies. Hence, enmity is discussed in order to depopulate the text (and wider public discourse) of actual enemies and to counter enmity itself.

Whilst the text may be depopulated of *enemies*, it is implicitly populated by 'us'. The general context of Cavanaugh's article is the rhetoric of the US 'war on terror'; more specifically, that justifying torture. Its intended audience is those of us who are repositioned by that rhetoric in relation both to putative terrorists and to torture, by virtue of our nationality, religion or both. For the focus is *implicitly* as much on those of us structured into relations with others dominated by fear (and hatred) as it is *explicitly* on those who might be subject to torture as targets of this manufactured enmity. And it is the former who are directly addressed in an invitation to resist the rhetorical manipulation of fear of 'the other', a fear which structures us into a stance of enmity in this form (and hate, rather than love) in such a way that lends legitimacy to consideration of torture. Thus, enmity appears here as an *explicit* theme of deliberation only to be dismissed as an attitude appropriate for Christians in rhetorically manufactured circumstances. However, enmity does not only appear here as an explicit theme of discussion. It is present also as a background structuring reality: an actual structuring of relations between 'us' and 'them' in which we are implicated and to which the article is a response as a plea for resistance.[4] Similarly, in the rest of the theological literature on torture, we find specific and direct reference to aspects of US policy, practice or public debate post-9/11 – albeit absent any explicit reference to enmity or to enemies (Keller 2005; Gushee 2006; McCready 2007; Hunsinger 2008; Gushee 2011). For since 9/11 concern with torture is no longer for American (and other) Christians an expression of international solidarity with the victims of oppressive foreign regimes. Now it is a matter of what is being done in 'our' name against proclaimed enemies, sometimes using Christian symbols or traditions of moral justification (McCready 2007; Hoffmeyer 2008; Hunsinger 2008; Gushee 2011). Read in this way, what appears transacted under the surface of recent English-language discussion of torture is refusal of co-option into or complicity in enmity towards putative terrorist others. That can (as in the majority of texts) be expressed more in qualitative terms, as a concern about being co-opted into rhetoric and practice that demonises or dehumanises (Keller 2005; Schweiker 2008). Or it can be expressed primarily quantitatively (Cavanaugh), by

[4] Cavanaugh's 2006 article marks the way in which 9/11 repositioned torture as a topic of discussion in US academic discourse, including Christian ethics, since his earlier work: cf. Cavanaugh, W. T. (1998) *Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body of Christ*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Cavanaugh, W. T. (2008) 'Torture and Eucharist: A Regretful Update in Hunsinger, G., ed., *Torture is a Moral Issue: Christians. Jews, Muslims, and People of Conscience Speak Out*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 92–112.

focussing on the discursive, fictive construction of enmity, suggesting that, although such enemies might exist, their number is excessively exaggerated for political purposes. Either way, the existential situation out of and in resistance to which these texts are written is the experienced incorporation into the 'war on terror' in its 'crusade' against terrorist enemies. The quintessential expression of that 'war' might well be considered to have changed policy, practice, and public discourse regarding torture. Certainly, this is its expression closest to home, the expression seeking consensual incorporation of US citizens not otherwise directly involved.

What we see in Cavanaugh's text, where enmity is explicitly mentioned, provides an interpretive key that helps us see what is going on in the other texts, where enmity is not explicitly mentioned; where I suggest it is being (subconsciously) avoided. Are these texts not so much absent as strikingly depopulated of enemies and explicit consideration of enmity? Are the other discussions of torture as much *implicitly* propelled by aversion to being structured into a position of enmity in the context of the 'war on terror' as is Cavanaugh's text *explicitly*? Might enmity – or, perhaps better, aversion to and avoidance of it – operate subliminally as a structuring theme beneath the surface of the whole post-9/11 discussion of torture?

I suggest the theological discussion of torture might legitimately be read as a literature of resistance to the 'war on terror', to the dynamics set in place between 'loyal' (Christian?) US citizens and residents on the one hand and suspect or potential terrorist enemies on the other. This is a refusal, in other words, to have enemies (and 'friends', actually) like these and in this way: refusal of the polarised dichotomies rooted in friend–enemy. Primarily, we find a stance of advocacy on behalf of those vulnerable to a gross exercise of state power commended to citizens of the state who might agitate and organise on behalf of those who have been, are or may be subject to torture. Attention is primarily directed, therefore, for understandable reasons, to the articulation of legal-moral regulation of treatment of persons by the state and towards the appropriate attitude (protective love and solidarity) of Christians towards those who may be subject to torture. The torture literature is an indirect and mostly implicit articulation of Christian reservations about enmity – in which enmity and enemies only rarely make an appearance.

Consequently, actual terrorist enemies and the question of appropriate responses to them, largely disappear from the discussion, included – insofar as they are mentioned at all – as vulnerable victims (along with innocent potential victims of torture): putative or actual victims unjustly subject to treatment that is theologically, morally, and legally indefensible, regardless of whether they may or may not be involved in terrorism. But mostly the tenor of discussion assumes innocence, since even guilt cannot justify torture. For what it is worth, this is a view that I also hold.

However, I want to move the discussion forward more positively as I see it as a missed opportunity to think through and take more seriously the question that is hidden behind these texts: how should Christians HAVE enemies? That is a discussion that is inhibited from surfacing by the understandable dominance of the interest in proclaiming torture indefensible, regardless of

whether those potentially subject to it *are* actually terrorists or not. For the net effect is largely to exclude those who might actually be engaged in terrorism from consideration *as enemies* (indeed, as terrorists) and exclusion of the theme of enmity from explicit consideration.

Consequently, the critique of torture is not rooted in consideration of the obligations that might be owed enemies, but in the duties and obligations owed to all human beings *qua* human: a de-particularized and de-contextualized obligation rooted in a universal account of human nature. The emphasis is on our agency and the character of our action towards them (either as torturers or as those with political agency to lobby against torture), rather than as subjects of action (terrorism) themselves. The focus shifts from the acts and agency of putatively identified terrorists and *their* construction of the relationship between 'us' and 'them' to *our* own agency, the character of *our* action; the construction of the relation from our side.

In context, this is easily understood. Where torture is legitimised by framing relations through the language of enmity, the strategy is to resist the departicularising and often dehumanising discourse of enmity in favour of universalizing and affirming, protective discourses of common humanity and social solidarity. Where the rhetoric of enmity exempts from the bonds of human obligation, affirming the humanity of those excluded is in itself an act of discursive resistance. Moreover, continuing to speak of and identify enemies (even to love them?) evidently risks becoming trapped in the vortex of that gravitational pull. Hence, explicitly repudiating or avoiding acknowledging that some of those identified as terrorist enemies *are* either terrorists or enemies, reframes the terms of discussion and the relationship between 'us' and 'them'. Depopulating the texts of enemies and enmity represents, then, refusal to be positioned in a dichotomised us-them relation, as I have already suggested.

Turning with the heuristic key of enmity to the substance of the arguments presented against torture also suggests this negotiation of enmity might be underlying the texts. Torture is denounced as an assault on or deconstruction of the human, often expressed by reference to established tropes in theological anthropology, such as the *imago dei* (Hunsinger 2008; Porter 2008) and / or established principles in ethics or jurisprudence (Denton-Borhaug 2008; Hunsinger 2008; Gushee 2011). This often extends to a concern with the dehumanisation already imaginatively instantiated and discursively realised in articulating the possibility of torture to which prospective, but as yet unspecified, persons may be subject. Sometimes that is expressed as concern with what both actual torture or entertaining its legitimacy have already done to the social body (Cavanaugh 2006; Hoffmeyer 2008). It is no great stretch to render the dehumanising and demonising practices and attitudes identified and denounced in these texts as preparatory to or involved in torture as forms of enmity: exclusion and expulsion from the bonds, mutual obligations, and responsibilities, of both the social body and common humanity.

If this interpretation is correct, the experience of enmity is a significant, though largely unexpressed, structuring theme underlying the post-9/11 torture literature. Silence about enmity and

the absence of enemies in this discursive context paradoxically suggests their significance to the discussion. It is indicative, in fact, of high levels of discomfort around enmity and of the risks associated with its acknowledgment, the dangers posed by rendering the theme explicit.

In Cavanaugh's article, enmity is the explicit focus of discussion and is subject to negative evaluation. What is not entirely clear is how specific or how extensive this negative valorisation and resistance is. Is it only enmity as it features in the post-9/11 context justifying torture? Or is there a more generalised problem with enmity, now being applied to a specific context? The latter would go some way towards explaining the absence of explicit consideration of enemies and enmity in almost all of the theological literature on torture, the relative lack of attention paid to terrorists or terrorism themselves and the longstanding relative lack of substantive, sustained and focal attention to love of enemies as a central theme in theology and theological ethics.

Almost certainly, in a context where torture of enemies is seriously contemplated, the distinction between resistance to any and all enmity or to specific forms of enmity will appear moot; the ambiguity, irrelevant. Here, surely the imperative is not to have enemies and comprehensively to delegitimise enmity. In face of the urgency of preventing torture (Hunsinger 2008), it might seem a matter of purely abstract, analytic interest to clarify whether the alternative proposed is an alternative mode of enmity or refusal of enmity in any possible modulation.

I appreciate the force of this point. Yet I wish to press for further clarity for a number of reasons, not least because of the compelling urgency of our situation. Not only torture, but terror lends urgency to our situation. Enmity does not only refer to that stance of dehumanising and demonising opposition to terrorists proclaimed by advocates of torture, into which I risk being passively incorporated. It also refers to the equally dehumanising and demonising stance of the terrorist in which I am equally passively incorporated.

I have been suggesting the extent and content of post 9/11 discussion of torture and terror suggests Christian theologians and ethicists experience a heightened sense of discomfort and correlate responsibility around our enmity of others, relative to others' enmity towards us. In part, I suspect that reflects the way in which we see ourselves, and especially our agency, positioned in relation to both in the post-9/11 world. But at least as powerfully shaping, I suspect, are extra-contextual traditions of interpreting the command to love enemies which conflate the two: our responsibility in face of others' enmity is to refuse to mirror it. In that way, what would be required in acknowledging others' acts of enmity towards us seems identical to that required awareness of our being incorporated into attitudes of active enmity towards others (so unworthy of further attention): substitution of enmity with an alternative attitudinal stance. And is the name of that attitude, not love? Is love not the opposite of enmity, doing away with it? Thus is reinforced in this context the sense that retention of anything that looks like enmity would be both redundant and problematic in appearing to evidence an attitude unreconstructed through love.

Love of enemies is such a significant, distinctive trope in Christian ethics it is unthinkable it is not at least subliminally present, shaping discussions where enmity is either the explicit theme or submerged, structuring presence. It is, therefore, highly likely that discomfort about and avoidance of enmity, concentration on our enmity towards others, evidenced in the torture literature are rooted in it. Significantly, the command itself is paradoxical and presents an unresolved tension. On any conventional definition, love and enmity are oxymoronic in combination. Few treatments attempt to preserve the paradox, ambiguity and dynamic tension when working out what it might mean to love our enemies. Commonly, the supposition appears to be that there is a zero-sum choice between love and enmity, such that opting for love represents refusal of enmity and loving means – from our side at least – refusing to have enemies. Hence, we find in the tradition a source of lack of clarity about whether only *specific* or *all* forms of enmity are prohibited, alongside a tendency to assume something like the latter: that, with love, enmity and enemies disappear. Something like that interpretation, I contend, does seem to operate as an unexamined, background assumption in a good deal of theological ethics. It explains why we rarely find love interpreted as a qualifier of enmity, rather its antithesis; why we in fact so rarely find extended treatment of enmity under the heading 'love your enemies'. Both enmity and enemies disappear as soon as they are targeted by love, as though we are more conscious of the threat posed to love by enmity than of the power love has to reconfigure enmity.

It seems likely to me that the torture literature might reflect a deeper suspicion of enmity strengthened by the post-9/11 context: That all forms of enmity, not only those that countenance torture, are theologically problematic. Or, better, that any and all forms of enmity incorporate dehumanising and demonising attitudes towards the other (hatred rather than love); attitudes that always foster the sort of treatment of which torture is but one especially repugnant example.

Evidently, having some further clarity about the legitimacy of specific practices of enmity is as urgent in this situation for the police officer as is clarity about practices that might constitute torture and distinguish it from lawful and morally legitimate uses of force. I would contend that this is just as urgent a matter, however, for the theologian *qua* theologian and *qua* citizen. Clarity about whether we are to oppose terrorists and terrorism – whether we are to ***have*** enemies – and, if so, how love modulates the practice of enmity is a matter of urgent, fully contextualised theological responsibility.

Specifically, in a world in which there really are some people trying to blow other people up or shoot large numbers in crowded spaces – even if their number be exaggerated; their identification difficult; the causes and our complicity in them complex; the discursive construction of enmity in their regard dangerous. Given all those caveats: practising or failing to practise enmity against terrorists is urgent and hardly trivial. No less urgent than the need to prevent their dehumanisation and torture.

Our need as Christians and theologians to resist being structured into a stance of enmity that demonises and dehumanises; our obligation to resist torture; our bad conscience about being structured into a relation of enmity through the rhetoric of 'the war on terror': none of these obviate our responsibility to oppose and resist the demonization and dehumanisation that lie behind and are involved in terrorism; to prevent mass murder; to protect our communities, including of course those who suffer the backlash of white radicalisation that can also be a consequence of terrorism. The question is whether the exercise of both obligations conflict. Evidently, opposing and attempting to defeat terrorism requires recognition and reappearance of enemies and enmity. The interpretation of the command to love enemies, the negotiation of enmity I argue we encounter in the torture literature, suggests love prohibits and cancels enmity in all its possible forms and senses. Thus, is conjured the disappearance of enemies *as enemies*, making their reappearance a source of difficulty for us. To the contrary, might not *having* enemies be rather the *precondition* for loving them, not the cancelation of that possibility? What I believe I have learned as both theologian and police officer about enmity, love and torture (not only but not least in the context of the post-9/11 world) suggests such possibility be worthy of further exploration and explication. Moreover, this supposition (*having* enemies might be a precondition for *loving* enemies) might assist in framing Christians' contextual responsibilities in ways that are distinctively Christian, are more radical and certainly more realist than a zero-sum disavowal of enmity that leaves theologically unsupported those who position themselves in enmity against terrorists to protect the community and to bring them to justice.

I describe what I propose worthy of exploring as distinctively Christian for two reasons. First, it preserves the tension and paradox entailed in continuing to conjoin love with enmity instead of supposing they appear sequentially (first enmity, then love that does away with it). Consequently, second, it more powerfully suggests that the command frees us from the prevailing conventional definitions of both love and enmity; frees us, that is, from the world for the world. In so doing, it admits the possibility that positions that *look* radical in opposing love to enmity might be operating with understandings of both that afford priority of meaning to the 'natural' or 'worldly' apart from the transformative impact of grace. What *looks* most counter-cultural sometimes has an idolatrous tinge.

To put the same issue another way, such interpretation inhibits enmity from being redefined and reconfigured through its continuing in tense proximity with love; prevented also, therefore, from being drawn by the gravitational pull of love into its service. Thus, our understanding as well as our practice of enmity are left unmodified and unmodulated by love; similarly, our understanding and practice of love are neither modified nor modulated by their possible combination with enmity.

Might the injunction to love enemies present us with a more radical and more realist option? One that *combines* love with enmity (McFadyen 1990, ch. 6)? Thereby enmity takes a form

oriented towards the humanity and the otherness of the other (set within the frame of a broader sociality which includes others and in which the enemy may also be incorporated), whilst love resists dehumanised and dehumanising expressions of this identity and of our current way of relating. This sort of interpretation, I suggest, better grounds, not only resistance to terrorism, but also more effective resistance to torture; to the dehumanising rhetoric of the 'war on terror', its assumed universal definition of what enmity means and entails. Moreover, recognising terrorists as enemies but subjecting enmity to love compels towards more expansive consideration of legitimate practices of enmity, beyond the provision that enemies be not subject to torture. It involves a more comprehensive comprehending of the social form of the good to which we ourselves, our enemies, our love and enmity might be related. And it is on the basis of that social form of the good, that our identification of enemies and our practice of enmity and of love will have to be justified.

I acknowledge this is not a novel idea. The injunction to love enemies is the often-submerged subtext of Christian debates around the issue of violence, which can be re-presented in the language of enmity, rendering the theme explicit. The options of both just war and pacifism may helpfully be understood as representing different practices of resistance to evil and evil-doers (enmity), shaped through love. (The revealing recent exchange between Nigel Biggar and Richard Hays can be read in this way, for example: Biggar 2009; Hays 2009; Biggar 2010; Hays 2010) In my view, that discussion could often be clarified through translation into the specific language of enmity. The same pertains in relation to theological engagement with the post-9/11 world, not least its consideration of torture if we interpret the proposed antidotes to malicious and malignant enmity in the torture literature as aspects of a form of enmity qualified by love, rather than alternatives to enmity. Read in this way, post-9/11 theological discussion might lead towards a more realistic and more radical understanding of the command to love enemies. Hence, 'solidarity', 'love' and 'justice' might be read together as indicating an alternative way of having enemies without attendant demonisation or dehumanisation, rather than as an alternative to having enemies.

Once we look for it, I think we can see the same intentions in underlying the much smaller set of post-9/11 texts that explicitly discuss acts of terrorism and terrorists. As I have indicated, this set represents idiosyncratic engagements, rather than a cohesive discussion. For that reason, it is difficult to generalise – except in the one, rather obvious point, that all are written out of an at least implicit consciousness of being structured into a relation of enmity by terrorists, whose attacks declare us all anonymous enemies and potential victims. Read through the hermeneutical key of enmity, here we find resistance to the way in which the rhetoric of the 'war on terror' tempts us to mirroring forms of retributive violence, uncontrolled by concern with justice, proportionality, or humanly transformative outcomes. Having been structured into a relation of enmity by the terrorists, we find in resistance to the lure of the 'war on terror' that same refusal

to be structured into the modes of enmity encountered in the torture literature – presented here as a salve to trauma. Here, however, refusal to be suborned into enmity as commended by the 'war on terror' cannot be interpreted as an alternative to acknowledging and having enemies (even where there is similar reluctance to speak explicitly in the language of enmity); rather, a different modality of enmity.

A clear illustration is again provided by a text by William Cavanaugh, one of two in this set where enmity appears in the title (Cavanaugh 2004). Cavanaugh's article proceeds on the uncomfortable but realist presumption of enmity and is best read as a discussion aiming to improve the quality of our enmity. It is a good and illuminating example of a text best read as resistance to the way in which those in the US (theologians included) are being positioned in relation to terrorists and terror through responses that declare the attacks acts of war and thereafter declares 'war on terror'. Since Cavanaugh is clear that terrorist acts are 'evil' and undeserving of the dignity he believes conferred through their designation as 'acts of war' (Cavanaugh 2004, 29, 32f.), his preference for a criminal / legal framework cannot be construed a *denial* of enmity. Whilst this is not the main burden of his argument, and these not its terms, it is best read as an argument against particular *qualities* of enmity (and, indeed, for other qualities of enmity instead) rather than blanket refusal of enmity in any and all forms. Whereas, on his (somewhat tenuous) reading, designating terrorist acts as acts of war extends them illegitimate dignity, he is rightly concerned that the consequent rhetoric directed towards enemy belligerents ironically does not dignify at all. Rather, it demonises. And in that demonisation, enmity exhibits a pathological quality, the antidote to which is enmity of a transformed and transforming quality.

Switching to a legal / criminal frame seems intended first to restrain and then direct victims' response away from retributive vengeance (that mirrors the enemy's enmity of us) towards the demands of justice, both narrowly and broadly construed. From that might we infer something more is signalled beyond resistance to demonisation and dehumanisation? Bringing offenders to justice entails taking their humanity seriously whilst in a stance of opposition in at least holding offenders accountable for their actions. But as we move from a narrower legal to broader conceptions, it also requires opportunities for terrorist suspects (and others) to narrate their actions and motivations in a more expansive context of explanation and meaning. Within the stance of enmity towards terrorists, understanding their motivations, their enmity, as human, and therefore as comprehensible and in part conveying legitimate grievance and critique, seems a recurrent feature of the terror literature (e. g., Sagovsky 2002). Once we are alert to it, it is not difficult to find it beneath the surface of the torture texts too. Cavanaugh describes it as a 'penitential' approach to terrorism (Cavanaugh 2004), one which combines opposition to enemies with confession in what must be a seeking of our humanity together. Enmity in the service of and moderated by love, perhaps?

In these observations, I propose we have the beginnings of a way of holding enmity and love together in tension. That might prove capable simultaneously of funding theologically grounded resistance to torture, as well as theological support for (thus might shape) the tasks of protecting the community against and preventing terrorist attack, pursuing terrorists to bring them to justice. Here is an intimation of an understanding of enmity and of love of enemies that better matches the ambiguities, nuance, and complexity of our situation – in which we are subject equally to the acts of terrorist enemies and to noxious modalities of enmity in response to the realities and perceptions of that threat.

In noting the significance of acting against terrorists with the intention to bring them into the criminal justice system, we are already straddling the boundary between the world of theological discourse and my second community of practice: policing (See further McFadyen 2020). Bringing offenders to justice entails implicit acknowledgment of their humanity. It is a process that engages their self-understanding and narration of reality and truth from their perspectives, so that motivations and the broader context of offending, for instance, can all be understood. The offender and situation are interpreted as humanly understandable, and not as expressions of some demonic, inhuman force. And they will be subject to judgement as such.

Can use of force and deprivation of liberty – practices of oppositional, confrontational enmity – in themselves (and not only as instruments towards an end that might be described as loving) be characterised as, shaped by, love, that carries the wellbeing (if not flourishing) of the suspect / offender within them? Limiting the use of force to what is necessary, reasonable, and proportionate in the circumstances (minimum level to achieve a lawful purpose) and in the interests of the neighbourhood (that which has lawful purpose such as preventing harm, damage, loss, or to effect arrest) is one way in which the wellbeing of the suspect – and their humanity – routinely enters police decisions regarding use of force. It is an at least minimal expression of love. Similarly, cessation of use of active force once compliance or control are gained is another significant test. Where control is achieved, absent continuing resistance, further active application of force would not only be unlawful but should be understood as torture, no matter how minimal. It is important that police operate with a far lower-level definition of the acts that constitute torture than is conveyed in internationally agreed conventions. It is neither the intensity of pain nor the level of violence that constitute torture for a police officer, nor yet their instrumental purpose. Rather, the one sufficient condition for force and violence to constitute torture is the achievement of physical control and power over the suspect / offender. At that point, the same act that would previously have been lawful and not dehumanising or degrading (say twisting partially or completely applied handcuffs to gain compliance or to use body mechanics to bring to the ground) becomes unlawful and dehumanising violation. Instead, when control is achieved or surrendered, where a suspect is completely in the power of the officer, there is a transfer of correspondingly absolute responsibility for the suspect's (now the officer's prisoner) wellbeing.

This includes, but is not limited to, the vulnerability created by police action, including use of force. It extends to the meeting of the detained person's physical needs (treatment of injuries, provision of food and water) but also their immediate psychological and emotional needs. Again, this is short of an orientation towards full flourishing, but it is a necessary condition at the very beginning of that continuum – a recognition of humanity and human need and recognition to take responsibility for the person of the other (that is typically continued whilst queuing in custody, where very human interactions regarding the prisoner's general situation and hope for the future and possible options for support might be explored).

At the same time, this is still a confrontational practice and is likely still to involve some use of force sufficient to negate risk of escape and of the officer being subject to violence or resistance. Moreover, the outcome is likely to be the journey towards formal police detention in the cells for the purposes outlined in the foregoing discussion (creating investigative space) and thence to bring to justice. So, handcuffs are likely to be and to remain applied, the person searched for weapons and possibility of escape negated by the officer maintaining physical advantage. For example, British officers are taught to switch immediately from aggression to caregiving after deployment of incapacitant spray, expressing care and reassurance, but also maintaining readiness against attack when the effects wear off. This is a practise of enmity that can be (and routinely is) combined with humanising practices oriented towards the wellbeing of the suspect / offender that might helpfully be characterised as forms of loving care.

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Aspects of Dealing with Evil in Israelite-Jewish Tradition[1]

André Zempelburg

Introduction

Apart from prominent exceptions as the questionable adoption in western politics ("axis of evil") or Susan Neiman's famous philosophical piece *Evil in Modern Thought* (2002), "evil" is not really a popular topic or concept in the 21st century and often reduced to evaluate negative moral behavior (cf. Oxford Dictionary; cf. Gabriel 2020). But from a cultural and religious perspective "evil" as topic and as well as concept has an age-old (heterogenous) tradition.

Within the frames of religions or even before, myths were created around or related to "evil" and passed down in varying narratives. Because of this huge difference one should refrain from making general assumptions about *evil in religions*. But one exception might be allowed: religions, which are dealing with "evil" have already accepted the idea that there is something to be called "evil", i. e., that *there is* something in this world which is referred to as "evil". But if there is—from the point of view of a particular religion—something to be called "evil" in this world, which is most of the time perceived negatively, then it seems plausible that the *homo religiosus* almost automatically tries to find a way of dealing with it, i. e., overcoming it.

In the following I intend to present and discuss three prominent cases of dealing with "evil" in the Israelite-Jewish tradition, which surely present possibilities of *overcoming* "evil", but not with "good", if "good" is understood as a kind of tool—so much can be revealed here already.

[1] Special thanks go to Phillip Tolliday, whose comments and querys about this text were extremely helpful.

The Ritual: Dealing with Evil

In order to answer the question of how to *Overcome Evil with Good*, or at least to get closer to an answer to this particular question, starting in Ancient Israel might not be everyone's first choice. Admittedly even less likely, if it is about reconciliation of two parties, more precisely described as *atonement* in its original sense, namely *to be* or *to become one* (again)—*at-one-ment*—and those two parties are man and the divine, the God of Israel.[2] But in Ancient Israel reconciling with the divine or be atoned by it, is not just an idle matter. Rather it is a necessity, if the "people of Israel", the body of people, individuals in a pre-modern sense, is interested in keeping on living. That might sound even weirder to modern-day readers, but according to the understanding of Israelite people, at least to the one connected to the priestly world-view, by giving the Torah to the people, God gave the people of Israel a particular *Lebensordnung*—order of life—, that is a kind of code to govern nearly every aspect of everyday life, according to which everyone has to orient his or her life accordingly and outside of which living is impossible.

In the event of transgressing this order of life reconciliation is the only measure to which we may resort to get back into the frame of the order of life, since by transgression life is forfeited. Once a year on the 10th day of the 7th month, i. e. in early autumn according to the Israelite and later Jewish calendar, the high priest representing the entire people celebrates a complex ritual consisting of several rites to ultimately achieve atonement granted by the God.[3] The core element of the ritual is the use of blood as the seat of life in order to not just purify the holiest places of the temple complex, which are the *Holy of Holies* (קדש הקדשים) with the *Ark of the Covenant* (ארון הברית) inside of it and the *Altar of burnt-offering* (מזבח העלה), but to give back life from particular, i. e. divinely chosen animals, as a ransom for the forfeited life of the people.[4] Taking the textual evidence seriously atonement happened by or during the sprinkling of blood on the *Ark's cover* (כפרת) and seven times in front of it (cf. Lev 16:14, 15, 16) and finally by putting blood on the four horns of the *Altar of burnt-offering* and sprinkling seven times over it (cf. Lev 16:18, 19).[5]

The idea or conviction of giving *life for life* is not the only challenging and at the same time culture-defining concept—until today—found in Lev 16. The other is that of the often-misperceived "scapegoat", which is not at all a sacrifice for one's sake, it is not purifying from sin nor atoning, since the scapegoat is neither slaughtered, therefore its blood is not used for whatever

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2 Cf. Lewis 2012, 195.

3 On the meaning and centrality of the ritual in Ancient Israelite religion see Schmitz 2006, 129. A sacrifice to 'redeem the community of its guilt' in an absolute, time-transcending sense is not known in Ancient Israel and in Judaism (cf. Neuwirth 2002, 61).

4 Cf. Zempelburg 2019, 68–125; Cf. Janowski 1982.

5 Cf. Zempelburg 2019, 87–88.

ritual purpose, nor burned on the *Altar of burnt-offering*.[6] The rite connected to the send-away-goat (scapegoat) consists basically of three steps: 1st) confession of transgressions, 2nd) putting them on the goat and 3rd) sending the "heavily" loaded goat far away into the desert where it should succumb to the desert's barrenness, an effect of the heat causing drought. To the modern-day reader this might probably sound odd. Therefore, some explanation is needed.

But before we get into the explanation of the previously summarily-described three steps of scapegoat-ritual, one further preliminary remark should be made: the whole ritual is done in the times of Ancient Israel by one elected person—the high priest, represented in the Torah by Aharon, the brother of Moses and Miriam and the archetype of the priest. Still, in Lev 16 the described ritual can be abstracted from one special person to many or basically everyone, which was done after the destruction of the second Jerusalemite Temple, if not already before.

At first the one, who—and this should be clear from the beginning—transgressed or sinned has to publicly, i. e. audibly, observably, for everyone around, declare his (or her) unintended and intended transgressions or sins—this could be equated with moral evil—or of those, he or she represents.[7] This is surely very different from what Hannah Arendt was referring to—the greatest evil—, because according to Arendt "the greatest evil perpetrated is the evil committed by nobodies, that is, by human beings who refuse to be persons."[8]

> "… I am certain that the greatest evils we know of are not due to him who has to face himself again and whose curse is that he cannot forget. The greatest evildoers are those who don't remember because they have never given thought to the matter, …".[9]

Very much the opposite is the case here, the transgressor is or, if some or many, they are aware of their deeds—no matter if they were unintended or intended.

The second and third steps of the scapegoat-ritual are more closely connected to each other than the first is to the latter two. The elected, he himself a transgressor or sinner, as was made clear before, or *the* representative of transgressors / sinners is loading—in a very literal sense—the materialized transgressions or sins onto the goat like a package or bag filled with whatever. This implies that transgressions or sins, the unintended or intended evil deeds, are not to be understood as simply abstract or to be confused with imagination without any dimension of existence. According to the people of Ancient Israel, at least from the priestly-theological point of view, transgressions / sins / the committed evil has no less reality than oneself or the heavens and

6 Cf. Zempelburg 2019, 89–91, 104–110.

7 Cf. Bautch 2012, 34.

8 Arendt 2005, 111.

9 Arendt 2005, 95.

the earth, etc. But the very moment it was realized that the wrong, which was done in the past, truly exists, the necessity of getting rid of it arose. That should not be surprising, since the evil around—in form of deeds and on a structural level—is contaminating, it corrupts people and provokes further transgressions, destabilizes society, which might eventually collapse—unleashed evil without limitation is ultimately fatal. Hence, it should now be understandable why the goat, which is surely neither sacrifice nor substitute, being burdened with all the transgressions / sins / evil deeds done by a people, is sent to a faraway place, at a distance from civilization.[10] Now, being reconciled with the *order of life* guaranteeing God and the previously committed wrong sent to no man's land, civilized life—on a personal or inter-personal level—gets another chance, people can learn from their evil deeds and do better, maybe even *good*, in the future.

To sum this up briefly: transgressions in Ancient Israel—and until today in Judaism—have to be publicly confessed, at the latest and especially on Yom Kippur. That means that one must become aware of what he or she was doing in the past and has to be honest about it. In a second step one has to let go and get rid of it. That does not mean that the committed transgressions / sins / evil deeds simply vanish like they have never happened, but they need to leave the *anthroposphere* to give human coexistence another chance.

Rewriting the Past: The Evil Instinct is Good

In his incisive chapter "Dialectics of Desire" in one of his early works called *Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture*, Daniel Boyarin shows that the Rabbis in antiquity had very different starting points in reflecting on Good and Evil. Certainly, Boyarin does not fail to admit that some Rabbis thought of Good and Evil as two opposing entities of a—in general—dualistic *Weltanschauung*. But "dualism" was not the only *a posteriori* access to the world among the Rabbis and way they were reflecting about the very same. The other approach according to Boyarin is to be called "dialectical", i. e., Good and Evil are nothing else but two sides of the very same coin, both are inextricably linked to each other.

Boyarin's interpretation starts by closely reading a passage from the Babylonian Talmud or Talmud Bavli on Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, on which one has to finally reconcile with another who was transgressed by the former to ultimately gain God's forgiveness and to be inscribed into the book of life for another year. The first section of the passage (bYom 69b), which Boyarin thinks "is a true myth,"[11] is about the inclination of idol worshipping, which according to the Rabbis is the original reason for the destruction of the Jerusalemite temple, the killing of the righteous and Israel's

[10] Cf. Janowski 1982 / 2000, 220f.; cf. Wright 1992, 73; cf. Sperling 2007, 492f.

[11] Boyarin 1995, 62.

exile –היינו האי דאחרביה למקדשא וקליה להיכליה וקטליהו לכולהו צדיקי ואגלינהו לישראל מארעהון. The second section is about the *inclination of sin* or more literally: the *inclination of transgression* –איצרא דעבירה. For the sake of clarity and completeness, as well as for those not familiar with the passage, referred to here, I will cite bYom 69b according to Boyarin's translation:

> "[1] 'And they cried out unto God in a loud voice' [Nehemiah 9:4]. What did they say? Rav (and some say Rabbi Yohanan) says: 'Woe, Woe: This is the one who destroyed the temple, and burned the Holy Place, and killed all of the righteous ones, and exiled Israel from their land, and still he dances among us. What is the reason You gave him to us? Is it not to receive reward [for resisting him]? We don't want him or his reward!' A sherd fell from heaven with the word 'truth' written on it. *Said Rav Hanina: Learn from this that the seal of the Holy Blessed One is truth!* They sat in fast for three days and three nights, and he was given over to them. A figure like a lion of fire went out from the Holy of Holies. A prophet said unto Israel: 'That was the Desire for worship of strange gods, as it is said, *This is the evil*' [Zach. 5:7]. While they were capturing him, a hair was pulled from his head. He cried out, and his voice carried four hundred parasangs [The entire distance from heaven to earth is five hundred!]. They said: 'What shall we do? Perhaps, God forbid, they will have pity on him in heaven.' A prophet said to them: 'Throw him into a leaden pot and stop up his mouth with lead, for lead absorbs sound, for it says, *This is the evil, and he threw the leaden stone into its mouth*' [loc. cit.].
>
> [2] They said, 'Since this is a time of [God's] favor, let us pray regarding Desire for sexual sin.' They prayed and he was committed into their hands. He said to them, 'Be careful, for if you kill that one, the world will end.' They imprisioned him for three days, and then they looked for a fresh egg in all of the Land of Israel, and they did not find one. They said, 'What shall we do? If we kill him, the world will end. If we pray for half [i. e., that people will only desire licit sex; Rashi], in heaven they do not answer halfway prayers. Blind him and let him go.' At least, a man does not become aroused by his female relatives."[12]

While the first section of the story retrospectively tries to explain why Jewish people are no longer attracted to idol worshipping—Boyarin deems this section a "etiological myth—, the second section is about the intention of getting rid of a certain here totally personified inclination causing sexual transgressions, with the propagated result of ending the world of man, since procreation would come to an end.

[12] Boyarin 1995, 61.

> "The dark and strange tale is the way that the Rabbis of the Talmud communicate their deepest thoughts on human psychology and especially the complex notion of the *Yetser Hara*ᶜ, usually translated as the 'Evil Inclination,' is one of the most intriguing formations in talmudic culture and one, I think, that is easily misunderstood."[13]

According to Boyarin's reading, the phrase of "halfway prayers are not answered"[14] is the hermeneutic key to the whole section. Since the *Yesær ha-rāv*, to be translated as "Evil Inclination" or "Evil Instinct" or, according to Boyarin, "Evil Desire," is not at all one side of a *dualism of Good and Evil*, but the dialectical anti-thesis to the *Yesær tōv*, the *Good Inclination* or *Good Desire*, or to put it differently: according to the Rabbis (in bYom 69b) the desire of man is *one*, not two. That means that there is no Good Desire without the Evil one and vice versa. Applied on the quoted passage from the Talmud Bavli, it can be said, that the sexual desire of man or in the desire of man in general cannot be reduced or limited to one aspect without vanishing altogether. And as long as there is desire, the possibility for destructive and lawless effects is given and that is, according to Boyarin, what gives the *Yesær ha-rāʿ*, the *Evil Inclination* or *Desire*, its name.

Consequently, in the *Weltanschauung* of the dialectically thinking Rabbis a *power of evil* or *evil entity* does not exist at all and could not exist, since everything there is came from God, who is axiomatically understood as *good*—the etymological correlation of 'god' and 'good' in the Germanic languages is apparent.

> "In contrast to other religious formations around and among the Rabbis (including Jewish ones), which held that there were opposing forces of good and evil in the world, the Rabbis insisted that everything came from God, and since everything came from God, then everything was good."[15]

In a very peculiar way the rabbinic perspective is expressed in a kind of transvaluation of values in the Midrash Bereshit Rabbah (9:7)—there it says:

> "Rabbi Nahman, son of Samuel, son of Nahman, in the name of Rav Shmuel, son of Nahman, says: '*Behold, [it was] very good!* That is the *Yesær tōv* (i. e., Good Inclination), and: '*Behold, [it was] very good!* That is the *Yesær rāʿ* (i. e., Evil Inclination)."'[16]

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13 Boyarin 1995, 62.

14 Boyarin 1995, 62.

15 Boyarin 1995, 63.

16 רבי נחמן בר שמואל בר נחמן בשם רב שמואל בר נחמן אמר הנה טוב מאד זה יצר טוב והנה טוב מאד זה יצר רע.

The quoted midrashic passage refers to the moment following the creation of man—the final act of creation in the priestly creation myth (Gen 1:31)—, when God for the last time in that process looked back and evaluated his own making. While he deemed the rest of what he was creating "good," the creation of man he deemed "very good." Since, according to the priestly creation myth and probably different to the one of Adam (cf. Gen 2), man is an ontological unity, his inclinations as intrinsic aspects of his being are one as well. And since man is deemed "very good" by his maker, his inclinations are as well. Both are peculiar to the human being and neither of the two inclinations dominates at the beginning of the creation of man.[17]

Hence, if there is no ontological difference between the *Good* and the *Evil Inclination*—or "Evil Desire" as Boyarin designates the concept of *Yesær ha-rāʿ*—they are in fact the same. So, why did the Rabbis retain the terminological distinction? Boyarin's hypothetical answer to this question is

> "that the Rabbis inherited the term 'Evil Instinct' from first-century Judaism much more averse to sexuality than they were, and unable to dispense with it, they ironized the term—'The Evil Instinct is very good'—and rendered the concept itself dialectical—blind in one eye, as it were."[18]

Surely, the Rabbis weren't blind at all to the destructive forces, which could be unleashed by the human inclination, the evil deeds man is capable of doing, but at the same time the Rabbis appreciated the necessary life sustaining dimension to it. According to rabbinic understanding, the human *Yesær*—inclination, instinct or desire—is the driving force of the human being. So that means that the "potential for evil," not the essence of evil, is by its nature inherent in the human *Yesær*, but also the potential for good; and not to be forgotten, the human *Yesær* is the driving force leading man to study Torah, learning what someone should do and ought not to do—in terms of Good, ultimately inscribed in the nature of God.

By ironizing the concept of the Evil Inclination and, therefore, ultimately the concept of Evil itself, the Rabbis overcame Evil with Good first and foremost on a textual level. But by doing so they were shaping perception and thought on Good and Evil one way or the other of generations of readers—students and scholars alike—of the previously quoted Midrash and other passages of rabbinic literature. Eventually, they were removing the basis for an essence of Evil. Therefore, Boyarin is right, when he points out that "just as the term 'Evil Desire' is turned on its head by midrashic manipulation, so can its very evil be turned to good by psychological-spiritual manipulation."[19]

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17 Cf. Zempelburg 2019, 144f.

18 Boyarin 1995, 63.

19 Boyarin 1995, 64.

The Myth Remains: Evil in Front of Your Door

Finally, I will give a (close) reading of Gen 4, the story of two brothers, which, according to my reading, symbolize the dichotomy of civilization and nomadism. The setting is strictly different from the one before, but similar to the former insofar it has to do with the human inclination and its effects—and Evil is in a certain sense omnipresent, but often rather subtly. The narrative leaves plenty of "gaps"—some of which I intend to fill, similar to midrashic readings of the past, but with a different methodological assumption.[20]

Immediately after man and woman, Adam and Eve, realized in the garden—they were originally sat in—that they were naked, the "man recognizes Eve, his wife" outside of it. Nobody had to tell them how to copulate—they just knew. Eva got pregnant—twice. She gave birth to Cain and Abel. The former worked the soil, the latter was a pastoralist. While Cain tends the ground from which his father was made and from which everything sprouts, Abel looks after the livestock, which is grazing the soil the older brother is working (Gen 4:1–2). Cain and Abel are symbolically the keepers of God's creation. They watch over a cycle that is highly fragile and at the same time the basis for the preservation of all living things. To put it simply, this can be described as follows: The soil produces all sorts of crops that serve at the same time as living space and food for rural life, regardless of their kind—including man. Whether due to external influence or at the end of a "natural" lifespan, every living being dies. The biomass is converted and returns to the earth in one way or another, that is, to where the human being has its origin, according to the Hebrew-Biblical account.

This cycle apparently continues for a long time undeterred, maybe for ages, if Cain and Abel are to be taken as symbols of human existence—agriculture versus pastoralism or nomadism.[21]

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[20] Cf. Boyarin 1994, 16.

