Julia B. Held

The Making of Citizenship

The Case of the East African Asians in Tanzania and Uganda, c. 1945–1972

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For James

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements....9

Abbreviations....12

Introduction....13

From Empire to the Nation State: Demographic Unmixing, Isolationism and Disintegration in the 1960s....15

Citizenship in the making....20

Insider and Outsider: Racial thought in East Africa....27

Political background: Tanzania and Uganda in the 1960s....29

History of Asian migration in East Africa....37

Asian heterogeneity and the making of an Asian minority....39

Methods & sources....43

Methods....43

Primary sources....45

Structure of the book....48

I 1945–1961: A multi-racial society on the road to independence....51

I.1 Perception and experiences of the colonial middleman: Economy as shared social space....51

The *duka* as central space....52

Stories of success and failure, wealth and poverty: The emergence of two contradictory experiences....62

Frictions in a divided society: Racialised strikes and labour protests....70

Conclusion....83

I.2 Asians in political transit: Collaboration, apathy and political activism....85

Segregated lives: Asians' fear and political apathy....87

Indian connections and India's influence on Asian local politics....96

Collaboration with the British administration....101

Political activism for an independent East Africa....109

Political multipliers: Support from Asian donors and publishers....109

Political participation....114

Backing TANU: Asians as political candidates during Tanganyika's transition phase 115
Ugandan Asians and the independence movement 119
Young Asians and the Uganda Action Group 122
Barriers to Asian political participation 128
Conclusion 132

II 1961–1967: Defining national and economic space 135
II.1 Negotiating citizenship 135
Making *citizenship legislation* 136
Shaping *citizenship culture* 145
Loyalty: *Citizenship culture* and the nation 146
Solidarity: *Citizenship culture* and the people 166
Getting by: Asians' *citizenship practice* 180
Conclusion 186
II.2 Africanisation and its limits 188
Africanisation: Claiming opportunities 190
From Africanisation to localization 196
Mainstreaming Africanisation 201
Obstacles and a shift in the economic agenda 207
The winners and losers of Africanisation 218
Conclusion 226

III 1967–1972: African Socialism and Nationalism as interacting means of exclusion 228
III.1 Taking over the economy: Nationalisation and Trade Licensing 228
The Arusha Declaration and Tanzania's first Nationalisation wave 230
Uganda's attempted "Move to the Left" 236
The Nakivubo Pronouncement: Nationalising the Ugandan economy 244
Targeting Asian landlords: The Tanzanian Building Act 249
Exploitation in the public discourse 262
Socialism as post-colonial remedy 268
Conclusion 274
III.2 Closing borders: From immigration laws to the 1972 expulsion of the Ugandan Asians 275
Disentangling the colonial legacy of British imperial citizenship 276
Criminalising Asian Traders: Tanzania's expulsion attempt 281

Tightening immigration legislation: Regional and global trends of restricting national space ... 286
The blurring lines of belonging and the withdrawing of citizenship: The expulsion from Uganda, 1972 ... 300
Conclusion ... 316

Conclusion ... 318

References ... 325

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Abbreviations

AA	Asian Association
AD	Arusha Declaration
AMNUT	All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika
ANC	African National Congress
BNA	British Nationality Act 1948
CIA	Commonwealth Immigrants Act
DP	Democratic Party
ICS	Political Pamphlets Archives Collection, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Senate House, London
KIA	Kenya Immigrants Act 1967
KY	Kabaka Yekka
MUL	Africana Section, Makerere University Library
TAA	Tanganyika African Association
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
UGA	Uganda Action Group
UAFU	Uganda African Farmers' Union
UIA	Uganda Immigrants Act 1969
UKNA	United Kingdom National Archives, Kew
UNA	Uganda National Archives
UNC	Uganda National Congress
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UTP	United Tanganyika Party
WL	Bodleian Special Collections, Weston Library, Oxford

Introduction

Three days before the tenth anniversary of Uganda's independence, on 06 October 1972, Uganda's leading newspaper, the *Uganda Argus*, opened its front page with the headline "Racial isolation to end at Uhuru."[1] The article reported about the Independence Parade rehearsal at Independence Park in Kololo, a township in Uganda's capital, Kampala, where President Idi Amin held a speech. Amin claimed that the 300 Asians taking part in the rehearsal were proof that the Asian minority had finally been willing to integrate into the Ugandan nation. The article was published at the height of the expulsion of circa 80,000 Asians from Uganda and less than two years after Amin had carried out a successful coup on 25 January 1971 to succeed Milton Obote as president. Only two months before the article was published, in early August 1972 Amin had announced that all Asian non-citizens had to leave Uganda within three months. Amin had later extended this expulsion decree to almost all Asians in Uganda.