[21] What should be noted here and according to my knowledge is—as far as I can tell—missed, is the possibility of reading the Cain-Abel-narrative not just as symbols of human existence, as I am doing in this paper, or even more generally expressed: reading the Cain-Abel-narrative as myth of human existence, but also as a biblical reference to Indo-Iranian myth of two opposing classes of gods, the Ásuras and the Daēuuas. The former will be represented in Zoroastrism Ahura Mazdā, i. e., Varuṇa in the Vedic religion. Ahura Mazdā's or Varuṇa's antipode are the Daēuuas or their leader Indra. Ahura Mazdā / Varuṇa stands for an established order connected to sedentarinism, while the Daēuuas and their leader Indra are standing for pastoralism (cf. Oberlies 2012, 62–65, 68, 100–101). And the former will severely criticize the latter for slaughtering animals for consumption and ritual (cf. Oberlies 2012, 63f.). Interestingly, both want to inherit "Father Heaven" (*diéus ph$_2$tḗr* / *dyáus pítaḥ*). The wisdom of this God of Heaven was inherited by an unknown god, probably called *Ásura, "Lord" (cf. Oberlies 2012, 65, 361 fn. 23) from whom Ahura Mazdā / Varuṇa descends. According to the *Rigveda* it is Indra killing his heavenly father Asura Dyaus, "Lord Heaven" and succeeds him (cf. Oberlies 2012, 99). The biblical account seems to respond to Indo-Iranian and Vedic religion in various ways: it seems that they

This nature-related sequence is also a culture-related one, because the human being—*homo sapiens* in an anthropological sense and Adam as the symbol of the biblical concept of man—has been a culture-creating creature from the very beginning. The term "culture" is derived from the Latin noun *cultura*, which can mean processing, maintenance, development, but also refinement and worship. Accordingly, the *cultor* or *cultor agri* or *cultor terrae* is the one who cultivates, maintains or even refines the field or the area—one should also think of the admirer of it. Seen in this way, we encounter Cain no more as the symbol of the raw and violent peasant—a term that is often used pejoratively, and not just in the sense of the proverbial "pawn sacrifice" in chess. *At this point in time, who can see Cain as who he is and not who he becomes or who tradition has made him?* As a creator of culture or its caretaker, he stands symbolically for the progress of civilization, whereby progress is by no means to be understood as a positive or negative evaluation. He paradigmatically embodies the human being who has ceased to be a hunter-gatherer, so he is not like the Cro-Magnon man of the late Pleistocene, but rather that of the Neolithic, more precisely Göbekli Tepes and Çatalhöyüks—the sedentary man who works the soil, takes care of it, harvests it, sacrifices a part of the yield to the gods, relinquishes plenty of it to his lords, is miserably satisfying his hunger, is building villages, then cities, even entire metropolises such as Çatalhöyük, Jericho, Babylon, Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, is ultimately enslaved by the grain, physically tormented and broken, finds his salvation in the last breath of life.

Herein lies, certainly anachronistic, a representation of modern and contemporary man who is at home somewhere, "works hard" and is somehow culturally rooted—he is doing things others do as well. These others are in fact different from the individual, indigenous, culture-creating subject—at least they are not identical with it—, but at the same time they are not so fundamentally different that they are categorized as strangers by the cultural subject. Rather, both groups are connected by "blood and soil," a certain kind of shared culture. Apparently only the strangers stand out all alone among those who look different from yourself—more precisely, different from the image that the subject makes of himself—and these are actually all, it might even include your own twin. The other becomes the stranger, i. e., he does not belong to the in-group, already because he was not during the subject's lifetime located where the subject saw himself located. These nomads, these wanderers, seem to enter an area that belongs to a particular subject or community of them, just because they have taken care of it—property through care or culture in the Latin sense. And now there are those who did not take part in taking care—who were not involved in *cultura*—, who did not sweat and bleed for it, were not wounded or died for it, but they want something—at least it seems so. From that perspective, the so-called strangers,

reinstate the previous god ("Father Heaven"), try to preserve animals sacrifices for their own temple, but do not intend to punish Cain severely and finally even the meaning of Abel (breath, wind, etc.) could be a reference to Indra, who is famous for being absent (cf. Oberlies 2012, 102).

want to nourish themselves and their kind, i. e., benefit at the expense of local-cultural natives. No moral evaluation, no apology and no pathos are required here. The only thing that should be noticed is that this is also part of the narrative of Cain and Abel.

Surely, Cain and Abel are brothers, fathered by the same man, born and suckled by the same mother, raised—in whatever proportions and in whatever way—by both. But all men—all human beings—are brothers and sister. The Jewish-French philosopher Emma-nuel Levinas draws attention to the fact that the otherness (*altérité*) of the other—this necessarily includes my neighbor—can take on a different character. In the otherness of my neighbor or in general terms: in the otherness of any subject's neighbor, an enemy can appear.[22] A *fact* that the almost two thousand year history of Christianity did not seem to know, or at least orphaned from its dominant strands; to this day a theology of enmity seems to me to be a *desideratum*. But the more fundamental question, one that Levinas probably out of piety related to his murdered brothers Boris and Aminadav would not have raised: what if the enemy appears in your own brother? What if your own brother is the stranger and the enemy appears in him? He, this stranger breaks into the cultural land of the subject and then he breaks through it by performing another rite, *his* rite. The original motive for all fear of infiltration, desintegration and exchange already exists in the Bible as the *Abelization of the lands of Cain*. The effort to preserve one's own—blood, soil, culture, identity—is the true primordial struggle and not like Thomas Hobbes in *De Cive* thinks: *bellum omnium contra omnes*—"a struggle of all against everyone,"[23] because according to the Hebrew-Biblical perspective, there is already a form of civilization existent and not a state of nature in which, according to Hobbes, the pre-civilizing man would be. From the Hebrew-Biblical perspective, there is no state of existence outside of civilization except death. There is an astonishing proximity of Spinoza in the third part of his Ethics—"On the Origin and the Nature of Affects"—to the biblical narrative when he writes: "Unaquaequae res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur—Everything strives to remain in its being according to its own nature."[24] The Spinozist idea of the *conatus essendi*, the striving of being to remain in its own being, is then transferred to the biblical narrative, the striving of the creator of culture to remain in his own cultural being—preserving it.

Almost out of the blue, at least the text does not give a clear indication of why this had to be done, Cain brought a present—a food offering—for YHWH from the fruits of the earth (ויבא קין מפרי האדמה מנחה ליהוה). Somehow typical, the younger brother imitates what the older brother does, hence, Abel also made an offering to God (Gen 4:4): "And Abel, he also brought an offering from the firstlings of his small livestock and from their fat –והבל הביא גם הוא מבכרות צאנו ומחלבהן."

[22] Cf. Levinas 2007, 244.

[23] Hobbes 2017, 32f.

[24] Spinoza 2010, 238f.

Cain offers a food sacrifice to the god YHWH, his brother Abel gave—probably several—burnt offerings, comparable to those that will be offered in the future by the distant descendants of Adam in front of a tent and again much later in front of a particular temple in Jerusalem. Much could be said about the importance of offerings, but here it is all about the impact of those offerings and even more so about their aftermath, which is commonly known.

YHWH, the god who created both brothers' parents, will look at Abel and Abel's offerings ascending to heaven in smoke. But God looked neither at Cain nor at his offerings. Cain—the elder, the firstborn, the one who is the symbol of culture and civilization, the one who still preserves and cultivates the soil, the very soil that produces all kinds of crops without which his younger brother could neither take care of his goats or sheep and please God with his offerings—becomes inflamed, and his anger rises. Cain's anger does not go unnoticed, nor does his face sink (ולמה נפלו פניך), and so God does what fathers sometimes do, they point out a problem and give advice (Gen 4:7): "Isn't it when you're going to be good, is it uplifting? But if you are not going to be good, sin will lie at the door. And its desire is for you. But you can rule over it הלוא אם תיטיב שאת ואם לא תיטיב לפתח חטאת רבץ ואליך תשוקתו ואתה תמשל בו–."

The actual situation seems clear. However, the term "desire" (*t*^{e}*šūqāh*) chosen here is striking. It is sin (*hattāt*) that desires for Cain. The obvious terminological and semantic proximity of Gen 3:16 and Gen 4:7, which will not be a coincidence in the case of more or less well-composed texts, need not be discussed here. The decisive difference in my opinion is that, according to Gen 3:16, God binds the woman to the man—Eve has no choice. Cain, however, has a choice. God points Cain on the actual situation that means that the latter is not simply at the mercy of sin.

Furthermore, insofar as Gen 4:7 is not to interpreted allegorically, the world of the first (symbolic) humans is haunted by an entity called *hattāt—wrongdoing* or *sin*. Sin here is not simply an evaluation of (human) wrongdoing carried out externally by a *thou*, an other or a third party, but an objectly perceivable entity that—in so far as it shows a minimum level of autonomous action, and this seems to be the case here—is itself a subject. This also means that man has to behave towards sin, that he has to take a position that puts him in a relationship to sin—like to every other subject—, that man is either unapproachable to sin or has a quasi-intimate relationship with it. Sin, which has subject-like features here, is at least an object. It is an object of great persistence. Even though attempts have been repeatedly made to discard their objective reality, sin seemingly calls itself back tirelessly into the consciousness of people in every age. Reflecting his experiences in Auschwitz—for some hell on earth—, Primo Levi wrote of the "incurable nature of the sin," which no one has been able to understand better than his people, as he states.[25] Sin is an

[25] Cf. Levi 2018b, 225.

incurable, indelible disease. Justice too will have to admit its impotence before the face of sin. At least, according to Levi, "it is foolish to believe that it can be eradicated through human justice."[26]

> "It," the sin, "is an inexhaustible source of evil: it breaks the body and soul of the drowned, extinguishes them and humiliates them; it falls back to the oppressors as shame, smoldering as hatred in the survivors and proliferating in a thousand ways, against the will of all, as a thirst for revenge, as moral easing, as denial, as tiredness and as relinquishment."[27]

Perhaps those who went through hell on earth experienced it in others—"l'enfer, c'est les Autres,"[28] writes Sartre in his famous play *Huis Clos* (*No Exit*)—, experienced it in places, in speeches, in texts, as power, sometimes more diffuse, sometimes more real, sometimes anonymously and sometimes personally. An experience tragically necessary, so that, facing those tragic fates, man again becomes aware that extreme evil seems to exist independently of human action and that man is constantly in danger to be seduced and consumed by it. Surely, this is a very different, even alien perspective to the one of, among others, Hans Jonas. He claimed that evil "rises alone from the hearts of men" and gains power in the world.[29] This Kantian notion, which sees evil rooted in human nature, not in reason, means in the end that humans do evil deeds by following their nature, not their reason. This is a different kind of dualism, the one that sees human nature and human reason as opposites. According to Hannah Arendt, neither Kant

> "nor any other moral philosopher actually believed that man could will evil for its own sake; all transgressions are explained by Kant as exceptions that a man is tempted to make from a law which he otherwise recognizes as being valid."[30]

But what if some laws in a particular civilized society are reversed to their opposite? Is the evil deed not rather demanded by reason in accordance with the reason of the twisted law? The committed evil wouldn't be in opposition to the law, it wouldn't be an exception to the law at all but done in total agreement with it. In fact, calling it evil from the point of view of this particular civilization would be inappropriate—the only exception to it would be the opposing moral and / or legal perspective from the outside of the particular frame.

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26 Levi 2018b, 225.

27 Levi 2018b, 225.

28 Sartre 1987, 95.

29 Cf. Jonas 1987, 43.

30 Arendt 2005, 62.

Christoph Schulte is pointing out a weakness in the Kantian moral philosophy, namely the lack of properly including the concept of the weakness of the will. In reference to the Epistle to the Romans (7:18) one's "attitude, the willful intent and maxim" is *good*, but is not acting accordingly, so his will is too weak to prevail over a sensual inclination.[31] According to Schulte, Kant does not just assume that the mind is willful, but "also the will without strong incitements other than the moral law is strong."[32] This Kantian perspective is weak insofar as it assumes that every man's heart is actually bad and not good as in the apostle Paul's letter. The consequences should be obvious: if a man's heart is bad, he is only able to (willfully) act according to moral law since he possesses a willful mind. But what if Kant is wrong and there are human beings with good hearts. Surely, if they are in possession of weak wills, they will probably succumb to their sensual inclination. And what if they have good hearts and Kant is also wrong about the will that its strength does not just come from moral law. Kant (theoretically) misses the possibility of men with good hearts and weak wills or men with good hearts and a *non-moral-law-will*.

Sin lies in front of the door. Cain kills Abel—man kills man, brother kills brother. We do not know how it happens. *Wa-jahargenū*—"and he kills him," that's what the text tells us. The Hebrew root *hrg* can also mean "slay". You can well imagine the situation. Both men stand on the field, as Gen 4:8 points out, they talk to each other, maybe they argue. According to the text, only Cain, the symbol of civilization, speaks. Maybe it is not just polemics by saying that it is always the civilized, who speaks, orders, demands, apologizes—all with the power of language. And Abel, is he just listening? Or is Cain so enraged that when his brother tried starting to speak, he runs Abel over his mouth? There seems to be a total asymmetry in power between the two symbols of the dichotomy of civilization and culture on one side and the nomadic wanderer on the other. Other than civilizations—symbolized by Cain—which are used to testify themselves in writing, the nomad Abel seems to be literally silent and in the next moment he will be silent forever. Abel's externally induced death might have been quick and painless, but was probably not silent. In order for blood to flow as the text does not fail to mention (Gen 4:10), great force must be exerted on the victim. Like Primo Levi in Auschwitz, Cain may have become aware of "how arduous a person's death is."[33]

It might be true that *everyone dies alone*, but not beyond the world—dying does not happen in nothingness: the cracking of the skull will have been audible or the wheezing after cutting the throat or the last warm breath as a result of the piercing of the Body. All of this is audible, visible to Cain, the animals of the field and the birds of the air—the light vanishes from the

[31] Schulte 1991, 81.

[32] Schulte 1991, 81.

[33] Levi 2018a, 212.

eyes, the body slackens, the body's structure breaks down. Where are the bones, tendons and muscles that distinguish humans in their majestically sublime posture from other "dry-nosed" primates? The Arabic language derived a concept of human from this: *qawm*, those who are able to rise—*qawm* or people, are those who rise upright, who walk upright, who live upright. Cain takes Abel's life and along with it to be *qawm*. If urine and excrement have not already been driven out of the body by the cocktail of adrenaline and fear, that is, Abel has been denied the grace of a rapid death, Abel's carcass will have to lose it a time later and starts to rot. No more is left, but carcass, secretion and excrement—and some non-human witnesses.

> "Destroying man," Primo Levi states, "is almost as difficult as creating it: It was not easy, it was not quick, but you Germans managed it. Here we are, compliant under your eyes. You no longer have anything to fear from us: no act of rebellion, no word of challenge, not even a judging glance."[34]

How much Abel is in Primo Levi, how much Cain in the Germans of his time who forced themselves on him and tried to destroy his life in every meaning of the word? Levi teaches us that annihilation is more than stopping the bodily functions of a human being.

Overcoming Evil with Good—how can this Evil be overcome? To this point, the Hebrew Bible has only one answer, namely by stigmatizing Cain in order to save his life, which means to end the very likely blood feud and associated with it the no less likely blood vengeance—this is to be seen as civilizational progress and indeed a necessary measurement to prevent a vicious cycle of evil intend and deeds. But as it is often the case, the victim—Abel—is forgotten, while the perpetrator—Cain—keeps on living and along with him, according to Primo Levi, sin as "an inexhaustible source of evil". According to my understanding of Primo Levi, evil cannot be overcome once and for all, but man can choose to leave the approaching sin sitting outside at the door (cf. Gen 4,7). As soon as you get involved with it, evil starts "proliferating in a thousand ways," even against one's own will. When asked which factors were key to his survival of Auschwitz, Primo Levi will, in addition to "happiness" and the persistent will, "always, even in the darkest days, recognize humans in my companions and in myself and not things and thus withdrawing myself from the humiliation and demoralization that has led many into mental shipwreck, also mention the will "to survive with the concrete aim of telling what we have experienced and gone through."[35]

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[34] Levi 2018a, 185.

[35] Levi 2018c, 506f.

To be able to tell one's own story you have to remember it and pass it on to others. By doing so, that is, to remember and to tell, Primo Levi is consciously or unconsciously using a concept deeply inscribed into Hebrew-Biblical and Jewish thought called *zakhor*. Only by doing *zakhor*, remembering and by telling, making sure that others will remember as well, people of the past and their experiences: victims and perpetrators, one's own suffering, deeds of all kind—good and bad—, etc., won't be forgotten. And only then can it be ensured that the victim of evil deeds won't become an "Abel"—the name, literally translated as breath, signifies an existence elusive or transient. Abel stands symbolically not just for the nomad or foreigner, but for the faceless other: the victim, about whose character, if anything at all, is barely nothing known and to whom no justice happens.

Although the whole narrative leaves the reader with a certain feeling of powerlessness, it teaches that Evil is not necessarily the last word. Two lessons can be learned: First, since sin is, according to Primo Levi, "an inexhaustible source of evil" the vicious cycle—the Biblical text refers to blood vengeance—needs to be stopped. Second, evil deeds can possibly happen all the time, but not necessarily. By keeping the memory alive—in the Biblical story of Cain and Abel it just takes one, i. e., God—the possibility of overcoming the vicious cycle and thus overcoming evil becomes a realistic option. With pathos, in order to not to forget what is good and how to do good, it might be helpful to remember what was and is evil. In that sense, *zakhor* is an aspect in overcoming evil with good.

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Protracted Evil: Emotions in Enduring, Ethno-National Conflicts

Carolina Rehrmann

Introduction

Emotional Qualities of Peace and Conflict

A plethora of crises reporting, and conflict analyses has been concerned with intractable, ethno-national conflicts. They are defined as prolonged, severe disputes between ethnic, religious, or national communities that appear as irresolvable on a rationalist basis. A majority of these conflicts manifests in competing claims for sovereignty or sole representation over disputed territories and are based on mutually exclusive identities. Examples like Israel / Palestine, Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Abkhazia seem cases in point.[1]

How probable is the solution of a conflict once it has become intractable? Statistics on the perseverance of ethnic or other forms of conflicts draw a bleak picture: Sustainable peace transformations hardly, if ever, occur, the longer conflicts remain unresolved. They rather alternate between periods of open violence and deceptive stillness (Colaresi et al. 2008: 102; Colaresi & Thompson 2002).

[1] For for a profound analysis of ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflicts see Griffiths 1993. For definitions of intractability, analyses of its socio-psychological foundations and related case studies see Bar-Tal, Halperin, Pliskin 2015; Imbusch & Bonacker 2010; Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal, Halperin & de Rivera 2007; Kelman 2008.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, there have been settlements of long-lasting conflicts. Apartheid in South Africa or the conflict in Northern Ireland, for instance, have – as a surprise for contemporary observers – come to an end in a comparatively peaceful transition.

However, a closer look at these countries shows that conflicting narratives, and traditional group affiliations remain broadly intact, while protracted traumas, mutual resentment and unresolved claims for justice still permeate political discourses.

More precisely, many intractable conflicts – be they resolved on a *political* level like the two above-mentioned, be they unresolved and hot like the Israeli-Palestinian or cold like the Cyprus Conflict – display the huge impact of mutually exclusive self-images and selective narratives on the conflict's causes and course.[2]

These conceptions also have an emotional dimension. In intractable, ethno-national conflicts, emotions may appear on the one hand as ritualized and omnipresent features of national narratives; and on the other as dynamic reactions to events.

The former lends meaning to artefacts and practices of collective remembrance, such as memorials of victory and defeat, museums of national history or parades. Depictions of plight or glory serve the purpose of imbuing awe and respect for the national cause and thereby fostering unity among the ingroup. Accordingly, narratives unfolding around the braveness or indignation of national "heroes" are very common in history textbooks to *impress* and thus impact the younger generations.[3]

The latter permeate conflict-related discourses. They manifest in language replete with metaphors, slogans or arguments that inspire pride, fear or resentment. Moreover, they might be a catalyst for conformity, when political leaders demand unity and support for the common struggle that are meant to make followers feel elation and dissenters to be ashamed. This way, emotional speech serves as instrument for conformity, since it lends radiance, appeal and orientation to

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[2] While competing memories and narratives are a common phenomenon in inter-state relations, in intractable, ethno-nationalist conflicts they are connected to unresolved political or territorial claims and thus tend to be a central and timeless factor of conflict endurance.

[3] Research on history textbooks reveals that despite recurring international endeavours in the 20th and 21st century a significant portion of textbooks depict history by means of unquestionable, monolithic, and awe-inspiring narratives. This tendency is very pronounced in conflict and post-conflict societies, where political and territorial claims are based on historical narratives (see Korostelina 2016; Pingel 2009: 9-19; Makryianni and Psaltis 2007, Bar-Tal 1998). By way of contrast, peace- and reconciliation-oriented approaches to history (textbooks) in such conflict contexts, employ multiperspectivity, underline the contingency and multi-layeredness of historical events and developments (e. g. political, economic, cultural or gender-related dimensions of history, as well as the interveaving of micro-, meso- and macrolevel factos) and promote empathy and re-humanization of the "other" (see Adwan/ Bar-On/ Naveh 2012 or the initiatives of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe at: http://www.cdrsee.org).

common ideas, such as hate for the enemy or stamina for the communal cause. It might further legitimize defence measures and increase citizens' readiness for sacrifices. Thus, emotions appear as a powerful conception for understanding both strategic actions and impulsive (re-) actions in conflict contexts.

What is perceivable on a social level is backed by experimental evidence. To measure the causal influence of emotions on individuals and groups, neuroscience and psychology have made visible the various shapes emotions appear in and how they take effect between bodily impulses and cognition. More importantly for conflict analysis, they have demonstrated emotions' social character as triggers for collective action, and their impact on cognition (Manstead 2005; Hutchison and Bleiker 2007; Crawford 2008).

Viz. while emotions have been traditionally perceived foremost as individual *reactions* to external events (appraisal) or tête-à-tête communication, they also shape cognition and action in the first place and might take long-term collective effects. For instance, the proverbial blind fury or black-out resulting from panic, stress, anger or anxiety are commonly known to motivate cognitive biases. In turn, indignation, fear, humiliation or anger are immediate impulsive reactions to (structural) violence or threats. All these emotions may as powerful impulses be both root-causes for e. g. violent actions, but as simmering moods of conflict societies they also affect collective perceptions and practices over the long term.

As, for instance, Bramsen & Poder (2018) state in a comparative case study of conflicts, they manifest as "accumulated levels of emotions, or emotional energy" that "fuel agency during a conflict as well as throughout its transformation". Accordingly, the authors show how negative and positive emotions such as shame or resentment as opposed to confidence or trust result from specific kinds of dominating, conflictual or cooperative interaction and in turn shape agency that might either aggravate conflict or facilitate its transformation.

Moreover, a significant aspect of emotions' collective impact in conflict contexts relates to their proven effect on intergroup-relations. For emotions enhance both intergroup cleavages and ingroup cohesion. This is most obvious when they are unleashed as collective impulses of excitement or fighting spirit that boost inward solidarity and a united front towards external threats – say in a sports game or in danger and crisis (Rydell et al. 2008). But it is also evident in the polarizing emotions of political ideologies or in the affective basis of military action (see Parkinson 1996; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006 or Wodak 2015).

Bringing ethno-nationalist conflict back in with its mutually exclusive, yet internally strong and powerful self-understandings, traumas and depravations, the interdisciplinary synthesis of constructivism, evolutionary and social psychology shows how deeply emotions as motivational force are intertwined with human needs, norms and identities.

Firstly, recent conflict analysis and resolution has put a growing focus on emotions as expressions of basic needs, such as the need for justice, freedom, prosperity, security, a positive self-

image, appreciation, (national) coherence and belonging (Ramsbothan et al. 2016; Sagy & Mana 2016; Bar-Tal 2007).

In this sense, emotions appear as impulses to act, since people usually pursuit good feelings, like appreciation, or safety, while they simultaneously strive to avoid isolation, sanction, or danger. Similarly, feelings of injustice or powerlessness are likely to be answered by impulses of aggression or indignation that aim at overcoming this unpleasant emotional state. In view of the fact that intractable, ethno-national conflicts so often violate or threaten these basic needs the role of emotions appears of central importance to understand their evolution.

Secondly and closely connected to the former, some emotions have to be grasped as moral judgements with enormous social significance. Shame, pride or indignation, for instance, are bodily expressions of evaluative thought and contain such a judgement (Parkinson 1996). Consequently, if someone is confronted with indignation, (s)he might feel ashamed and take measures to be pardoned and feel better. In ethno-national conflicts with their strong appeals to unity and their narrow role models, this normative meaning is a pivotal feature of analysis.

Eventually, and closely connected to the two former aspects, emotions are also part of and in turn shape collective identities. That means that emotions have become an integral part of collective self-images. As mentioned above, emotions are an aesthetic feature of national heritage, discourses and practices depicting glory, danger or defeat. As such they represent and shape collective attitudes of pride, anger or grief that community-members recognize affectively, identify with and also act upon in emotional (gender) roles. These general emotional attitudes and representations in turn, seem to affect collective beliefs and the evaluation of events (Bar-Tal 2007, 1430).

In view of the above mentioned, this paper targets the question: In which ways do emotions – particularly emotions directly related to violent heritages – contribute to the perpetuation and aggravation of ethno-national conflicts? In answering this question, the paper follows two theses. First, societies in (post-)conflict states coping with security issues, traumas and open claims manifest a higher potential for arousal that is a higher level of excitement, and escalation risk.[4] Second and related, in (post-)conflict societies with their open wounds, and territorial or political issues at stake emotional states can more easily be manipulated for strategic purposes.

[4] The dictionary of psychology published by the American Psychological Association (APA) defines arousal other than neurologically as a state of heightened responsiveness of the brain also as a "a state of excitement or energy expenditure linked to an emotion. Usually, arousal is closely related to a person's appraisal of the significance of an event or to the physical intensity of a stimulus. Arousal can either facilitate or debilitate performance"; online at <https://dictionary.apa.org/arousal>. For studies on the role of emotions in conflict and post conflict contexts and their role for escalation see (Coleman 2000: 537; Stephan 2008, 373; Aggestam 2006, 25–27).

Drawing on the findings of psychological conflict theory and concepts, I will start out with a critical discussion of why emotions are a pivotal part of conflict analysis, for they appear as causal for their endurance, as well as for their transformation and reconciliation. I will then in-depth discuss the essence of socio-emotional conflict structures by showing the immense social impact of emotions on cognition, action, memory, norms and collective identities.

This the paper aims at broadening the rationalist view that perceives emotions only as obstacles to genuine, reasonable thought. While emotions (as mistrust, frustration, or fear) can clearly be an impediment to reason and farsightedness or the willingness to compromise and thus ultimately to the resolution of a conflict, I want to illustrate the role of emotions as essential part of a conflict's social fabric. Here, it shall be demonstrated that both negative and positive emotions can "tie down" a conflict, when they appear as expressions of unfulfilled needs, polarizing norms and identities, but may also pave the way for the transformation of time-honoured fronts and for sustainable peace, when they facilitate reconciliation. The discussion will be underpinned with examples taken particularly from the educational sphere and media discourses of Israel-Palestine and Cyprus with a special focus on gender roles.

Emotional Conflict Analysis: Why Conflicts Endure

Present-day research on emotions spans a variety of disciplines, ranging from neurobiology, evolutionary and social psychology to sociology and political science. More precisely, the social sciences enlist findings of the humanities to identify the impact of emotions on a collective level (Crawford 2000, 129). Still, research on emotions has been confronted with both conceptual challenges and unfavorable cultural premises.

To begin with, emotions are difficult to grasp, measure and evaluate on a social level, for they may be disguised, repressed, denied or even feigned for strategic or normative reasons. On a conceptual level they are difficult to categorize in between bodily impulses or evaluative thought.[5] However, the basic reason for their traditional neglection in conflict analysis seems to be a governing rationalist paradigm. A glimpse into the history of philosophy, economy and po-

[5] "(If) we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind them, no mind-stuff out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains." James' (in Dolan 2002, 1191) famous quote underlines the impossibility of grasping emotions without bodily references. However, they still do not seem to be easily assignable in between the somatic and mental sphere. Is fear a bodily impulse (feeling of pain, strain, pressure) or rather a mental construct that results from a conscious evaluation of a specific situation? Which of the two is more relevant in motivating action? Some partly synonymous variations of emotional states, such as panic as opposed to fear and apprehension appear to be at different places of a scale between body and mind.

litical thought starting from Plato, and Aristotle, to Adam Smith, and the IR-theorists Waltz and Keohane shows that emotions have for long been considered as unfavorable, at best an irrelevant deviation from this paradigm.

> "[…] emotions have virtually disappeared as credible motives in modern scholarship […]. One would hardly know that they existed from reading the analysis of causes of conflict in the social science. When references to emotions are made they are likely to be abstract, casual, indirect, and brief" (Scheff 1999, 334–335).

An increasing number of scholars points out that the reason for this lies in a rationalist bias deeply rooted in Western tradition and modernity. It is reflected in a normative dichotomy of (good) rational thought and (bad) incontrollable affect, the former of which is associated with reason, modesty, masculinity, control, and regulation, the latter with irrationality, uncontrollable impulses, femininity, or complexity. Thus, emotions appear as inconvenient, even dangerous for one's well-being and aims (Oatley et al. 2011, 1343).

By the turn into the 21st century also a turn in re-evaluating the role of emotions seems to have taken place in the political science, particularly in IR. Recent works on international politics and conflicts deploy a variety of methodologies and approaches to show the manifestations of emotions in the social sphere, ranging from discourse analysis, to the analysis of imagery and aesthetic narratives (see e. g. Clément & Sangar 2018), while others aim at deconstructing traditional concepts of IR's logic of action and conflict theory, particularly from neorealism and institutionalism by making visible the emotional qualities of interests, deterrence, or norm compliance (see Crawford 2000, 154).[6]

Reflecting the afore-mentioned cultural premise, also the traditional focus of conflict analysis has rested upon the assumption that conflicts can be rationally resolved. As Nadler et al. (2008, 4) criticize this attitude is reflected in the term *resolution* itself:

[6] The norm of shielding reason from the "corrupting" power of emotions later seems to have turned into an ontological premise: Emotions simply disappeared from the sphere of thought and action. The founding father of economic thought, Adam Smith, for instance, had seen avarice and greed as basic impulses of the liberal economic system. Interestingly enough, these two emotions were little by little replaced by the allegedly rational term interest (Mercer 2006, 288–289). Consequently today, action guided by interests appears "de-emotionalized" and synonymous with reason, while the underlying impulses have become invisible. Similarly, also neo-realism and institutionalism are based on the premise of actors' rational choices and cost-benefit calculations. Emotions do not come into play as credible influential parameters (For critical discussions of the former neglection of emotions see Scheff, TJ (1994), Bloody revenge. Emotions, nationalism and war, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, esp. 61–66; Hardin, R (1995), One for all. The logic of group conflict, New Jersey, esp. 46, 56; Hopkins et al. (2009), esp. 13 ff; Baert et al. (2010), esp. 126, 136, 143–144 and Scheve, C (2009), esp. 14, 50–51, 70–71; Hall (2009), 84–89.

> "The use of this terminology reflects more than a semantic preference. It underscores the prevailing view in much of the social science literature that conflicts are attributable to disagreements on the division of scarce and coveted resources and that their ending is predicated on the parties' ability to agree on a formula for their division."

In this perspective, conflicts are regarded as the literal cake, whose parts need to be distributed in a way that both parties can or should eventually consent to willingly receive.

Intractable conflicts, however, are precisely defined by being *indivisible*. As mentioned in the introduction, they seem non-negotiable for the willingness to compromise is impeded by strong group affiliations, maximalist claims, mutual resentment, and unprocessed traumas. The authors (ibid.) illuminate this point by distinguishing three qualitative layers of overcoming conflict: *settlement*, *resolution* and *reconciliation*. While settlement simply indicates the absence of violence, resolution means that a majority within the respective communities actually backs a truce or peace process. The deepest layer – reconciliation – is reached by an ideal emotional state of mutual acknowledgement of pain and fault. Such an outcome is manifest in high figures of mutual tolerance and trust that in turn allow for a balanced power-sharing system, ideally also for close inter-communal, inter-ethnic or inter-religious ties or even for a common, overarching identity. This implies that the former conflict parties have reconciled attitudes about the past – respectively, about the way the past has been dealt with. Thus, reconciliation represents a profound emotional transformation of the conflict paradigm. It is the deepest, most holistic and sustainable form of conflict transformation – but also the most ambitious (Hutchison & Bleiker 2008).

Reconciling protracted or post-conflict communities and allowing for a peaceful common future raises ethical, legal and material questions. On a more immediate basis, the consequences of trauma, loss, and depravation, particularly feelings of humiliation and injustice, and claims for material compensation must be met. On a long-term basis, monolithic conflict narratives and competing identities that legitimize exclusion, discrimination or segregation must be transformed.[7]

All of these aspects possess obvious emotional qualities, including both positive and negative emotions: Particularly in violent conflicts, positive emotions of pride and belonging, and the pleasant feeling of coherence that monolithic narratives and exclusive identities provide, bind members of a community together. In turn, negative emotions of fear, anger, frustration or humiliation that reflect unresolved security and justice issues, increase the risk of uncompromising attitudes and the power-political instrumentalization of these emotions. Consequently, recon-

[7] For in-depth analyses on the deeply intertwined emotional, ethical, legal and economic post-conflict challenges related to the concept of transitional justice (understood as restorative, retributive and distributive justice) see Boraine 2006; Leebaw 2008; Rehrmann 2020a & 2020b).

ciliation requires both, the fulfillments of the people's needs, but also that positive emotions formerly reserved exclusively for one's own community find new, common ground.[8] However, this is rarely the case and if it is, it is confined to very limited circles.

Accordingly, a closer look at two prominent examples of conflict transformation – South Africa and Northern Ireland – reveals that even though a political solution has been reached, they are far from being reconciled. Notwithstanding the considerable success of symbolic acknowledgement of committed atrocities by the South African *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, twenty-five years after the end of a political system that was based on racist segregation and the deprevation of civil rights for the black community, the country seems still haunted by the past. That is reflected in broad discontent and frustration about insufficient reparations for the victims of violence and the still existing, huge economic disparities between black and white people (Zenker 2014; Tambe Endoh 2015).

Also, with regard to Northern Ireland evaluations on the quality of peace seem twofold. While decreased security concerns and growing political identification with the devolved government are tangible results of the established agreement (see Knox 2018), recurrent disputes over national symbolism, political representation, and collective memory practices, as well as a long-term increase of "peace walls" between the Catholic and Protestant communities indicate that more than two decades after the *Good Friday Agreement* one could at best speak of peaceful *co*-existence between the former conflict parties. Ruane (2015, 175) puts it in a nutshell, when stating:

> "Viewed in the light of the historic conflict, the Good Friday Agreement was a breakthrough [regarding, XX] the role of the British state, which shifted from its traditional alliance with the Protestant / unionist community to a more neutral position. This has opened up new possibilities. However, it has not in itself undone the more embedded sources of conflict – in particular the depth of the cultural oppositions and the conflicts of identity; and the principle of equality on which it is hoped to build a permanent peace is now another source of conflict. For the moment the hope for reconciliation has dimmed and there is increasing concern about the future. The challenge is to find ways of containing current conflicts while searching for new points of possible intervention."

As the quote aptly expresses, the political solution of the conflict has left the deeper, mutually exclusive group affiliations and attitudes about the past broadly untouched and thus allowed for

[8] http://www.parikiaki.com/2017/11/together-we-can-uncovering-the-unwritten-history-of-cyprus/ [04.01.2020].

the simmering historical resentments to affect present-day affairs. This status quo seems representative for other protracted conflict settings with their still competing collective memories, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia or Kosovo (Biermann 2020).

It is even more apparent in unresolved protracted conflicts. Here, Israel-Palestine and Cyprus seem fairly similar. Both are based on ethno-religious cleavages and mutually exclusive claims of autochthony in a complex asymmetric power constellation. Both remain unresolved despite decades-long international mediation and periods of intensive negotiations. While the former is characterized by intermittent violence and a high security risk, the latter has been practically non-violent for almost half a century. The narratives in both conflicts, however, appear to have lost no vigor.

In May 2018 dozens of Palestinians were killed, and hundreds injured at the border of Gaza while fiercely protesting against the move of the US-embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. From BBC and CNN to Al Jazeera, images of an angry crowd, young men tossing projectiles towards the border, crying women and horrified family members bending over dead bodies reached the international community. Again, key political actors and observers engaged in heavy cross talks over truth and legitimacy of the events: Pro-Palestinian comments emphasized the unlawfulness of Israeli presence in the West Bank and the daily deprevations and humanitarian crises Palestinians bear. Pro-Israeli comments focused on the continuous security threat Israel faces particularly by Hamas and its denial of Israel's right of existence.

This anew escalation would not be as revealing, if it was not about the fact that the current events reflect a decade-long heritage of intermittent violence between Israel and Palestine and – at least with regard to the dominant discourses within both communities – their mutually exclusive perceptions.[9] The Israeli-Palestinian case strongly illustrates that a resolution of the conflict cannot be brought about, if the basic needs (security for the Israelis, freedom and quality of live for the Palestinians) of the two sides are not sufficiently dealt with. Until that happens the region will remain an emotional powder keg with an extremely high escalation risk with every violent incident mirroring *en miniature* the conflict's broader structure, its symbolism and competing national narratives. In this emotional frame, one side's gain will be automatically perceived as

[9] The movement of the US-embassy to Jerusalem was perceived by the Palestinian community a further step towards creating political facts on the ground in what for a significant portion of the Israelis in turn is based on warranted historical, respectively biblical claims over state and territory. This dilemma was exacerbated by the fact that the date of movement coincided with competitive national-calendar-days for both communities: On May 15th Palestinians commemorate the Nakba (catastrophe) that marks the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their original territory in 1948. By way of contrast, Israelis one day earlier with Yom Ha'atzmaut celebrate the establishment of the State of Israel, which in national memory is inseparably linked with their own catastrophe, the Shoa. Originating from both communities' national traumas the Israeli / Palestinian Conflict has been evolving ever since along competing claims of sole representation over the same territory.

the other side's loss; reasons for celebration on the one side will appear as reasons for mourning on the other (*zero-sum-perception*).

Netanyahu's inauguration-speech at the US-embassy in Jerusalem speaks for itself as solemn reference to the braveness and glory of the nation and, as he stated, to the triumph of truth, and justice for the Israeli people. Ironically, he even called it "a great day for peace". His speech was criticized by many international observers and Israeli peace activists for blanking out the Palestinians' needs and perspectives.[10]

The same seems to hold true for the Cyprus Conflict. Divided since 1974 and partly occupied by Turkey, the island remains in a legal limbo for Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot agree on a formula for reunification. Observers criticized both sides' intransigence, chauvinism and monolithic truths that ignore the other side's needs (Tocci 2006). Cypriot president Papadopoulos' speech to the nation on the eve of the Annan-Plan referendum in 2004, which could have led to reunification in a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with divided powers, appears as representative:

> "On April 24 you will vote a YES or a NO to the Annan Plan. You will decide the present and future of Cyprus. You will decide for our generation and the generations that will come after us. I trust your judgment. I am certain you are not affected by false dilemmas and you are not scared by threats about alleged international isolation. I am certain you are not convinced about what it said that this is the chance. I am sure that for you the moral principles and values of our people, their civilization and national historic life still mean a lot to you and you want to continue with security, justice, freedom and peace. Weighing the pros and cons of YES and NO, the consequences of YES are heavier and more onerous. I call upon you to reject the Annan Plan. I call upon you to say a resounding NO on 24 April. I call upon you to defend your dignity, your history and what is right."[11]

[10] <https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-netanyahus-speech-at-the-opening-of-the-us-embassy-in-jerusalem/>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/opinion/sunday/benjamin-netanyahu-embassy-gaza.html>; <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2018-05/israel-benjamin-netanjahu-iran-jerusalem-frieden> [accessed 29.12.2019]. Netanyahu's attitude is broadly criticized by Israeli moderates, the left and above all by Israeli peace activists.

[11] The original speech was hold in Greek and translated into English. The English version is taken from the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, [online] <www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf [accessed> 14.12.2019].

The extract, which the president read out solemnly and with tears in his eyes, marks the end of a speech full of emotional messages that back his plea to conformity and united strength. It is representative until today for the preceding media campaign against the plan. United Nations and European Union had tried to convince the president about the mutual benefits of overcoming the status quo. Papadopoulos, in turn, accused them of interfering into internal national affairs and called the plan humiliating and dangerous.[12] Accordingly, his speech is drafted to appeal to patriotism, pride and fear. He grants "trust" in advance and the conviction that the people will not be "scared" to keep up their "moral principles and values", and safeguard their basic needs by sending a fierce, uncompromising message, and thus defend their "dignity", and "history" as moral obligation for the succeeding generations. His messages would not have been as effectful, had they not been embedded in a discursive cultural routine of displaying love and respect for the ethnic community, honor for the struggle of the forefathers, as well as unity, conformity and intransigence as imperative needs for survival and success of the national cause – a discourse that remains static until today (Rehrmann 2020c, 296–369).

Why is reconciliatory emotional transformation so difficult to achieve? More precisely: Because on an immediate cognitive level, emotions appear as normal, and expedient and because they deeply shape the interpretation and structuring of reality in conflict societies.

First, intractable conflicts are characterized by an implicit and permanent emotional state of emergency and intergroup-polarization that people are born and socialized into and that affect all aspects of life (Coleman 2000). Here, negative and positive emotions are interrelated, mutually enhancing and become self-evident over time. Negative emotions result from collective experiences of violence, powerlessness, and the constant deprevation of basic needs for security, freedom, and prosperity. This manifests in collective fear of the other, high social stress levels with – as the Israeli-Palestinian case shows – quick outburst of indignation about the contentious issues, while ingroup-solidarity promotes inter-group cleavages, and eventually becomes an impulsively, responsive routine to external events. In Bar-Tal's (2007, 1430–1446) words:

[12] The so called "Annan-Plan" was drafted under the auspices of former UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan as a treaty aimed at uniting the Republic of Cyprus (now represented only by the Greek Cypriots) and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (to date a de-facto state occupied by Turkey and represented by the Turkish Cypriots) in a federation. The plan was put to vote in April 2004. While the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted "yes", a majority of Greek Cypriots voted "no" after what observers called a populist and exclusivist ethno-national media-campaign led by the Greek-Cypriot president himself. Papadopoulos was accused of shedding crocodile-tears and manipulating fears, resentments and national pride during his televised address in order to achieve the rejection of the plan for his own power-related motives. For further information see Asmussen, J. (2004), Cyprus after the Failure of the Annan-Plan, European Centre for Minority Issues Brief 11, [online] <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/34229/brief_11.pdf> [accessed 11.02.2019].