It seems cynical of the Ugandan President to claim that this was the historical moment, when the African and Asian communities would finally get closer together. It displays a rhetoric which had its roots far before Amin took power. By 1972, the *Uganda Argus* had become a mouthpiece for the government's propaganda. It is therefore not clear if as many as 300 Asians really participated in the parade rehearsal. Further, they had most probably participated out of fear rather than due to a strong feeling of national loyalty. In his speech, Amin demanded that the Asian minority identified with Ugandan Africans which included intermarrying. He claimed: "If you had done like that long ago, what is happening now would not have happened."[2]

What can we learn from this article if not factual information? The rhetoric draws a connection between belonging (to the Ugandan nation) via a specific form of integration: biological kinship. It reflects the notion that belonging to a nation could only be achieved by blood ties possible through intermarriage, a notion that excluded Asians from the nation for now.[3] Moreover, in his speech Amin blames the Asian minorities alone for their inability to integrate.

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1 Racial isolation to end at Uhuru, *Uganda Argus*, 06 October 1972. *Uhuru* is the Swahili term meaning freedom or independence which was used widely in the region. In this case it refers to the tenth anniversary of Uganda's independence.

2 Racial isolation to end at Uhuru, *Uganda Argus*, 06 October 1972.

3 This point has been raised by Ali Mazrui: Mazrui, Ali. 'Racial self-reliance and cultural dependency: Nyerere and Amin in comparative perspective'. Journal of International Affairs 27, no. 1 (1973): 105–121.

Since the end of colonial rule in East Africa, the question of belonging became more and more pressing. Newly created nation states were busy defining a national identity to integrate ethnic diversity within its state borders. Yet, racial categorisation played an equal part in this re-defining of national membership. Colonial migration connecting British India with the east coast of Africa had a deep impact on population constellations long after independence had been achieved. After independence, these migration regimes had left migrants out of place as well as out of space, as they had no attributed space in the post-independence society. Expectations of self-governance were high; and the Swahili term *uhuru* while it was used as synonym for independence contained a more comprehensive idea of freedom – not only from colonial rule but from suppression and foreign political, social and economic dominance. Independence, however, did not automatically bring this sought-after form of *uhuru*. The influence of non-Africans continued especially in the economic sphere.

African leaders had to manage these disappointed expectations, while the public discourse debated how comprehensive *uhuru* could still be achieved. A great amount of disillusion came from the fact that the people who were believed to be out of place, as they were perceived as foreign or *wageni*,[4] stayed where they had been and kept the privileges they had always had – at least for the moment. Sara Rich Dorman, Daniel Patrick Hammett and Paul Nugent have shown that by making nations, the idea of strangers was created at the same time.[5] They further point out: "[…] the 'outsiders' are often those who migrated into the region during the colonial period, or even before, and whose claim to citizenship is thus seen as less 'authentic'."[6]

This book is structured around three main themes: first, the reconfiguration of public space – from the imperial to the national resulting in demographic unmixing; second, citizenship – the way East Africans legislated, imagined and practised citizenship; and third, race – as a component as well as a competing category of citizenship.

Decolonisation did not only mean a replacement of the colonial administration with a new national government; it also meant a transformation of the public realm into a specific national space. What did the reconfiguration of this public space mean for those who inhabited it; and how was it reshaped by contemporaries? When the social order defined by colonialism reversed what did it mean for those who had held privileges during colonial time, like the Asian minority? The book will examine how contemporaries tried to reshape and restrict the public space (political, social and economic) to exclude non-Africans from national space. We will

4 *Wageni* is the Swahili term for guests or strangers.