> "Societies may develop characteristic collective emotional orientations, with an emphasis on one or a number of particular emotions. The society provides the context, information, cues, models, and instructions against which the emotions of its members arise."

In this perspective, a collective repertoire of beliefs and attitudes of communities in conflict are triggered by common emotional reactions.

Second and closely related, emotions serve existential purposes, for according to evolutionary psychology they are both a reflection of basic needs and instrumental in securing the survival of a group.[13] Both aspect's relevance is enhanced in conflict, for the emotional dichotomy of communities in conflict has to be understood as a strategic adaption to "an abnormal, violent, and insecure environment" (Aggestam 2006, 24). More precisely, *love* for one's community and *hate* for the other, are instrumental in avoiding both psychological and physical harm. National *pride* and a *feeling of solidarity* may help in backing a *sense of superiority*, *belonging* and a *positive self-image.* In turn, the *dehumanization* of the other based on stereotypical images and feelings of *contempt* and *hostility* might shield from the emotional consequences of one's deeds and legitimize aggression, exclusion and discrimination. At the same time the polarization of emotional group-relations strengthens internal cohesion against external threats (see Bar-Tal 2006). As such, emotions serve the purpose of survival, but are also a convenient power-political instrument. For they justify demands for conformity and loyalty.

Third, emotions shape how events are being remembered, processed and interpreted and they trigger according actions. Concerning memory, there has been profound neuro- and social psychological evidence on the mutual activation of (certain) memories and (certain) emotions and the association of events through similar emotions (Ross 2006, 212–214; Crawford 2000, 140–214; Taylor et al. 1994), while scholars of collective memory and national remembrance have underlined the relevance of aesthetic arrangement of events for their appeal and reactivation (Assmann 2019, Lowenthal 1985, 254).

The evaluation of incidents according to prevalent emotions and related beliefs – Bar-Tal (2007, 1446) calls it "top-down-cognitive processing" – is based on the experimental evidence that the evaluation of character, intentions or qualities of a person or group are strongly influenced by prior beliefs (*prior-belief-effect*) (Greitemeyer 2008, 80).

As the Palestinian-Israeli context repeatedly illuminates, prevalent emotional attitudes of mistrust, contempt or anxiety are likely to lead to impulsive, premature or disproportionate actions and violent escalations. Moreover, collective feelings of injustice and humiliation on the one

[13] Particularly anger, affection and disgust are called hereditary primal affects. They serve the purpose of defending or pro-tecting "to respond to crucial events related to survival and reproduction" (Long & Brecke 2003, 28).

hand, or pride and love on the other are likely to prime how people or specific events are being interpreted by the respective communities. Bar-Tal et al. (2009), for instance, proved in a study conducted with Israelis and Palestinians that the more participants had internalized the exclusivist, mutually stereotypical conflict ethos, the higher was their tendency to ascribe bad intentions and bad character to a depicted person from the other community.

Fear seems to have a similar impact. Neuropsychology has shown how it promotes bias and heuristic processing, the homogenization of outgroups and a cognitive bias on intergroup-differences (Oatley et al., 2011, 1346; Calvo & Avero 2005, 433–451; Worchel & Coutant 2008, 428). This is likely to result in a cognitive-affective spiral of declining intergroup-relations and thus is highly relevant in understanding escalation:

> "As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain with them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment and security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon their fears of insecurity and polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart. Together, these between-group and within-group strategic interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that can explode into murderous violence" (Lake & Rothchild 1996, 147).

In line with this, Halperin et al. (2008) showed in a questionnaires-based study with Israeli-Jewish students the clear negative interrelation between high levels of fear and low levels of legitimacy for the Arabs, as well as a tendency to focus on solely negative events of Israeli collective memory. Here fear clearly impacts both, perception and memory.

Similarly, as fear shapes cognition and triggers action, so does *anger* when it promotes impulses of aggression or calculated acts of revenge:

> "anger can be understood as a strong emotion or experiential response to a real or imagined shame, frustration, threat, or injustice; aggression is an impulse to hurt as a possible response of anger; and revenge is a more deliberate form of aggression" (Long & Brecke 2002, 28).

Thus, anger can be directed inwardly or towards external events and actors. Either way, it is deeply connected to the need to rectify a perceived adversity or injustice. Anger against oneself might cause self-destructive behavior, while vis-à-vis an external target or person it might cause immediate (bodily) acts of physical re-empowerment or more strategic, long-term (cognitive)

plans of afflicting harm. Both actions are likely to be instantly liberating but may (less among narcissists) be followed by remorse, shame, grief or a shifted perspective once the initial need has been satisfied. On that note, various studies that have proven how anger may dramatically lower the inhibition threshold for risky actions (Mackie 2008, 1874), how it enhances outgroup-stereotyping (Sasley 2011, 463) and sparks claims for justice (Small, Lerner & Fischloff 2006, 289). In crisis situations an unfulfilled need for justice and aggressive impulses have shown to decisively narrow the focus of attention, lower risk aversion and the ability to empathize with an outgroup, triggering polarization and escalation (Rydell et al. 2008, 1151). The cited escalation of protests in Gaza seems a case in point, as it represents how high levels of fear, anger and resentment promote spirals of violence and escalation.

Eventually, the same appears to be true for *shame and guilt*.[14] They result from the perceived transgression of social norms and are accompanied by the threat of social sanctions. Consequently, both will often be suppressed and denied. One way of doing this, is de-humanization. Experiments prove that guilt motivates depreciation and dehumanization of outgroup members that have fallen victim to ingroup violence (Miron & Branscobe 2008, 77–97). Thus, the endeavor of avoiding embarrassment triggers cognitive bias. Scheff (1999, 334) points at the fatal consequence of such repression and denial in the context of depravation and loss:

> "Unacknowledged appears to be recursive; it feeds upon itself. To the extent that this is the case, it could be crucial in the causation of interminable conflict. If shame goes unacknowledged, it can loop back upon itself (being ashamed that one is ashamed) or co-occur with other emotions, such as grief (unresolved grief), fear (fear panics), or anger (humiliated fury). Unacknowledged shame seems to foil the biological and cultural mechanisms that allow for the expression and harmless discharge of these elemental emotions. In the absence of shame, or if it is acknowledged, grief may be discharged by weeping, under culturally appropriate conditions of mourning. But if shame is evoked by grief and goes unacknowledged, unending loops of emotions (shame-grief sequences) may occur. The individual will be unable to mourn."

In view of the characteristic entanglement of guilt and sorrow in intractable conflicts with their complex intermingling of cause and consequences of violence and the consequent blurring of clear confines between victims and perpetrators, this passage demonstrates the importance of acknowledging and processing shame for coming to terms with the past.

[14] While both emotions are often used interchangeably, the former refers to the unpleasant feeling that either oneself or someone else has done something improper or ridiculous. Guilt, in turn, stems from the awareness of having hurt someone else; <https://dictionary.apa.org> [accessed 06.01.2020].

However, studies on the motivational role of shame and guilt have shown that they do not only cause acts of denial and externalization of blame for self-protection, but also prosocial, reconciliatory behavior (Shepherd 2013: 43). This underlines the importance of the social context – that is, if there is a favorable social climate for the exhibition of remorse and public apologies. As will be discussed in the next section, in ethno-national conflicts such moral emotions are often repressed because they are considered an inappropriate deviation from idealized gender roles and as a sign of weakness in relation to social cohesion and external images.

In her sensitive account of public silences in Cyprus Galatariotou (2012, 242–245) describes repressed traumas, fears and shame of perpetrators and witnesses of violence as resulting in a collective neurosis that impedes closure, mourning and empathy for the victims.

In view of the above mentioned, it does not come as a surprise that reconciliatory potential in both conflicts remains fairly limited. Nonetheless, there are numerous endeavors. The "bereaved families' forum", for instance, grants Israelis and Palestinians that have lost relatives to the conflict, strength and consolation in mutual support, and acknowledgement of their common loss (Hermon 2012). In Cyprus the bicommunal NGO "Together we can" transcends national and political boundaries to empower relatives of missing persons in search for their loved ones' remains unitedly. Both associations promote empathy with and re-humanization of the other. Both, however, also act in a profoundly unfavorable environment, for they are faced with suspicion and rejection by the majority society. This shows how reconciliatory emotions may appear as threat to emotionally polarized societies.

These insights have inspired social psychologists Nadler and Shnabel (2008, 46–53) to establish the idea of an *apology-forgiveness-circle*. They draw on the premise that the cognitive influence of emotions is based on the needs for physical and social integrity: Experiencing violence, they assume, causes deep feelings of humiliation and helplessness that subsequently motivate cravings for revenge and empowerment. Thus, a victim's aim is to make amends for the perceived asymmetry of power and injustice. Conversely, a perpetrator's guilt and fear of sanctions may cause either repression or justification strategies (e. g. externalization of blame). As the authors state, only apology (by the perpetrator) and forgiveness (by the victim) will free both from their emotional imprisonment.

The reconciliation process in South Africa in so far as it was based on individual encounters between victim and perpetrator is an excellent case in point. Archbishop Tutu (2010) and psychologist Gobodo-Madikizela – both members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and prominent figures in the political transition – have repeatedly stressed the liberating and empowering force of forgiveness. As Gobodo-Madikizela (2006, 117) aptly points out:

> "For just at the moment when the perpetrator begins to show remorse, to seek some way to ask forgiveness, the victim becomes the gatekeeper to what the outcast desires –

> readmission into the human community. […] In this sense, then, forgiveness is a kind of revenge, but revenge enacted at a rarefied level. Forgiving may appear to condone the offence, thus further disempowering the victim. But forgiveness does not overlook the deed: it rises above it. 'This is what it means to be human', it says. 'I cannot and will not return the evil you inflicted on me.' And that is the victim's triumph."

To a certain extend these encounters had the power to appease the victim's pain, its impulses of aggression, the frustration that may result from the feeling of powerlessness and injustice, and thus to allow for forgiveness and to provide closure. However, the perceived lack of material compensation and the mentioned socio-economic cleavages have also raised critique about what was perceived as a too narrow focus on socio-emotional reconciliation. That underlines the need for a comprehensive approach to transitional justice as collectives' need.[15]

To sum up, particularly conflict-related emotions are mutually enhancing, favor selective and biased cognition, impede reconciliatory action, and, eventually, may promote the characteristic, maximalist positions of parties in conflict. Thus, they inhibit rapprochement on possible emotional and cognitive levels, including empathy, multi-perspectivity, apology and forgiveness. "It is no wonder", Crawford (2000, 116) underlines, „that postconflict peacebuilding efforts too frequently fail and wars reerupt because settlements and peacebuilding policies play with emotional fire that practitioners scarcely understand but nevertheless seek to manipulate". Thus, if conflicts exhibit an emotional impasse, it is very likely that they are resistant to factual-pragmatic negotiations and cost-benefit-calculations. This will become even more evident, if one considers the power emotions exert on norms and identities.

Emotional Norms – Normative Emotions

Some emotions, as already mentioned initially, carry normative meaning. *Honor*, *pride* and *appreciation*, for instance, reflect the fulfillment of social standards, while *shame* or guilt indicate transgression, failure and alienation (Scheff's (1999, 334). Accordingly, an actor's need for recognition and social integration, and his aspirations to avoid humiliation and isolation, provide a powerful social sanction instrument to motivate conformity. But moral emotions are also fundamental in securing constructive social relations. As studies on psychopathological behavior

[15] For first-hand-insights into the TRC's hearings and their emotional dimensions see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLL0CGivAds&t=91s>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRE_eM_LtR4&t=1895s>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdJWX7kRC18> [accessed 06.01.2020].

have shown, somebody who does not fear social sanctions, exclusion or rejection can easily act unscrupulous (see e. g. Cacioppo and Gardner 1999, 194).

Moreover, emotions – whether displayed or repressed – reflect normative role models. To admit or express certain emotions – think of *boredom*, *jealousy*, *embarrassment* or *fear* – can be regarded as impolite, as a sign of weakness or even as an affront. Other emotions, such as (national) pride, an aggressive stance towards an outgroup or the expression of stoic serenity might be encouraged. That is especially important in ethnocentric communities with their often-narrow gender roles and high conformity pressure based on self-white-washing and other-maligning beliefs.

> "Her soul is genuine and full of grace!
> In the most of utmost humiliation.
> Her heart grieves,
> Since borealis has blown away her dreams.
> And the Northern Neighbour
> Has brought sludge and blood
> And locked the door of her house.
> Her soul is genuine and full of grace.
> Resting in silent pain
>
> She commemorates Madonna's grief
>
> At the moment of her child
> […]
> Planting a tree of patience
> Untiringly awaiting the halo and
> Lightening of Wonder."
>
> [translated from Greek by the author]

A Greek-Cypriot history-textbook depicting a mother waiting for the return of her lost child and the invading Turkish army (a reference to the island's division in 1974) blatantly shows this contrast in opposing emotional gender roles.[16]

The image of the woman in chains is complemented by a poem titled "Tribute to the Cypriot Woman". As embodiment of grace, and innocence she backs a favourable self-image of the

[16] Both images and poem from Παπαδόπουλος (2001: 11: 39).

community anchored in an ethno-religious narrative of suffering and ultimate glory and shall serve as normative role model. Her stoic appearance is juxtaposed with the frightening image of "Attila's Attack" (*Attila* being a pejorative synonym for Turkey). Both images are a miniature depiction of the broader, monolithic narratives that impede critical self-reflection or empathy for the other but are drafted to inspire polarizing resentment.



Figure I: Tribute to the Cypriot-Woman

Figure II: Attilas Invasion

Under these circumstances, it appears as very likely that publicly acknowledging guilt or shame is considered ignoble or unmanly and by way of contrast aggressive demeanor is rewarded; that empathy with an outgroup is regarded as "betraying the fatherland" and undermining social cohesion.

Accordingly, both in Cyprus, and in Israel / Palestine, peace activists are often accused of weakening the common national front, if they engage in reconciliatory actions and dialogue with the other. Both community's collective suffering, and their declared cause of restoring the political status quo ante by means of intransigence and fighting spirit, facilitate the labeling of rapprochement gestures as dangerous and unethical.[17]

Dajani (2020) shows in her analysis of Palestinian textbooks how education promotes in-group-conformity and fighting spirit. Figure III and IV depict female role models that obviously serve a normative-emotional purpose. While the first shows a desperate woman clasping onto an olive tree. The olive tree, as the author (ibid., 89) explains, is a symbol of Palestinian "resistance and resilience" – the second is a reference to a historic figure, a popular Arabic poet, who send her four sons to fight for Islam. All of them died as martyrs.

Figure III, taken from Islamic Studies, Grade 5, Vol. 1., 2017, Lesson 1, 6., in Dajani (2020), 89); courtesy of the author

[17] A prominent example is Prof. Mohammed Dajani-Daoudi, former professor at Al Quds University, East Jerusalem. Dajani faced considerable hostility from within the Palestinian community for taking Palestinian students to Auschwitz within a trilateral, scientific reconciliation project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). For further information see: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/middleeast/palestinian-teaches-tolerance-via-holocaust.html>; <http://www.jcrs.uni-jena.de/Hearts+of+Flesh+_+Not+Stone.html>; for the case of Cyprus see i.a. Hadjipavlou, M. (2010): Women and Change in Cyprus. Feminism and Gender in Conflict, London: I. B. Tauris.



Figure IV, taken from Islamic Studies, Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2017, Lesson 14, p. 74, in Dajani (2020), 137); courtesy of the author

Both are to remind the pupil of her obligation for the national cause, that is inspired by female models whose despair, vigor and determination to follow.

Thus, moral emotions can be utilized strategically. In this sense, the permanent visualization of past injuries that appear in the institutionalized memory of societies in intractable conflicts as symbols of collective victimhood can also be understood as emotional role models (a reminder of being brave, patient, and uncompromising) and a convenient political means of keeping the pain alive and thus relevant for legitimizing maximalist positions. In the case of Cyprus or Israel / Palestine the universal depictions of pain (in memorials, schoolbooks, songs, movies, or oral history) can be metaphorically seen as a festering wound that legitimizes the respective communities' claims. This way the socio-emotional status quo is perpetuated by impeding closure, remorse and mourning.

Emotions and norms, one can sum up, are deeply interconnected insofar as actors comply with norms out of an emotional motivation for social appreciation. The specific forms and prescriptions of emotional expressions furthermore reflect cultural ideals, as well as strategic goals. As such, emotional role models aim at avoiding signs that can be considered as a gesture of *mea culpa* or a sign of weakness, while they strive to reinforce the validity of one's position by aggression, indignation or intransigence.

Emotional Identities and Social Representations

Having discussed the social, relational, and normative features of emotions, it appears obvious that they are closely connected to identities. In Uljas' (2001, 257) definition of social identity as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives "from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" the impact of emotions is already implicitly present. Social identity, according to this definition, has a cognitive and an affective dimension. Ross (2006, 210) calls it "affective identity".

In line with this definition *ethno-national* identity, for instance, can be defined as consisting of a common pool of knowledge, the consciousness of belonging to that nation or ethnicity, and a series of related emotions that serve as affective basis for founding myths, narratives of pain and glory, or collective rituals that individuals enact and identify with.

This cognitive-affective basis of identity is backed by experimental evidence. According to *Social Identity Theory* (SIT) individuals take over collective perceptual and interpretative patterns and thus "de-personalize" depending on the degree of their identification with a certain group. In other words: „To the extent that group membership defines them, people do not think of themselves as unique individuals, but rather as relatively interchangeable members of the group" (Mackie et al. 2009, 287). Similarly, Intergroup Emotion Theory claims that social categories and emotions interact (Rydell et al. 2008, 1141). Listening to one's national anthem, for instance, might activate one's national identity and the feeling of pride. Watching one's favorite football team playing, will most likely evoke powerful emotions according to the level of identification (Mackie et al. 2008, 1872). Being depersonalized, the fans' emotional state becomes synonymous with that of the team: Emotions of victory or defeat directly emanate to the fan block by means of affective identification. The glorious victory of one's team will make the fan feel pride, happiness, and superiority; the own team's defeat will trigger anger, humiliation or frustration – even though neither victory nor defeat were based on one's own action. This artificial, temporary construction of rivalry gives a good hint as to how intractable, particularly interethnic conflicts with their strong connection to glorious narratives of victory and defeat work on a larger scale.

As the anthem and football examples show, affective identities can be evoked by certain triggers that push *this* particular identity (out of an individual's multiple identities) into the foreground (*salience*). Say, a person whose self-image to varying and dynamic degrees consists of perceiving himself primarily as father, agnostic and journalist, might when hearing the national anthem feel primarily French (in that moment *French* as identity marker becomes *salient*).

Several studies showed that when people were successfully encouraged to identify with a group, they instantly displayed specific emotions (Mackie et al. 2008, 1871; Sasley 2011, 458;

Mackie et al. 2000, 602–616). Moreover, emotional bonds show to create a strong cognitive bias favoring the ingroup. People randomly divided into groups displayed an immediate inclination to evaluate the ingroup favorably and diverse (the latter means: *intra*-group differences were more consciously perceived), while the outgroup was in tendency perceived as negative and homogenous (see Howard 2000, 360–370; Worchel and Coutant 2008, 423–446; Beck 2000, 151–153; Nadler et al. 2008, 348). As Miron et al. (2010, 768–779) proved in an artificially created conflict situation, a strong affective connection to one's own group even caused "higher confirmatory injustice standards": The stronger the emotional identification with the ingroup, the more difficult it was to convince its members of their own unjust behavior.

These results show how emotion, cognition and identity can stiffen negative attitudes in intergroup relations. In ethnocentric conflicts, where ethnic identity is made permanently salient out of cultural or strategic reasons, certain emotions can also be permanently salient and thus reinforce intercommunal cleavages. Thus, one can say, the more one identifies as exclusively Greek, the more love s/he will probably feel for his/her identity and the more likely s/he will harbor negative feelings for the Turks and perceive them as homogenous (and vice versa). The more one sees himself as Israeli, the more one is emotionally attached to the nation's exclusive symbols, the likelier it is that (s)he will perceive Palestinians as a collective threat and their claims as illegitimate (and vice versa).[18]

Eventually, emotions also have a high recognition-value being part of cultural heritage, (gender) roles, scripts and routines:

> "[P]eople", Parkinson (1996, 675) argues drawing on the cultural function of emotions, "intentionally adopt emotional roles for rhetorical purposes to further the development of their self-narratives. […] Emotional roles derive from the myths, legends and unarticulated common knowledge which are background features of cultural life."

Thus, in taking on emotional roles, actors lend meaning to their claims and simultaneously express their compliance with society, its narratives and collective identity. Pupils portraying pride or contempt against an enemy in annual national parades, politicians using fierce gestures and uncompromising language in public speeches or the afore-mentioned stoic serenity of the missing's mother, are emotional roles that may serve as identification symbols for entire societies as shared among families, in schools or media in form of aesthetically arranged narratives:

[18] For the Israeli-Palestinian case see Mana et. al. 2015 & 2019.

> "Aesthetic sources are particularly suited to capture emotions because they seek to do more than simply represent an object or event as realistically as possible. To be of artistic value, a work of art – be it a poem, an opera, a painting or a photograph – must be able to engage and capture not only exterior realities, but also, and above all, our human and emotional relationship with them" (Hutchison and Bleiker 2007, 131–132).

In other words, omnipresent representations of physical or mental pain, braveness and victimization in intractable conflicts can all be regarded as an emotional heritage that is being transmitted in a ritualized form (particularly to the younger generation) and takes full effect precisely because of its emotional content. Thus, a national hero's pain, can literary be conserved and made palpable for those that have not had a first-hand experience of this pain. That underlines the relevance of cultural artefacts as carriers of emotions and sources of emotional identification and illustrates the self-perpetuating emotional mechanisms of intractability. Papadakis (1994) for instance, shows how the Greek and the Turkish "Museums of National Struggle" are based on mutually exclusive, carefully arranged, highly emotional, haptic and visual narratives that shall appeal in particular to young visitors to embark on a journey into the national heritage along photographs of tragic events, vitrines with personal belongings of the national "heroes", statues, shrines and memorial plaques. Here, the emotional power shall bind events together, underline their timeless importance and thus contribute to a permanent salience of an exclusive national identity.

Eventually, illustrations of pain and anger have become collective symbols both in Cyprus and Palestine. An award-winning photograph of a young man protesting at Gaza-border, said to resemble Delacroix's *La Liberté guidant le peuple* is one of endless similar motives that have come to signify Palestinians' fighting spirit.[19]

In the Cyprus Conflict the public sphere is full of embodiments of the Greek-Cypriots' collective pain. The mothers of the missing have become such an omnipresent embodiment to be found in education and media (figure V).[20] Their pain, loss and anxious hope for return of their loved ones represents the pain of trauma and violence and loss of territory, and the hope for an eventual return to the homelands (Rehrmann 2017). Thus, they have become emotional depictions of collective identity.

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[19] Described image is part of the series "Palestinian Rights of Return Protests" by Mustafa Hassona; onlineat:<https://www.leica-oskar-barnack-award.com/bildstrecken-finalisten/2019/mustafa-hassona.html> [accessed 11.07.2020].

[20] Figure VI taken from: https: <https://www.ahistoryofgreece.com/november17.htm> [accessed 11.07.2020].

Conclusion and Prospect

It was the aim of this paper to discuss in theory and illustrate on the basis of experimental and social evidence the impact of emotions on aggravating and prolonging intractable, ethno-national conflicts.

To sum up, emotions in this context appear as

1.) basic needs for security, sense, belonging, justice, freedom, prosperity or acknowledgement (needs often deprived in intractable conflicts);

2.) motivational impulses that either stem from the depravation of these needs or are a reaction to external events with the goal of doing justice, liberating, protecting, or empowering and thus restoring an emotional balance (such as the discussed conflict-related emotions *fear*, *anger* and *humiliation*);

3.) affective ideas and impulses that to varying degrees both emanate from and influence memory, thought, or evaluation and particularly narrow down an individual's or group's perceptions and attitudes towards past or present events;

4.) as ethical judgements, normative role models or affective identities that transmit certain self-images and norms, inspire and demand conformity, sanction deviation, serve as cultural reference points of belonging and thus constitute and shape social and intergroup-relations, and, eventually;

5.) as aesthetic components of narrative structures that lend meaning, beauty and power to social artifacts and make them graspable and transmittable for future generations.

In this entirety emotions appear to maintain and aggravate conflict for four interrelated reasons:

First, because the depravation or endangering of basic needs will make the willingness to compromise unlikely. The often-cited Israeli's need for security and the Palestinian's need for life-quality, but also the related studies are cases in point. As such fear on the one side and resentment on the other can be seen as the two key emotions impeding rapprochement and compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Second, because negative impulses as reactions to (structural) violence or loss possess a devastating momentum that raises the risk of escalation. This is particularly the case in violent and simmering conflicts with high security risks.

Third, because cognitive biases resulting from emotional intergroup-polarization affect how things are remembered, perceived and judged and therefore are likely to maintain or even aggravate existing polarizations.

Fourth, because aesthetic heritages of glory and pain are deeply intertwined with people's positive self-image, sense of coherence and communal belonging.

Fifth, because normative role models favor high conformity degrees that are inspired by collective pride or indignation and compliance-pressure based on fear of sanction and exclusion. Both the Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are arenas for charismatic political leaders that appeal to the public by their fierce, uncompromising attitude, by referring to the struggle of one's ancestors and the related moral obligation to continue their cause (evident e. g. in the Cypriot textbook), by citing aesthetically arranged narratives (deep-rooted national founding myths, or thrilling stories of victory and defeat) that underline the ingroup's righteousness, and by vehemently de-legitimizing internal as well as external critique as unfair or dangerous for national unity.

Sixth, because all of these emotional states, respectively effects facilitate power-political manipulation. The instrumentalization of fear, resentment and patriotism in Papadopoulos' speech to the nation appears as representative.

In this sense, the decisively heightened role of emotions in ethno-national contexts and the heightened risk for being used for strategic purposes appears as verified. Thus, emotions – be they in form of protracted trauma, aggressive or protective impulses, normative pleas, aesthetic narratives or enacted role models – indeed appear to acquire a particular important meaning in crisis, as well as in ethno-national conflicts with their often narrow and normative codes of behavior.

What does this mean for the prospect of reconciliation? It means that profound and sustainable peace needs to address all party's emotional needs, so to promote the willingness to compromise and reduce the risk of violence. South Africa is the most prominent example of empowering and acknowledging the victim's suffering through public encounters and testimonies of victims and perpetrators.

Thinking about the three categories introduced in the beginning of this paper – settlement, resolution and reconciliation – one can conclude that personal healing and social acknowledgement of injustice will strengthen a conflict's sustainable resolution. Also, a conflict's formal settlement that succeeds in providing the competing parties with a feeling of being acknowledged in their needs will naturally reduce the popularity of uncompromising attitudes and compliance pressure.

However, the most profound paradigm shift towards socio-emotional reconciliation can only be realized, if a common memory and inclusive narratives are established that allow for positive identification with the former outgroup and for common, overarching self-images to evolve.

Neither of the cited (post-) conflict societies from Northern Ireland to South Africa or Cyprus has managed to establish a broadly shared, affective identity based on mutual acknowledgement and shared stories that would not only reconcile conflicted heritages but pave the way for a pleasant common future.

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Die Bundeswehr – Böses tun, um gut sein zu können?[1]

Marcello Clemenz, Kai Nickelsdorf, Alexander Strelau, Franz Voißel, Steffen Wortmann

Warum braucht ein Staat wie Deutschland eine Armee und Soldaten? Und wenn es Soldaten braucht, welche braucht es dann überhaupt? Die Gründerväter der Bundeswehr gingen davon aus, dass Streitkräfte den außenpolitischen Handlungsspielraum eines Staates erweitern und damit dessen Souveränität garantieren.[2] Aber gilt das heute noch? Deutschland liegt in der geografischen Mitte der Europäischen Union. Es ist umgeben von Freunden, mit denen der Handel floriert. Es besteht ein gegenseitiges Interesse an Stabilität und Frieden. Unstimmigkeiten werden politisch beigelegt, militärische Drohungen sind obsolet geworden. Müssen Staaten in einer solchen gemeinschaftlichen Umgebung noch die funktionale, also evtl. tödliche Effizienz von Streitkräften präsentieren, um ihre Souveränität zu sichern? Sind Militärs in ihren per se autoritären Strukturen, nicht vielmehr eine Gefährdung für die demokratischen, freiheitlichen und moralischen Werte, wie sie in Deutschland vorherrschen? Und sind Soldaten damit schon etwas ‚Böses', das es zu verhindern gilt?[3]

Um diese Fragen beantworten zu können, ist ein kurzer Blick in die Vergangenheit Deutschlands notwendig. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war es für die alliierten Siegermächte alles andere als selbstverständlich, dass der ehemalige Kriegsgegner Deutschland ein eigenes Militär erhalten sollte. Zu frisch waren die Erinnerungen an zwei Weltkriege und die daraus entstandenen Folgen für Europa und die Welt. Selbst als im aufkommenden Kalten Krieg die beiden Supermächte, die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und die Sowjet Union, ihre Interessensphären

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1 Diese Aussage wurde sinngemäß im Laufe der Diskussion während des Seminars „Overcome Evil with Good" durch Frau Prof. C. Dahlgrün getätigt.

2 Beck 2016, 31.

3 Graf von Baudissin 1978, 10.

absteckten, um ihre jeweilige Ideologie durchzusetzen, änderte sich diese Einstellung noch nicht. Der notwendige Änderungsdruck entstand erst, als sich im Sommer 1950 die beiden entstandenen Machtblöcke in Korea gegenüberstanden. Nordkorea überfiel seinen Nachbarn im Süden, wobei beide durch ihre jeweiligen Verbündeten im Osten bzw. im Westen unterstützt wurden. Sofort gewann auch die Frage nach der Sicherheit Westeuropas an Bedeutung, da sich die beiden Blöcke an der innerdeutschen Grenze ähnlich wie in Korea gegenüberstanden. Ein westdeutscher Sicherheitsbeitrag rückte mehr und mehr in den Fokus.[4] Deutschland und seine ehemaligen westlichen Gegner begannen sich mehr und mehr als Schicksalsgemeinschaft zu verstehen, deren Wohl und Wehe miteinander verknüpft waren.

Zwar wurde eine ‚Wiederbewaffnung' der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht ohne Kritik und Befürchtungen diskutiert, die Umstände und die gefühlte äußere Bedrohungslage sorgten 1955 aber dafür, dass ein westdeutsches Militär gegründet wurde. Dafür gab es zwei wesentliche Grundvoraussetzungen: Zum einen sollte eine westdeutsche Armee in das internationale westliche Bündnis integriert sein. Zum anderen sollte die Bundeswehr explizit Teil und Beschützer einer freiheitlich demokratischen Gesellschaft werden.[5] Wie aber konnten die Institution Bundeswehr und ihre einzelnen Angehörigen angemessen in den demokratischen Staat und die Gesellschaft integriert werden? Wie konnte die politische und militärische Führung der Bundesrepublik, in einer nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg pazifizierten, demilitarisierten und politikverdrossenen Gesellschaft Menschen finden, die bereit waren Soldaten zu sein, ohne dass sie sich mit Werten der Wehrmacht identifizieren würden. Soldaten sollten sich aus demokratischen Staatsbürgern rekrutieren und die damit verbundenen Werte auch in den Streitkräften beibehalten.[6] Ein neues Führungsverständnis musste entstehen, welches sowohl militärische Effizienz sicherstellen, als auch demokratische Integration fördern sollte: die Innere Führung. Wolf Graf von Baudissin, gemeinhin als Gründungsvater dieser Führungsphilosophie bekannt, schlug vor, dass der Soldat, als Staatsbürger in Uniform, an einem öffentlichen (militär-)politischen Diskurs teilnehmen und diesen anleiten solle. Die offene und aktive Auseinandersetzung mit Herausforderungen der Zeit solle es Streitkräften ermöglichen, sich stetig weiter zu entwickeln und sich in der Mitte der Gesellschaft zu etablieren. Dabei spielte die Übernahme von demokratischen Werten bspw. aus dem Grundgesetz in die militärischen Gepflogenheiten eine besondere Rolle.[7]

Doch welche Bedeutung hat die Innere Führung im Jahr 2019 für den Einsatz von Streitkräften und das Selbstverständnis von Soldaten? Heutige Kritiker sprechen ihr jegliche Kraft ab und sehen in ihr ein Hindernis. Sie gehen davon aus, dass der Staatsbürger in Uniform ausgedient

4 Kießling 2005, 141, 337–338.

5 Heinemann. Kielmannsegg (2007), 138.

6 Horn 2010, 447.

7 Will 2002, 20ff.

habe. Sie wünschen sich einen archaischen Kämpfertypus, der auch in Hightech-Kriegen bestehen kann. Sie sprechen der Inneren Führung ab, in den heutigen Konflikten einen effektiven Beitrag zu leisten.[8] Sie fordern, dass sich die Bundeswehr als eine Art Gegenentwurf zur westlichen Gesellschaft neu erfinden müsse und ihren Platz nicht mehr in der Mitte einer vermeintlich hedonistischen Bevölkerung suchen dürfe. Dieses Verständnis vom Staatsbürger steht nach Meinung der Kritiker stellvertretend für all das, was den Soldaten davon abhält, tapfer zu sein und seinen Auftrag zu erfüllen. Die Essenz gesellschaftlicher Werte sei nämlich für jene vermeintlich bloße Selbstverwirklichung, Konsumlust, Pazifismus und Egoismus. Das ‚Soldatische' ergebe sich aber aus ‚Werten' (näherhin: Tugenden) wie u. a. Disziplin, Wahrhaftigkeit, Treue, Selbstlosigkeit, Weltoffenheit und Mut, welche der Zivilgesellschaft angeblich fern seien. Das ‚Zivile' auf der einen Seite und das ‚Militärische' auf der anderen Seite stellen in diesem Verständnis zwei Pole dar. Die Werte des einen Pols können sich aber nicht im anderen wiederfinden, sie schließen sich gegenseitig aus. Innere Führung mit ihrer lediglich gesellschaftsintegrierenden Funktion könne demnach nicht das Ziel erreichen, eine funktionierende Armee für moderne Einsatz- und Konfliktszenarien auszubilden.[9]

Innere Führung sei zu abstrakt, habe nichts mit dem eigentlichen Auftrag der Streitkräfte zu tun und treffe nicht den Kern des Soldatenberufes. Damit behindere sie die Suche nach einer soldatischen Identität, in der alles ‚Zivile' als Gegenentwurf zum eigenen Sein verstanden werde. Der sog. miles protector, also der Soldat als Beschützer in Zeiten von Sicherheitsvorsorge, Krisenprävention und Krisenstabilisierung auf der einen Seite, wird dem ‚miles bellicus', dem Kämpfer im Gefecht, auf der anderen Seite gegenübergestellt. Die Kritiker behaupten, dass eine Vermischung dieser Arten von Soldaten nicht möglich sei und setzen eine trennscharfe Idealisierung dieser Archetypen voraus.[10]

Dieser Streit um die Bedeutung des Staatsbürgers in Uniform, um die Existenzberechtigung der Inneren Führung, die Ausgestaltung der soldatischen Identität und damit um die Aufgaben und Ausrichtung von deutschen Streitkräften fasst die wesentlichen Aspekte der Kritik an Innerer Führung zusammen.

Die Kritik reduziert die Anforderungen an den Beruf des militärischen Führers häufig auf den Aspekt des sog. militärischen Handwerks, also einfach gesagt auf taktisch geprägtes, praktisches Können. Der ‚miles bellicus', ist also ihr Idealbild eines Soldaten. Dieses vermeintliche Idealbild geht aber an den Bedürfnissen einer modernen, westlich geprägten Gesellschaft vorbei, da es die Anforderungen an den Beruf eines Soldaten im Allgemeinen und den eines Offiziers im

8 Die Aussage geht auf GenLt a.D. Hans-Otto Budde zurück, vgl. Winkel 2004.

9 Vgl. Rotter 2014, 53–62.

10 Schmitz 2017, 374–375.

Besonderen auf einen eher ‚handwerklichen' Aspekt reduziert.[11] Aber was ist mit Situationen, in denen es auf mehr als nur praktische Fähigkeit ankommt, wie sie Einsatz- und Kriegsszenarien in ihrer ganzen Komplexität regelmäßig darstellen? Gerade in Einsätzen oder Kriegen werden Soldaten nicht nur mit Unbestimmtheit und Ungewissheit konfrontiert, sondern auch mit Situationen, in denen sie extremen Belastungen ausgesetzt sind. Ein bloßes funktionales Handeln reicht aber nicht aus, um in Kriegen jeglicher Art zu bestehen. Dies gilt vor allem für diejenigen, die die Verantwortung tragen, andere Menschen zu führen.[12] Innerer Führung und der darin erfolgenden soldatischen Erziehung kommt grundsätzlich die Aufgabe zu, sich und andere auch auf solche Extremsituationen vorzubereiten. Die Erziehung soll Soldaten und ihre Führer dazu befähigen, die Verantwortung des eigenen Handelns nicht nur am eigenen Gewissen, sondern darüber hinaus auch an den demokratischen Werten Deutschlands auszurichten. Damit bietet sie also eine Orientierungshilfe, um in außerordentlichen Lagen zu bestehen.[13]

Dies gilt umso mehr, je schneller und weiter sich moderne Medien ausbreiten und entwickeln. Hatte das militärische Handeln des einzelnen Soldaten zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts noch relativ geringe öffentliche Auswirkungen, wird diesem spätestens mit dem Konzept vom ‚Strategic Corporal' eine immer größer werdende Bedeutung zugeschrieben. Hinter diesem Begriff verbirgt sich die Idee, dass beispielsweise Fehltritte einfacher Soldaten auch vor dem Hintergrund der sich via Internet und *Social Media* schnell und weltweit ausbreitenden, ungefilterten Nachrichten einen großen Einfluss auf mindestens die Operationsführung, wenn nicht sogar auf die politische Führung eines Landes haben können.[14]

Die stellvertretend dargestellten Kritiker Innerer Führung begehen im Zuge ihrer Beanstandungen einen wesentlichen Fehler: Sie vereinfachen das komplexe Berufsbild eines Soldaten und die Konsequenzen seiner Handlungen. Eine solche Kritik zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die Geschichte der Bundeswehr. Natürlich war es, ist es und wird es die Kernkompetenz der Streitkräfte bleiben, körperlich und geistig belastbar zu sein und den Willen aufbringen zu können, sein eigenes Leben in Gefahr zu bringen und im äußersten Fall töten müssen zu können.[15] Diese Aspekte grundlegenden Fähigkeiten des bundesdeutschen Soldatentums beschreiben sein Aktionsfeld indes nur sehr unzureichend. Denn sie klammern eine wichtige ethische Maxime aus, auf der sich die funktionalen Aufgaben des Militärs begründen. Soldaten auf allen Ebenen der Hierarchie der Bundeswehr sind zunächst verantwortlich für ihr eigenes Handeln. Innere Führung enthält in diesem Sinne keine Aufforderung zur Diskussion in Gefechtssituationen.

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11 Unger 2014, 29–31.

12 Di Fabio 2005.

13 Döge 2008, 71.

14 Barcott 2010.

15 Vgl. Hartmann 2007.

Sie enthält vielmehr den Appell, demokratische Werte wie etwa die Menschenrechte zu achten und als Führungskraft Befehle mit Bedacht an die jeweilige Situation anzupassen. Dieses gewissenhafte Handeln hat sich in der deutschen Demokratie an der Verfassung und den darin vertretenen Werten auszurichten. Dieser Anspruch steht fest und findet in dem durch alle Bundeswehrsoldaten geleisteten Eid einen präzisen Ausdruck. Der Soldat muss in letzter Konsequenz Verfassungsdiener sein und bleiben.

Auf der anderen Seite wäre es falsch anzunehmen, dass die gefühlte Belastung durch die Innere Führung gänzlich unberechtigt wäre, die Kritiker vollständig falsch lägen und sich Innere Führung nicht weiter entwickeln müsse. Das dargestellte Spannungsfeld zwischen Kritikern und Befürwortern besteht weiter fort. Diesem ist weder mit einer neuen Begriffskonstruktion noch einer inhaltstheoretischen Anpassung Innerer Führung beizukommen.[16]

Durch den Anspruch, der an die Innere Führung gestellt wird, wird in berufsethischer Dimension ein übergroßes Erbe angetreten. Innere Führung ist schlichtweg zu komplex, um sie ohne Weiteres zu verstehen und umzusetzen. Die betreffende Zentrale Dienstvorschrift stellt Innere Führung als eine dynamische Führungsphilosophie mit einer Berufsethik dar, die an demokratische und rechtstaatliche Werte gebunden ist. In dieser grundlegenden Vorschrift werden die sehr berechtigten Ziele der Inneren Führung abstrakt und akademisch formuliert. Eine konkrete Definition dieser dynamischen Führungsphilosophie fehlt aber weitestgehend.[17] Auch dies ist eine zentrale Kritik an Innerer Führung und trägt zur begrifflichen Unsicherheit und Vagheit bei. Innere Führung ist nur schwer greifbar, oftmals zu akademisch und abstrakt und wird damit häufig als verkopft und hinderlich für die Einsatzbereitschaft der Truppe angesehen.[18] Der folgende Absatz ist vor diesem Hintergrund um Präzisierung bemüht.

Zunächst definiert das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland die besonderen Fähigkeiten der Bundeswehr als grundsätzlich tödlich auf Distanz. Die deutsche Verfassung begründet damit eine Aufgabe, die viele Bürgerinnen und Bürger in der deutschen Gesellschaft landläufig als etwas Böses begreifen. Die Bundeswehr erscheint vor diesem Hintergrund zum einen als das wirkungsvollste Instrument staatlicher Gewalt, das zum anderen in Politik, Medien und Zivilgesellschaft kontinuierlich reflektiert und evaluiert wird. Wie kann die Bundeswehr aber in einem derart kritischen Umfeld ein Instrument von höchster Schlagkraft sein und dies bleiben? Militärische Schlagkraft meint hier allerdings auch politische und ethische Fähigkeiten, die durch die Innere Führung angesichts der psychologischen und propagandistischen Kampfführung der damaligen und heutigen Gegner auf Dauer geschaffen werden mussten. Innere Führung versucht also ein immer vielschichtiger werdendes politisches und militärisches Umfeld

16 Schmitz 2017, 376.

17 Vgl. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 2008.

18 Hartmann 2016.

zu verstehen, zu analysieren und daraus Folgerungen für die Schlagkraft der Truppe zu treffen. Darüber hinaus soll das Konzept vom Staatsbürger in das Konstrukt Militär integriert werden, obwohl es wenig demokratisch ist.

Dies galt im Kalten Krieg und gilt auch heute noch. Die Umwelt mit ihren Einflüssen ist zu komplex, um den Beruf des Soldaten allein auf seine Fähigkeit, tödliche Gewalt auszuüben, zu reduzieren. Die immer wieder aufkommende Kritik und die Forderung nach ‚Rückbesinnung' auf vermeintliche militärische Kernkompetenzen und die Wiederauferstehung des sog. miles bellicus greift daher zu kurz. Militärs können heute nicht mehr agieren, wie dies vielleicht noch in früheren Kriegen vor Verbreitung der Massenmedien der Fall gewesen ist. Soldatinnen und Soldaten müssen sich darüber im Klaren sein, dass sie sich bei der Ausübung militärischer Gewalt im Fokus des allgemeinen öffentlichen Interesses befinden. Ein Umfeld, in dem sie losgelöst von geltenden Normen und Gesetzen, und damit einem gültigen ethischen Wertekanon handeln können, darf es nicht geben. Dieses Umfeld aber als Grundlage seiner Kritik herbeizusehnen, führt die eigene Beanstandung ad absurdum.[19]

Aufmerksames und an unseren demokratischen Werten ausgerichtetes militärisches Handeln verhindert nicht nur, dass sich Staatsbürger in Uniform von denen ohne Uniform entfremden. Es kann auch dazu beitragen, Fehltritte zu verhindern, die ein öffentliches Spießrutenlaufen durch die Medien zur Folge hätten. Dieses ‚An den Pranger Stellen' schadet nicht nur dem Ansehen der Bundeswehr als Organisation, sondern auch den betroffenen Soldaten. Soldaten sind also allgemein dazu angehalten, ihr Handeln an dem auszurichten, was von der *Gesellschaft* als ‚Gut' betrachtet wird. Und genau diesen Soldatentypus braucht eine freiheitlich und ethisch geprägte Gesellschaft: einen Soldaten, der vielleicht vermeintlich Böses tun muss und darf, wenn er sein soldatisches Handeln am Moralischen ausrichtet und letztendlich Gutes erreicht.

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[19] Zur Kritik an der Inneren Führung und dem bestehenden Bedarf ihrer Weiterentwicklung und Reform wird hier nichts weiter ausgeführt. Es wird aber auf die Lehrgangsarbeit im Lehrgang für Admiral-/Generalstabsdienst National von Strelau, Alexander: Innere Führung oder ‚Inneres Gewürge'? Vom Wesen einer Führungsphilosophie verwiesen, die diese Thematik intensiver behandelt.

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Eine Fußnote zu „Die Bundeswehr – Böses tun um gut sein zu können?“

Volker Stümke

Sollen oder dürfen Soldaten der Bundeswehr wirklich Böses tun, um damit letztendlich Gutes zu erreichen? Es ist zunächst gut, dass Corinna Dahlgrün diese Frage so pointiert gestellt hat, und ebenso ist es gut, dass die Offiziere sich auf diese Provokation eingelassen haben. Genau damit haben sie demonstriert, was sie geschrieben haben: dass Innere Führung ein demokratischer Diskurs sein soll, in dem nicht nur vor Fehltritten gewarnt wird, sondern auch eruiert werden kann, in welche Richtung die Bundeswehr weitergehen kann und soll – und in welche eben nicht. Der gesellschaftliche Diskurs über die Aufgaben der Bundeswehr muss geführt werden und sollte nicht den Massenmedien überlassen bleiben.

Mit Bedacht ist im obigen Schlusssatz allerdings nicht vom Bösen, sondern vom vermeintlich Bösen die Rede – und genau so kann ich ihm zustimmen. Denn es gibt Handlungen, die auch für einen Soldaten verboten sind und bleiben müssen; an dieser Stelle steht für mich das absolute Wertwort „böse“ als Warnung vor Taten, die niemals geschehen dürfen (Hannah Arendt) – im Unterschied zu Handlungen, die möglichst nicht geschehen sollten; sie würde ich traditionell als „schlecht“ bewerten und sie sind vermutlich von den Offizieren als vermeintlich böse bezeichnet worden. Es gibt also für mich einen kategorialen Unterschied zwischen der Bekämpfung eines Kombattanten und der Folter; das Erstgenannte ist schlecht und sollte nur unter sehr eng und möglichst präzise gefassten Ausnahmefällen erlaubt sein, das Zweite darf als eine böse Tat niemals geschehen. Maßstab für diese Unterscheidung ist die Menschenwürde als dasjenige „Gut“, das uns bindet und an das sich auch unser Grundgesetz gebunden hat.

Silent Echoes of Good Deeds: The Example of Kalavryta

Charalampos Karpouchtsis

Introduction: Greece, Germany and the Unhealed Wounds of the Past

In Kalavryta, a small town on the Peloponnese, the clock on the church tower in main square stands still, marking the hour the town was torched by German troops on 13th December 1943. It is one of the few visible signs of a horrible event that shocked Greek society during the Occupation of Greece in the Second World War (WWII). This event, and similar events throughout Greece, continue to be points of reference for both Greece and Germany. Currently, over 75 years later, the two countries are partners in multiple unions, amongst them in the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Monetary Union (EMU). Their bilateral history includes peaceful and calm, as well as war-ridden and dark sides, mutual dependencies and economic asymmetries. The European crisis has demonstrated the fragility of relations amongst European Union memberstates. However, recent events have shown that past traumata do not only reoccur in a state's foreign relations, they also become part of foreign policy making. Old wounds reappear, wounds most politicians and academics deemed healed. The darker sides of the Greek-German past have gained political, academic, and public attention in recent years thematizing the Occupation of Greece[1] by the Wehrmacht and the Axis, the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the legacy of the years 1941–1944. At the

[1] For Greece the Occupation marks a historic event, a period of suffering and resistance, thus the word is written with a capital O. When I use the term "Occupation", I refer to the Occupation of Greece during WWII as a whole.

same time a discussion around reparations, compensation and restitution has become more and more important for Greek governments and the public, while Germany dismisses these issues.

The deterioration of the Greek-German relations awoke new political and academic interest in the countries' bilateral affairs (Parasidis and Karpouchtsis 2015). The new conflict creates new interest and coincides with the Hölderlin Approach of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies "Reconciliation amidst conflict" (O'Malley et al. 2017; Leiner and Flämig 2012). The crisis becomes a catalyst, a chance to work on old wounds, to reopen a dialogue on the past. In these terms, the worsening of the bilateral relations was soon followed by a shift of gear in German foreign policy towards Greece. This change may be viewed as a policy of reconciliation towards Greece (Gardner Feldman 2017) with various initiatives, such as the proposal to form a Greek-German Youth Organization or by creating the Greek-German Fund for the Future (GGFF) to promote scientific research, as well as aim at reconciliation with the Greek Jewish Communities and the other martyr communities.[2] In this article I concentrate on the last category, to which Kalavryta belongs.

The term "Martyr Cities and Villages" may be confusing in the international context as it has a religious connotation. The same term has been ascribed to the French village Oradour-sur-Glane, which was completely destroyed by SS-troops during WWII. In 1946 the French village received the title "martyr" for its suffering (Farmer 1995, 2000). Similarly, the term is used in Greek to describe places of terror, communities that have suffered extreme loss and / or total destruction during WWII. Out of respect for these places and their history, I shall use the term, which they ascribe to themselves and is widely used within the Greek-German dialogue on this topic. The term "martyr" has no religious meaning in this context, it is rather used to describe the martyrium, the horrible pain inflicted upon them, and at the same time ascribes a notion of sacrifice for freedom (Kanellopoulou 2010). Similar places within Europe would be Oradour-sur-Glane in France or Lidice in the Czech Republic, places we often refer to as "places of terror" or in German "Orte des Grauens". For a better understanding I refer to the Greek places of terror as "martyr communities" to summarize cities and villages that bear this title. They are of great importance within Greece as topoi of memory and are as such also places of interest for Germany.

In this article I concentrate on one of Greece's better-known martyr cities, namely Kalavryta, situated on the Peloponnese. In 1943 all male population of the town was shot, and the town was torched, leaving behind a destroyed community of women and children. This town serves as an example because it was an important point of reference for Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003), a German woman, who visited Kalavryta in 1952 and

[2] It is important to note, that certain Martyr Cities bear this title because of the suffering of their Jewish Communities, as is the case for Thessaloniki. However, in this text I concentrate on Kalavryta, a town with no Jewish presence.

vigorously tried to help the community by organizing vocational training for orphaned boys after finding out what happened (Králová 2016a, 202–209). Schramm von Thadden's example is probably unique not only because it happened so soon after the end of the war, but also because it led to something that still echoes today: she accompanied 33 orphans from Kalavryta to the country of their fathers' murderers – Germany – for them to receive vocational education (Chamakiotis and Antonopoulos 2010; Antonopoulos and Chamakiotis 2010). Schramm von Thadden probably is the first "reconciliation activist" within the post WWII Greek-German context. Her activities of support for Greek places of German terror were extensive and continued through the following decades in different villages and towns. This paper focuses on her first project in Kalavryta.

The importance of Schramm von Thadden's work became evident to me during my political work since 2015 and during my research since 2017 in Greece and Germany. Diplomats in both countries have enthusiastically referred to Schramm's work and have pointed at her book, which exists in both languages. What is more, I have met with mayors and civil society leaders from multiple martyr communities, including Kalavryta, where again a number of interview partners have referred to Schramm von Thadden and her projects. Therefore, I shall concentrate on her project in Kalavryta and discuss how, why and in what form it still echoes on.

As the title suggests, this piece focuses on one example of empathic action that has left a lasting effect. In doing so, I touch upon the issues of reparation, while focusing on the role of recognition and discussing the notions it entails as prerequisites or as foundations upon which human relations in post-conflict societies can be built. The presented case demonstrates how this can be the same foundation upon which an honest rapprochement can be built, opening up a process of reconciliation. In doing so, this paper aims at contributing to the theory of reconciliation through recognition.

Drawing upon a real-life example the role of recognition in the martyr city of Kalavryta as a start for a reconciliation process is discussed, showing that pragmatism and symbolism can have a lasting effect. For a better understanding of the topic I first set the theoretical frame on recognition and reconciliation. Then I concentrate on the role of Greek places of terror within public memory and highlight the history of Kalavryta in the wider context of post WWII narratives. Thereafter, the work of Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden is presented. Finally, her example is discussed against the symbolic and pragmatic realm of recognition and reconciliation.

Recognition: Founding a Base for Reconciliation?

The concept of recognition has been connected to an agonistic approach from various scholars, who built their theories around Hegel's theory of recognition. The politics of recognition (Taylor 1997)

have stimulated an agonistic understanding of reconciliation processes between former enemies (Schaap 2004). However, these concepts apply when referring to processes between groups or their representatives that take place in an organized manner, in which various actions are taken to allow coexistence in a post-conflict society and is connected to concepts of multiculturalism. This agonistic approach sees the continuity of the conflict in a nonviolent manner as constructive in forming a common base of dialogue that may allow for a reconciliation process to be fruitful. In our case, theories of politics of recognition are important regarding martyr communities as political entities with a common identity and their relation to German and Greek governments or in their relationship with each other. However, in our case the process takes place amongst persons, therefore I claim this example does not fit into the concept of *politics of recognition* as Taylor understands it, and therefore I do not employ Taylor's concept in this analysis[3] as I do not refer to multicultural societies.

Personal recognition precedes politics of recognition, especially when bringing the concepts of recognition and reconciliation together. What if recognition does not lead to reconciliation, or if recognition is not part of a larger plan to start a reconciliation process? When is recognition enough to be a stand-alone characteristic of an interaction between members of former enmity-groups? The example of Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden and her relationship with the widows of Kalavryta poses an example of human interaction before (or beyond) a reconciliation process. What is more, our example takes place in the early 1950s, meaning before concepts of reconciliation became popular and before those concepts entered the broader political arena, at least within the European sphere regarding traumata of WWII. A short discourse on recognition and the philosophical discussions around the concept allows for a better understanding. This may also provide, as I will show in this piece, one possible theory to understand interactions amongst single individuals or between individuals and smaller groups that form a basis of dialogue prerequisite to reconciliation. Thus, this turns a theoretic approach into an analytical tool.

To create a theoretical frame for our example I concentrate on Ikäheimo's (2011; 2014, 2015) understanding and theories on recognition. Building upon the concepts of Hegel, Ikäheimo and Laitinen differentiate between vertical and horizontal recognition. The vertical recognition constitutes the recognition of persons as bearers of rights or norms which are recognized by and recognize institutions. Based on this concept of Honneth (1994), who calls this kind of recognition "respect", Ikäheimo talks of institutional recognition. Regarding our example we are looking at the relation between the widows of Kalavryta and Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden, with institutions playing a minor – if not counterproductive – role. Thus, for our analysis the concept of horizontal recognition is of greater importance.

[3] For an in depth reading on agonistic approaches in reconciliation processes see Du Toit 2018, 178–187.

Horizontal recognition takes place amongst persons in what Laitinen (2011, 310) explains as "taking the other as a person". Taking the other as a person grasps the interaction between recognizer and recognized and this can also be applied to groups. For Laitinen recognition in taking the other as a person has four aspects, with the aspect of "unselfish recognitive attitude" being the genuine form of recognition that we can view as morally "good" (315). This deontological dimension is further enhanced with Ikäheimo's analysis, who draws upon Honneth's concepts and adds value to the discussion by differentiating the axiological, the deontological and the contributive dimensions of horizontal recognition (Ikäheimo 2015, 25). With his "intersubjective recognition" he focuses on recognition of persons as persons, aside from normative recognition of persons as bearer of rights or entitlements. He further differentiates the three dimensions in two modes, namely the conditional and the unconditional recognition. The conditional mode is characterized as "egocentric" or "not-genuinely personifying" (the recognizer recognizes the recognized and vice versa with self-interest, fear or value for profit). The unconditional mode is characterized as "allocentric" or "genuinely personifying" (the recognizer recognizes the recognized and vice versa with love, respect and gratitude) (Ikäheimo 2015).

Thus, an intersubjective unconditional recognition or genuinely personifying recognition is the ideal form human relations can be built upon. Ikäheimo's analysis provides a theoretical tool with which we can understand processes of dialogue and interaction and even cooperation with persons or group members of former hostile entities, before larger institutions or organized action takes place. For our analysis to be tested against "overcoming evil with good" the concept of intersubjective unconditional recognition is to be complemented by theories of reconciliation.

Reconciliation is both a goal and a process (Bloomfield et al. 2003). Processes of reconciliation are designed to contribute to the improvement of relationships damaged as a result of wrongdoing. In the case of Greece and Germany, reconciliation refers to the trauma of the Occupation of Greece and its legacy, which lies over 75 years in the past. This relationship evolves around different notions of remembering and forgetting, forming different narratives. As Anderson (1991) pinpoints, remembering and forgetting shapes identities, perceptions of the self and the other. Still, remembering and forgetting go hand in hand, as Anderson and Miller (2000) put it, because by deciding what a community remembers, it also decides what it forgets. In our case Kalavryta, the events as well as the relation to Ehrengard Schramm is remembered by the persons involved. The narratives around Greek-German relations may vary, but the narrative regarding this specific relationship is mostly shaped by the ones that participated in it and enriched by the historiography and the research on Greek-German relations and WWII from 1945 to date.

Furthermore, for the process of reconciliation to start it is necessary to build a relation of trust, an environment in which the parties can interact honestly. This becomes possible when there is genuinely personifying recognition. In turn, genuinely personifying recognition opens the way for further measures to promote the process of reconciliation, it creates a paradigm shift. A thorough

discussion on reconciliation as a process and as a goal as well as contradictory points on one of the main tools of reconciliation theory and praxis, namely Transitional Justice, are provided by Rehrmann (2020). She sees the paradigm shift in a post conflict society as paramount for the creation of trust. This entails truth-seeking, justice (in various forms) as well as prosecution of perpetrators, depending on the type of the conflict and the road chosen to overcome the conflict. However, she underlines that concepts of Transitional Justice (TJ) may entail contradictions or imbalances that need to be addressed. For the present case study acknowledgment and reparation are of specific relevance (Rehrmann 2020, 30–35). For a symbolic gesture to be honest, there is a need for it to be complemented by material means. In Rehrmann's words:

> "The mutual dependency of TJ measures is also visible in the question of reparations and acknowledgement: As already stated, acknowledgement of harm without criminal trials can appear as lip service and a lack of sincerity. The same is true for acknowledgement without reparations. Conversely, reparations without public recognition of harm may seem like blood money."
>
> (Rehrmann 2020, 34)

Following the discussion on remembering, the process of reconciliation in post-conflict societies must involve a discussion on narratives, especially if the conflict lies many years back as in our case. Furthermore, for a reconciliation process to be balanced, there must be a combination or rather a balance between symbolic and material reparation. In order to adjoin this process, trust is prerequisite and therefore, genuinely personifying recognition is necessary.

Before moving to the next section, one last, and often neglected issue that plays an important role in reconciliation processes and has apparently played a role in the current case study shall be mentioned: the gender perspective. The case of Kalavryta and Schramm is a case of interaction between non-combatant women, which facilitates contact amongst members of former enemy groups (Rehrmann 2017). More specifically, as gender studies have shown, in traditional societies women are often excluded from the political and military spheres of conflict. This exclusion, respectively their limitation to the civil sphere, have oddly become an advantage in post-conflict reconciliation, as the wide range of women's civil society networks for bonding and trauma reprocessing across national borders has shown (see for example Hadjipavlou 2010 and Cockburn 1998). Again, genuinely personifying recognition must have played a role in seeing each other as persons rather than entities with normative attributes, who belong or who represent the perpetrator or the victim. This was further facilitated by the gender aspect.

Occupation, Resistance and Kalavryta: Divided Memory as Political Narrative

The Second World War has been paramount in shaping Greek memory and by extension identity. The narratives surrounding the Greek resistance, the sacrifices and the sorrow of the event are embedded in Greek memory culture and are part of the Greeks' national identity (Karpouchtsis 2018). The martyr communities of Greece have gained attention since the late 1990s and have-become more important in local, regional and national memory and are part of Greek memory politics (Karpouchtsis 2016). Kalavryta has had a significant role in shaping Greek memory politics, being the first city to receive the title "martyr" by presidential decree in 1993 (Hellenic Parliament 1993). In this section, I will first discuss what happened in Kalavryta during the war and the divided memory that exists around the horrific events. This is important, in order to place and retrace the past in Kalavryta and by extension in Greece. Thus, I will provide an understanding of the dominant narratives of the past, which are problematic for the bilateral relations and especially for the recognition of the victims of Kalavryta. Furthermore, the events and the resulting symbols are presented. By doing so, I will identify events and protagonists, the way they are remembered in the town and by extension in Greece and illuminate the role of the widows and mothers of Kalavryta. This will allow for a better understanding of the symbolism of Kalavryta and the importance of Ehrengard Schramm's project.

But first, let me give a short historical retrospective: After pushing back the Italian attack in 1940/41, Greece was overrun by the Wehrmacht. By June 1941 all of Greece had fallen and was consequently divided into three occupation zones, which were controlled by Germany, Italy and Bulgaria respectively. From the beginning of the Occupation, resistance started forming, especially in provinces rather difficult to control, in the mountains. Resistance was met with harsh repression. These retaliation policies, so called "Sühnemaßnahmen", were enforced from the beginning of the Occupation. Such acts were meant to break the support of the population towards *andartes*[4] (Greek for partisan or resistance fighter or guerilla) and to prevent future acts of resistance but also to punish, to sanction. This strategy meant random killings of civilians, mass executions, massacres, raising settlements to the ground and lootings. The main victims of this sanction-policy were civilians, including women, children and elderly or non-combatant males (Droulia and Fleischer 1999; Meyer 2008; Meyer 2002; Michaelidis et al. 2006; Králová 2016a; Dordanas 2002, 2007; Mazower 2016).

On 16th and 17th October 1943, a battle between andartes and German troops took place in Kerpini, a location ca. 10 km away from Kalavryta, leading to the capture of 78 German soldiers.

[4] The term *andartes* is Greek and refers to the Greek resistance fighters during the Occupation. The term is widely used internationally in academia and relevant bibliography.

The andartes hoped to negotiate an exchange of hostages. The German hostages were being moved to different locations. Operation Kalavryta was ordered on 25th November 1943. German companies from different locations were closing in towards Kalavryta, killing people and destroying places that were considered suspicious. On 7th December Greek fighters killed the captured German hostages. Two managed to escape and informed other German forces of the incident. This infuriated the German troops further and retaliation become even more vicious. On 9th December 1943 and after having spread death and destruction in multiple villages in the area around Kalavryta, the German troops reached Kalavryta. After occupying the city for four days, on the 13th they torched the town and killed all males aged 12–65 (Droumpouki 2014, 356–361; Army General Staff 2012; Králová 2016a, 55–56; Giannakis 2014). After retreating, the Wehrmacht forces also destroyed two monasteries. Before looking into what followed, it is important to see the divided memory on the events.

There was and still is a discussion going on regarding the series of events. Popular opinion of the time was that if the andartes had not have killed the German hostages, the horrible murder in Kalavryta might not have happened. Others believe that from the moment the order for Operation Kalavryta was given, the fate of Kalavryta was already sealed and the killing of the German soldiers did not cause the tragedy. This division in opinions becomes evident in the documentary of Giannakis (2014). While the historical truth becomes more of a politicum, it is interesting to look at the controversy this discussion represents and the broader meaning in post WWII Greece.

This issue of divided memory shows the dominant narrative of the post WWII era in Greece. The largest part of resistance was organized by the left-wing organization EAM (National Liberation Front) with its military arm ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army). After the end of WWII, in 1946 a civil war broke out in Greece, in which many former ELAS fighters clashed with the national forces, which again accommodated former collaborators of the occupation forces in their ranks (Chandrinos 2015). The civil war ended in 1949, condemning the political left of the country into lawlessness and disbanding its narrative from the official political sphere. This was further supported by the international trend of the Cold War with the Soviet Union now being the new threat and the common enemy. As a result, many massacres committed by occupation forces were blamed on the resistance. In simpler terms this means, that if there had been no resistance, or "*if you had not helped the andartes, your village would not have been destroyed*". This formed an understanding that harsh repression had been necessary, and the original fault did not lie with the occupation forces, but the resistance of the andartes. This is widely problematic, as many times there was no help from a destroyed village towards the andartes or no direct connection between any support for the resistance and a vengeance act. Similar diverging narratives or divided memories exist also in other places where massacres took place as Chandrinos pinpoints (Giannakis 2014) or as Droumpouki (2014, 375–400) analyzes.

This conflictual narrative became the official narrative of the country. Greece was surprisingly fast in reestablishing diplomatic and by extension economic and trade relations with Germany. This narrative posed no obstacle, it was rather facilitating this development. Germany was an important trade partner for Greece, especially since Greece followed a realist approach in rebuilding the country, at least in economic terms (Apostolopoulos 2003, 2004). Simultaneously, Germany was seen as an experienced player in *fighting the Soviets* (Fleischer 2009, 529), thus a valuable ally in the new security landscape. The question of reparations was partly solved after the Paris Reparation Conference in 1945/46. Further settlements were reached in the London Conference and the Agreement on German External Debts where the winning powers, amongst them Greece, gave Germany a generous debt relief and then postponed the reparations indefinitely. Germany was to pay its former enemies after the signing of a peace treaty, hence, after its reunification (Králová 2016a, 184–193; Konstantinakou 2015, 48–140). Under this light, the Greek governments structured their diplomacy within the new order of the Cold War.

This was vigorously supported by Germany and especially by the German diplomatic representation in Greece. They followed the strategy of blaming everything bad on the andartes and the civil war, putting the blame on the Greek leftists and stringently tried to erase the memory of the Occupation from the Greek public sphere (Fleischer 2009, 519–523, 530–531). Following this logic, the atrocities committed against civilians were not seen as unjust or illegal, but rather as normal measures or sanctions during war time. Therefore, if places that suffered received any help, this was to be seen as compassion (Droumpouki 2014, 363), as charity, rather than compensation. The perception of acting within a proper legal frame was very strong in Germany. Only much later was the German public to face the bitter truth that it was not only the SS that committed crimes, but the common soldiers of the Wehrmacht as well. The belief that the Wehrmacht was acting honorably has been popular for a long time within Germany and started changing after the *Wehrmachtsausstellung* in the 1990s.

In this section, I have shown how the divided memory of Kalavryta, representing diverging narratives within Greece, were further strengthened in the post WWII international arena, how this additionally supported realist foreign policy and was in return supported by Germany, which had a coinciding narrative regarding its policies in former occupied countries and the self-image of the virtue of its own troops.

Enduring in Time: Widows and Mothers of Kalavryta

Keeping in mind the dominant narrative of the early 1950s, I am now coming back to the events of 13th December 1943 in Kalavryta. After a long campaign, German troops entered Kalavryta on 9th December 1943. On the 13th they gathered all residents in the school buil-

ding. There they separated all males aged over 12–65 (or looked over 12) from the rest and took them up a hill, leaving a school room full of women and children locked inside the building. The Kalavrytan males were led ca. 1 km up the Kapi Hill. While the men were waiting on the hill, the houses of Kalavryta were looted by soldiers and the women and children were kept in the school building. Finally, the houses and the school building were torched. While Kalavryta was burning, the shooting of the Kalavrytan males began, in an execution with automatic weapons, followed by coup de grâce to whom survived the machine gun fire. The women and children managed to break out of the school and were not shot at or stopped. The troops left. The women did not know what had happened to their sons, brothers and husbands yet, they were shocked and frightened after escaping from the burning school and did not have a picture of the extent of the tragedy. Next, they were more shocked to find their houses looted and destroyed by the fire. Only later did they discover the bodies of the men on Kapi Hill, an image of dead loved ones (Droumpouki 2014, 358–361; Foteinopoulos 2008; Giannakis 2014).

Kalavryta has an elevation of 758m and it is very cold during winter. In December the ground is frozen. Most women buried their dead right there at Kapi Hill, while others dragged them ca. 300m downhill to bury them in the cemetery. The despair, hopelessness and perplexity of these first moments and the following days must have been immense (Giannakis 2014). According to the witnesses in Giannakis' documentary, the relatives dug graves by hand in the frozen ground, often not being able to dig a proper hole. For days, the women took turns guarding the shallow graves to protect the dead from vultures. At the same time, with most buildings being destroyed, the living conditions of the women and their children were less than miserable. Within a few hours Kalavryta became a ruin city consisting of women, children and elderly, deprived of their loved ones and deprived of their means of livelihood.

The psychological trauma of the women of Kalavryta appears unimaginable. The decimation of families meant the destruction of what was the nucleus of Greek society and economy at least in provincial towns and villages. Hence, this event was a trauma on an economic, a social and a private level, an invisible mutilation of the left-behind inhabitants and their town. The sudden and destructive turn life took for the survivors is difficult if not impossible to grasp. In various interviews I have conducted in Greek martyr villages, interviewees pointed out that the ones that suffered the most were the ones that survived and had to live with this past, living close by the place their loved ones were buried or in some cases, living in the same house their loved ones were murdered in. Photographs and video material of the time after the tragedy of Kalavryta show a burned-down town and a high number of women of all ages dressed in black. The absence of men in the pictures is striking. Photographs of the memorial services are desperate, depicting crying women, tearful children and faces of agony and pain (DMKO 2020; Municipality of Kalavryta 2017).

Kalavryta was slowly rebuilt, it was repopulated, and the major weight of this process was resting on the shoulders of the women of Kalavryta. This image of "resting on their shoulders" like a cross becomes visible in the name of the association that represented the victims, the widows and the orphans of Kalavryta, named "Golgotha" (as seen in Droumpouki 2014, 371). These women hold a special place in the local memory and by extent in the Greek narrative. Symbolically, they are referred to as "Καλαβρυτινή μάνα" meaning „Kalavrytan mother" in singular. The Kalavrytan mother is today the heroic figure of Kalavryta, who had to endure, survive and rebuild. None of the Kalavrytan widows ever remarried (Chamakiotis and Antonopoulos 2010, 259–266).

Figure 1 Sculpture "No more wars" by Nikos Dimopoulos in the yard of the Museum of Kalavryta (Photo taken by Charalampos Karpouchtsis in March 2019).
The one plaque describing the sculpture reads: There are no winners in war. The other: The story. A woman from Kalavrita – carries the dead body of her husband executed on 13/12/1943 by the Germans from the place of execution to the cemetery of the town, dragging him on his bloodstained coat, right before the grieving eyes of her children.

The events left behind two main strings of memory: one in which the direct victims, that is the executed male inhabitants, and one in which the secondary victims, that is the female inhabitants, are remembered. The memory of both is commemorated by physical signs, statues and memorials and is intertwined. Artworks commemorating Kalavryta and the posters and pamphlets regarding commemoration ceremonies almost always portray the women dressed in black (DMKO 2020). In addition, in the yard of the former school, todays *Municipal Museum of the Kalavrytan Holocaust*[5] (DMKO), there is a statue of a woman who is dragging her husband, while her two children stand next to her. The interpretation lies in the eye of the observer. The museum advocates peace and sends out a message against nazism, fascism and a message against wars, as it emphasized life before and after the tragedy. This strategy fits into the pacifist character of museums that advocate peace (Dekel and Katriel 2015). The dynamic of the sculpture further supports this perception as a place of real persons, of people that were here, by positioning the "dragging woman" in its yard, further focusing the pain of the survivor.

Another artwork stands on Kapi Hill. There stands the monument in memory of the killed at the place of execution or as the locals call it, the place of sacrifice. An impressive, imposing monument commemorates the dead on large concrete formations, while on the hill the date 13.12.1943 is written and below one can read in Greek: never again war – peace. Centrally positioned in this striking monument is a smaller statue of a petrified woman. This stone statue in closed posture symbolizes the Kalavrytan mother. The stone sculpture of the petrified mother symbolizes endurance and strength. We say: "hard like stone". The petrification and the closed posture also represent time standing still, to the feeling of frozen moments, similar to the clock in Kalavryta's main square. Time stands still for moments that do not end, even after they pass.

[5] The originally Greek term "holocaust" is used in modern Greek in different ways. Generally, it means complete destruction or complete burning and is thus often ascribed to martyr villages that were burned down during WWII. This creates confusion with the Holocaust. As such the term is problematic and must be carefully distinguished when referred to in an academic, civil society or international context (see Králová 2016b).

Figure 2 Sculpture "Petrified Mother" by the artist Anna Vafia. It is in the middle of the main monument, the so called "place of sacrifice" on the Kapi Hill (Photo taken by Charalampos Karpouchtsis in March 2019).

Next to the official and publicly attended commemoration ceremonies, which are dedicated mainly to the dead and take place in December, another commemoration for the Kalavrytan mother takes place. This happens annually on 14th August, one day before the celebration of Holy Mary, which is a nation-wide holiday. Commemorating the Kalavrytan mother one day before the Holy Mother is celebrated in Greece, where Greek Orthodox beliefs are very strong, is of immense symbolism. As shown in this section, the women of Kalavryta are of great importance in the local narrative and in the broader memory of the event and what followed. Their role as survivors that had to endure and rebuilt the town was paramount. While the position of women in the world and in provincial Greece at that time was characterized by social, educational and economic disadvantage, it is even more important to keep them in mind as protagonists for Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden's visit and what followed.

A German Woman in Kalavryta: Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden

Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden was born in 1900 in former Farther Pomerania. She lived to be 85 and led a multifaceted life, starting as a monarchist who later became a politician of the Socialdemocratic Party of Germany (SPD). Schramm von Thadden studied history and concentrated on Greece (at that time the *Kingdom of Hellas*) and published successful works on Greece. She married in 1925 and had three children. She visited Greece for the first time in 1935 to discover the country and do field research. During this trip she even met with the former king of Greece. Later, the former monarchist pursued a political career in the SPD, holding office in the Federal State of Lower Saxony (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 5–30).

During WWII her sister was convicted for *Wehrkraftzersetzung*, for plotting against the nazi regime, imprisoned in the Konzentrationslager Ravensbrück and executed in Plötzensee in 1944. Schramm visited her sister very often during her captivity and tried everything in her power to free her, in vain. The execution of her sister must have marked her for life. Most likely, she was no friend of the Third Reich, but she was and remained a person who deeply loved her country (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 10–13).

In 1952 Schramm visited Greece anew for field research. During a trip on the Peloponnese some locals told her in a tavern to never visit Kalavryta, because she would not be welcomed, for the Germans had done horrible things there (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 32). When she returned to Athens, she asked the German diplomat Knoke about the incident. He replied he did not know about the events of Kalavryta and could not send anyone from the representation to find out, fearing the person would be lynched. He also added that each year, when the press referred to Kalavryta it created anti-German sentiments and that he complained to the Greek authorities about these publications. As Schramm's son points out in the same book, this is a controversy. Knoke must have known, at least partly, what had happened there, because he knew about the media attention. The very fact that he complained about the media coverage of the issue underlines how he attempted to silence it. This corresponds with the strategy to suppress memory of German atrocities as well as to keep a narrative of acting within the frame of "normal" warfare, which was pointed out before. However, Schramm proposed to be sent herself instead of a man, because – as she believed – as a woman she would not be attacked by anybody. Knoke agreed and she left for Kalavryta (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 33).

In Kalavryta, introducing herself as a Swiss, she found out about the vengeance act that left behind a town of widows. She remained in Kalavryta for two days and talked to 14 persons to discover and understand the recent tragedy. This experience must have influenced her greatly.

Following her memoires, after the visit in Kalavryta she remembered a paragraph from "Kreuzweg" (Way of the Cross) of Reinhold Schneider, a spiritual, Christian poetry, from a book her sister had been reading in prison and gave to her:

> "On your way of the cross, you handed the gift of Mercy to Love, upon it, it recognizes itself for all eternity. It rests in the hands of the women."
>
> (as seen in Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 41)[6]

The text continues and suggests that the forgotten "Love" must be reintroduced in the world by those who know it. Schramm met the tragedy-ridden women of Kalavryta who keep going on *their cross-carrying journey*. This may be symbolic but in the eyes of the observer becomes a rather literal picture. Schramm von Thadden, with her ability to speak Greek and apparently with a high degree of empathy and human understanding, saw the women as they saw themselves: carrying a heavy weight on their shoulders. Quoting out of her first letter to the German Foreign Ministry she writes:

> "We Germans must do something here, especially here. (…) But we must provide well thought help and not disperse some charities." This is one of the cases, "where a state can follow no better policy, than simply to follow the voice of the heart."
>
> (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 41)[7]

Regarding this first visit of Ehrengard Schramm in Kalavryta, it is probably the first time that a German woman and historian visited the place interested in the tragedy, talking to the local women in their mother tongue and listening to their stories. This act was a primal act of recognition, of eye-to-eye interaction between a member of the perpetrator group and members of the victim group. It is unclear whether anybody believed she was an official representative of Germany. From the records it is unlikely that she was perceived as one. Von Thadden was not acting in the name of an institution, she was trying to find out what had happened, and this attempt turned into genuine interest for the Kalavrytan widows. Being a woman must have facilitated interaction. Not being male was most likely important for both but more important for the Kalavrytan women as von Thadden could not have been a soldier and in the larger sense a murderer of their men. The first interaction between these women was original and personal

[6] Translation from German is my own.

[7] Translation from German is my own.

in the absence of an institution. Furthermore, they did not recognize each other as bearers of certain rights in a normative sense. Thus, these encounters have the characteristics of horizontal intersubjective recognition (Ikäheimo 2015).

The decision to take action to ease the situation of the widows was taken directly after the trip to Kalavryta. Schramm von Thadden used all her influence and her contacts in order to help the widows. She first discussed her idea with the German diplomat Knoke in Athens, where the idea to create a workshop for the women to produce and then export carpets was born. Interestingly, Schramm von Thadden had two thoughts in her mind. First, she understood that whatever she manages to achieve regarding the widows of Kalavryta would never be more than a symbol, a gesture of easing the pain, of "taking away the sharp edge of bitterness" (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 18). She understood that it was impossible to make up for what happened. This made her thinking even more original and genuine, as there was no completion in terms of ending the suffering or the pain. Easing it was the goal. As apparent here, the absence of completion adds to the personal recognition of the other's pain. Following this example, *setting a sign* has later also characterized the work of other German organizations such as Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste (Rabe 1983). Schramm von Thadden was a pioneer regarding *easing the pain* at least regarding German civil society initiatives in Greece after WWII (Chamakiotis and Antonopoulos 2010, 11).

Second, she did not mean to set a precedent for Germany, making the Greeks think the help they received was a form of reparation or compensation from the German government and actively avoided this (Králová 2016b, 156). Nevertheless, her engagement contrasts the German Foreign Office's lack of empathy and willingness to support any form of reprocessing and coming to terms with the past, reaching to open hostility to support any form of reconciliatory gestures or economic help for Greece (Fleischer and Konstantinakou 2006). In order to avoid precedence, she planned to act through a private, that is non-state initiative. This led her to contact a civil society organization, the German Women Circle. She was member of this organization and could count on the support of their president, Dr. Else Ulich-Beil. The support of her project was granted by both, the German Foreign Office and the German Women Circle. The idea was to create a carpet manufacture industry in Kalavryta where the widows could work and sell the rugs and carpets to Germany. Von Thadden vigorously planned and worked on the project, even arranging a lift of import tax for products imported to Germany from this carpet manufacture of Kalavryta.

Her hard efforts reached a peak very fast. She accompanied Chancellor Adenauer to his first visit to Greece. During this visit, she made contact with the former king′s daughter and queen, who was of German origin. On that occasion, Adenauer's daughter Lotte Adenauer donated 50 000 Deutsche Mark to the queen to support projects in Kalavryta. This was clearly thanks to the efforts of Schramm von Thadden and the German Women Circle.

Despite these women's honest commitment, it also shows how Germany maintained the strategy of avoiding precedence and highlights the "charity character" any official act of Germany should appear as. This strategy of "charity giving" rather than "deserved support" further marked German policy towards martyr communities in the future and was official policy in German diplomacy (Droumpouki 2014, 363). The first German Federal President to visit Kalavryta was Johannes Rau who felt "sorrow and shame" (Rau 2000) at the memorial site. The local press rather disapproved of his speech as well as the lack of material reparation. Others, including the local clergy, welcomed the gesture. Interestingly, Rau did not use the chance to say sorry or to apologize in any way for what had happened. Expressing "sorrow and shame" was for many locals not enough (Droumpouki 2014, 377–378). This is due to the lack of material compensation and the fact that apologies alone do not make amends for afflicted harm (as seen in the footnotes of Droumpouki 2014, 378). Another obvious reason of Greek resentment is the fact that it took Germany decades to send a high political representative to visit Kalavryta. The lack of words involving the meaning of being sorry adds to that tardiness.

Representative for the lack of recognition of the issue as a whole is the fact that the queen of Greece misplaced the German cheque and found it months later, which delayed the project in Kalavryta. The queen never visited Kalavryta. Schramm von Thadden appeared deeply disappointed. Furthermore, the lack of vertical recognition for the widows mirrors en miniature also the broader lack of recognition from the German official side for committed atrocities all over Greece. To discuss the political and economic context goes beyond the scope of this paper. Still, this lack of vertical recognition becomes evident in the last part of this analysis. Regarding the role of the Greek state, even when the check was found, the project started but was never completed as the national agency in Greece did not finish the building for the carpet workshop. The reasons behind this remain unclear to date.

Since there was still no progress with the carpet workshop in 1954, Schramm von Thadden, in close cooperation with trusted personalities of Kalavryta, picked up an old idea: to provide vocational training to Kalavrytan youths (males) in Germany. The boys would return and help build industry in Kalavryta or provide for their community. This far-fetched plan was originally the idea of one Kalavrytan woman but was dismissed right from the start.

Avoiding any detailed account of the project's planning, fallbacks and individual contacts with German ministries and local personalities, I want to focus on its central aims. The project was to help orphaned boys (who lost their father to the tragedy of 13th December 1943). They were to express interest, to be chosen by a commission consisting of the representative of the widow association, the mayor of Kalavryta, Ehrengard Schramm, and a German from the vocational training organization *Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft* (Schramm von Thadden et al. 2003, 59). Finally, their fathers could not have been partisans. The gender aspect is clearly representative of the thinking of the time, of men (the boys) being the main point of attention. The criterium of

belonging to the victims is essential in *helping those that need it the most* and keeping a democratic character of choosing the participants together. The last point is evidence of the broadly accepted narrative of the time in Greece and Germany. Von Thadden wanted to avoid helping sons of andartes as they could have killed German soldiers. Without going into detail on this aspect, it is interesting how the narrative of the *good Wehrmacht* and the *bad partisans* was embedded in this project and in a broader sense in the bilateral relations. This may serve as one example of *reconciliation without truth*. Broadly refusing help for the sons of andartes is characteristic for the zeitgeist and, as such, remains a rather bitter part of the project's conception.