5 Dorman, Sara R., Daniel P. Hammett, and Paul Nugent, eds. Making nations, creating strangers: states and citizenship in Africa. African social studies series v. 16. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

6 Dorman, Sara, Daniel Hammett, and Paul Nugent. 'Introduction: Citizenship and its Casualties in Africa'. In Making nations, creating strangers: States and citizenship in Africa. ed. Sara R. Dorman, Daniel P. Hammett and Paul Nugent, 3–26. African social studies series v. 16. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

analyse how this narrowing of space follows a pattern of exclusion, which Rogers Brubaker has labelled demographic unmixing.[7]

Citizenship concepts played a big part in narrowing this space for Asians in East Africa. In this book I analyse how citizenship evolved from its earlier imperial form created in the remits of the British Empire to a local concept of citizenship. I will focus on the process of citizenship making and ask questions on how citizenship laws were created, how citizenship was debated and imagined in the public sphere and how individuals practised and utilised citizenship. This three-pronged set of questions will explain the *making of citizenship* in this specific local context and will show how the definition of citizenship narrowed over time culminating in the expulsion of Ugandan Asians with local citizenship. A defining factor for this process was race.

Those who fought for independence based their claims on a strong anti-racialist reasoning and in the 1960s the continent-wide joint efforts to fight Apartheid in South Africa found wide public support as well as political backing especially in Tanzania (with Dar es Salaam becoming the headquarters of the African liberation movement). How was it then possible that racialised policies targeting Asians were simultaneously implemented and how were these policies justified? How willingly did actors use racial categories to make sense of the political and social setting. We will discuss how racial categories were used in the language of citizenship, in some cases competing with citizenship as the defining category of belonging but more often complementing ideas of citizenship, creating a distinct racialised *citizenship culture*.

From Empire to the Nation State: Demographic Unmixing, Isolationism and Disintegration in the 1960s

The 1960s in Africa were a decade of contradiction. Expectations were high. The overall enthusiasm about independence was prevalent and ideas of Pan-Africanism led to attempts at stronger cooperation – like the idea of an East African Federation. This cooperation between the newly independent nation states as well as a continent-wide movement aimed at helping other African societies to rid themselves from colonialism and the system of white supremacy in Apartheid South Africa. Yet, ideas of African integration and the global outlook which can be found for instance when looking at Tanzania's and Uganda's participation in the Non-Alignment Movement contradicted isolationist tendencies like the tightening of immigration systems happening at the same time. In the whole of Africa, decolonisation, the unbundling of

7 Brubaker, 'Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives'.

imperial connections, resulted in the creation of a vast number of nation states. In this context the status of migrants who migrated via channels of imperial migration regimes had to be renegotiated. The decaying British Empire left behind a messy system of belonging with different statuses such as Commonwealth and UK citizenship and the status as British protected people. While the British Nationality Act, established in 1948, was supposed to preserve part of the Empire by creating a new Commonwealth identity, it actually created an even more confusing and complex set of imperial and national citizen statuses which until today leaves some individuals of the 'Windrush' generation in limbo regarding their legal status.[8] While this book will concentrate on the ever changing political and social space of Asian minorities in Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda, it sheds a light on the (often racialised) wider debate on imperial and national belonging in the context of decolonisation and can explain exclusionary processes which took place at other places and times in Global History.[9] This exclusion of Asians in East Africa can be mainly examined by posing questions about post-colonial concepts of citizenship, which excluded Asians from political space and the imaginary of post-colonial society, as well as analysing how economic policies were designed to bar members of the minority from economic space.

By contextualizing the exodus of East African Asians with the concept of demographic unmixing, we gain a wider understanding of processes and relevant factors and make it comparable to other global histories of unmixing. Unmixing – while as a term widely used in secondary literature about migration and ethnic cleansing – has rarely been defined or even consistently applied. The only theorised concept of unmixing given by Rogers Brubaker is the definition that will be used going forward.[10] Brubaker defines unmixing as a form of migration. According to Brubaker unmixing appears in the aftermath of empire and is "generated by the

8 In 2018 it became known that a number of people of the Windrush generation had been deported from Britain and had their British citizenship withdrawn due to a lack of documentation. The Windrush generation, named after the MV Empire Windrush, the first boat arriving with immigrants from the Caribbean, are the people who arrived in Britain between 1948 and 1971 but held British passports and CUKC status before arrival in Britain. For more on the impact on the British Nationality Act 1948 and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and 1968 see: chapter III.2.