Finally, after choosing a group of boys von Thadden stayed in Kalavryta and gave German lessons to the group to prepare them for their trip to Germany. After several months and minor conflicts with local politicians, 33 boys were ready to travel to Germany. It is striking to see the personal effort von Thadden and her local supporters put into this project. She stayed in Kalavryta, taught German to a group of children and accompanied the youths to Germany, together with the local widow Adamantia Agriou, whose husband had been shot on the day of the tragedy. Some Greeks have tauntingly claimed that she had taken the boys to their murderers' country. Some others announced that after what had happened, this was the least the Germans could or should have done. Both, however, neglect the project's symbolic significance. In the first instance, whether this project was or was not a success should be judged and has been judged by the ones involved, that is the boys themselves. It has been underlined by Schramm von Thadden and the participants that they did not go to Germany against their will. Secondly, it is important to keep in mind that von Thadden was not acting in the name of the German state or the government, nor did she make any profit from this project. She most probably gained some sort of personal or ethical satisfaction, but still she was acting selflessly, and invested her time and her skills in the Kalavrytan boys in an altruistic manner. Allocentrism and altruism are evident. This was recognized by the widows and the boys, otherwise they would not have trusted her. Of course, the scarcity of resources and lack of chances for economic development, which were also the result of the destruction of Kalavryta, had influenced their participation in the project greatly (Sotiris Chamakiotis as seen in the documentary of Giannakis 2014; Chamakiotis and Antonopoulos 2010, 76–81). Still, if the Kalavrytans had not trusted her, they would not have allowed her to bring their children to the country of their former tormentors. The genuinely personifying recognition Schramm gave to the Kalavrytan widows was returned in trust. It was this trust that enabled a process to commence. The boys went to Germany, received their training, returned to Greece and have since played a role in being bridges of communication between former enemies. As stated in the introduction, it is no coincidence that diplomats from both countries and representatives of martyr villages still point to her work.

Lessons Learned from Kalavryta-Schramm: Effects of Genuinely Personifying Recognition

Interestingly, von Thadden did not apologize *in the name of Germany* to the Kalavrytans nor was she personally blamed by the Kalavrytans for what happened. This shows that highly symbolic acts are not necessary when there is no direct identification of representing the perpetrator group or the victim group and when actions are honest and not instrumentalized. It shows that communities have an understanding of what is possible and feasible: von Thadden in knowing that she can only ease the pain and setting a sign and the widows in accepting her help and trusting her with their children. Chamakiotis and Antonopoulos were among the boys that went to Germany and count Ehrengard Schramm amongst the women that marked them. They write about her (269–270):

> "E. Schramm has been a bright exception amongst millions of her German countrymen, who maintained an unbelievable stance towards the pain and horror Hitler's hordes had caused us. (…) With her lovable pronunciation of Greek language, she touched the accords of the female soul, so that our mothers opened their hearts to a German with a Swiss passport. So, with her humanism, the sweetness of her speech, her compassion, and her persuasiveness, she captured the first castle, the hearts of our mothers."[8]

This sharply contrasts with Rau's visit to Kalavryta in 2000, whose symbolic gesture did not satisfy the Kalavrytan population. This underlines how different roles require different actions for an act whether symbolic or material or both to have an effect and be accepted. Superficiality and instrumentalization are not accepted by victims. Her example directly contrasts the existing cases of vertical recognition and in these terms German official policy, which followed a strategy of normality regarding horrific crimes of WWII in Greece, positioning many events within the area of normal warfare. This is further supported by the fact that a symbolic gesture of "saying sorry" did not come sooner than 2014, when Rau's successor German Federal President Joachim Gauck asked for forgiveness in the martyr village Lingiades (Gauck 2014).[9] Von Thadden, acting as a person and not as a representative of Germany, received the trust of the locals and her

[8] Translation is my own.

[9] This case remains disputed, because President Gauck did not use the term "Entschuldigung" but the term "Verzeihung" that in Greek mean not the same. Entschuldigung is connotated as sorry, while Verzeihung as forgiveness. Saying "sorry" differs from "asking for forgiveness". This is a discussion that needs further analysis on another occasion.

action is still respected today (Chamakiotis and Antonopoulos 2010, 270; Antonopoulos and Chamakiotis 2010).

She instinctively combined what in terms of reconciliation theory would be material and symbolic reparation. Symbolic in building a relationship of trust with the Kalavrytan mothers, thus recognizing them, their situation and their pain. Material in investing her own time and (certainly to some extent financial and other) resources as well as skills in order to mobilize further resources from German ministries and organizations as well as in teaching German in the village. Her example highlights the importance of personal contact for pragmatic recognition processes as well as the importance of horizontality in terms of meeting the other eye to eye.

Conclusion: Outlook, Limitations and Space for Further Analysis

Summing up, the case of Kalavryta and Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden shows that unconditional intersubjective recognition forms the basis for horizontal relationships and is, especially after violent conflict, of great importance in forming trust and building up personal relations between former enemies, or between members of the perpetrator and victim groups. Furthermore, when this basis is established, a combination of symbolism and material reparation can go a long way and create a lasting positive example that echoes on in the symbolical but also the pragmatic sphere. In this case, the symbolic gesture of von Thadden did have a lasting effect at least on the lives of some of the victims' relatives. This real effect continues to inspire and thus reenters the symbolic sphere.

Furthermore, this case study illuminates the facets of vertical recognition, that is the role of institutions in recognition and thus reconciliation processes. In doing so, it has further shown how narratives are intertwined with pragmatic policies that directly influence recognition, hence affecting reconciliation processes. The case of divided memory and how the conflictual narratives have been instrumentalized by political institutions is characteristic for a strategy that avoids recognition. Thus, it avoids all parts that recognition would further entail, e. g. symbolic gestures and material reparation. When recognition is provided only through symbolic gestures, victims are not satisfied because they are not accompanied by material means or because the symbolism is not considered honest and genuine but instrumental or superficial.

Consequently, if Schramm's act had been further supported, embraced and developed by the German governments, today's atmosphere regarding anti-German sentiments, claims for material reparation as well as need for symbolic acts would maybe be less urgent. Starting with honest initiatives as soon as possible is paramount. If there had been more early initiatives, the picture

would be a better one. Furthermore, the chosen case study demonstrates that a combination of vertical and horizontal recognition, involving symbolic acts and material means forms a substantial and resilient approach for a successful reconciliation process.

This analysis pinpointed the role of horizontal recognition in forming trust between former enemies and can become the basis of rapprochement between victims and perpetrators. It has also highlighted the role of narratives in policy making as well as in personal interactions. The symbols of Kalavryta around the mother-figure have shown the role and perception of gender after violent conflict. It is questionable whether the whole project would have succeeded, if it had evolved amongst men or former combatants. Most probably it would not. This example has shown how genuinely personifying recognition may create a lasting positive example of a rapprochement process. Finally, this paper has applied Ikäheimo's theory to a practical example and thus provided one example of how to use current recognition theories in analyzing empirical cases of reconciliation processes.

Since the chosen example is only one in a landscape of over 100 martyr communities, it cannot claim to be representing the majority of them, nor can any conclusions drawn from it be automatically transferred onto the other ones. However, the case of Schramm on the one hand shows how German-Greek relations are still burdened by old, unprocessed traumata, but also underlines the immense potential of trans-national, socio-emotional reconciliation on the civil society level. Since the Greek martyr cities and villages have hardly been known to German society up to date, further research is needed to provide a better understanding of the challenges and chances for a comprehensive Greek-German reconciliation process.

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Protracted Evil: Missing Persons and the Case of Cyprus

Carolina Rehrmann

Introduction

British human rights lawyer Niall MacDermot (in Andreu-Guzman 2001) called enforced disappearance "the worst of all human rights violations. Indeed, (…) a challenge to the very concept of such rights, the negation of a human being to exist, to have an identity", and its political practice "the ultimate corruption, an abuse of power […]".

Missing persons are a sad and common phenomenon in post-conflict societies. Ranging from Syria, and Spain, to Argentina, Guatemala, Chechnya, the former Yugoslavia and Cyprus, they have come to symbolise the dark heritage of oppressive regimes, of civil wars and dictatorships that continue to be sensitive and painful even decades after the political resolution of violent conflict.

"Doing away" with members of opposing groups, regime critics or inconvenient minorities has not only been commonly defined as one of the most dramatic human rights violations, but is also a drastic, horrifying technique to exhibit absolute power and to cover up one's own crimes by avoiding formal accountability or the trouble of show trials. On that note, sadly enough, the politically motivated disappearance of people has been used as effective instrument of collective intimidation and as convenient method of dispensing with unpleasant opponents. For good measure, uncovering the fate of these persons is refrained from by succeeding governments – even though other transitional justice measures, such as trials and institutional transformation, might have been realized. For the circumstances of enforced disappearances might trigger a series of broader legal, ethical and material questions. They comprise the prosecution of systematic human rights violation, the identification of perpetrators and perpetrator groups, the compensation

and protection of victims' relatives, and the long-term establishment of their memory to counter oblivion and silence.

In view of the above mentioned, it does not come as a surprise that missing persons belong to the most silenced issues of protracted or post conflict societies. Often, the depth and sincerity of national governments in dealing with that unresolved matter is indicative of the quality of democratic transition, respectively the quality of retributive (criminal), restorative (healing) and distributive (material) justice as a whole.

Considering the quality of dealing with missing persons as a powerful yardstick of the broader quality of post-conflict reconciliation, the case of Cyprus is indicative. The years of inter-ethnic violence between 1963 und 1967 and the islands partition in 1974 have caused hundred thousand of internally displaced, and thousands of casualties out of which, until recently, 2000 persons were considered missing. Their existence has for decades been silenced, respectively negated by both sides. Since 2006 under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot governments and civil society the *Committee on Missing Persons* under the auspices of the Red Cross has been engaged in uncovering the fate of these missing persons, locating their mortal remains, exhuming and delivering them back to their families, so they can be buried (CMP 2018). Despite significant progress in this endeavour, the long silence, as well as the reluctant and desultory political commitment, and – not least – both societies confrontational and mutually accusing attitudes appear to reflect *en miniature* the protracted state of the Cyprus Conflict as a whole in what is a profound lack of transitional justice and reconciliation. Within this broad unfavourable climate, it is primarily due to external and civic engagement that the sensitive issue of the missing persons is touched at all and small steps of progress on the path towards closure for the relatives and acknowledgement for the victims are made.

What has been achieved and what is missing on a pathway towards emotional closure, legal acknowledgement and social reconciliation with regard to the missing in Cyprus? In what way does this sensitive issue reflect the broader protracted conflict structures of the Cyprus Conflict?

In order to illuminate these questions, I will start out with a short theoretical introduction into the inherent challenges of transitional justice measures, go on with a comparative overview of the phenomenon of missing persons – comprising its legal, social, ethical and emotional dimensions – and eventually give a detailed account of the selected case study. Here, it will particularly focus on the discourses and practices concerning the heritage of the missing within the wider conflict narratives. It will then discuss the CMP's work and its social repercussions, present first-hand accounts of the relatives' needs and perspectives and conclude with evaluating a special reconciliatory initiative by the bi-communal NGO *Association for Historical Dialogue and Research* (AHDR) aimed at transforming the binary conflict narratives on missing persons in Cyprus.

Shadow of the Past: Inherent Challenges of Dealing with Legacies of Violence

How have post-conflict societies tackled legacies of violence and why have respective endeavours so often remained contested in their success and fragile in their effect?

To answer this, firstly, I will start out with giving an overview of the legal, emotional and ethical measures aimed at confronting gross human rights violations commonly subsumed under the concept of transitional justice (TJ). What does that term mean? TJ, first and foremost, comprises legal action to avoid impunity, identify perpetrators and remove them from their former positions. But it also strives at giving the victims of violence and discriminated groups a sustainable voice, acknowledging their pain, providing material compensation, if needed psychological support and guarantee their long-term social and political integration.

Either for reasons of unwillingness or weakness of successor regimes, many societies have opted for silencing the past by granting broad amnesties: Argentina, Spain, Chile, El Salvador or Algeria are cases in point that chose to keep the book of the past broadly closed for a long time. However, also the reprocessing of troubled heritages – achieved through the endeavours of successive governments (as in South Africa) or introduced through international actors (as the case with Nazi-Germany and to a certain extend post-communist Yugoslavia) shows to have been protracted and stained. At either case, reprocessing is likely to meet with internal opposition for perpetrators, and bystanders are likely to opt for silence, denial and suppression. Within Germany's *double collective memory* (Assmann), the respective decades after 1945 and 1989 (without intending to parallel them as such) both can be said to have exhibited this latency phases. The (self-) critical discourses that followed were stimulated in the first place by successive generations.

Thus, reprocessing is a most sensitive matter. As the debate on inherent tensions of transitional justice measures suggests, transformation always comes with prices, tensions and risks. In TJ-theory the categorization between *retributive* and *restorative* measures indicates the challenge of reprocessing the past while at the same time laying (respectively not endangering) the foundations of a democratic transformation. This is particularly the case, if dominant, self-whitewashing conflict narratives remain broadly the same even after regime changes.

The verdicts of the ICTY, for instance, against foremost Serbian and Bosnian perpetrators, have been critically discussed for being met with indignation and refusal within the respective communities – particularly within Serbia. Albeit a glaring example of legal accountability, retributive measures (even more so, if introduced externally) might fail in reconciling former opponents or even deepen existing interethnic cleavages. It does not come as a surprise therefore,

that restorative measures of mutual acknowledgement of committed crimes between opponent communities have often been limited (Humphrey / Veljanovska 2019).

Moreover, broad criminal prosecution might motivate denial and silence and thus both endanger social cohesion and hamper the production of evidence – evidence that is crucial for the well-being of missing person's relatives. That is why in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was installed first and foremost for truth seeking to give the formerly excluded and repressed victims of Apartheid's violence a public voice and include their narratives of pain into the collective memory of the newly established democratic country. To motivate perpetrators to public statements – thus provide a lasting account of public acknowledgement of the victims' pain, and possibly release relatives of dead and missing from torturing uncertainty about their loved one's fate or their last moments – the TRC granted impunity in exchange for the voluntary confession of crimes. This has caused resentment on the part of many victims that accused the TRC of providing the opportunity of ransom. This critique appears to have gained further impetus by a growing number of people who consider that South Africa's focus on truth, acknowledgement and reconciliation has left economic disparities widely untouched (see Boraine 2006; Leebaw 2008; Rehrmann 2019; Zenker 2014; Tambe Endoh 2015).

The cited examples shed light on the risks and possible pitfalls of tackling traditional narratives, power-political hierarchies or economic privileges. On the one hand, they underline that transitional justice can only be effective and sustainable, if it achieves to introduce a fundamental paradigm shift regarding former ideological or interethnic cleavages within or between the respective societies. On the other hand, they show that retributive and restorative measures should ideally complement one another in what is called a *holistic* approach to justice and reconciliation.

According to TJ-theorists, an essential part of this holistic approach is to foster empathy and promote long-term dialogue and mutual understanding of the former conflict parties within a newly established democratic framework by providing (ideally an institutionalized) space for constructive encounters between perpetrators and victims, and eventually by building up a broad collective memory that transgresses ethnic, political, racial or religious boundaries (Bar-Tal / Bennink 2004; Kelmann 2008; Nadler / Malloy / Fisher 2008).

For Alex Boraine, former vice chair of the South African TRC, such a transformation also presupposes to acknowledge that there are diverse actors with more than one perspective, possibly limited and relational knowledge, with diverse and conflicting memories of the course of conflict, and a range of diverse needs – the need to confess, to be forgiven, the need to know, and to mourn, the need for compensation, empowerment and acknowledgement of suffering. On that note, he broadens what he calls forensic truth to include dialogical and healing truth (Boraine 2006, 21). Given the narrow, mutually exclusive and mutually accusing narratives of many post-conflict societies, this paradigm shift appears as one of the most fundamental challenges for reconciliation.

Present Absence: Missing Persons in Post-Conflict Societies

As this section will illuminate, attempts of resolving the sensitive issue of missing persons has been met with similar risks and challenges.

To start with: What are missing persons by legal definition? A broad, and topical challenge in today's globalized world, conceptually, they also refer to those who voluntarily choose to disappear without leaving traces behind for their love ones. The criminally relevant situation of *enforced* disappearance is a phenomenon resulting from both authoritarian and totalitarian regimes' repression measures, but also particularly visible in the trans-national grey zones within the context of illegal migration, organized crime, human trafficking, or forced prostitution. It is the former conception that the present paper is interested in. Here, missing persons resulting from political repression refer to political opponents held incommunicado in secret places, those who have been secretly executed and buried, or even children taken from their parents and given to regime conformists. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines them as "those who are unaccounted for as a result of armed conflict, whether international or internal. They might be military of civilian, anyone whose family has no information on their fates or whereabouts" (ICRC 2007, 4). While Art. 7.1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court refers to enforced disappearance as

> "the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of state or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time" (CoE 2016, 27).

The practice of doing away with internal opponents in oppressive regimes ranges back from Adolf Hitler's well known *night-and-fog-decree* (*Nacht-und-Nebel-Erlass*) of 1941 as a weapon of intimidation and maximization of power vis-à-vis suspected regime critics (Finucane 2010, 176) to the practice of child abduction of political opponents as a measure to instigate fear and 'dry out' their fertility – as done in military Argentina (see the related Hague Convention). In Spain the issue of missing persons has stirred most recent national debates over the exhumation of the mortal remains of Franco's opponents that have been buried in what is said to be Europe's largest anonymous mass grave until today. With more than 100 000 republicans missing in Spain since 1936, roughly estimated hundreds of thousands in Iraq as a consequence of the wars, crises and interventions since the 1980ies, 40 000 missing as a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia since 1994, and 5000 still missing in Chechnya as a result of the wars with Russia, the issue of

missing persons as a result of enforced disappearance can be considered one of the most tragic and pressing consequences of violent conflict (see Minder 2018; CoE 2016; ICRC 2007).

On an institutional level, truth and clarification commissions under the auspices of the United Nations and the Red Cross, as well as specialized political chambers formed by the respective governments themselves, have been established to tackle these developments – with moderate success. Although significant achievements can be measured in the location and exhumation of mortal remains and the financial aid for families of the missing, the spheres of legal investigation, official acknowledgement of the victims' plight, and the establishment of collective commemorations for committed atrocities have been widely neglected (see ICRC 2007; CoE 2016).

It has been above all the endeavours and perseverance of internationals, civil society and victim's associations that attempt to counter the lack of action on state side, and to tackle collective silence, impunity and forgetting. In Argentina for instance – as Spain one of the countries promulgating broad amnesties following the dictator regime – is has been the famous mothers and grandmothers of the "Plaza de Mayo" which exerted pressure onto succeeding governments of the junta-regimes to disclose the circumstance of their (grand) children's disappearance. Also, in Guatemala, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Cyprus, it is primarily an alliance of international actors, civil society and relative's organizations that engaged into uncovering the fate of the missing.

These actors can rely on a series of legal frameworks, encompassing international conventions and inter-governmental agreements that over the decades have been established to counter the practice, diminish the risk and deal with the consequences of enforced disappearance. These frameworks draw on international, humanitarian and martial law, specifically on the right to life, liberty, security, and a fair trial, on the prohibition of torture, special protection of civilians, war captives and wounded and, eventually, on the relative's right to know. These are recorded in the Geneva Convention and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, in directives, recommendations and measures stipulated in the Council of Europe's ministers' "g*uidelines on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations",* the UN Human Rights Committee, and, more specifically the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearance, the International Commission on Missing Persons and the ICRC's "International Convention for the Protection from Enforced Disappearance" (CoE 2016).

These IOs and working groups cooperate both with governments, as well as with victim's associations and NGOs on the ground. Aimed at prevention of and dealing with forced disappearance, the measures of these organisations and associations comprise local presence / documentation of human rights violations and the registration of inmates to minimize their risk of them being done away. Further, they include law-enforcement in domestic legislation that strengthens and secures human rights and fights impunity, but also the training of legal and forensic experts for purposes of criminal investigation and localization of remains. International and local organizations are also often the only ones to pressure for access to archive information or promote

public discourses on establishing memorials for the missing and introduce material reparations and psychological support for their relatives.

All these measures appear even more crucial, since uncovering the fate of missing persons is a race against time: With the passing of the years (often decades) locating and identifying the mortal remains becomes a growing challenge. For evidence might be destroyed, contemporary witnesses that know about the who, how and where of disappearance, as well as close relatives to give DNA might have died, and also the bones will be more difficult to attribute due to their decay.

Spain is a most recent case in point. In October 2018 a video went viral in social media showing a known artist spraying the word "freedom" on general Franco's tomb in the Basilica of the "Valley of the Fallen", a monumental compound honouring the memory of the fascist dictator (The Local 2018). The disputed *lieu de mémoire* remains also the biggest mass grave in the country, where the remains of supporters and opponents have been buried anonymously until today (Heidhues 2018) – an affront for many relatives of the missing, most of whom have no clue as to the circumstance of their deaths and remains. Legally, this was made possible for Spain had opted for keeping the book of the past closed as a precondition for democratic transition. With its "Pact of forgetting" of 1977 a broad amnesty against Franco's officials was launched. Decades of silence passed and were justified as a necessary price for political and social cohesion of the young democracy. The socialist government that came to power in 2007 was the first to touch the silenced past promulgating the "Law on historical memory". It secured primarily financial aid and information facilitation for relatives and civil associations in the location, exhumation and identification of mortal remains, but did not manage to establish a state body undertaking direct and concerted action. Moreover, support of local authorities in accessing archives varies and even seems decreasing ever since the formation of the conservative government in 2011 (ICMP 2018). It was only in 2018 that a first central electronic database for the dead and missing of the civil war was initiated by civil society and makes some slow progress in what comprises an unresolved conflict heritage of more than eighty years (Pedret 2018). As such Spain demonstrates the long shadow and the perseverance of a highly sensitive, unresolved past.

Eventually, apart from the seeking of evidence and acknowledgement of guilt, also the economic plight of the relatives of missing persons appears as serious challenge. If the breadwinner went missing that might affect an entire family. Furthermore, partners and children might not manage to enforce financial assistance due to a lack of evidence of the missing person's fate. The psychological strain is no lighter burden: A significant share of relatives of missing persons reportedly live in an in-situ state for many years, even for decades, tortured by uncertainty, torn between hope and despair, and often enough deeply disappointed by a lack of official acknowledgement following broad amnesties. Even if the hope of the missing being alive may be vanishingly small, there is no certainty of death to induce a conventional mourning process, and no grave to grieve and pay tribute to one's memory in order to, eventually, reach some form of

emotional closure. Relatives of the missing from the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, for instance, are reported to light candles in the church: While some go to the section for the living, others go to that of the dead. A mother of a missing son after yearlong unfruitful endeavours to uncover her son's fate is cited with the words: "Even if I find a skeleton, I don't care. I want my son back" (ICRC 2007, 3, 12). This appears representative and revealing for the high stress level that uncertainty causes as opposed to evidence.

In view of the above mentioned, a most prominent example of relatives actively countering their isolation in trauma, while also fighting forgetting and denial within a broader culture of patriarchy and militarism, is the Argentinian mothers and grandmothers "de Plaza de Mayo". Their endeavours are an example of self-empowerment, where the questioning of traditional gender roles merged with persistent political activism to claim knowledge, justice, compensation and memorialization regarding the former regime's gross human rights violations. As their personal accounts suggest, with the passing of time isolated house wives, mothers and grandmothers became an organized public voice, and they themselves important political actors that have decisively moved forward the question of the *desaparecidos*, pressured for the provision of access to archives, for assistance to relatives, the summoning of witnesses, and the leading of trials and have as such strengthened democratic participation, the role of civil society and the acknowledgment of human rights in post-war Argentina (see Sternbach et al. 1987; Bosco 2006). Thus, in Argentina the issue of missing persons, particularly the willingness of successive governments to cooperate in the investigation, and acknowledge committed deeds, can be considered a powerful indicator of the quality of its democratic transition.

The Missing of Cyprus: A Miniature of the Island's Broader Conflict Structures

Competing Narratives: A short Summary of the Cyprus Conflict

Cyprus has been divided since 1974. In that year Turkey intervened after yearlong interethnic violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and an attempted Greek coup following the island's independence in 1960. The conflict goes deep back into the history and is interwoven with colonial, geostrategic and nationalist aspirations. More than a century before, ever since the establishment of modern Greece in 1832, the Greek Cypriots aspired the unification with their motherland, while the Turkish Cypriot minority – following the foundation of the Turkish state about hundred years later in 1923 – aimed at the islands partition to preserve their political

rights and autonomy. It was under British rule and their well-established *divide and rule*-politics that the tensions between the two communities further escalated. When the island was finally given independence as "Republic of Cyprus" in 1960 in a consociational democracy under the supervision of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey that were to guarantee the maintenance of the status quo, both communities found their maximalist goals unfulfilled. Throughout the sixties a militant group and some political circles of the Greek Cypriot community aspired to minimize the minorities' political autonomy, perceiving it as a thorn in the eye on the pathway towards unification with Greece, while also Turkish Cypriot nationalists organized in counter attacks. During those years the island witnessed a growing climate of violence and intimidation both against the other but also against moderates of the own community. Many Turkish Cypriots fled into enclaves under the protection of the Turkish army. Eventually, after an attempted coup d'état by the Greek military junta to occupy the island (a move backed and welcomed by nationalist Greek Cypriot circles), Turkey intervened invoking its right to preserve the status quo as guarantor power. However, it did not reinstall the status quo ante, but occupied one third of the island, which was accompanied by a broad population exchange. In 1983 the North unilaterally declared its independence as "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) and remains a de facto state to date recognized only by Turkey.

The conflict has broad about hundreds of thousands of internally displaced, thousands of casualties and hundreds of missing persons on both sides. Until today, no retributive or restorative justice measures have been taken in acknowledgment of one's own deeds. Rather, both communities' dominant discourses and public spheres represent monolithic, mutually exclusive and self-whitewashing narratives of the conflict that only contain the own community's plight and losses, while silencing the other's.

In official Greek Cypriot collective memory – which is to be found in museums, such as the *Museum of National Struggle*, in memorials honouring the Greek Cypriot freedom fighters against the Ottoman, and later British colonial rulers, a preponderance of Greek flags, monumental tributes to first Greek Cypriot president and archbishop Makarios, nationalist parades and holidays partly converging with those of Greece, and taught in history textbooks – the character of the island has always been Greek, while the Turkish Cypriot minority is not perceived as autochthonous. According to the dominant view, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have mostly lived peacefully among one another. The island's partition is being presented as the result of foreign geostrategic interests, primarily Turkey's. Greek Cypriots keep up the memory of the "brutal Turkish invasion" in memorials, songs and images and demand Turkey's withdrawal to reunite the island.

By way of contrast, on official side in the North Turkey's intervention is being celebrated annually with fireworks and military honours. It is called "the happy peace operation" that saved the Turkish Cypriots from the fatal grip of the Greek Cypriot majority that is being depicted as always having harboured aggressive aspirations. In the North, Turkish flags, statues of Ataturk,

a national museum reminding the hardship of the sixties and a historic site of crime that has been turned into the *Museum of Barbarism* shall bear witness to the Greek Cypriot atrocities and reinforce the legitimacy for maintaining the status quo of partition.

While the internal border, the "Greene line", had been hermetically closed for almost thirty years, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf *Denktaş* opened it in 2003 due to internal pressure that was encouraged by UN-led negotiations to reunite the island and the prospect of EU-integration. The compromise drafted in the so called "Annan-Plan" (named after UN-general secretary Kofi Annan, who led the talks) aimed at creating a new federal republic, while readjusting territory, and compensating for loss of property. However, the plan was not approved by a Greek Cypriot majority, so the island was not reunited and, thus, de jure only the South, the Republic of Cyprus, joined the EU.

Ever since Greek and Turkish Cypriots can pass from one side to another through a series of checkpoints. There have been timid reconciliatory initiatives and gestures of good will on both sides introduced by more progressive governments. However, neither have the sides succeeded to agree over the unresolved questions of power sharing, and territory, nor have the mutually exclusive dominant narratives significantly transformed to provide a viable political basis for a re-united island. As the next section will illustrate, the dealing with the Cypriot missing is a case in point.

1963 – a year of massive violence against the Turkish Cypriot minority – is being remembered in the North, while silenced in the South; taken at the "Museum of Barbarism"
(© Carolina Rehrmann)

Suppression, Trauma and Silence: The CMP's Quest for Evidence and Reconciliation in an Unfavourable Environment

The Committee on Missing Persons is the only transitional justice organization in Cyprus and a contested one. Moreover, the CMP works entirely in the sphere of restorative justice, that is in the sphere of evidence seeking, acknowledgement and closure for the relatives of the missing. Information on potential burial sites or any hint that might help in the location of bones can be given by anyone anonymously and with the guaranty of no legal consequences taken. Established in 1981 by the United Nations, the bicommunal committee under the auspices of the Red Cross is chaired by an external UN-representative, and two governmental delegates (a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot). It employs archaeologists, and biologists, that participate in locating, exhuming, and identifying the mortal remains of the about 2000 missing Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and delivering them back to their families. The CMP furthermore employs three psychologists from either side that deliver the news of evidence to the relatives and support them during the process of identification and burial.

For more than three decades the CMP could not assume any significant work due to a lack of political circles and society's willingness of cooperation. Since 2006 indications from civil society, as well as official information exchange on burial sides led to first exhumations. By 2016 more than half of the missing were exhumed, and a significant portion identified (CMP 2018). On its homepage the CPM presents itself as a successful initiative for inter-communal reconciliation. Representative images of UN-delegates, along with Cypriot governmental representatives, videos and reports on both sides efforts and strains shall underpin the impression of a voluntary cooperation.[10] Without misjudging the factual success of the CMP, this impression seems to be deceptive. A deeper view into both communities' national narratives, their dealing with the missing persons' issue, as well as a series of personal interviews with CMP-officials, its psychologists, forensic scientists and missing person's relatives conducted in March 2016 suggest a deep cleavage between claim and reality.

First and foremost, why did it take the CMP so long to effectively assume its work and why does it not have a retributive mandate? A view into the broader post-conflict context might be revealing: No single human rights violation committed between 1963 and 1974 by Greek and Turkish Cypriots against members of the own or the other community in towns and small villages – vandalism, harassment, even rape and murder – has been brought to trial. Thus, the missing's issue is socially explosive: It touches neighbourly relations, and particularly regarding the *intra*communal tensions between militant nationalist groups and left-wing opponents raises sensitive issues of impunity. For, as Galatariotou (2012, 260) states, in a densely populated

[10] See <http://www.cmp-cyprus.org>.

and confined space of rural cohabitation in villages dispersed among a small island, it is hardly conceivable that crimes remained hidden. Interviews with forensic experts taken in the CMP's laboratories located in the UN-buffer zone told the author that 20% of all missing were women and children. This gives an insight into the level of violence, the percentage of civilians involved (CMP forensics 2016) and it might explain why collective silence has been maintained to protect perpetrators and back the dominant conflict narratives. Implicitly also the political leadership demands this silence in its omnipresent appeal to national unity to foster communal strength against the common foe. Moreover, impunity in the own sphere is justified referring to the other community's inertia:

> "The denial of crimes committed by one community towards the other is legitimated internally by the other's lack of acknowledgement of their transgressions. Because Greek Cypriots have not as a community examined their behaviour, Turkish Cypriots have been able to avoid assessing their own actions during the conflict. Further, the Turkish army's continued overpowering presence on the island makes Greek Cypriots reluctant to talk of Greek Cypriot human rights violations or inter- or intra-communal atrocities committed during the war" (Bozkurt und Yiakinthou 2012, 25).

On Greek Cypriot side, only those who were directly involved in the *coup* were dismissed from their positions, but without any broader social debate. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot internally displaced, as well as relatives of murdered and missing have taken legal action against the respective other at international courts, though with very limited success due to a lack of acknowledgement by the respective party or – in case of the missing – of forensic evidence (Bozkurt / Yakinthou 2012, 22–26 and personal interview with a Turkish-Cypriot relative of a missing person[11]). In 2014 the International Court of Justice sentenced Turkey to a fine of 90 Million Euros compensation for the families of missing persons and for discrimination against the Greek Cypriots still living in the North. The sentence was rejected by Turkey (Karadeniz / Toksabay 2014).

While the Greek Cypriot community is paying some small pensions for the missings' relatives – interestingly enough, only since 1997 – and has declared July 15th as the official commemoration day for the fallen and injured by the Turkish invasion, in the North there is neither compensation, nor memorialization. Turkish Cypriot officials have repeatedly emphasized that all missing are dead (see Closa Montero 2008, 21, 101, 411 and Bozkurt / Yiakinthou 2012, 8). What at first glance might appear as a disparity of openness towards the past and empathy for

[11] Personal interview led confidently on March 15th 2016 in Nicosia.

the relative's plight, is much more to be evaluated within the context of the respective communities' national narratives.

For decades the dominant narrative of the "TRNC" as reflected in the name *happy peace operation,* in holidays, museums and history textbooks has been that of the ultimate conclusion of the ordeal the Turkish Cypriot minority went through (see i.a. Papadakis 2003, 1994). As two huge, illuminated flags installed on one of the *Trodos* mountains close to Nicosia and visible from the South or banners at the border writing "TRNC forever" shall make clear, there is no interest in the revision of the status quo. As investigative journalist and peace activist Sevgul Uludag states: "The missing persons issue was a kind of taboo on our side […]. People were told they are dead, don't look for them. The missing persons issue was a zone of silence in our community and I wanted to break that silence".[12] Her impressive endeavours will be discussed further down.

This memorial is to be found in the Greek Cypriot village Potamia honouring the memory of two missing men. Each statue is positioned in front of a marble slab with their respective birth and missing dates, while a poem inscribed on a round plate between them hails their immortality. As such it comes close to the symbolism of a cenotaph – an empty grave as a substitute for the missings' remains and a tribute to the timeless glory of the national community – but also represents an artifact of accusation that keeps up the memory (and hope) of an ultimate return (© Carolina Rehrmann).

[12] Vgl. <http://womensenews.org/2008/08/uludag-unearths-the-missing-stories-cyprus/>.

By way of contrast, the Greek Cypriots keep up the memory of their lost land and lives in the north. The missing and the relatives' pain mingles with the idea of the ultimate happy ending. It is to be found in numerous documentaries, annual parades headed by the internally displaced of the Northern municipalities, history textbooks – as the one titled "I know, I don't forget and struggle" (γνωριζω, δεν ξεχνω και αγωνιζομαι) that shall teach the young generation about their lost patria in the North and remind them of their duty to struggle for its liberation – and complemented by political circles and the Church of Cyprus that relentlessly declare their engagement, respectively their prayers for the liberation from the *Turkish joke* (Papadopoulos 2001, Simerini 2004). Not without ironic undertone Papadakis (2005) comments on this stance by stating:

> "For decades Greek Cypriot political rhetoric, as expressed by almost all parties, was the chant of ALL: ALL refugees back to their homes; ALL Turkish settlers out of Cyprus; ALL Turkish troops out of Cyprus. Even if on paper a federal solution had been agreed upon in 1977, even if this was to be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that meant not all refugees would be able to return—though all would be compensated—this had never been spelled out."

Picture I: "The Tziaos Five"

This also affects the way the missing persons issue is being dealt with in the public sphere. The crying mothers of missing sons that gather at the border every year and accusingly hold up photographs of their sons demanding information from the North (see this author's first article on emotions in enduring conflicts in this volume), have become a powerful and collective metaphor of the ingroup's pain and of an idea deeply interwoven with the national, ethno-religious narrative of century long strain and the prospect of a happy, glorious ending that is that one day all refugees will happily return to their homes and the island will be reunited (Rehrmann 2017, 69). Interestingly enough, as Cypriot psychologist Catia Galatariotou (2008, 862) aptly states, here the missing persons play a crucial role as symbols for an in-situ state of suffered trauma without closure and the hope for ultimate salvation: "[…] the missing", she says refering to their political as well as to their emotional dimension, "were kept metaphorically alive and culturally speaking unburied, both in official propaganda and in the minds of their relatives. The recovery of the missing became a metaphor for the recapture of a lost past, or lost territory, or national recovery and redemption". This refined socio-emotional finding is underpinned by concrete legal evidence: As she reports (2008, 856; 2014, 257–259), political circles have repeatedly withheld information on the fate of missing persons. One of the most prominent cases in this respect is the fate of the so called "Tziaos Five"[13]. The five Greek Cypriots had been missing since Turkey's intervention in 1974 and become legend. Anonymous information given to the CMP in 2009, not only led to the exhumation and identification of their mortal remains but proved that high ranking Greek Cypriot politicians had been informed about their fate and kept silent about it. Rather than providing evidence and closure Greek Cypriot political circles appear to be interested foremost in upholding the matter of the missing as a hot and media-effective cause. The mentioned fact that no crimes committed by the own community – either against the other or within the own group – have been investigated, underscores the political explosiveness of the matter and thus explains the hesitant and biased stance of political officials and the broader community. Galatariotou (2008, 858) labels this condition by stating:

> "As justice was never done nor seen to be done the Cypriots became accustomed to keeping their heads low, speaking quietly and trying not to cross the path of the gunmen. That it was known that someone had killed with impunity damaged the moral authority of the republic irretrievably in the minds of all its citizens, intensified the sense of fear and insecurity, and kept primitive anxieties permanently unleashed. In its function as

[13] The "Tziaos Five" are depicted kneeling with their arms raised next to a Turkish soldier. The popular photograph is to be found in large numbers in print media and social networks, see: <http://greekcypriot.blogspot.de/2009/08/cyprus-missing-persons.html>.

> collective super-ego – representative of moral conscience, arbiter of guilt and deliverer of just punishment – the state emerged deeply compromised".

The issue appears even more sensitive for – as mentioned above – questions of human rights violations almost always tackle neighbourly relationships: "Many of the crimes that resulted in death or disappearance, resulted from an escalation of tit-for-tat antagonisms, or were perpetrated by people from neighboring villages or even by neighbors. In some cases, this makes survivors quietly reluctant to see that the guilty parties are named for what they have done, and in others, more determined to keep the book of the past closed" (Bozkurt und Yiakinthou 2012, 26).

The lack of endeavours to cover up the fate of the missing together with a selective, whitewashed conflict narrative leave Greek Cypriot relatives behind with nagging and unresolvable questions. Spyros Hadjinikolaou, whose father went missing when he himself was a little boy, puts into words the painful initiation processes he went through in making sense of the tragic loss that would not be in harmony with the official narrative of peaceful coexistence:

> "But is that the real story of Cyprus? […] from the age of seventeen, nineteen, when someone starts questioning things […] me and my brother started looking around for real information, not for just the mainstream thing that used to come from the schools, from the newspapers and the politicians, cause it wouldn't really make sense to us that some crazy guys come and kill your father. The very essence of my emotions when I saw my father's remains is that there was this guy in bones only and a couple of holes in his skull who was my father and he was younger than me. There should be something else behind it – there should be something that led these things – although, that is not a justification for the wrong doers. We are still very angry about the wrong doers who dropped our family into despair and pain for all these years. But, I believe that my family got a peace of mind after the exhumation and the identification of the remains and the funeral, even if it was delayed for forty years. With the question mark of course that we don't know what happened to them and how, and when, by whom. That is still an issue that we are after" (Evripidou and Nugent 2012 [transcribed by the author]).

His statement underpins the emotional importance of the CMP's endeavours in uncovering the missing's fate and at the same time shows the relative's need for both knowledge *and* legal accountability. However, working within a broadly unfavourable political surrounding, its graspable success in promoting intercommunal rapprochement, let alone reconciliation and in providing relief and closure for the relatives when evidence has been delayed for decades appears at least questionable.

To start with, the political representatives' general scepticism concerning any broader, restorative justice endeavours seems to be a case in point. As Bozkurt und Yiakinthou (2012, 19) state:

> "[…] over the course of our work we found that key policy makers in the field received truth commissions with a great deal of cynicism. The main concern is that they may undermine the ongoing truth-seeking process initiated by the CMP. If people fear their crimes becoming public, they will no longer provide the CMP with information about burial sites, which will prevent families of victims from ever finding their loved ones' remains".

Although the tension between evidence and legal accountability is a fair argument already discussed above within the context of South Africa, the representatives' stance is also indicative for the general quid-pro-quo-attitude that excludes any broader vision of reconciliation both within and between the Cypriot communities in favour of factual evidence for one's own group.

On that note, although somewhat ambiguous, it is not less indicative for the lack of political support and the lip-service both sides pay to the CMPs cause that the committee is being financed by external funds to 80%. As confidential statements of CMP-members suggest both communities are interested first and foremost in exhibiting the own community's losses. After decades of unwillingness of cooperation, it has been through external pressure and civil society efforts that politicians of either side finally engaged in a quid-pro-quo disclosure of information on burial sites that would pave the way for further investigation with the sole aim of providing certainty of a missing's remains. Moreover, and interestingly enough, the Greek and Turkish psychologists do not cooperate with one another. In fact, they hardly interact, not even in a mutually helpful exchange of their work experience. This again, emphasizes the divided character of the CMP as opposed to its own self-portrayal.

How do relatives react to delivered certainty? As the CMP's psychologists emphasized, relatives might for decades live with the hope of the loved one's ultimate return, calling their emotional state a scarred wound. Confronted with forensic knowledge about their loved one's death they might show disbelief and rage, resignation or even gratefulness for the end of a strenuous uncertainty. However, the longer this uncertainty lasts the more it appears to become an essential part of relative's identity and emotional routine. Interviews the author undertook with Greek and Turkish Cypriot relatives of missing persons underline how emotionally acute the urge to know, and particularly in case of elderly parents of missing also an albeit vague hope to find the loved one alive (a hope backed by the political narratives of the South), might be even after more than four decades. The

fact that certainty is delivered so late, though, appears other than being relieving, often rather disturbing than reconciling and offering closure. Many families – as the psychologists explained in personal interviews with the author – remain in a state of unwillingness to cope with the newly acquired evidence even a long time after the reception and burial of the mortal remains and continue to display high levels of emotional stress. This appears to be the case, because for many decades relatives have get used to the in-situ state of maintaining hope. One psychologist recalls an incident where an elderly woman – mother of a missing son, whose remains had been recently found –begged him to allow her to continue believing in her son's potential reappearance. This somewhat contradictory plea is a sign of her unwillingness, or inability as the case may be, to let go of a familiar emotional state. The older the relatives and the longer their state of uncertainty, the higher the risk appears that evidence will not be relieving and initiating a state of mourning. "We can't help them the way we would want to", one of the psychologists states, explaining that he feels insufficiently prepared and trained for being exposed to the relatives' anxiety and trauma. With only three psychologists having to look after a continuously rising number of relatives (as identification numbers increase), all agree that they are hardly able to ensure neither a profound nor a long-term support. This is underlined by the fact that only two of the three possess a degree in psychology. Also, as already mentioned, Greek and Turkish psychologists neither cooperate officially, nor do they even unofficially meet in what could be a potentially helpful exchange of experiences and expertise – a further proof of the CMP's communal division.

Uludağ attending a missing person's funeral (above) and assisting a burial, after having helped in locating a missing persons' remains (second image © Veral Celiker, both courtesy of Sevgül Uludağ)

Not surprisingly, given the political climate, many relatives feel left alone by the respective governments. Particularly in the North their cause is being silenced from official side. After decades of complete international isolation due to its de-facto status the Northern government is particularly interested in promoting a favourable image of Northern Cyprus for touristic purposes. However, although the matter seems omnipresent in the South, relatives complain that the eventual burial of their loved ones' remains – an event often covered by the media and attended by political representatives – becomes politicized for media and party-political purposes. As one relative frankly states: "We have been completely left alone by officials for so many years. I did not need and did not want them to attend the burial, so they could use that for their own interest". On that note, one of the psychologists recounts that when first contacting relatives he had to explain to them that he was not a political party delegate and did not pursue any political purposes[14] – statements that blatantly underline the alienation between victim groups and political circles and suggest that there is no honest interest in tackling the relatives' burdens.

It does not come as a surprise therefore that a significant forensic success and an increase of public knowledge about the issue is primarily due to civic engagement. Here, first and foremost,

[14] Interviews with psychologists of CMP and Greek and Turkish relatives of missing persons led confidently between March 13.–16. 2016 in Nicosia.

Turkish Cypriot journalist and human rights activist Sevgül Uludağ has been engaged for decades to counteract silence and denial as co-founder of the bi-communal NGO "Together we can" (TWC). In close cooperation with Greek Cypriot peace activists and relatives of missing persons she aims at producing evidence about their fate and – equally important – collect and make public the silenced and forgotten stories of victims of violence. She publishes and reads out these personal accounts in seminars and youth camps. "Cyprus. The untold Stories" is an appealing anthology of anonymized eyewitnesses' memories of fear and escalation, group deportations, and executions and gives a disturbing impression of the peoples' emotional heritage (Uludağ 2005[15]). It is due to her braveness and persistence, her bi-communal reputation and particularly her being on a civic, thus non-political mission that a significant number of missings' fates could be solved (a fact even admitted by members of the CMP). For possible confidants trust her much more than the half-heartedly committed official government delegates. Relentlessly she is pursuing evidence, and supporting relatives, while giving their memories and trauma a dignified platform. For her engagement she was nominated for the Nobel Peace Price in 2019.

At the café of the bi-communal *Home for Cooperation* that is located at the UN-administered buffer zone in Nicosia's old centre, the author had the opportunity to listen to members of TWC recounting stories of witnesses' strained silence, but also of perpetrators late confessions and their cathartic effect. Their stories underline both the acuteness and sensitivity of the topic, but also the "humanity of the other", for they depict both communities' losses.

In view of the above mentioned, one can conclude in stating that the CMP seems an *en miniature* depiction of the broader socio-psychological conditions of denial and impunity and a mutually exclusive, competing image of ultimate justice. The lack of legal and ethical reprocessing, and a lack of *national ownership* of investigating the missings' fate, together with the promises and biases of political propaganda have nurtured a psychological disposition of diffuse fear, suppression, frustration and (misled) hope. By way of contrast, civic engagement and personal exchange among relatives appear to be a much more decisive step towards closure and reconciliation.

The *Association for Historical Dialogue and Research*: An Alternative Approach to History and their Portrayal of the Missing Persons

Located within Nicosia's buffer zone in the Home for Cooperation – a vibrant place for bi-communal NGO's, artistic and musical encounters – the bi-communal Association for Historical

[15] Vgl. <http://sevgululudag.blogspot.com>.

Dialogue and Research (AHDR) headed by peace-oriented educators and scientists is concerned with critically reflecting Cypriot history education and producing peace-educational material.[16] Established in 2003 the AHDR develops three-lingual (English, Turkish, Greek) supplementary history textbooks and conducts teachers trainings aimed at transforming both communities' monolithic and selective narratives of the past and thus increasing their understanding of and empathy for one another. To this goal they employ peace educational methods, such as multi-perspectivity, role-switch and depict Cypriot history and its conflicted heritage from a variety of interrelated topics in order to show the multi-layeredness and contingency of history and to foster open and constructive dialogue about sensitive and contested issues. They transgress, broaden, diversify and contextualize traditional history education with its often abstract and timeless focus on (mono-causal and one-sided causes and courses of) war, conflict, and (mostly male dominated) high politics. In line with peace educational premises AHDR's publications aspire to show the contingency of history by illuminating the relational, multi-dimensional nature of both Cypriot social and political life, while also cross-cutting ethnic or religious boundaries by delving into gender-related, social, or cultural-artistic aspects of Cypriot history from (pre-national) Ottoman to recent times.

A consecutive five-booklets-series is committed to the topic of the Cypriot missing. It is titled "Thinking historically about the missing persons. A guide for teachers" (MP I) and includes i.a. the introductory booklet "Developing historical thinking" (MP II), followed by the comparative thematic overview "What do we mean by missing persons? Experience and responses around the world" (MP III), the local account "Missing persons in Cyprus" (IV), concluded by the interactive guide „How should the missing persons of the Cyprus Conflict be remembered. Lesson plans and rationale" (MP VI) and a number of related resources for further investigation. The series has been developed in cooperation between the *AHDR*, *the Elders*, and the *International Center for Transitional Justice*.

A conceptual introduction into the phenomenon of missing persons in booklet I is followed by booklet II with a critical account of debates on modern history education that aim at motivating teachers to engage into an interactive, self-reflective and student-centered way of dealing with history in classroom. Then the authors illuminate the difference between scientific history, historicity and normatively charged, timeless heritage, and between forensic, and intersubjective truth. Drawing on findings of cognitive psychology and learning theory, they further trace recent debates on history didactics that motivated a gradual shift away from monolithic truths, strict chronology, passive reception and memorizing of abstract, de-contextualized historical events (Booklet II, 4–23). Diplomatically, without directly criticizing any community's understanding of history, booklet II shall thus sensitise for the need to perceive history and history

[16] <https://www.ahdr.info>.

education as an investigative and open process. Such an approach, as the authors carefully state, could also help overcome students' confusion and insecurity when it comes to evaluating historical events:

> "Classroom experience in Cyprus, at least, suggests that the above descriptions [that is teacher-centered, 'chalk-and-talk-style history education] apply in the case of Cypriot students also and this claim is also supported by anecdotal evidence of teachers' perceptions: concerns about students' inability to connect the knowledge of different historical periods and about the tendency to confuse chronology and to 'misplace' people and events in time appear frequently in history teachers' everyday discussions" (Booklet II, 15).



Booklet Cover 'Thinking Historically about Missing Persons. A Guiede for Teachers', courtesy of AHDR

Having framed self-reflective, student-centred education as modern and innovative and thus paved the way for a more inclusive and dynamic understanding of history didactics, booklet III goes on with introducing the phenomenon of missing persons in global and comparative perspective by an in-depth depiction of various case studies. Here, the authors inform about the legal intricacies, particularly about the emotional challenges for relatives, the potentially conflicting interests of the conflicting parties, and about diverse endeavours and (limited) successes of internal and external actors in dealing with missing persons, while highlighting the important role of civil society. Considering the politicization, biased perceptions and "timelessness" of the topic in the two Cypriot communities, readers are invited to an external view on the matter – a view that motivates empathy, de-ethicizes, universalizes and humanizes the issue, while realistically showing the chances and limits of certainty and closure for the relatives. This shall facilitate a critical perception of the own developments in Cyprus. Only then, booklet IV explicitly deals with the Cypriot case. It does so by focussing on the losses and plights of both communities, cautiously, though unequivocally criticizing the instrumentalization of the topic by both political circles and by highlighting the tenacity and resilience of relatives and civic activists in investigating the missings' fate. Booklet V transforms the theoretical knowledge into interactive learning units, where students are asked to switch roles assuming perspectives of different actors in order to understand their diverse feelings, interests and needs. They are finally invited to reflect on the meaning of memory places in order to "understand how representations of the past express the aims and purposes of the people who construct them" and to create a virtual memorial for the missing of Cyprus. To facilitate this task students learn about the diversity of memory places, about mono- and multi-ethnic, contested, inclusive and divisive memorals. Here, the booklet contrasts two British memorials, the "Victoria Memorial, Lancaster" as glorifying tribute to the nation, as opposed to the self-critical "Slave Trade Arts Memorial Project" (Booklet V, 19–23), stating:

> "Whereas the Victoria Memorial expresses a conventional (if now discredited) narrative of 'national greatness' created at the height of the British Empire, the STAMP Memorial expresses a counter-history, commemorates a group of people 'hidden' in the older 'official' narrative and draws attention to the suffering of the victims of 'empire'" (Booklet V, 24).

Moreover, an unusual, pop-cultural memory place to be found at a central square of the multi-ethnic city of Mostar – the Bruce Lee-Statue – is selected for that purpose. The authors explain that with the aim of countering the dominant, mutually exclusive memory practices of Bosnia and Herzegowina the Youth group "Urban Movement Mostar" established this statue to remind of a trans-ethnic heritage of the eightees with Bruce Lee representing a youth idol throughout Yugoslavia:

> "Unlike the other two memorials discussed in this section, the Bruce Lee statue bears little apparent relationship to the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Urban Movement Mostar clearly intended a relationship, however: by memorialising Bruce Lee, first, they looked for common ground between divided communities, and, second, by not memorialising an ethnic 'hero' they refused to fall back on the conventional political narratives that fuelled the Bosnian conflicts. The relationship between past and present that Urban Movement Mostar sought to create is symbolic rather than literal and explicitly future-oriented as much, and perhaps more than, past-oriented" (Booklet V, 29).

Given Cyprus' omni-present, static, selective, state-owned and competing memory culture, – at least in the South – the forced hope to find the missing as a metaphor for a happy ending of the broader conflict, the critical discussion of memory cultures and their meaning for inter-ethnic relations appears as an inspiring guide for the students. What is more, developing their own ideas to create an inclusive memory place for the Cypriot missing is not only a way of transforming dominant memory discourses, but also of creating a common vision for Cyprus' future. For this task they receive concrete guidelines that put all booklets' premises and educational values at one glance:

> "• **Diversity**: commemorations should aim to include as wide a range of experiences, communities and time periods as possible;
>
> • **Multiperspectivity**: commemorations should encourage participants or audiences to consider a number of perspectives on the missing persons question;
>
> • **Openness**: commemorations should aim to encourage participants or audiences to form their own meanings and narratives rather than to impose one meaning or story;
>
> • **Accuracy and balance**: commemorations should be thoroughly researched and historically accurate in their details and also provide a comprehensive treatment of the issue;
>
> • **Sensitivity**: commemorations should demonstrate awareness that the missing persons issue is a sensitive one and ensure that the issue is represented in ways that anticipate and take account of a range of community reactions;
>
> • **Engagement**: commemorations should foster a meaningful interaction with members of the public, and thus questions of who to reach and how should be taken into account" (MP V: 35).

Being a guide for a cognitively and ethnically pluralistic, inter-active, dynamic, inspiring and sensitive *lieu de memoire*, the last booklet invites to a fundamental paradigm shift of Cypriot collective memory.

As members of the AHDR communicated to the author, these and other booklets are being carefully promoted by the Association in teachers' trainings and seminars, although – with minor exceptions – not positively received by the respective public institutions of higher education. However, they are a great endeavour to achieve restorative justice and an alternative approach to conflict resolution that, if this one and similar initiatives only had some more impact on the broader societies, could initiate a first step into bringing the two communities closer with respect, empathy and mutual acknowledgement of one's own deeds and the other's plight – a goal not achieved through decade-long political negotiations.

Conclusion

As the conceptual and comparative outline of missing persons and the way post-conflict societies have been dealing with it showed, they belong to the most sensitive and intricate issues to solve. Often, they *en miniature* reflect the lack of quality of reprocessing, justice and reconciliation. For acknowledgement, reparations, and memorialization on a collective level, and apology, forgiveness and closure on an individual level are both needed to do justice and tackle the relatives needs and are at the same time essential elements of a holistic socio-emotional transformation. Here, Cyprus is no exception. The missing persons' issue has been politically instrumentalized for either community's respective purposes and squeezed into the narrow sheath of their mutually exclusive national narratives. Consequently, on both sides of the divide relatives have found themselves left alone in their pain and needs, even if the official stories (one of forced closure and silence, the other of forced perpetuation of pain and hope) vary. On that note, the CMP's history, its belated action, its division, and it's ambivalent emotional repercussions are cases in point. Being a transitional justice mechanism that has been launched by external actors with the significant support of civil society, it is operating in an unfavourable political environment. Its intended effect of providing closure through certainty remains limited and undoubtedly it does not contribute to the communities' reconciliation, for on the one hand its findings are being used to back either sides victimhood and on the other it does hardly promote or presuppose institutional cooperation. This indicates the limits of forensic truth for emotional reconciliation. By way of contrast, the self-reflective, cautious and multi-perspectivist AHDR-approach shows how a broader paradigm shift would have to look like to provide healing through acknowledgement and a sense of justice for the missings' relatives and to lay the foundations for a common future.

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Responding to Institutional Abuse in the Anglican Church of Australia: Ambiguities in Overcoming Evil with Good

Phillip Tolliday

Introduction

In this paper I will outline some of the ambiguities—as I see them—of overcoming evil with good within the context of institutional abuse in the Anglican Church of Australia. In 2013 Julia Gillard, Australia's first—and to this point, only—female Prime Minister, instituted, in the face of considerable opposition, a Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse in Australia.

A Royal Commission may be convoked at either Federal or State level. In this case, it having been called by the Prime Minister, it was convoked at the Federal level. A Royal Commission is given wide-ranging powers that are operative within a clearly defined remit or terms of reference. Presided over by a reputable member of the judiciary, the Commission has wider powers than the courts to obtain evidence and compel witnesses. The Royal Commission was convened in 2013 and it was anticipated that it would have concluded its work by the end of 2015, however, in the event it did not hand down its final conclusions until late in 2017. Since that time institutions have been working their way through the recommendations.

A variety of institutions came under the scrutiny of the Royal Commission, among which were churches. Churches included not only parishes under their sphere of influence but also had responsibility for schools and children's homes. The focus of this paper is not on Institutional

abuse generally, but rather upon the Anglican Church of Australia, to which I belong and about which I am best equipped to comment.

Dioceses comprising the Anglican Church of Australia first began hearing stories during the 1980s and 1990s of children in their care having been abused by clergy and other church workers. Starting as a trickle these stories gathered in frequency and intensity, rapidly becoming a deluge. Despite this flood of complaints about the abuse of children, victims of abuse—or, as they are now generally known, survivors of abuse—were usually dismissed by the ecclesiastical authorities to whom they presented their grievances.

Victims discovered that they confronted an apparatus that was largely uninterested in their stories, and moreover, one that considered itself sufficiently powerful to deflect any actions that might have been brought against it. However, the passage of time; the deluge of complaints; the gradual diminution of the social power and prestige of the church *qua* institution; the worldwide spread of the issue of child abuse, combined with the fact that in some parts of the world, for example, in the Anglican Church of Canada, litigation was being pursued with an increasing measure of success; all these factors contributed to the Anglican Church of Australia acknowledging, albeit reluctantly, that it was indeed likely to be held liable to account for these events.

Unlike the Roman Catholic Church about which there has been ongoing and bitter debate as to whether that Church is a form of legal entity subject to litigation, the Anglican Church of Australia has not enjoyed protection from such a threat. Therefore when litigation became a possibility in the Australian context, it threatened to make crippling financial inroads into diocesan funds. Australian Anglicans already knew that their compatriots in Canada had been subject to litigation—and with devastating effect. The Diocese of Cariboo had ceased to exist in 2001 as a result of being unable to bear the financial costs that were consequent upon litigation on behalf of victims of abuse who, as children, had been in the care of that diocese.

Faced with the very real possibility of the Canadian experience replicating itself in Australia, the Anglican bishops met together—with clergy and lay people—at a General Synod in order to devise a response. That response came under the general heading of *Safer Ministry Protocols* and would eventually culminate in a document called *Faithfulness in Service*, which would become operative in the national Church from 2004.[1] The General Synod also called upon the dioceses

[1] A few comments are necessary about the phrase 'national Church.' There is a real sense in which this is a misnomer. The Anglican Church of Australia is made up an aggregate of autonomous dioceses. The General Synod of the national church passes canons, which are, after debate, subsequently adopted or rejected by each autonomous diocese. Thus the fact that something is passed by the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia is strictly meaningless and only comes into effect as and when it is adopted by a particular diocese. The point I am seeking to make here is that it is a significant undertaking to get national 'buy-in' on anything! *Faithfulness in Service* is one such thing. Incidentally, one of the complaints leveled against the Anglican Church by the Royal Commission was its structure of diocesan autonomy that prevents dioceses and particularly bishops, from mutual accountability.

to adopt a 'post conflict Committee and Professional Standards Board, and the appointment of a Director of Professional Standards.'[2] However, as Muriel Porter pointed out, as recently as 2017 there still persisted 'differences in legislation and approach … a source of puzzlement and frustration to the Royal Commission' [19].

The Response to Survivors of Child Abuse

The church's response toward survivors began to shift gradually from indifference to engagement. Bishops adopted a range of responses, including listening to those who had been abused; engaging in a program of education and consciousness-raising for clergy and other church workers, both employees and volunteers; and, of course, the provision of financial compensation. As an outcome of the Royal Commission many Anglican dioceses have adopted the *Redress Scheme*. This scheme was a recommendation from the Royal Commission for all institutions in which child abuse had happened. There is a website on which one can find out which institutions have signed up to the Scheme and those that have not done so.[3] Most Anglican dioceses in Australia have joined the Scheme. Of course joining the Scheme is not compulsory but it would be a very bad 'look' if the church didn't do so.

All dioceses in the Anglican Church of Australia have now adopted varying forms of Safe Ministry Education and so the following information is available on the website of the Diocese of Adelaide and is representative.[4] The website points out that there are two main elements: screening and training. Most recently, as essential to the screening element, the South Australian Government, in response to a recommendation made by the Royal Commission, will, from 1 July, 2019, introduce the *Working With Children Check*. The diocese has made it mandatory for all clergy, all lay people working with children (this is in accordance with State legislation) and also all parish Wardens and all members of Parish Councils. The latter two categories are included on the rationale that these people exercise leadership and authority in a church community, although they may not necessarily, and in many cases probably won't, have any contact with children.

Currently there are two categories for screening and training: category one and category two. Category one is for clergy and all church leaders, including church wardens and parish councilors. Category two is for people such as lay assistants, servers, vergers and sacristans. The diocesan

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2 Muriel Porter, *The New Scapegoats: The clergy victims of the Anglican Church sexual abuse crisis*, Morning Star Publishing: Northcote, 2017, 19. Further citations will be found in the body of the text.

3 https://www.nationalredress.gov.au.

4 https://adelaideanglicans.com/safeministry.

regulations also note that if there is some uncertainty about whether someone should treated as Category one (more rigorous) or Category two (less rigorous), the former is to be applied. The educational programs, National Police Check and personal questionnaire must all be refreshed every three years. And all who are subject to screening for Safe Ministry, regardless of whether they are classified as Category one or Category two, must be familiar with the contents of the booklet *Faithfulness in Service*; undertake to follow the same and witness their agreement by signing the appropriate form. Thus it might be claimed with some plausibility, that the church has cast the net far and wide in an effort to ensure that an intentional program and screening, consciousness-raising and education is put in place.

At a special session of the Adelaide Synod convened in 2005 the late Rev'd. Andrew King, a whistle-blower who had uncovered evidence of significant mismanagement by the Diocese toward victims of child sexual abuse, made his way slowly to the lectern in order to speak to the assembled synod. He moved slowly because his body was wracked by leukemia. Andrew had a personal stake in this issue. While he himself had not been the personal victim of abuse, his brother had been less fortunate. Standing behind the lectern Andrew uttered the following words: 'Well, this is really bloody awful, isn't it!' No-one said a word, but we all sat transfixed. He went on, 'And you know what one of the worst things is? Yes, we're here, but hardly of our own freewill. We're here because we had to be dragged here, kicking and screaming.' It was, as they say, a moment. Nobody said a word. No one, not even the Chancellor moved to censure him for swearing. We all knew he spoke the truth.

Before I turn to the examples of the church attempting to 'overcome evil with good' I want to make some things perfectly clear. Nothing in any of the examples I present is designed to covertly condone, explain, excuse or in any way mitigate the crime of child sexual abuse. Such abuse is a highly charged emotive issue—and properly so. When committed within families or institutions, child abuse is not only a crime but also a fundamental betrayal of trust. When that institution is a church the betrayal appears especially heinous. People believe that children are entitled to something much better than this – and they're right: they are![5]

In such a highly charged environment it is unsurprising if in its entirely legitimate and justified desire to provide a safer environment for children the church begins to look closely at the behavior and ethics of its clergy and church workers. Indeed, as I have already stated, the result of this was the publication of the booklet *Faithfulness in Service*.

[5] Muriel Porter makes a similar claim: 'I emphasise that this book is not attempting to whitewash those clergy and other church officers who have abused children or teenagers, or committed any form of sexual assault that could be categorized as criminal. When such abuse is proven beyond reasonable doubt, they should be subject to the full weight of the laws of both church and state.' 13.

In 2017 Muriel Porter wrote a book entitled, *The New Scapegoats: The clergy victims of the Anglican Church sexual abuse crisis*. Her argument, and it is a courageous argument to make in the face of the current climate of opinion, is that 'the Anglican Church of Australia – forced by public outcry to introduce measures to stop further abuse – has used those measures to insulate itself from further reputational damage' [6]. Porter believes that we are dealing here with a horrible form of circularity, where the reputation of the ecclesia is paramount. She charges the church with 'going to extraordinary lengths to make individual clergy pay the price for the church's good name, making the clergy the scapegoats forced to bear the church's shame' [6]. A significant part of her book is given over to claiming that the church has used the sexual abuse crisis as an avenue to exact 'harsh treatment against … clergy and church officers for not conforming – or for being accused of not conforming – to the rigid new sexual purity standards imposed on them' [13].

A primary contention made by Porter is that conservative elements within the Anglican church saw an opportunity—and took it—to produce a raft of protocols that moved far beyond the initial and stated remit of responding to child abuse and other forms of criminal sexual behavior. Specifically, in her sight is the claim, reiterated in subsequent editions of *Faithfulness in Service* that all clergy and church workers are to maintain 'chastity in singleness'; a standard of behavior that is not criminal, is contracted between consenting adults, and is in line with the sexual mores of the contemporary society. This is an example of what she has elsewhere called 'the new Puritanism.' However, in this paper my aim is not to pursue this particular avenue, although I will make mention of it in a concluding footnote, but rather, to note how the church is showing a disturbing predilection to apply savage sanctions against those who were not themselves guilty of child sexual abuse, but who nevertheless failed to act on information from the victims.

Those in Authority

At the General Synod of the Anglican Church held in 2004, the then Primate, Archbishop Peter Carnley made an address in which he said,

> "The handling of such difficult matters, particularly when the atmosphere is charged with the fear of legal proceedings, and complicated by the intrusive advice of some insurance companies, and probably also by the naïve hope that the nightmare might simply go away, has often left the victims feeling uncared for and devalued at the expense of institutional protection. Often there have been delays in handling of complaints, something we now recognize to be an entirely unacceptable secondary form of abuse."[6]

[6] Anglican Church of Australia: Proceedings of the Thirteenth General Synod 2004, 13–14.

Carnley was surely correct to identify the devaluing of victims at the expense of institutional protection, but he was skimming over a significant issue when he referred to 'delays in handling complaints.' In many cases the complaints of victims were ignored and deliberately avoided. Of course one may interpret this as a 'delay' but only with the understanding that in many cases it was hoped and believed by the church that such a delay would be permanent. And clearly, those who failed to act, or to act in a timely matter, were those in authority and for those who were still around at the time of the Royal Commission they would be compelled to give an account of their inactions.

Porter turns her attention to the case of what she calls the *Scapegoat Bishop*. Keith Slater was formerly Bishop of the Diocese of Grafton from 2003 until his resignation in 2013. Within the Diocese of Grafton was located the North Coast Children's Home at Lismore. Slater was deposed from holy orders by the church, or more specifically, by the Professional Standards Board in the Diocese of Grafton in 2015, two years after he had resigned in 2013. The deposition was made in response to his mismanagement of abuse claims arising from the Children's Home at Lismore.

Deposition – removal from Holy Orders – is the harshest penalty the church can inflict on its clergy. And it is extremely harsh. There are lesser penalties, ranging from counseling to reprimand to removal of a license to act in a clergy role. Removal of licence means there is the possibility of a return at some point to a ministry, even if it is restricting in some way. Deposition, however, is permanent … Keith Slater had been ordained for forty years at the time of his deposition. In deposition, his Holy Orders as deacon, priest and bishop were swept away; he became a layperson once more, no longer holding any ordained position, role or status within the Anglican Church of Australia [36].

Porter notes that deposition (commonly known as 'defrocking') had already occurred—and justifiably so—in the case of the serial pedophile priest Robert Ellmore in 2001. Historians at the time opined that Ellmore's had been the first deposition from Orders in Australia since the 1880s. Given that Ellmore had been found guilty of the charges and child sexual abuse and had been sentenced to nine years in jail by the New South Wales Supreme Court, it seems entirely appropriate that the church deposed him from his orders. There is no serious argument to suggest that the sanction was misapplied in Ellmore's case, or in others of a similar nature.[7]

Press reports in March 2015 claimed that Bishop Slater's deposition was the result of a recommendation by the Royal Commission, which had recommended that he face disciplinary action for ignoring complaints from sexual abuse victims. The report was misleading. There is, writes Porter, 'no evidence of such a recommendation in either the Commission's findings from its

[7] Another former Bishop of Grafton, Donald Shearman had been deposed from his Orders in 2004 for his abuse of a fifteen-year-old girl in his care at a country hostel in the 1950s; he was a married priest at the time. See Porter, 27.

intense examination of the Grafton Diocese, or the associated press release' [27]. This, however, did not mean that Slater was blameless. In fact, he was very far from being blameless.

Evidence presented to the Royal Commission regarding the North Coast Children's Home showed that frequent and systematic abuse had been carried out against children in the care of the Home from 1940 until 1985. The sexual abuse perpetrators were clergy, staff and other residents. From 2005 complaints about the Home began to be made to the Diocese and in 2006 a group of forty former residents launched a complaint against the Diocese. ‚Being a relatively small rural and under-resourced Diocese it is plausible to think that they may have been frightened by the size of any possible compensation. They therefore adopted what the Royal Commission described as a 'defensive legal position' in which they sought to disavow any responsibility for what went on in the Children's Home. However, the Commission found that the Home was at 'all relevant times … strongly associated with the Anglican Church and its predecessor, the Church of England' [28].

At the time when the complainants brought their grievances to the Diocese of Grafton, the diocese was in financial straits due to the founding of one of its schools. The Commission heard that a debt incurred by the school in the 1990s had blown out to $12 Million by 2007. The diocese was trying to work its way out of this financial morass and had by 2010 reduced the debt from $12 Million to $10 Million. However, this was at the cost of and to the detriment of sexual abuse victims. The diocese had prioritized the paying down of the school debt over the victims claims to compensation. There was a choice to be made and in the view of the Royal Commission the Diocese of Grafton had made the wrong choice.

The Commission's findings were damning. They record that the diocese failed to follow its own policies, adopted in 2004 and 2005 (Finding 5); that it conducted some negotiations with survivors in a 'hostile manner,' contrary to the spirit of its own protocols (Finding 7); that it offered complainants amounts that were 'substantially lower' than if the claims had been resolved under its policies (Finding 8); and that it had also misled some of the complainants that the diocese's policies would be followed (Finding 8).[8]

There is absolutely no doubt that the abuse claims were not handled well by either the diocese or its bishop. The Commission took the view that the entire leadership of the Diocese was at fault, including its Diocesan Council. The Registrar (effectively the Diocesan Business Manager) and the Diocesan Lawyer were both blamed by the Commission for the diocese having adopted its defensive position.

Certainly, as the bishop could be said to be ultimately responsible for the diocese, it is hard to argue that he should not have resigned because of the diocese's failure. He did so in May 2013,

[8] See Porter, 31. The findings of the Commission may be accessed at http://www.childabusroyalcommission.gov.au.

acknowledging his responsibility for ensuring full compliance with the diocese's abuse protocol, and that he 'had failed in his duty.' [29].

His failure was particularly egregious because Slater had also failed to respond to repeated advice from the then Primate of the National Church, Dr Philip Aspinall.

The Commission noted that between 2006 and 2012, the Primate advised Bishop Keith Slater that 'the group claimants should have their complaints properly heard and be offered counseling and pastoral support; he should seek out further people who had been abused at the North Coast Children's Home' and 'he should inform the police of all criminal allegations which came to his attention arising out of the North Coast Children's Home.' The Bishop did not follow the Primate's advice. [33].

Instead, it was the Primate who reported some of the abuse to police. Thus it can be argued that the Diocesan Bishop abrogated his responsibilities. The Primate then said to Bishop Slater that the latter's position was 'untenable.' Shortly after this Slater resigned. But herein lies another peculiarity of Anglican polity. The Primate lacked power and authority to compel Slater to act. The most he could do was to give advice and apply moral suasion; neither or which proved to be sufficient. Two years after he had resigned, Slater was defrocked on the order of the Professional Standards Board in the Diocese of Grafton.

The findings of the Royal Commission into the Diocese of Grafton were that there had been a systemic failure of the entire leadership. This included the bishop, but also the Diocesan Council and everyone else in the leadership team. Anglican theologian Scott Cowdell had noted that sexual abuse in the church and measures adopted to deal with it were both an example of 'systemic dysfunction in ecclesial faith and life.' He went on to point out how 'new attitudes and structures to deal with the problem of abuse and its concealment … are laudable as far as they go … [but are] insufficiently systemic. They identify and address the symptom, which is abuse, without inquiring after a deeper malaise in the church that becomes manifest in abusive relationships.'[9] Cowdell was taking aim at the long established tradition of scapegoating; a practice that would become disturbingly common as the Anglican Church sought to protect its reputation.

As I noted, the Commission leveled blame at the entire leadership team of the Diocese of Grafton, but as Muriel Porter has observed

> "A diocesan council cannot be deposed, and nor would it be if it were possible. In practical terms, it would be unthinkable as it would throw the diocese into chaos. And punishing an amorphous leadership team would not satisfy the anger – righteous or otherwise – of those who believe their claims of abuse were not treated satisfactorily; they

[9] Scott Cowdell, 'An Abusive Church Culture? Clergy Sexual Abuse and Systemic Dysfunction in Ecclesial Faith and Life,' *St. Mark's Review*, 205, Aug 2008, 31–49.

> require retribution on a named individual. He was the fall-guy for the whole system, and did nothing to help the 'system' learn the deeper lessons of its collective failure. … So deposition of the bishop as the figurehead for the sins of a much wider group in a case such as this functions as a means of placating survivor anger, and hopefully restoring reputation [36]."

Slater's story has a sequel. Despite the press claiming that 'under church law there is no avenue of appeal' against deposition, Slater did indeed appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, the Anglican Church's highest court. The Tribunal handed down its unanimous verdict in 2017. Curiously the Tribunal noted that it did not have jurisdiction; nevertheless it examined the matter with great attention, arriving at the finding that Slater's deposition 'was null and void on various grounds.'[10] Citing what it called 'jurisdictional deficits' in the processes of the Diocese taken against Slater, the Tribunal also noted 'that there had never been any suggestion of sexual misconduct on Slater's part,' nor was there any explanation as to why his manifest shortcomings as Bishop of Grafton served to render him unfit for, *any* clerical office in the Church.' [35].

Since the Tribunal declared itself to have no formal jurisdiction, it noted that its decision could not be final. Instead, a final decision would need to be made by Slater's successor, Bishop Sarah MacNeill. She had already indicated that she would abide by the Tribunal's decision, and it was, they judged, a matter for her as to whether 'she respects the Tribunal's view and whether, in addition, she formally revokes that instrument (i. e., deposition) or takes any other actions to remedy the steps taken and announced against him in 2015.[11]

The members of the Tribunal also urged that any reference to Slater's deposition be removed from the National Church Register. In the face of considerable anger from some of the victims and in a spirit of resigned despair over yet another failure in church processes, Bishop MacNeill reluctantly agreed with the findings of the Appellate Tribunal and Mr Slater became once more, Bishop Slater. On the 3 November, 2017 Sarah MacNeill announced her resignation as Bishop of Grafton and from active ministry, citing personal reasons and health concerns. Overcoming evil with good is, it seems, more difficult than it may first appear.[12]

Since the scapegoating of Bishop Slater there have been further recent developments. Some, though not all, bishops that were criticized for their mishandling of sexual abuse within their dioceses have, after their retirement, found themselves the object of projected action to depose

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[10] Those interested in reading the detailed judgement may care to consult the following on the Web. 'Appellate Tribunal of the Anglican Church of Australia, Appeal of Keith Francis Slater, 19 January 2017'.

[11] Appellate Tribunal decision, 47.

[12] I understand unofficially that there may be another attempt to depose Keith Slater and have him 'defrocked.' Apparently the Board of Professional Standards in the Diocese of Grafton has firmed up its processes in response to the earlier judgement of the Appellate Tribunal.

them of their Orders. Earlier this year an article published in the *Newcastle Herald* claimed that Col Elliot, Chair of the Newcastle Diocese Professional Standards Board, recommended that Richard Appleby, the former Assistant Bishop from 1983-1992 'be defrocked for failing to act on allegations of sexual abuse.' The meeting was convened in November 2018 and the Board handed down its recommendation in February 2019. Appleby was indeed criticized by the Royal Commission and seems to have tried at times to mislead it, which was surely a misstep. Appleby's boss, Alfred Holland, also attracted criticism from the Commission, for he was the Bishop of the Diocese and also failed to act, but Holland died in October 2018, thus passing beyond the reach of the Professional Standards Board. Similarly, in the Diocese of Tasmania, the present Bishop, Richard Condie is pursuing former Bishop Philip Newell, not just for failing to act but also for allowing a suspected pedophile priest (and later convicted) to remain in the church provided he 'amend his life'.[13] The article simply refers to disciplinary action against Newell, without noting the actual nature of the action, although reference to a 'removal of orders' in an earlier article from the ABC seems to suggest that Deposition is the sanction the church has in view. However in this case there is an interesting twist because the former Bishop took out an application—subsequently upheld by the Tasmanian Supreme Court—to prevent the church from proceeding with its investigations. The court seems to have made its decision based upon Newell's age and general health. Finally, an article published in *The Herald* in February 2019 proclaimed that Bishop Roger Herft, recently Archbishop of Perth and sometime Bishop of Newcastle had failed to act on allegations made by victims of sexual abuse; had been criticized for his inaction by the Royal Commission; and was now the subject of a church investigation by the Episcopal Standards Board to ascertain what likely further action might be taken. At the time of the writing the issue remains with the Episcopal Standards Board and nothing will be made public until a decision has been reached. However, I think sufficient examples serve to make the point, which is that those bishops who either themselves failed to act or presided over processes which, for a range of reasons were not activated, now find themselves standing-in, as it were, for the diocesan apparatus and personnel who, according to the Royal Commission bear responsibility for the mismanagement of sexual abuse allegations.

Analysis

Examples such as the ones given above provide ample evidence that the church has not been well served by some of its leaders. In an incisive analysis of power and the church, Steven

[13] Story was run by the ABC and published in June 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-04/former-bishop-philip-newell …/11178160.

Ogden refers to the 'epistemic hubris [as] a manifestation of the subject formation of church leaders, which is symptomatic of, and contributes to, sovereign power. … under sovereign power, the bishop sees himself as the sovereign exception, regardless of circumstances or a lack of consent.'[14] Whether bishops really have this power may perhaps be doubted, but that some of them have acted as if they did – this cannot be doubted. It is perhaps unsurprising that having marshaled to themselves such sovereignty they are not in a strong position to defend themselves against the ultimate sanction being applied against them when they are held responsible for the mismanagement of sex abuse allegations from those in their care. Nevertheless Cowdell has put his finger on an important point when he notes how he is concerned that

> "the increasingly widespread acknowledgement of systemic factors in producing abusive church environments is not reflected in our current modes of response. Specifically, it is disingenuous at best and sinister at worst for the church to limit its response to addressing individual behavior, as the Codes of Good Practice and their attendant complaints procedures do. Seeking only to identify and discipline individual abusers, as if that alone will address the problem comprehensively, is to misrepresent and trivialize a more complex reality, and to risk creating scapegoats. Of course, scapegoats often draw attention to themselves precisely because of disordered behavior, and may well need to be disciplined, but neither truth nor justice is served by loading all our sins and burdens onto them, thereby denying a wider problem in ecclesial faith and life."[15]

Cowdell's point is well taken when it comes to the issue of Bishop Slater. He has, it would seem, been made to serve as a scapegoat for a grossly mismanaged response. Of course he was culpable for the part he played in it, but to apply to him the same sanction of Deposition of Order that had been reserved for those who had actually abused children, must, I think, give us pause for thought. In fact there exist a range of sanctions, including reprimand and restriction or removal of license; it is significant that the church appears to wish to punish those who mismanaged the crisis with no less ferocity than those who perpetrated it.

In this discussion it must not be forgotten that child sexual abuse is not only a crime; it is also a sin. Of course to say something is a crime seems to make it so much more serious than simply claiming it to be a sin, but in part this is because we are no longer sure what we should mean by

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[14] Steven G. Odgden, *The Church, Authority, and Foucault: Imagining the Church as an Open Space of Freedom*, Routledge: London & New York, 2017, 53.

[15] Cowdell, 'An Abusive Church Culture?', 32.

sin. No other theme in Christian anthropology has been so obscured for us than that of sin and our approach to it. In an incisive essay Wolfhart Pannenberg has argued that 'the decay of the doctrine of original sin led to the anchoring of the concept of sin in acts of sin, and finally the concept was reduced to the individual act.' This, he argues, has led to a moralizing of sin, which is evident in our propensity to scapegoat others.

The universality of sin forbids the moralism that will not accept solidarity with those who become the instruments of the destructive power of evil. Sin's universality shows such a moralistic attitude to be hypocrisy. The Christian doctrine of the universality of sin has the specific function of helping to preserve solidarity with evildoers in whose conduct the sin that is latently at work in all of use finds expression. This anti-moralistic function of the doctrine has often been underrated.[16]

There is one feature in this whole sorry saga that has remained constant, that is the reputation of the Church. When, in the early days, victims came to the church and told their stories of pain and abuse, they were usually ignored. The reputation of the church was paramount. It would not, it *could not* have done these things. After some years, the church saw that victims were indeed being truthful. Once again though the reputation of the church was paramount and compensation was given to victims—and let us acknowledge that it was more than deserved! Then came the protocols, not only to prevent abuse but also to preserve the institution from the threat of litigation. The one constant feature is the reputation of the church, which was to be preserved at all costs. And what were the costs? Initially it was at the cost of the victims of sexual abuse. Latterly it has come at the cost of demeaning and persecuting some of its clergy.[17]

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[16] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*. Vol.2, William Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1994, 234–35.

[17] It might seem that this conclusion does not fit well with the observations I have made throughout the paper. For example, I have not suggested that the bishops now hauled before church tribunals are innocent of all offence: quite the contrary. However, the other part of Porter's book concerns the wider remit of church protocols that reach far beyond child sexual abuse and which are proving to be increasingly problematic. Once again I cite the opinion of Scott Cowdell: 'I suggest that these new institutional arrangements on the church's part, with codes, tribunals and a new pitch of clergy discipline, covering much wider issues than sexual abuse, are themselves potentially if not actually abusive. Under cover of a genuine crisis of sexual abuse, detailed codes of behavior governing every aspect of ministry are now applied in many dioceses, with clergy being brought before investigators …' Porter cites Winston Churchill's well-known comment that 'one should never let a crisis go to waste.' Make no mistake, the sexual abuse of children within the churches was and remains a crisis. But one cannot help but be left with an uneasy feeling that elements within that same church have used the crisis to create an environment where overcoming evil with good has created some evils of its own.

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Overcome Evil with Good – Fallstudie Kornelius

Miriam Schade

> „Es gibt zwei Irrtümer über die Teufel, in die das Menschengeschlecht leicht verfällt. Sie widersprechen sich und haben doch dieselbe Auswirkung. Der eine ist, ihre Existenz überhaupt zu leugnen. Der andere besteht darin, an sie zu glauben und sich in übermäßiger und ungesunder Weise mit ihnen zu beschäftigen."
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> C. S. Lewis[1]

Nicht zufällig habe ich das Zitat von C. S. Lewis an den Anfang dieser Fallstudie gestellt. Sich mit dem Bösen überhaupt und dann auch noch aus theologischer Perspektive zu beschäftigen, scheint gegenwärtig mindestens ungewöhnlich. Die theologische Entwicklung lässt seit der Aufklärung, spätestens aber mit Rudolf Bultmanns Forderung nach einer Entmythologisierung, eine Rede vom Teufel / Diabolos / Satan in der protestantischen Tradition schwerlich zu. Selbst ein nicht personifiziertes Böses, umschrieben etwa als negative Energie oder negative Atmosphäre[2] passt, nach Auskunft einer Studentin in einem meiner Seminare, nicht in und zu dem (ganz persönlich: ihrem) gegenwärtigen Gottesbild.

Dass Böses geschieht, darüber wird hingegen nicht geschwiegen – lautstark brüllt es nicht nur von den Seiten der Bild-Zeitung: Kriege, Unrecht und Ungerechtigkeit, Katastrophen und menschliches Elend. Böses hat viele Gesichter. Und davon sprechen auch die Landeskirchen, manchmal medienwirksam in Szene gesetzt, wie etwa Margot Käßmanns Ausruf: „Nichts ist gut

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1 Lewis 1992, 7.

2 So etwa bei Josuttis 2000, z. B. 41. Josuttis bezieht sich dabei auf die Überlegungen des Philopsophen Hermann Schmitz.

in Afghanistan!".[3] Aber über einen Umgang mit dem Bösen, ja gar von einem Kampf gegen das Böse, wird aus theologischer und landeskirchlicher Perspektive wiederum häufig geschwiegen.

Dass die Beschäftigung mit dem Bösen und insbesondere der Kampf gegen das Böse / die Bösen jedoch momentan sehr aktuell ist, zeigt Hollywood. In den vergangenen acht Jahren brachte allein der Marvel-Konzern ca. 30! Kino-Blockbuster heraus, die im Wesentlichen ein Thema kennen: Helden und Antihelden kämpfen gegen das Böse (in seinen sich stets wandelnden Gestalten).[4] Dem ist zu entnehmen, dass der Kampf gegen das Böse und auch das Böse an sich, eine gewisse Faszination ausüben, der sich selbst kirchenferne Menschen voller Begeisterung aussetzen.

Diese kurze und zugegeben stark skizzierte Gegenwartsbetrachtung offenbart zweierlei, zum einen die theologische Schwierigkeit, über ein Böses / das Böse, den Kampf mit diesem und gegen dieses gegenwärtig angemessen zu sprechen, und zum anderen die durch weltweite Entwicklungen hervorgerufene, zunehmende Notwendigkeit in dieser Hinsicht sprachfähig sein zu müssen, zu sollen und zu können. Die Möglichkeit, dies zu erproben, bot sich auf der Tagung „Overcome evil with good", die, ein Pauluswort aufnehmend, in unterschiedlichen Fallstudien nach dem bzw. den Bösen fragte, zu erörtern versuchte, wie das Böse in dem konkret vorliegenden Fall überwunden werden könne und damit auch den Gedanken eines Kampfes gegen das Böse zuließ.

Mein Beitrag zu dieser Tagung bestand aus einer Fallstudie aus dem Umfeld meiner Forschungsarbeit mit traumatisierten Kindern und wurde ausgewählt, da sich in der nachfolgend wiedergegeben Geschichte die bereits angesprochenen theologischen Schwierig-keiten offenbaren, zu denen die anwesenden Vertreter der verschiedenen Konfessionen (protestantisch, anglikanisch, pfingstkirchlich, katholisch u. a.) und Ausbildungsgrade (Studenten, Professoren, Pastoren und Vikare, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter und Offiziere der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr) nun herausgefordert waren, Stellung zu beziehen, um eine Lösung anbieten zu können.

Die Fallstudie „Kornelius"

Kornelius ist 10 Jahr alt als ich ihn auf einer Freizeit für Pflegekinder und Pflegeeltern kennen lerne. Weil er besonders schwer traumatisiert ist, konnte er nicht in einer normalen Pflegefamilie aufgenommen werden, sondern brauchte eine Pflegestelle, das bedeutet, seine jetzige Pflegemutter

[3] Vgl. Käsmann 2010.

[4] Vgl. http://de.marvel-filme.wikia.com/wiki/Marvel_-_Filmliste, eingesehen am 01.12.2018. Ebenfalls aufzuführen wären hier diverse Star Wars-Fortsetzungen, die bereits für Kinder aufbereitet werden.

ist sozialpädagogisch ausgebildet. Da es für die Kinder ein besonderes Kinderprogramm geben soll, weist seine Mutter uns Mitarbeiter auf Besonderheiten im Umgang mit Kornelius hin. Sie berichtet, dass Kornelius' Eltern einer Gruppe Satanisten angehörten, die den Jungen gemeinschaftlich sexuell missbraucht und gefoltert hatten. In der Folge zeige sich nun ein starkes dissoziatives Verhalten (Gefühlstaubheit und Erstarren), wenn er mit Triggern in Berührung komme. (Trigger sind körperliche, visuelle oder akustische Reize, die das traumatische Geschehen für den Moment in all seinen Facetten wieder gegenwärtig machen).

Da die Freizeit während des Osterwochenendes stattfand, wurde in der Kindergruppe auch die Kreuzigungs- und Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu behandelt. Anhand von Stationen und mit den Bildern einer Kinderbibel wurde den Kindern das Geschehen verdeutlicht. Plötzlich schreckte Kornelius auf: Er hatte auf einem Bild der Kinderbibel einen Soldaten mit einer langen, schwarzen Peitsche entdeckt. Innerhalb von Sekunden wurde er plötzlich ganz aufgeregt, starrte wie elektrisiert auf das Bild und wurde immer nervöser und unruhiger. Als die Leiterin der Kinderstunde den Kindern die Aufgabe gab, das Kreuzigungsgeschehen auf eine Tapetenrolle aufzumalen, gab es für ihn kein Halten mehr. Er stürmte wie wild auf den Maltisch zu, versuchte sich mit aller Gewalt einen Platz unter den anderen Kindern zu verschaffen und geriet außer sich.

Die Gruppenphase und anschließende Plenumsdiskussion

Nach der Vorstellung des Fallbeispiels wurden die Tagungsteilnehmer in Kleingruppen entsandt, die jeweils aus Vertretern aus England (Leads), Teilnehmern aus Jena, Offizieren und anderen Gästen bestand. Ihre Aufgabe war es, die Frage zu beantworten, wie das Böse, das Kornelius erlebt hatte, und welches anscheinend „getriggert" worden war, in eben dieser Situation überwunden werden könne.

Drei Gruppendiskussionen sollen hier schwerpunktmäßig wiedergegeben werden:

Gruppe I[5] beschäftigte sich inhaltlich mit vier Kernthemen. Sie fragten sich zuerst, was Erwachsene generell tun könnten, wenn ein traumatisiertes Kind getriggert würde und kamen zu dem Schluss, dass zunächst einmal anerkannt werden müsse, was geschehen sei, denn das Trauma lasse sich nicht rückgängig machen. Des Weiteren könnten Rituale gefunden werden, die dem Kind Raum gäben, über das Erfahrene zu sprechen. Schließlich müsse die Verantwortlichkeit geklärt werden: Fühle sich das Kind für die traumatische Erfahrung, in diesem Fall den Miss-

[5] Die nachfolgenden Aussagen entstammen dem Protokoll der Gruppe, welches geführt wurde von Stud. Theol. Florian Klein.

brauch, verantwortlich, müsse geklärt werden, warum es dies so empfinde, um ihm dann vermitteln zu können, dass der Täter schuld sei und nicht das Kind.

Als zweiten Schwerpunkt diskutierten sie, wie man dem Kind zeigen bzw. erklären könne, wie das Böse zu überwinden sei. Um mit dem Kind darüber ins Gespräch kommen zu können, entschieden sie sich dagegen, „dem Bösen" einen ontologischen Rang zu geben, da sie befürchteten, das Kind könne dann annehmen, das Böse sei durch den Missbrauch auch ein Teil von ihm selbst geworden. Stattdessen entschieden sie sich dafür, eine Kategorisierung einzuführen (good-evil-bad), die das erfahrene Übel klassifizieren helfe, um ein metaphysisches Böses auszuschließen, und schlicht bei der Tat an sich zu bleiben. Diese solle rational betrachtet werden und müsse nicht zwingend einer Begründung bedürfen. Unrecht und Böses passiere halt im Leben und gehöre dazu.[6] Bevor es jedoch zur Wiederherstellung von Vertrauen kommen könne, müsse der böse Einfluss beseitigt werden, was zu der Frage führe, wie tief die Wunde sei, die durch den Missbrauch entstanden sei.

Der dritte Diskussionsschwerpunkt widmete sich der Möglichkeit von Versöhnung und Vergebung. Dies sei abhängig von der persönlichen Definition des Bösen, denn es könne ja auch angenommen werden, dass die Eltern selbst vom Bösen besessen gewesen seien, weshalb ihnen nur eine eingeschränkte Schuld zugesprochen werden könne. Dies würde freilich den Akt der Vergebung erleichtern, da sie dann auch für ihre Taten nur eingeschränkt verantwortlich seien. Gleichzeitig waren sich die Gruppenteilnehmer darin einig, dass eine christliche Rede von Vergebung, wolle sie Gutes bewirken, frei sein müsse von einem Anspruch des Vergeben-Müssens, bei dem das Opfer keine Wahlmöglichkeit habe. Stattdessen bedeute Vergebung für den Jungen, Frieden mit sich selbst zu schließen und nicht hauptsächlich mit den Eltern. Gleichzeitig sei jedoch zu bedenken, dass der Täter keinerlei Macht mehr über das Opfer habe, wenn dieses ihm vergebe.

Schließlich wandte sich die Gruppe der Betreuerin zu und fragte, was diese in der vorliegenden Situation tun könne. Nach Auffassung der Teilnehmer dürfe sie keine Vergebung oder Versöhnung erzwingen. Genauso wenig dürfe sie ihn dazu drängen, über das Erlebte zu sprechen, stattdessen solle sie ihm Freiraum geben, bis er selbst in der Lage sei, über das zu reden, was passiert war oder sich anderweitig mitteilen wolle. Gleichzeitig ergäbe sich das Problem der Balance. Nähme man das Kind in der akuten Situation aus der Gruppe heraus, könne dies dazu führen, dass sich Kornelius als „anders" wahrnehme. Lasse man das Kind in der Gruppe, könne

[6] Diese Haltung ist zwar generell nicht falsch, dennoch drängt sich die Frage nach dem „Warum?" und noch mehr nach dem „Warum ich?" bei traumatisierenden Erfahrungen fast automatisch auf und kann nicht ignoriert werden. Gleichzeitig ist davor zu warnen, sie leichtfertig zu beantworten. Eine befriedigende und für den Betroffenen lösende Antwort, kann nur dieser selbst (unter Hilfe) für sich finden.

der Freiraum vielleicht nicht gegeben werden, der jedoch notwendig sei, damit Kornelius sich äußern könne.

Die Diskussion in *Gruppe II*[7] drehte sich hauptsächlich um die akute Notsituation der Betreuerin und um die Frage, was zu tun sei. Der Überlegung, dass das Böse ausfahren müsse, entsprach der Vorschlag eines Exorzismus. Gleichzeitig rückte auch in dieser Gruppe das Problem in den Mittelpunkt, ob und inwieweit die anderen Kinder zu schützen seien. Hierfür wurde erwogen, Kornelius nach mehr Informationen über seine Situation befragen zu können, wofür dieser jedoch überhaupt erstmal (emotional) erreicht werden müsse. Dies könne über einen liebevollen Umgang und die Vermittlung von Liebe geschehen.[8] Ebenso wurde erörtert, ob es eine Möglichkeit gebe, mit dem Jungen über den sexuellen Missbrauch durch die eigenen Eltern zu reden. Dies führte zurück zu der Frage nach dem Bösen und der Überlegung, ob eine satanische Macht unterstützt würde, wenn man sie ernst nehme. Ebenso stellte sich dann jedoch die Gegenfrage, nämlich ob man die satanische Macht verharmlose, wenn man sie ignoriere. Schließlich musste offenbleiben, ob es in der akuten Situation überhaupt sinnvoll wäre, mit Kornelius über den sexuellen Missbrauch und den Satanskult zu sprechen, wenngleich man sich darin einig zu sein schien, dass eine Form von Reinigung angebracht sei, um einen emotionalen Heilungsprozess zu ermöglichen.

Gruppe III[9] diskutierte zunächst die Frage, ob Kornelius Böses erlebt habe. Dies wurde einstimmig mit Ja beantwortet. Darauf folgte eine kurze Erörterung von Kenntnissen zur Traumaforschung und den Folgen von Traumatisierungen für die Betroffenen, bevor man sich der Überlegung zuwandte, was in der konkreten Situation getan werden könne. Wäre es möglich, Kornelius aus der Situation herauszunehmen, war eine Option. Doch wie könnte dies geschehen? Die Gruppe diskutierte, ob eine Verbalisierung dessen, was gerade geschehen war, und was der Auslöser für den Trigger sein könnte, nämlich das Erzählen und die bildliche Darstellung der grausamen Situation der Kreuzigung in der Kinderbibel, dem Jungen bereits helfen könnte. Besonderes Augenmerk wurde dann auf die Peitsche gelegt, da diese der Auslöser für Kornelius' Verhalten zu sein schien. Es wurde überlegt, ob das Bild der Peitsche bei dem Jungen eine körperliche Erinnerung (bodyrememberance) an seine Misshandlungen ausgelöst hatte. Vor diesem Hintergrund sei schwer abzuschätzen, ob Kornelius nicht selbst ebenfalls gewalttätig werden könnte. Was aber bedeute denn dann ein „Überwinden des Bösen?", so wurde in der Gruppe weitergefragt. Die Gruppe definierte dies wie folgt: The maximum understandig of overcoming: like it never happened – the minimum understanding of overcoming: avoid, go through. In der

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7 Das hier zugrunde liegende Protokoll führte Stud. Theol. Lorenz Opitz

8 Allerdings wurde hier nicht besprochen, wie dies konkret aussehen könne.

9 Das Protokoll der dritten Gruppe führte Stud. theol. Christiane Gebauer.

akuten Situation sei ein Mittelweg möglich: Überwinden in Form eines nicht von den Triggern und den damit zurückgebrachten Erinnerungen *Überwunden-Werdens*, also ein Standhalten!

In der sich an die Gruppenarbeit anschließende Plenumsdiskussion stellten die einzelnen Gruppen ihre Überlegungen und Diskussionsschwerpunkte vor. In dieser Zeit wurde die Spannung zwischen der notwendigen Hilfe in der Akutsituation und der generellen Frage, wie der Junge das Böse, das ihm in der Vergangenheit geschehen war, überwinden könne, deutlich. Es reiche nicht aus, nur die gegenwärtige Situation zu betrachten, wenngleich man abschätzen müsse, ob man Kornelius nicht die Freiheit geben solle, zu tun, was auch immer er tun wolle, weil er vielleicht eine eigene Strategie habe, sich zu helfen. Hierfür bedürfe es jedoch eines sicheren Rahmens (safe space), damit sowohl er als auch die übrigen Kinder sich sicher fühlten, so argumentierten die Diskussionsteilnehmer. Doch, so wurde immer wieder zurückgefragt, wie könne das Böse der Vergangenheit überwunden werden, zumal das vergangene Böse für Kornelius gegenwärtig sei und es sich verschlimmern könnte, je mehr Zeit vergehe. Ist ein dagegen Ankämpfen auch eine Form des Überwindens des Bösen?

Die Auflösung der Fallstudie

Nach der Plenumsphase wurde das Ende der Fallstudie vorgestellt und das Verhalten der Seelsorgerin erklärt:

Die Seelsorgerin fing Kornelius am Tisch auf und fragte ihn, was er tun wolle. Kornelius sagte ihr aufgeregt, er müssen den Soldaten unter das Kreuz malen. Kein anderer dürfe den Platz unter dem Kreuz in Besitz nehmen. Da müsse er den Soldaten mit der Peitsche hinmalen. Die Seelsorgerin versprach ihm, dass sie darauf achten würde, dass niemand den Platz unter dem Kreuz bemalte; er sei für ihn reserviert, aber er müsse warten, bis ein Platz frei sei. Mit großer innerer Anspannung ließ er sich widerwillig darauf ein. Als ein Platz am Maltisch frei wurde, holte ihn die Seelsorgerin herbei und ließ ihn den Soldaten mit der Peitsche unter das Kreuz malen. Als das geschehen war, kehrte eine völlige innere Ruhe bei ihm ein. Kornelius ging zu seinem Spiel zurück, war völlig ausgeglichen und entspannt. Etwas hatte sich in ihm gelöst.

Deutung:

Der Soldat mit der Peitsche hatte, so erklärte seine Pflegemutter später, eine Erinnerung an seine Foltererfahrung in ihm ausgelöst. Da Kornelius aber ein sehr spirituelles und tief gläubiges Kind sei, suchte er einen Ort für dieses Erlebnis, von dem ihm keinerlei Gefahr her drohte: das war für ihn das Kreuz. Als der Soldat dort aufgemalt war, konnte er sich entspannen, weil sein Erleben,

das er mit dem Soldaten verband, an einem Ort abgelegt war, der für ihn Sicherheit darstellte: Das Kreuz Jesu.

Analyse der Diskussionen und des Fallbeispiels

Die Diskussion in den einzelnen Gruppen und im Plenum einerseits und die Auflösung der Fallgeschichte andererseits offenbaren verschiedene Herausforderungen, Schwierigkeiten und Rückfragen, die in diesem Abschnitt erörtert und reflektiert werden sollen.

1. Sprachschwierigkeiten hinsichtlich des Geschehens

In allen Gruppen trat das Problem zu Tage, die Ereignisse des Fallbeispiels in ihrer ganzen Tiefe ergreifen und ausdrücken zu wollen und zu müssen und dies aufgrund sprachlicher und theologischer Deutungsvielfalt nicht zu können. In dem Fallbeispiel wird Böses in vielen Facetten sichtbar. Da ist das Leid, das Kornelius angetan wird und das sich als böse deklarieren lässt, weil es grausam und unmenschlich ist und den Jungen seelisch, physisch, psychisch und geistlich verletzt. Seine Würde und die Grenzen seiner Physis und seines Wollens werden missachtet und gewaltsam übertreten. Dies führt bei dem Jungen zu einer schweren Traumatisierung.

Die Handlungen werden von Menschen verübt und zwar explizit von den eigenen Eltern. Damit ergibt sich die Frage: Sind nur die Handlungen böse, oder sind es die Täter auch? Ist ein Mensch böse oder sind es nur seine Handlungen? Und letztlich findet all das im Rahmen eines Satanskultes statt, was wiederum die Frage eröffnet, ob das Böse Macht hat, Menschen zu korrumpieren und zu bösem Handeln zu verleiten.

Ein Blick in die systematisch-theologische Literatur zeigt ein Ringen um ein zeitgemäßes Verständnis dieser Fragestellungen. Ich werde mich im Folgenden unter Bezug auf ausgewählte Dogmatiken an Antworten versuchen.

Wie ist das Böse zu denken oder: Vorstellungen vom Bösen

Härle reflektiert in seiner Dogmatik:[10] „Fest steht jedenfalls, daß es aus christlicher Sicht weder so etwas wie einen Glauben *an* Teufel und Dämonen im Sinne religiöser Verehrung oder

[10] Vgl. Härle 2007, 489.

daseinsbestimmenden Vertrauens geben kann, noch eine Gleichrangigkeit von Gott und Teufel im Sinne eines Dualismus."[11] Mit Härle ist ein Dualismus demnach abzulehnen. Es ist auszuschließen, dass es neben Gott eine weitere ungeschaffene, ewige und Gott gleichrangige aber ihrem Wesen nach entgegengesetzte Macht gibt.[12] Das Böse ist also nicht das Gegenstück zu Gott, oder, um es mit C.S. Lewis zu sagen: „There is no uncreated being except God. God has no opposite. No being could attain a 'perfect badness' opposite to the perfect goodness of God; […]."[13]

Eine weitere Möglichkeit, nämlich, das Böse in Gott hinein zu verlegen (Monismus) und Gott als die Einheit von Gut und Böse zu verstehen, ist mit Kasper abzulehnen.[14] Kasper argumentiert entsprechend gegen den Monismus, Gott sei der Heilige, dem alles Böse fremd sei.[15] Somit ist weiterhin festzuhalten, dass das Böse weder in Gott liegt noch ein duales Gegenüber darstellt. Es ist demnach etwas außerhalb Gottes.

Joest wiederum erörtert, dass dem Bösen ein unbedingter Zerstörungswille zugehörig sei, der in seiner Radikalität keine Persönlichkeit, wie sie beispielsweise dem Menschen durch den Willen zur Liebe und zur Gemeinschaft gegeben sei, erlaube.

> „Aber im Willen der Zerstörung und des Todes begegnet kein Du, mit dem Gemeinschaft sein könnte, sondern nur die nackte Negation aller Liebe und Gemeinschaft, die dahin tendiert, uns in den Tod der Versteinerung im Alleinsein mit uns selbst zu stoßen. Dieser Wille bleibt für uns ein schreckliches ‚Es', ohne jede sinnvolle Beziehung zu uns selbst."[16]

Ähnliches äußerte Ratzinger:

> „Wenn man fragt, ob der Teufel Person sei, so müsste man richtigerweise wohl antworten, er sei die Un-Person, die Zersetzung, der Zerfall des Personseins, und darum ist es ihm eigentümlich, dass er ohne Gesicht auftritt, dass die Unkenntlichkeit seine eigentliche Stärke ist."[17]

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11 Härle 2007, 490.

12 Vgl. Härle 2007, 490; vgl. Joest 1996, 422.

13 Lewis 1961.

14 Vgl. Kasper 1979, 72–74, zitiert nach Sattler 2012, 360.

15 Vgl. ebd.; Vgl. z. B. Lev 19,2.

16 Joest 1996, 424f.

17 Ratzinger 1973, 363.

Was bedeutet das? Lk 18,19 spricht davon, dass Gott der vollkommen Gute ist und in 1Joh 1,5 heißt es: „Gott ist Licht und in ihm ist keine Finsternis." Der Argumentation der genannten Theologen folgend, bedeutet dies, dass die Abwesenheit Gottes, die Abwesenheit des vollkommen Guten, die Abwesenheit Gottes als Licht, als Böses gedacht und verstanden werden kann. Das Böse ist damit nicht als eigenständige Existenz zu begreifen, sondern als Abwesenheit des Göttlichen und als Negation des Lebens an sich.

Die Rede von dem Bösen

In der Bibel begegnet einem vielfältige Rede von dem Bösen. In Eph 6,12 heißt es: „Denn unser Kampf richtet sich nicht gegen ‚Wesen von' Fleisch und Blut, sondern gegen die Mächte und Gewalten der Finsternis, die über die Erde herrschen, gegen das Heer der Geister in der unsichtbaren Welt, die hinter allem Bösen stehen."[18] Hier werden die Termini Mächte, Gewalten und Geister verwendet. In den Evangelien begegnen einem wiederum die Begriffe Teufel (z. B. Mt 4,5), Satan (z. B. Lk 10,18) und Dämonen (z. B. Lk 4,33). In welcher Weise kann deshalb von dem Bösen gesprochen werden?

Joest resümiert in seinem Exkurs „Zur Lehre vom Teufel"[19] unter Verweis auf konkrete bildliche Vorstellungen, die auch Gräueltaten (wie die Hexenverbrennungen) zur Folge gehabt haben, dass das biblische Reden von Teufel, Satan, Dämonen und bösen Mächten nicht wörtlich zu nehmen sei, sondern das Übermaß menschlicher Sünde darstelle, die in ihren Wirkungen übermächtig würden.[20] Seine Rede vom Bösen ist damit zunächst eine metaphorische und anthropologische.

Josuttis behält phänomenologisch betrachtet die Rede vom Teufel und den Dämonen unter Verweis auf Christoph Blumhardts Erfahrungen mit der Gottliebin Dittus bei[21] und versteht unter diesen Bezeichnungen negative Mächte, die auf den Menschen einwirken und denen man in der Wirkkraft Gottes entgegentreten müsse.[22]

Härle verweist darauf, dass im Neuen Testament häufig die Rede sei von Teufel und Dämonen und diese Vorstellungen so eng mit dem Wirken Jesu verknüpft seien, dass man sie nicht ignorieren könne.[23] Wie kann also vom Bösen gesprochen werden und zu welchen Bedingungen?

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18 Zitiert nach der NGÜ.

19 Joest 1996, 423.

20 Vgl. Joest 1996, 423.

21 Vgl. Josuttis 2000, 29.

22 Vgl. Josuttis 2000, 29f.

23 Vgl. Josuttis 2000, 29f.

Härle beschreibt diesbezüglich biblische Passagen, die eine Rede vom Bösen als Teufel zulassen bzw. nahelegen. Sein Fokus liegt dabei auf dem Machtaspekt des Bösen, den er dreifach aufschlüsselt: Das Böse übe (unter Verweis auf Joh 8,34) Macht aus, um Menschen damit zu infizieren, sie in Besitz zu nehmen und zu beherrschen. Das Böse entwickle (unter Verweis auf Mk 5,6–13) eine starke Eigendynamik und einen Widerstandswillen, wenn man es vertreiben wolle. Und schließlich verstelle sich das Böse, es maskiere sich (unter Verweis auf 2Kor 11,14) trete als Engel des Lichts auf und sei damit eine aktive, initiative Macht.[24] Mit anderen Worten: das Böse übt Macht aus, manipuliert, es maskiert sich, es will den Menschen kontrollieren, gefangen halten und beherrschen; es führt in Versuchung, es verführt zur Sünde, es führt zum Tod (Röm 6,23). Härle resümiert: „Von diesen Beobachtungen und Überlegungen her erscheint es nicht nur als möglich, sondern als durchaus sachgemäß, vom Teufel, Satan und von Dämonen zu reden."[25] Mit Härle kann demnach diese negative Macht, die die Abwesenheit des vollkommen Guten, das Gott selbst ist, bedeutet, und die die Menschen kontrolliert und verführt, als teuflisch bzw. dämonisch bezeichnet werden.

Für das vorliegenden Fallbeispiel ist dies durchaus von Bedeutung, denn aus seelsorglicher Perspektive verliert dasjenige an Macht, was einen Namen bekommt, weil es weniger diffus und damit unkontrollierbar erscheint. Dem Bösen und auch dem bösen Geschehen einen Namen zu geben, gibt dem Betroffenen Kontrolle zurück. Die biblischen Termini bieten dafür eine gute Grundlage.

Ethische Konsequenzen

Auf der Grundlage des bisher dargelegten ist nun noch nach der Bösartigkeit des Menschen zu fragen: Der Mensch kann von dieser negativen Macht korrumpiert, in Besitz genommen und infiziert werden. In dem zu analysierenden Fallbeispiel wird dies deutlich darin, dass die Eltern von Kornelius sich bewusst in den Herrschaftsbereich des Bösen begeben, indem sie Anhänger eines Satanskultes werden. In Röm 6,16 heißt es: „Wisst ihr nicht? Wem ihr euch zu Knechten macht, um ihm zu gehorchen, dessen Knechte seid ihr und dem gehorcht ihr […]." Damit ist der freie Wille des Menschen, sich also aussuchen zu können, unter wessen Herrschaftsbereich er sich begibt, angesprochen, ebenso wie die daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen. Kornelius Eltern entschieden sich dazu, sich dem Machtbereich des Bösen zu unterstellen und nahmen damit

[24] Vgl. Härle 2007, 491f.

[25] Härle 2007, 492.

in Kauf, dass ihr Leben und Handeln korrumpiert wurden. Damit setzten sie nicht nur sich selbst, sondern auch ihr Kind der Wirkmacht des Bösen und seinem zerstörerischen Einfluss aus, was sie wiederum durch ihr Handeln Teil werden ließ von dem Bösen, das ihrem Kind geschah. Auf diese Weise versündigten sie sich an Gott und an dem Jungen.

2. Inwieweit spielt die spirituelle Komponente des Satanskultes für das seelsorgliche Verhalten eine Rolle?

In dem Seminar wurde u. a. ebenfalls kurz diskutiert, ob aufgrund des Missbrauchs, der im Rahmen eines satanischen Kultes stattfand, ein Exorzismus nötig sei. Dies ist m.E. differenziert zu betrachten. Die Ausführungen in dem vorausgehenden Abschnitt zeigen, dass negative Mächte zu dieser Welt dazu gehören und jeder Mensch ihnen prinzipiell ausgesetzt ist.[26] Es liegt in der eigenen Verantwortlichkeit, wieviel „Raum" man ihnen überlässt. Das diese Auseinandersetzung ein Kampfgeschehen darstellt, wird in Eph 6,10ff. deutlich:

> „Schließlich: Werdet stark im Herrn und in der Macht seiner Stärke! Zieht die ganze Waffenrüstung Gottes an, damit ihr gegen die Listen des Teufels bestehen könnt! Denn unser Kampf ist nicht gegen Fleisch und Blut, sondern gegen die Gewalten, gegen die Mächte, gegen die Weltbeherrscher dieser Finsternis, gegen die geistigen Mächte der Bosheit in der Himmelswelt."

Versteht man unter diesem Kampf, den jeder persönlich ausfechten muss, einen Exorzismus, also ein mutiges Widerstehen in der Kraft und Stärke Gottes, dann wäre dem zuzustimmen: Die Seelsorge mit Kornelius ist dann ein Exorzismusgeschehen, denn sie befähigt den Jungen, den Auswirkungen des Bösen in seinem Leben (Kontrollverlust, Angst u.v.m.) zu widerstehen und stärkt seine Selbstwirksamkeit. Da Kornelius den Soldaten mit der Peitsche unter das Kreuz malen will, stellt er seine Erfahrungen und Erlebnisse sinnbildlich unter den Herrschaftsbereich Christi. Kornelius vollzieht damit letztlich selbst einen Exorzismus, weil er sich Christus zuwendet und auf diesem Weg das Böse, das ihm geschehen ist, überwindet. Sein Handeln stellt somit eine bewusste Absage an das Böse dar.[27]

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[26] Vgl. Mt 4: Selbst Jesus wird in dieser Stelle vom Teufel versucht und 2Kor 4,4 spricht davon, dass die Wahrheit des Evangeliums deshalb von vielen nicht erkannt werde, weil der „Gott dieser Welt" ihren Sinn und Verstand verblende.

[27] Diese Form des Exorzismus findet sich u. a. in den Taufagenden der anglikanischen Kirche.

Wie ist das Verhalten der Seelsorgerin in der Akut-Situation zu bewerten?

Diese Frage ist schon deshalb von Bedeutung, da Kornelius Teil einer Kindergruppe war, für die die Seelsorgerin ebenfalls Verantwortung trug. Die Einschätzung der Seelsorgerin in der Akutphase war, dass für die übrigen Kinder keine Gefahr bestand. Wenn dies der Fall gewesen wäre, hätte sie Kornelius aus der Gruppe herausgenommen und sich mit ihm allein beschäftigt, während eine zweite Mitarbeiterin das weitere Malen der übrigen Kinder beaufsichtigte. Da Kornelius jedoch auf die direkte Ansprache der Seelsorgerin reagierte und sich vom Maltisch zurückzog, war ein Herausnehmen aus der Gruppe nicht nötig. Dass die Kommunikation mit dem Jungen in dieser Situation gelang, ist verschiedenen Komponenten zu verdanken: Zum einen boten der Raum, die Gruppe und die Leiterinnen ein sicheres Umfeld für den Jungen. Bereits am Vortag hatte er hier positive Erfahrungen sammeln können. Ebenso dürfte unterstützend gewirkt haben, dass seine Pflegemutter in unmittelbarer Nähe war und jederzeit hätte kommen können, wenn er sie gebraucht hätte. Es war außerdem nicht sein erster Aufenthalt bei dieser Freizeit. Seine Pflegemutter und er besuchten diese Veranstaltung regelmäßig, so dass sich für ihn dadurch eine gewisse Vertrautheit eingestellt hatte. All das waren in der Akutsituation stabilisierende Faktoren, die es ihm unbewusst erleichterten. Des Weiteren war die Ansprache der Seelsorgerin fest und klar. Sie wirkte weder verunsichert noch unfreundlich und reagierte nicht emotional auf seine Aufregung, sondern selbstsicher und stark. Dies gab Kornelius in seiner Emotionalität Richtung und Halt. Nicht seine Emotionen bestimmten, was geschehen würde, sondern die Seelsorgerin gab die Regeln vor. Da sie nicht emotional reagierte, konnte sie auf diese Weise seine innere Aufregung auffangen, ließ ihn damit jedoch nicht allein, sondern zeigte ihm einen Ausweg auf. Dieser bestand in dreierlei Aspekten: „Warte!“, „Du darfst!“, „Ich passe auf!“. Das „Warte!“ traute ihm zu, den inneren unangenehmen Zustand aushalten und damit kontrollieren zu können. „Du darfst!“, war das Zugeständnis an seine Emotionalität und das Verstehen seiner inneren Not, den Soldaten genau an diese Stelle malen zu müssen. Und schließlich war ihre Zusage „Ich passe auf!“, das Versprechen der Seelsorgerin, sein Vertrauen nicht zu enttäuschen und dafür einzustehen, dass seinem Wunsch entsprochen wurde.

Mit ihrem Verhalten unterstützte die Seelsorgerin damit den Versuch des Jungen, das Böse zu überwinden. Für ihn bestand die Lösung darin, seine schlimmen Erfahrungen, für die der Soldat mit der Peitsche symbolisch stand, unter das Kreuz zu bringen, das für ihn Sicherheit und Schutz bedeutete. Nachdem er dies getan hatte, hatte sich alle innere Aufregung gelöst. Kornelius hatte wieder einen Teil seiner Erfahrungen überwunden. Für die Seelsorgerin war die Situation damit ebenfalls aufgehoben. Mehr konnte sie für den Moment nicht tun, zumal keine langfristige Begleitung von Pflegemutter und Sohn aufgrund der wohnlichen Entfernung möglich war.

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Claiming Blessings: Theological Reflections with Quaker Peacebuilders on Overcoming Evil with Good

Rachel Muers

Introduction

In this paper, I seek to develop a theological account of how ‚overcoming evil with good' is experienced and practised by a network of grassroots peacebuilders in post-conflict situations. The contemporary case studies that form the basis of the paper are drawn from a collection of testimonies from the peacebuilders and peace activists who are part of Quaker Peace Network Africa. Following the reflections of these peacebuilders, I take as my initial starting-point the idea that peacemaking is not only, or not even, an attempt to fix a problem or eliminate an evil. It is, rather, the act of claiming a divine promise – the promise of blessing.

My source for the peacebuilder testimonies is the collection *This Light That Pushes Me*, a book and photographic exhibition containing the words, the stories and the portraits of people who are both survivors of violence and actively involved in peacebuilding. Many of the author-subjects have become founders and directors of the projects of Quaker Peace Network Africa.[1] Short verbatim quotations from the contributors are typeset as poems, and juxtaposed with their photographic portraits and prose narrations of their experiences. In reading the stories recounted in *This Light That Pushes Me*, I am attentive to the particular decisions made about their representation –providing close readings of this material as it stands without making assumptions

[1] The book itself is a joint venture between the aforementioned network (whose chair wrote the introduction), British Quakers, and the photographer Nigel Downes, himself a survivor of a very violent childhood. The book is produced for a general audience of all faiths and none.

about the extent to which it is, or is not, backed up by systematic theological reflection on the part of the individual or of the compilers of the book. It is important to note that the collection and circulation of these testimonies occurs in the context of Quakerism as a globally-networked peace church tradition – committed both to nonviolence and peace activism as practices, and to integrating these practices into theology and spirituality.[2]

Two aspects of the collection of testimonies to be considered should be highlighted here. First, the contexts in which the Peace Network operates can mostly be described as *post*-conflict situations – meaning *inter alia* that they challenge any simple binary between situations of war and situations of peace. Conflict persists on many different levels; questions about the integration of peace and justice come to the fore; peace is understood not simply as the absence of war, but rather as a complex multi-faceted reality requiring long-term commitment and (at least for some of the activists and theorists involved) as a process rather than an end-state.[3] Second, the people whose voices are heard in the collection are survivors of violence as well as peace activists. Questions about the nature and possibility of healing, what it means to 'resolve' a conflict, or how the pervasive evil can be overcome with good, all affect them at an individual as well as a societal level.

In order to explore the potential significance of these peacebuilders' testimonies for Christian theology, I also bring the peacebuilders' experiences into dialogue with Julian of Norwich – writing from a very different time and place, and frequently hailed in the twentieth century (in England at least) as a theologian for our time and an 'apostle of reconciliation'.[4] An important piece of background for this recontextualisation of Julian is the careful work of Grace Jantzen and others to set her in her fourteenth-century English context – in the aftermath of the social breakdown caused by the plagues, amid religious and political rebellion violently suppressed – not only as a detached commentator, but also as a participant in the life of a suffering city.[5] Although the journey from fourteenth-century Europe to twenty-first-century Africa might seem a long one, it has in fact been taken before, in a series of articles relating her work to reconciliation activities in post-genocide Rwanda.[6] Unusually, however, for work on Julian and reconciliation or peacebuilding, I focus initially not on her assertion that she sees 'no blame' in God, but rather on her wider reflections on sin, evil and the goodness of God; I return to the question of blame and forgiveness at the end of the paper. This

2 On which see Muers 2015.

3 For a discussion of the importance, and the successes and failures, of post-conflict 'peacebuilding' in African countries since the 1990s see Khadiagala 2017.

4 On Julian as twentieth-century 'apostle of reconciliation', see Whitehead 2009, 132.

5 Jantzen 1987.

6 On Julian in Rwanda, see Maskulak 2017; Maskulak 2011.

de-prioritisation of questions of blame and forgiveness reflects the balance of material in the peacebuilders' testimonies themselves.

Claiming Blessings: The Peacebuilders

> "We lost people.
> We lost people.
> Even relatives.
> Relatives.
> Friends.
> Relatives.
> Many many many many.
> It was worse here in Rwanda.
> Violence brings only
> Hatred Death Conflict
> Blessed are the peacemakers
> I think
> People want to be
> Blessed."[7]

David Bucura, whose words are quoted above, was one of the key figures in the establishment of the Quaker peacebuilding and reconciliation program in post-genocide Rwanda; he was himself a refugee in Congo and most of his family were killed. His lament for Rwanda mourns both the loss of individual people and of relationships and kin networks.[8] He creates, in a few words, a vivid picture of social collapse as well as a litany of specific and unique pain. Everybody 'lost people' irreplaceably and everyone was drawn into the maelstrom of 'hatred, death, conflict'. In the disordered but inevitable and inescapable sequence of sin–violence, hatred, death, conflict, one thing leading to another and none of them leading anywhere – he voices a collective predicament of being unmade. In comments elsewhere, he has expressed equally vividly the deep sense of the *incomprehensibility* of evil – a sense that persists despite the availability of social,

7 Bucura in Shipler Chico 2014, 40.

8 Bucura's repeated references to 'relatives' – and indeed the repeated lament 'we lost people' – recall the connection, explored by Akinoa and Uzodike, between *Ubuntu* philosophies and post-conflict peacebuilding projects in many African contexts including Rwanda. Akinola and Uzodike 2018.

political and psychological explanations, of which he makes use in his work: 'I can't understand from where the devils of 1994 came'.[9]

In the middle of this collective, inescapable and non-sensical situation, the key turning point is the dominical promise 'Blessed are the peacemakers'. The participants in the peace networks – initiating and leading local reconciliation programmes, community mediation and dialogue groups – are identified here as people who 'want to be blessed'.[10] To be precise, as Bucura's words make explicit, they believe that they, along with their fellow-suffering creatures, are *promised* a blessing. They reach out, with their intellects and their imaginations as well as with their bodies and lives, to claim the blessing that is supposed to be theirs.

The refusal to give up on the promise of blessing becomes, for Bucura and his colleagues, the refusal to compromise with violence. This in turn leads to the pursuit of risky small-scale activities of peacemaking without guarantees. A clear example from *This Light That Pushes Me* of such risky small-scale activity is in the story of Rose Imbega, whose peace activism began with an incident of impromptu local mediation – averting group violence and risking its redirection towards herself – following a conversation she overheard on a bus.[11]

The language of 'claiming a blessing', or recognising the promise of a blessing, helps to articulate the open-ended character of the action undertaken. Peace work in the post-conflict situation is not – as numerous commentators have observed – a matter of restoring a previous situation or of imposing a known solution; in the type of work described here there is no clear prior understanding of what success will look like. As Esther Mombo, a Quaker theologian closely involved with peacebuilding work, has put it: 'Reconciliation is not a skill to be mastered … it comes as a stance assumed before a broken world rather than as a tool to repair that world'.[12] Nor is peace work straightforwardly a matter of obedience to a command whatever the consequences. Peace work is practical engagement with the realities of the given situation, on the basis of a trustworthy but – as things stand – vague promise.

This idea of undertaking risky work on the basis of a promise of blessing helps to explain a further feature of how the peace activists describe their work. The theological words of the activists quoted in *This Light That Pushes Me* frequently sound – if quoted out of context – naïve and overoptimistic, especially when set alongside their stories of horrendous and irrecoverable loss. Joseph Mamai Makhokha, for example, a survivor of the 2007-8 election violence in the Mount Elgon area of Kenya, says 'Even if our perceived enemies drove us away / I think there

9 In Friends Peace Teams 2017.

10 An extensive range of examples are described and discussed in Mombo and Nyiramana 2016.

11 Shipler Chico (Hg.), 30.

12 Mombo 2017, 130.

is something of God in that person … Let each see that of God in their perceived enemy'.[13] This kind of statement, I suggest, is best understood not as something that can be demonstrated – as the fruit of experience or the conclusion of a process of theological reasoning – but rather as the *starting* point for the practice of peacebuilding. The blessing of finding the image of God in the 'perceived enemy' is something that is promised and not yet realised; it needs to be claimed through the engaged practice of peace work.

Claiming Blessings: The Theologian

> "[We] see evil deeds done and such great harm inflicted that it seems impossible to us that any good could ever come out of this. And we witness this, sorrowing and grieving over it, so that we cannot repose in the blessed contemplation of God as we should do."[14]

The accusation of over-optimism has also from time to time been levelled at the theology of Julian of Norwich. A significant proportion of the discussion of her thought has focused on the affirmation that 'sin is befitting, but all shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be well'.[15] Denys Turner, Marilyn McCord Adams and others have offered detailed refutations of the idea that Julian is here offering theological 'cheap grace' in the form of a denial of the reality and gravity of sin.[16] They draw attention to passages like the one quoted above; Julian's affirmation that all shall be well arises in the context of her intense awareness of the extent and depth of human suffering, from which she is never released and into which her theological work draws her more deeply.

Julian rejects accounts of sin that exclude it from the providential goodness or good providence of God, and thus has no choice but to affirm that it is 'befitting'. The fact that she makes this affirmation even in the face of her inability to see how any good can come of the 'great harm' that sin has caused to God's creatures does not signal a decision to stop paying attention either to the

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13 Shipler Chico (Hg.), 20. Mamai Makhokha, a survivor of violence in the Mount Elgon area, died in 2015; he had held several leadership roles among Kenyan Quakers and in the Friends Church Peace Team.

14 Julian of Norwich 2015, 80.

15 Julian 2015, 74.

16 Turner 2011, especially 85–88; Adams 2011. Note that Adams does not altogether acquit Julian of the charge of putting forward an overoptimistic theology; she writes that Julian 'does not consider the chances and changes of this present life sometimes wrecks and ruins human agents, at least *prima facie,* shatters them into people who would be unable or twists them into people who would be unwilling to profit from her advice.' Adams 2011, 445.

'great harm' or to the character of God. Rather, it is the starting-point for further close readings – of the narratives and images of Christ that constitute Julian's visions and are also formed out of her life experience, of the teachings of 'holy church', and of the lives of fellow-Christians.

There is a parallel, I suggest, between Julian's determination to continue to wrestle with the experience of 'great harm', sorrow and grief, and the peacebuilders' action of claiming a blessing. As Turner puts it, Julian has to 'win through' with 'time and much reflection' to the conviction that the outworking of salvation in Christ is an uncountably greater good than a world with no sin and no redemption.[17] Julian refuses all economic accounts of soteriology – that is, all suggestion that Christ pays a price or penalty *owed* for sin – and instead treats salvation as a 'work of pure delight' that exceeds all possible calculations of price. The pain of sin (for Julian) is met by, or, better, enclosed in and anticipated by 'a kind of blessedness we might never have had nor known if that quality of goodness which is in God had not been opposed'.[18] In other words, even in the middle of her reflections on sin she reaches not (only) towards repair or recompense but towards 'bliss' or blessedness as the *telos* of God's ways with the world.

Asking *how* all things shall be well in the light of the great harm of sin – as Julian does repeatedly in the course of her revelations – becomes, like the work of the peacemakers, an insistent grasping after a blessing that one has been promised but cannot confer on oneself. It is also an expression of deep longing, longing to be who one is, to be blessed. Peacemakers do not emerge from this encounter as doers of good works, who receive (in this world or the next) the reward of a blessing for obedience to a dominical command. They are, rather, people caught in the middle of the senseless maelstrom who still *want to be blessed*, whose 'action' is longing or thirst for a blessing.

Can we meaningfully talk about theological *thinking* as 'claiming a blessing'? The image of Jacob wrestling – and refusing to let go of the one who wrestles with him until he has been given a blessing (Gen 32:26) – appears occasionally in recent theology, usually in relation to the reading of difficult texts or of engagement with specific contemporary issues.[19] The image draws together powerfully the sheer difficulty of theological work (hermeneutical, constructive or apologetic) and the sense that it is compelled or motivated by divine encounter – as well as the coexistence of pain and blessing in the texts and traditions theologians inherit. My framing of theological work as 'claiming a blessing' goes beyond the image of wrestling with specific texts and traditions, to identify theological *fides quaerens intellectum* as the work of holding on to received knowledge

17 Turner 2011, 212, 214.

18 Julian 2015, 129: see Turner 2011, 210–11.

19 Williams / Higton 2007. Another famous, if very bleak, example is Phyllis Trible's reflection that 'to tell and hear texts of terror is to wrestle demons in the night, without a compassionate God to save us'. Trible 1984, 3.

of and speech about God, in the confidence that it will be life-giving and intelligible in a particular situation where this is not yet apparent.

As has already been suggested, to talk about blessing in theology is to point to the *telos* of creation – in a way that refers both back to God's blessing on all creatures and forward to the eschatological consummation, the ultimate aim of God's saving and relating.[20] It is also to point to the substantive content of that *telos* – the full well-being and flourishing of creatures – and to the connection between the conditions of created well-being and the conditions of ultimate blessedness. Creatures are destined to be blessed *as* the particular creatures they are, above and beyond what can presently be known of their needs and capacities but without annihilating their particularity. Blessing mediates between the general or universal (God pronounces blessing on all creatures, or on all the nations) and the irreducibly particular and differentiated (blessings are given to many specific creatures and creaturely realities). This open-ended dynamic of blessing acquires a new dimension – and gives rise to new concerns – when the focus is on *claiming* a blessing rather than on pronouncing one. *Wanting* to be blessed, *claiming* a blessing, appears in this perspective as a creaturely act of trusting response – in the context of the enormous gulf between the blessing promised and the present situation.

The theologian seeking understanding is claiming a specific blessing that has its own specific ground of hope – namely, that divine truth is knowable and shareable, that reason and understanding are included in the dynamic of blessing. Crucially, as with the work of the peace activists, the blessing given – the understanding reached – is not exactly determinable in advance from the problem confronted or the question posed; Julian rarely receives a direct answer to any of the questions she asks; but she does advance in her understanding, and in her capacity to communicate that understanding, in response to every question she asks.

Both Julian's work and the work of the peacebuilders is genuinely unfinished business, not simply a matter of communicating a known truth and waiting for the world to accept it. The tension between full confidence on the basis of the word received, on the one hand, and compassionate suffering and longing for completeness, on the other, is captured in many of the juxtapositions of *This Light That Pushes Me*. In many cases the words of the peacemaker express confidence, and her or his story shows how the situational courage arising from that full confidence results in very small-scale, impermanent and fragile change in situations of extreme suffering or danger. The audacity of the declarations, in terms of the mismatch between what is claimed and what is observed, is matched by the audacity of the actions in terms of their contextual vulnerability. The key point to note here, for the purposes of connecting the peace activism with theology, is that it is not merely a question of the gap between theory and practice or between the 'already' and the

[20] For a summary of this theme – which draws heavily on Westermann 1978 – see Kelsey 2009, 447–450. See also Ford 1999, 239–251.

'not yet'; it is that the peace activists do not yet know what their faith *means* at the point where they begin to act. In the same way, Julian trusts, and unfolds the implications of, the visions she sees while, by her own repeated account, not knowing what they mean.

In the final section of this paper I indicate some further ways in which peacebuilders' reflections on 'overcoming evil with good' can enter into dialogue with theology – and in doing so I turn back, briefly, to the questions of justice and forgiveness with which much previous theological work on peacebuilding has been concerned. I argue that it is significant that such questions are *not* to the fore in the peacebuilder testimonies I have discussed – and that this in turn sheds light on Julian's controversial 'God of no blame and no wrath'.[21]

Healing not Fixing: Understanding the Peacebuilders' Hope

> "Healing
> is different
> from fixing.
> It is easy to fix things
> but it takes time for healing …
> It is risky also
> so you need to understand
> That things will not unfold the way you are expecting."[22]

> "Someone can't forgive with a broken heart. We need first to heal our wounds, our deep wounds. Then start the work of peace and reconciliation … [We] need to heal. Then forgive. Then love."[23]

Adrien Niyongabo, founder of a trauma recovery and community reconciliation centre in Burundi, and leading Rwandan Quaker peacebuilder, Cecile Nyiramana, both write in post-conflict contexts where questions of blame, forgiveness and retrospective justice are much to the fore. Nyiramana is a victim of genocide who is also the wife of an accused perpetrator; her grassroots peacebuilding work has focused on the establishment of dialogue, reconciliation and healing groups for women across communities. These activities of community groups sat alongside the much larger-scale, and much-discussed, *gacaca* court processes for justice after the 1994

[21] See Maskulak 2011.

[22] Adrien Niyonbago in Shipler Chico 2014.

[23] Cecile Nyiramana in Shipler Chico 2014.

genocide; reflection such as Nyiramana's offer a valuable additional perspective on the struggle to 'overcome evil with good' in the context of horrendous suffering described by David Bucura.[24]

Niyongabo's comment that it is easy to 'fix' things suggests a reference to the kind of post-conflict 'closure' that can be achieved through the apportioning of blame and innocence for past wrongs, the determination of punishments or recompense, and the conviction that justice has been served. It might also recall models of peacebuilding within which 'peace' is a clear externally-determined end point, achieved at a specified time. Moreover 'fixing' suggests the return to a previous known state – 'overcoming the evil' by going back to where we were before.

By contrast, as we have seen, the activities of the Quaker peacebuilders are not 'fixing' according to a predetermined plan, but rather engaging in an open-ended process – in which 'things will not unfold the way you are expecting'. Referring to this open-ended process as 'healing' draws attention both to the deep suffering with which the process begins, and to the ongoing suffering that is not 'fixed' by a return to previous norms, by a cessation of open hostility, or even – importantly – by the processes that apportion judgement and blame, and enact forgiveness. It is important, of course, that neither Niyongabo nor Nyiramana denies the importance of 'fixing' or of forgiveness. Forgiveness and the framework within which it sits – and localised acts of 'fixing', of setting particular quarrels right, of figuring out how to do justice – matter very much *in their place*; but their place is within a larger process, which both reaches deeper into shared suffering and trauma – attending to the 'deep wounds' and the 'broken heart' – and opens up the promise of a greater and as-yet-unimagined good – not only forgiveness or uneasy coexistence, but love.

Nyiramana's prioritisation of healing over forgiveness, which is based on her own extensive experiences of grassroots community work with women in Rwanda, sheds new light on Julian's claim to see no wrath and no blame in God. Julian seeks a theological response to the 'great harm' of sin and even to the 'evil deeds done', in the context of the good providence of God, that eschews the juridical – both in the relation between God and humanity, and in the judgements that humans might make about divine goodness. Accounts of divine justice and punishment, and theodicies, perform a kind of 'fixing' in relation to the manifest ills caused by human sin; something similar could be said, indeed, of the economic accounts of soteriology which, as mentioned earlier, Julian eschews. They enable a kind of intellectual balance or satisfaction to be achieved through the knowledge that justice has been done and (in the case of divine wrath) forgiveness granted, but, as Nyiramana's experience shows, all is *not* well because the heart is still broken. Moving too quickly to find a resolution to the process of 'overcoming evil with good' leaves both the heart and the community unhealed.

Nyiramana suggests, in both her writing and her peacebuilding work, that an exclusive focus on forgiveness – on resolving and overcoming a specific past wrong – leaves the heart unhealed

[24] On *gacaca* courts, see inter alia Bornkamm 2012; Melvin 2010; Longman 2010.

because it denies the depth and complexity of shared suffering. Instead, she contextualises acts of forgiveness within a process that begins with healing and opens out into love. This in turn prevents forgiveness from becoming *either* a way to deny the depth of suffering and trauma *or* an end-point that prevents people from claiming the full blessing that is offered to them.

Taking this insight back to Julian's work, the relativisation of forgiveness – and of the whole question of divine wrath and blame – comes perhaps into sharpest focus, or makes most sense, in her meditation on the crucified Christ. Christ suffers in his flesh the pain of the whole of creation – the 'great harm' and inexplicable evil deeds – including the tearing apart of the social body, suffered 'out of kindness', that is, in kinship with humanity. Longing and compassion, which Julian sees intertwined in her vision of the crucified Christ, are born together in the space of lament for collective loss.[25] Compassion at Christ's suffering passes over into 'kind compassion' for the suffering of others – and extends into a longing for communal healing and shared blessing.[26] All of these movements – the compassion of Christ and Christ's desire for humanity, the compassion and sorrow of the one who contemplates his suffering, the compassion for others that it engenders, and the love that underlies 'each instance of kind compassion that a man feels for his fellow Christians' – are open-ended, not because there is doubt about what they mean or where they are going, but because they have to be lived out, and their promise claimed, in each particular situation.

Conclusion

The actions and words of the peacebuilders discussed in this paper arise from a place of deep lament and loss – confrontation with evil deeds, with great harm, and with the impossibility of seeing a way out of the predicament. Their responses to the predicament, both in actions and words, bespeak a remarkable optimism – expressing the desire to be 'blessed', expecting to encounter God in the supposed enemy, seeking not only to fix isolated problems but to bring about long-term healing. I have sought in this paper to begin a conversation between these peacebuilders and a theologian who speaks out of a similar place of lament and loss – reflecting on and enacting the struggle to claim a promised blessing. Both theological work and peacebuilding are understood here as practices motivated by the desire for individual and communal healing and blessing, met and carried by the divine desire for the healing and blessing of creation.

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[25] On the importance of the social body for Julian, see Bauerschmidt 1999.

[26] 'Each instance of kind compassion that a man feels for his fellow Christians out of love – it is Christ in him'. Julian 2015, 76.

Much more could be said both about Julian's theology and soteriology, and about the theological background of the Quaker peacebuilders discussed here. However, a theological conversation that ignored *practice* – both the practice of theology and the practice of peacebuilding – would, I suggest, risk missing important insights on the theme of this volume. It would risk 'fixing' problems on the theoretical level without asking how these fixes contribute to processes of healing that move communities towards love.

The projects to which the present volume relates raise an important set of questions about the relationships between theology, ethics, pastoral practice and activism, which the comparison I have sketched here may help to illuminate. Looking at theological work as 'claiming a blessing', and placing it alongside peace activism, invites recognition of its contextual motivation – the particular needs, desires, suffering that surrounds it – as theologically significant, but not determinative of the content and not the only basis for judging its success. 'Claiming a blessing' is not just finding a ready-made theological solution for a real-world problem, but it *is* searching for the intelligibility and life-giving character of Christian faith in the real world. None of this makes theology *the same as* peace activism (or any other practice to which it might be compared) but it makes it harder to place it in a different category altogether – and also harder to draw sharp and well-defended lines between contextual, practical, systematic, pastoral and mystical theology on the basis of their supposed different relationships to context and practice.

One of the most important insights of the study processes to which this volume of papers relates is that theology should not be understood, either as theory that is developed nowhere in particular and then put into practice in the real world, or as the end-point of a process of gathering experiential data. Theology is itself caught up in the struggles of individuals and communities – the everyday 'evil deeds' and 'great harm' as well as the extraordinary ones – and its processes of seeking understanding can themselves be caught up in the movement of 'overcoming evil with good'.

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Investigating the 7/7 London Bombings: Suspects; Victims; Human Beings

Leeds Case Study

Alistair McFadyen

The Case

I was asked to present a case study drawing on my policing experience in what Prof Dahlgrün referred to as an 'interesting social context'. Indeed, the city of Leeds is certainly that. As a policing environment – even in its everyday, routine forms – it can be immensely challenging and, for precisely that reason, also richly rewarding. For the purposes of our case study, however, I thought it would help clarify issues and sharpen analysis not to focus on one of the more everyday incidents and threats that police routinely respond to. I chose instead a case that might more readily be recognised as deserving the adjective, 'evil'; one that presents us with the complexities involved in confronting and overcoming evil without succumbing to it: the 7/7 London bombings in 2005.[1] Although 300 km distant from Leeds, a significant aspect of the investigation was conducted in Leeds. It was in any case an incident that has affected the whole

[1] In my rather junior position in West Yorkshire Police, neither a direct role in nor knowledge of the investigations that form a case study. What follows draws on the official report (2006. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. London: The Stationery Office.)) and other discussions in the public domain. I am profoundly grateful also to the generosity of retired temporary Chief Constable John Parkinson, who led the Leeds investigations and who kindly agreed to speak with me in preparation for this case study. Of course, I am to blame for any inaccuracies, misinterpretation or misunderstandings. I should also point out that these are my personal views and interpretations and do not necessarily represent those of West Yorkshire Police.

nation and indeed continues to shape (and mis-shape) us in many ways. That is, perhaps, one measure of evil: the extent to which evil is not merely inherent in the immediate event, but has capacity to engender prolonged and deeply traumatising consequences through a whole society as it seeks to absorb, understand and respond to it. This is the kind of traumatic event that significantly reshapes our social world, not only in consciousness – in patterns of interpretation and thought – but also materially: in how we structure and organise ourselves; how we institutionalise behaviours and how we work within new or recalibrated social structures and institutions. In the immediate aftermath, a traumatising event's ripples can make it very difficult both to discern and to act on the good in ways that are genuinely healing, that seek genuine justice and truth, in ways that are neither imprisoned by nor therefore the vehicles of the dynamics of the evil both in and unleashed by the event.

First, I shall give a brief, factual outline of the bombings themselves, mindful that those not British or too young to remember them may not be familiar with the circumstances. That leads quite naturally into the heart of this case study, where I briefly present several aspects of the situation that required sensitive decision-making. Then I share the reflections of the participants before sharing with you the decisions actually taken and the operant considerations that led to them. (If you wish to adopt a case-study approach in your reading of this chapter, you may wish to break off after this to consider your own response to the decisions outlined there, subsequently to review both your decisions and the values that informed them by comparing them with the values and decision-making tool provided in a footnote.)

At approximately 8:50 AM on the morning of 7th July 2005, three bombs were simultaneously detonated on three crowded trains in the tunnels of the Underground train network in central London, travelling east, west and south respectively from King's Cross station. A little under an hour later, a fourth bomb was detkonated on the top floor of a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, central London. The four bombs caused at least 756 casualties, including 56 fatalities.

The initial investigation by London's Metropolitan police quickly established that this was the UK's first suicide bombing. It was also the first terrorist attack committed by British-born Islamists. Their identities were established about a week after the attack (three were second-generation Pakistani-heritage British Asians; the other, born in Jamaica but brought up in the UK, converted to Islam at 15, soon after his mother did so): Mohammed Siddique Khan; Shehzad Tanweer; Hasib Hussain (all from Leeds) and Jermaine Lindsay (who had lived most of his life in Huddersfield – 30 kms from Leeds – but in 2003 had moved to the town of Aylesbury, 60 km to the north-west of London).

At the time of the attack, world leaders were gathered at the G8 summit elsewhere in the UK (Gleneagles, near Edinburgh) and it is possible that the attack was timed to coincide symbolically with that meeting. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the original plan had been for all four bombs to be detonated underground, presumably simultaneously. The Tavistock

Square bus detonation might well have been out of time and out of place. The last bomber (Hussain) can be seen on CCTV leaving the underground system and purchasing a battery in a shop in the concourse of King's Cross overground station before, after some apparent vacillation, boarding surface public transport. We know that, at the time the other bombers boarded their trains and Hussain was himself in King's Cross underground station, there were delays on the Northern line. It is therefore possible that the original plan had been for Hussain to detonate his device to the north of the others so that together they would form a symbolic (burning?) Cross, but was frustrated either by a battery failure or the delays on his planned route, or both.

Investigation established that the Leeds-based bombers had driven to Luton train station, close to Aylesbury, where they met Lindsay who had driven there in a separate car. All then boarded the train to London King's Cross in high spirits and carrying heavy rucksacks. One of the cars left in the station car park contained unused explosive devices, other bomb-making materials and a handgun.

The bomb factory itself was identified at 18 Alexandra Grove in the Headingley area of Leeds, heavily populated by students alongside a significant British Asian Muslim population, and about 1 km from the University where Professor Muers and I lecture in theology. Unused materials were found in the factory, alongside the equipment used to make the bombs.

Although the identities of the four bombers were established in this early stage of the investigation, it was still unknown whether there were other members of the plot still at large (although subsequent investigation found no indication whatsoever of the involvement or support of anyone else). In the immediate aftermath, however, both witness accounts and initial interpretation of CCTV capture suggested there might have been a fifth bomber. The unused devices found in the car left at Luton train station might also reasonably have supported suspicion of an additional plotter who for some reason had not joined the others on the day. The equipment left in the bomb factory similarly left unanswered questions about whether other collaborators might have been tasked with their removal. None of those suspicions proved to be accurate. I mention them here to provide a sense of the context of uncertainty concerning the possible existence of supporters and active collaborators in which the Leeds investigations were conducted. It would be in Leeds that questions concerning the bombers' motivations; their acquisition of technical competence; knowledge of or support for the plot amongst family, colleagues, friends and other contacts; whether others in the family wider community might also be at risk of radicalisation would have to be explored.

In the planning and conduct of that investigation, the police faced a number of complex issues, both tactical and human. To start you thinking about the latter, I invite you to revisit the casualty figures I gave you above and to ask yourselves who you expect to be included in those figures. More specifically, whether you expect the four bombers to be included or excluded in the number of fatalities and whether there is any sense in which you might regard the bombers as also

themselves victims. The four bombers are, in fact, included amongst the fatalities. Please pause for a moment before reading further to consider how you feel about that and what your answer is to the question about regarding them as victims in some sense.[2] Please also consider why you (perhaps instinctively) answer in the way that you have done: what seems to be at stake in the bombers' inclusion in the tally either under the more neutral heading 'casualties' or the perhaps more freighted term 'victims'?

To some extent, that question had immediate bearing in relation to body recovery (which, in these circumstances, is also recovery of body-parts and their reconstitution). Especially in the earliest stages of the investigation, that process of recovery was part of the forensic examination of the scene that helped to establish where the bombs had been detonated and whether their position suggested they had been in the possession of specific persons, detonated remotely or by fuse. Beyond the forensic, investigative interest, however, there remains a question whether, how and why you treat human bodies and body-parts differently from the way you treat other fragments and debris of evidential value. Beyond the interests of the investigation, families of victims will have expectations and interest in the way in which those remains are handled, identified and collated. As part of their grieving process and coming to terms with the reality of what happened, they are likely to want to know some detail about where their loved one was, why and how they died and they will likely be comforted by knowing that the process of body recovery and examination was conducted in a way that respected the dignity and humanity of their loved one. At the most basic level, the bereaved would have a right to expect that as much of the body of a loved one has been recovered and that what has been presented as there remains have been accurately identified.

The question whether we regard the bombers also as victims is one way of answering other question: how are their bodies treated? what happens to them after the investigation? But also: how are their families approached, engaged with, their needs identified and

[2] in what seems to me to be a related and parallel intuition, in the days and weeks after the attack, British newspapers published the names and often also the photographs, together with details of movements on that day but also of their lives. This was done without any explicit comment or explanation. Yet it seemed to me at the time (as it still does) to be an act of resistance to the dehumanisation and de-individualisation of victims in a mass-casualty terrorist attack of this sort. Victims are not chosen on account of who they are, what they believe in, not even what they represent. In a strict sense, they are not chosen at all, they are simply there in these locations at that time to be used instrumentally towards the immediate goal of killing and maiming as many people as possible and whatever more ultimate purpose that was intended to serve. In relation both to terrorist purpose and their acts, they have lost already their humanity and individuality. To their great credit, British newspapers seems to understand the signal importance doing what they could to recover and present the humanity and individuality of the victims to the public – especially at a time where, inevitably, there was widespread coverage of the bombers' life-stories, their identities, formation the values and beliefs, their movements and their relationships.

met? Regarding the bombers as victims and not only as suspects is one pathway towards recognising that, like other victims' families, the families of the bombers are also bereaved; indeed, if – as proved to be the case – they were completely unaware of the plot or of the bombers' radicalisation, likely to experience a very complex form of grief. Like other families, that grief would likely be affected by the delay in the release of bodies for a funeral due to the demands of the investigation – a delay religiously and culturally significant for Muslim families.

Clearly, there was a need to conduct investigations within the families and the wider community in areas of Leeds where the suspects either lived or had links to, all of which have significant Asian and Muslim populations. These investigations included forensic search of several premises, including of course the bomb factory, but also homes of family and associates and some buildings of religio-cultural significance. Negotiating tension between investigative needs and the human needs of families and the wider communities to which they belonged mirrors the question I have already raised regarding the perpetrators themselves: can they be treated as victims as well as (sometimes and for a time) potential suspects?

The question takes a slightly different form regarding families: notwithstanding the need to ask questions of them, should families be regarded primarily as survivors, traumatised and bereaved? That same consideration might be extended towards the wider Muslim communities in Leeds, especially those to which the suspects belonged – they were also traumatised and confused. Locally and nationally, Muslim communities faced questioning by the media and others trying to understand the bombers' motivation and its continuity or discontinuity with the values, perceptions and interpretations of Islam and sense of British identity held more widely. In Leeds, the scale of media interest and the nature of such questioning could sometimes be experienced as intrusive by a community that generally had little preparation or training to give the kind of account of themselves that was being sought.

Muslim communities also faced significant increased hostility locally and nationally as racist and Islamophobic agitation increased after the attack (especially after a further Islamist bomb attack on London's transport network on 21 July 2005 – an entirely independent conspiracy, where none of the devices detonated properly).

We have now arrived at the point where I can more clearly state the issues to be addressed in this case study. There are three foci:

- the families;
- local Muslim communities;
- the bombers' bodies, especially in view of the risk that a funeral service might attract Islamophobic attention will provide the opportunity for Islamist display; similarly, any grave might become a site either for the celebration of martyrdom or for desecration.

I invite you to ask:

- what should happen?
- Why should it happen?
- How might it be achieved?

Either before you develop your own ideas and proposals in relation to this case study, or else when you review them afterwards, you may wish to refer to several of the documents listed in the bibliography for this case study: especially the National College of Policing's Code of Ethics (2014a)2020</access-date></record></Cite></EndNote> and its supporting documents (2014b), together with the National Decision Model (2013) used in all police decision-making in England and Wales and against which all police decisions have to be justified. The principles attributed to Sir Robert Peel, founder of the Metropolitan police, are still regarded as both foundational and expressive of the distinctive spirit and culture of British policing (2012).

Group Discussion

There was significant discussion in all groups whether and why the bombers should be treated in some respects as victims themselves, what purposes that might either frustrate or serve. In the case study, this question was raised in relation first to the treatment of the bombers' remains; second, treatment of the bombers' families. In several discussion groups, however, consideration of this question was pushed further back to the presumably lengthy process through which the bombers' motivations were formed and shaped and to questions of free will. Broadly speaking, there was consideration of the various factors that might have so framed the bombers' worldview that conspiring to commit a terrorist act of mass-murder could be contemplated; indeed, might it also have come to seem an act they believe themselves compelled or required to commit? There was some discussion of the determining influences of the Koran, of specific traditions of interpretation that present themselves as the one true and pure expression of Islam, of global and local Islamist individuals and groups. Acknowledging that the case study had given insufficient detail to evaluate this question in relation to this particular group of terrorists, the discussion nonetheless seemed premised on the assumption that a terror group might be both perpetrator and victim. There was a widespread view that being subject to the powerful, shaping influence of an ideological expression of religion might be a form of victimisation to the extent that it suppresses free will, replacing it with a sense of command and obligation. Possibly underlying this approach to the question is the near incomprehensibility to us of an attack designed to

kill and maim a large number of strangers and to kill oneself. In some ways, it is easier to believe that this is the action of somebody either not in their right mind and capable of rational or moral thought or else subject to coercion, force or control such that the action is not properly theirs.

In following this line of thought, the discussion groups (without much relevant information to assist or guide them) were trying to come to a fuller and richer understanding of the bomber's motivations and actions and to resist any immediate impulse to dehumanise and demonise them.[3] In some of the discussions, there is at least the suggestion that the bombers could be regarded as victims to the extent that their action was not free, whereas culpability and guilt were correlated with free, moral agency. There is a risk here, which I think the discussion group realised and navigated well. If the attempt to understand the bombers' human situation leads us to believe that they were not thinking and acting freely and so are victims, then in an odd way we have stripped them of their humanity in the very act of seeking it. Significantly, we might then feel relieved of the difficult task of seeing their motivations and actions as human responses to their view of the world, not least how they see Britain in particular and the West in general. The more that we see what they did as mad or evil and therefore beyond comprehension and unworthy of our engagement, the less we seek to understand what they did as human (blameworthy, but human still) and to ask questions of them, but also of ourselves in order to understand how it is they came to see their country the way that they did.

This attempt to hold together being a perpetrator and being victim, blame and human understanding, was evident in other considerations raised in the same discussion group. In asking what should be done with the bodies of the bombers, the group paid careful consideration to the phenomenon of forgiveness as entailing judgement but without the kind of condemnation that leads in the direction of demonisation and dehumanisation. In particular, this group noticed (at least implicitly – this is my interpretation) both the importance of dignity in this regard and its reciprocal nature. They alluded explicitly to the adage that you know the character of the society by the way that it treats its prisoners and the biblical caution around exercising judgement, lest we too be judged. Extending these observations in considering what to do with the bodies, the group observed that in failing to accord them appropriate human dignity our own dignity and humanity would also be at stake. The participants decided, on this basis, that each of the bombers should be accorded a proper funeral. However, there was some can tingling debate in the group as to whether this recording of human dignity constituted forgiveness. But an unresolved issue seems to depend on whether forgiveness did involve an avoidance or refusal of judgement,

[3] Certainly in a few of the more recent convictions for terrorism offences, it does seem that some vulnerable individuals have been targeted and groomed by extremists in ways that suggest they might be considered victim as much as perpetrator, or at least that the question of their culpability is neither simple nor straightforward one. However, there is no evidence that would support this sort of phenomenon in this case.

that these things happened, they are evil, these people did them and are to blame for them, we judge them and their actions. Precisely the same unresolved tension was experienced in at least one of a group discussion as well.

One group focused on the way in which the attack threatened the cohesion of a diverse and plural society. This group noted two particular aspects of the dynamic of evil unleashed by the attack which, combined, appears to serve the global strategy of Al Qaeda very well. This discussion group noticed ways in which it could be said that Muslim communities in Britain were also victims of the bombing. It is possible that they were indirect targets of the bombing, expected to encourage others to radicalise and act out any disquiet and critique of the British state and its foreign policy in a violent, Islamist direction. Second at the same time, there was evidence of white radicalisation (sometimes making over use of claimed Christian identity, language and symbols) and a rise in significant levels of questioning, distrust and hostility from these and other quarters. This had potential to exacerbate Muslim communities' experience of marginalisation and of grievance, whilst at the same time making it harder to articulate such grievances or to articulate specifically Islamic perspectives on our life together in Britain and the world.

Although this group did not identify specific actions, it did identify the building of trust as a key priority for police and for all agencies to work towards greater intercultural understanding. More generally, importance was underlined of acting in ways that avoided unconscious collusion with the dynamics of evil present in and unleashed by the attack; to uphold the values and the reality of a floral and diverse society. In particular, this group maintained that good could over overcome the evil by refusing to follow the logic of violence.

What did happen

An immediate decision was taken by the police to treat the bombers' families as they would those surviving and bereaved by the deaths of other victims, albeit with some variations. Due to the fact that they were the families of the bombers, they had specific safeguarding needs that others did not. Some family members had to move out of their houses or searches were undertaken (and were provided with hotel accommodation free of charge). There was significant potential that they might be targets of a revenge attack as the identities of the bombers were known; the potential that affected the rest of the community as well. Furthermore, there were specific cultural issues both in the families and wider community that needed nuanced understanding and careful navigation: family honour was threatened; there were intergenerational issues that could make it uncertain whether one generation of the community at full understanding of and could speak for others.

In England and Wales, families of those who have been killed in a road traffic collision, through suicide, as the result of a criminal act, mass casualty event or critical incident (e. g., kidnap) are routinely assigned a Family Liaison Officer (a FLO). This is a specialist role undertaken by police officers in addition to their normal duties following specialist training. It is a role that has been developed and more clearly defined in the years since 2005, which can combine investigative with welfare rolls. Designed to ensure both family and investigation benefit from a sensitive and compassionate single point of contact: to act as a conduit for communication from the investigation to the family and the other way around. Even where the dead family member is not a suspect, a significant part of the role is to gather and evaluate information and evidence from the family that might benefit the investigation and pass it on. At the same time (and in the case of 7/7, where the dead family members were suspects), the role is reassurance, welfare, the building of trust and confidence – not least in ensuring the family receive information from the investigation in a timely and appropriate manner. It can include signposting to welfare and support agencies as well as helping families understand and navigate investigative, coronial and criminal proceedings.

The senior investigating officer was open and transparent about the dual aspects of this role and established what he describes as positive relationships with families immediately. This led to an onion-layered approach to a safeguarding wrap-around the family but extended into the wider community. Close safeguarding relationships were established between the FLO and the neighbourhood policing teams responsible for the local areas in which families lived, local community leadership, local councillors and community leaders, the police independent advisory group (advising especially on how well police understand and navigate community issues and concerns), members of Parliament. All were engaged in positive and open engagement as appropriate within the limits of the needs of the investigation to ensure there was a general understanding of what is happening in the investigation, what the concerns, needs and threat to the community were perceived to be. A communication strategy was devised together with partner agencies such as the local council, designed to positively impact neighbours, the local Muslim communities and the wider communities in Leeds and across the UK.

In addition, the police engaged in some targeted and similarly open engagement with white communities perceived to be at risk of radicalisation in order to hear, understand and respond to their concerns and to ensure they were apprised of some of the early findings of the investigation, especially those that contradicted misinformation being circulated by some far-right groups who were agitating and planning activities designed to destabilise community cohesion. Some arrests were made amongst the membership of those groups in the course of their activities.

On the 16th July, The Khan family issued this statement; a statement that in part reflects the above strategy:

"Police engagement with the families helped establish trust and confidence. In particular, it enabled very open conversation about the potential risks and consequences of public burial as previously discussed above. All families agreed to conduct funerals in a manner and in locations that did not (and I believe it is true to say still do not) attract public attention, but did allow families to have aerials that allowed them to fulfil their obligations, despite the complexities of their grief and the mixed exaggerated shock about what had left to these deaths that had taken the lives of so many others."

"The Khan family would like to sincerely express their deepest and heartfelt sympathies to all the innocent victims and their families and friends affected by this horrific and evil act."

"We are devastated that our son may have been brainwashed into carrying out such an atrocity, since we know him as a kind and caring member of our family."

"We urge people with the tiniest piece of information to come forward in order to expose these terror networks which target and groom our [sic] sons to carry out such evils." (2015)

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Glossar

The Editors

Corinna Dahlgrün ist Jahrgang 1957. Sie studierte Germanistik und Evangelische Theologie in Hamburg. 1991 folgte die Promotion (Laientheologie im Mittelalter am Beispiel Hartmanns von Aue), von 1990–1992 das Vikariat. Von 1992–1995 war sie Pastorin in Hamburg, 1995–2001 Assistentin in Göttingen, im Jahr 2000 schloss sie ihre Habilitation (Die Notwendigkeit eschatologischer Predigt) ab. Von 2001–2004 war sie als Professorin für Praktische Theologie an der Kirchlichen Hochschule Bethel tätig. Seit 2005 hat sie den Lehrstuhl für Praktische Theologie an der FSU Jena inne. Ihre Schwerpunkte liegen in der Spiritualität, Liturgik, Homiletik, Seelsorge und Pastoraltheologie.

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André Zempelburg is a post-doctoral researcher in the field of Old Testament studies at Jena University and is an associated member of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies. He holds a PhD in religious studies of Jena University, on the topic of atonement and reconciliation in (Rabbinic) Judaism. And he is co-editor of the 4th volume of the series 'Research in Peace and Reconciliation' (RIPAR) titled "The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation". His main research interest lies in comparative and philosophical reflections on religious concepts and underlying mythological structures of narratives.

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Major M.A. Leonard M. Fritz ist seit 2004 Angehöriger der Bundeswehr. Im Rahmen seiner Ausbildung zum Offizier hat er an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität in Hamburg Politikwissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen studiert. Als Offizier durchlief Major Fritz mehrere Führungsverwendungen im nationalen und internationalen Kontext und verfügt über Einsatzerfahrung in Konfliktgebieten wie beispielsweise Afghanistan und Mali. Seit Abgabe des Kommandos über die Stabs- und Fernmeldekompanie der Division Schnelle Kräfte 2019 absolviert Major Fritz die zweijährige Generalstabsausbildung an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg.

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Alistair McFadyen is senior lecturer in Systematic Theology in the School of Philosophy, Religion & History of Science, University of Leeds, UK. He writes (and teaches) mainly around themes related to theological anthropology, being especially drawn towards those often complex and ambiguous situations where humanity is threatened, vulnerable, at risk or somehow in question. Throughout his career, he has grounded this theological work in non-academic vocations: psychiatric nursing; suicide counselling; youth work; since 2002, policing) in a kind of triangulation between academy, church and the 'world'. His main publications are Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (CUP, 2000); The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the individual in Social Relationships (CUP, 1990); his most recent, again combining his two professions, '"I Breathe him in with every breath I take": Framing Domestic Victimisation as Trauma and Coercive Control in Feminist Trauma Theologies' in Feminist Trauma Theologies: Body, Scripture & Church in Critical Perspective, ed. by Karen O'Donnell & Katie Cross (SCM Press, 2020); 'Loving the Neighbourhood, Loving Enemies: Towards a Theology for (and from) Policing' in Andrew Millie, ed., Public Theology and Criminology: On Hope, Mercy and Restoration (Bristol University Press/Policy Press, 2020). In 2014, he was awarded an MBE for services to policing and the community.

Rachel Muers is Professor of Theology at the University of Leeds. She has previously held academic posts at the University of Exeter and at Girton College, University of Cambridge. She has published widely in the fields of modern Christian theology, ethics, and Quaker thought. Her books include Testimony: Quakerism and Theological Ethics (SCM 2015) and Living for the Future: Theological Ethics for Coming Generations (T&T Clark 2008), as well as the textbook Modern Theology: A Critical Introduction (with Mike Higton, Routledge 2012). She has been a member of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches.

Miriam Schade, geboren und aufgewachsen in Eisenach, studierte an der Friedrich Schiller-Universität in Jena Theologie. Nach Feldforschungsarbeit in Sao Paulo/Brasilien promovierte sie im Fachbereich Praktische Theologie bei Frau Professor Dr. Dahlgrün zum Thema „Seelsorge mit traumatisierten Kindern" (inzwischen auch als Buch erschienen: Dem Schrecklichen begegnen. Seelsorge mit traumatisierten Kindern). Derzeit arbeitet sie als Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Praktische Theologie in Jena und schreibt an ihrer Habilitation zum Thema „Spiritualität der Pfingstkirchen in Deutschland". Inhaltliche Schwerpunkte liegen in der Seelsorge, der Spiritualität, der Homiletik und der Ökumene.

Oberstlt i.G. Alexander Strelau wurde 2003 in die Bundeswehr eingestellt und stuierte bis 2008 Staats- und Sozialswissenschaften. Dieses Studium schloss er 2008 ab. Im Anschluss durchlief er verschiedene Verwendungen als Infanterieoffizier und als Referent im Bereich Human Ressources der Bundeswehr. Er war von 2016 bis 2018 Teilnehmer des Lehrgangs Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst der Bundeswehr. Dort beschäftigte er sich in verschiedenen Seminaren von Prof. Stümke unter anderem mit Frage, ob das Böse Bestandteil des Militärs ist bzw. sein muss. Von 2018 bis August 2020 war er Grundsatzreferent für den Bereich Personal im Kommando Cyber- und Informationsraum und erarbeitete verschiedene Vorschriften zur Einführung und Ausgestaltung von Karrieremodellen in der Bundeswehr. Darüber hinaus war er Teil eines Gremiums, welches die Durchführung eines Screenings zur Identifizierung von Fachpersonal für den Bereich Cyber/IT erarbeitete und in der Bundeswehr etablierte, um dem Fachkräftemangel zu begegnen. In dieser Funktion veröffentlichte er u. a. als einer von zwei Autoren den Artikel „Fachkarriere, Zulagen und fachliches Recruiting: Die Bundeswehr geht neue Wege im „Wettbewerb um die besten Köpfe““ (in: Wehrtechnik Spezial 2020). Er ist seit September 2020 Stabsoffizier im Büro der Präsidentin des Bundesamtes für das Personalmanagement der Bundeswehr.

Volker Stümke (*1960) studierte evangelische Theologie und Philosophie in Hamburg, Tübingen und München, promovierte in Hamburg zur Christologie C.H. Weißes (1992) und habilitierte sich in Wuppertal zu Luthers Friedensethik (2007). Nach dem Vikariat, drei Jahren Mitarbeit beim Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentag und zweieinhalb Jahren Erziehungsurlaub ist er seit 1998 Dozent (Lt.Wiss.Dir.) für evangelische Sozialethik an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr Hamburg und apl. Professor an der Universität Rostock. Sein Schwerpunktthema ist die Friedensethik und dort vor allem das Verhältnis von Religion und Gewalt. Jüngste Publikation: Religion und Gewalt. Eine Rezension, in: Theologische Rundschau 84, Tübingen 2019, 40–95 & 105–157.

Phillip Tolliday is Alumnus of Flinders University, South Australia. He has taught in the fields of historical and systematic theology. More recently he has published in the area of reconciliation and has developed an interest in the fields immigration and identity politics. He has a background in philosophy as well as theology. A recent publication is ‘Reconciliation: A Negotiation between Anamnesis and Amnesia’ in C Rehrmann, R Biermann and P Tolliday, eds., (2020 Socities in Transition: The Caucasus and the Balkans between Conflict and Reconciliation, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen.

FKpt Marcello Clemenz, FKpt Kai Oliver Nickelsdorf, FKpt Steffen Wortmann, Oberstlt i.G. Franz-Josef Voißel sind bzw. waren Teil des 13. Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst National an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr.

Menschliche Motive und Taten können beides sein, „gut“ und „böse“. Doch: Wie ist dem „Bösen“ zu begegnen, und wie ist mit seinen Folgen umzugehen – mit Krieg, Ungerechtigkeit und Schuld?
Im Römerbrief fordert der Apostel Paulus, das Böse mit Gutem zu überwinden. Unter dieser Überschrift vereint der Band interdisziplinäre Beiträge aus theologischer, sozialpsychologischer, friedensethischer und militärischer Perspektive, die versuchen, entsprechende Wege aufzuzeigen.

Corinna Dahlgrün ist Professorin für Praktische Theologie, Carolina Rehrmann Habilitandin im Bereich sozialpsychologischer Konfliktforschung und André Zempelburg promovierter Religionswissenschaftler. Alle drei arbeiten an der FSU Jena.

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