9 Kedar, Benjamin Z. 'Expulsion as an issue of World History'. *Journal of World History* 7, no. 2 (1996): 165–180.

10 Brubaker, Rogers. 'Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 2 (1995): 189–218. Brubaker, Rogers. 'Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the "New Europe"'. *International Migration Review* 32, no. 4 (1998): 1047–1065. Brubaker is concentrating on ethnic unmixing, Jan Jansen when talking about the Mediterranean uses the more general term of demographic unmixing, which will also be used in the following: Jansen, Jan. 'Unmixing the Mediterranean? Migration, demografische "Entmischung" und Globalgeschichte'. In *Globalgeschichten: Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven*. ed. Boris Barth, Stefanie Gänger and Niels P. Petersson. 1. Aufl., 291–313. Globalgeschichte 17. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014.

reconfiguration of political space along national lines."[11] This reconfiguration of political space is an uneven and long-time process. The investigation period from 1945 to 1972 used here is thus only a short period of this long-time process, implications of which can still be found today. This shows how medium-term policies can have long-lasting influence on processes of exclusion and that alternative political programmes and decisions such as in the case of Tanzania can change the outcome of those processes. The reconfiguration of political space is a *conditio sine qua non* according to Brubaker, yet not sufficient.[12]

First, types of organised and disorganised violence like the Buganda riots, the anti-Arab and anti-Asian pogroms during the Zanzibar revolution and killings of Asians during the failed coup in Tanzania 1964 as well as the use of force by Ugandan military and police during the Amin time can be factored in here. Second, anticipated and actual policies of successor states towards the minority (e. g. control over recruitment to state employment) are a relevant factor in this case; Africanisation policies including recruitment tactics of civil servants in the 1960s as well as application procedures to acquire citizenship and the revision of the validity of already issued citizenship registration certificates are examples for such anticipated and actual policies. Third, availability and quality of the resettlement opportunities in an external national homeland, the increasingly limited chance of settling in the UK led to a rush in emigration and voucher application. Moreover, self-identification by East African Asians with India (or Pakistan) as an external homeland was limited. The reorientation towards Britain shows the presence of multiple identities. Fourth, likelihood and attractiveness of mobilisation can offer an alternative to migration; finding what Brubaker calls a "voice" or finding a form of representation can be an alternative to exit. Amin's Uganda did not offer a voice as alternative to exit. However, in Tanzania the full adoption of *ujamaa* (African familyhood) values and the acceptance of economic restrictions in the name of Tanzanian socialism offered an option (although limited) to integrate into socialist society.[13]

Demographic unmixing can be found in various post-imperial contexts. Most similar to the exodus of Asians from East Africa are other demographic homogenisation processes in Africa often following either decolonisation or the introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s. Secessionist movements were a common occurrence after independence, the most well-known examples are Nigeria and the Congo. There are further many cases of expulsions of individuals or certain population groups in other African states. One well-known example

[11] Brubaker, 'Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives': 203.

[12] Ibid., 203–5.

[13] Brennan, James R. *Taifa: Making nation and race in urban Tanzania*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012. Nyerere, Julius. *Ujamaa: The basis of African Socialism*. 1962.

is the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969 and then again the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985. African newspapers in the 1960s were full of news about expulsion of non-nationals – often citizens of other African countries. During the Ugandanisation process Kenyan Luo were expelled from Uganda in 1969. One of the more recent examples of demographic unmixing in Africa could be observed in the Côte d'Ivoire after the death of long-time President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993:[14] during two civil wars in Côte d'Ivoire, President Laurent Gbagbo used the concept of *ivoirité* which defined within narrowing margins who was Ivorian (Christians/people from the South) to exclude his main rival Alassane Ouattara, a Northerner, and his supporters from any form of political representation. Outside of sub-Sahara Africa examples like the Mediterranean case analysed by Jan C. Jansen are post-independence processes.[15] Brubaker himself is assessing the situation of Germans and Hungarians after the end of the Habsburg Empire and the German Kaiserreich. Moreover, reconfiguration of political space triggered demographic unmixing in post-Soviet countries, prominently in former Yugoslavia.[16]

By understanding the Asian exodus as a result of the reconfiguration of space and contextualising it with the global phenomenon of demographic unmixing in post-imperial contexts, we will see that the Asian expulsion and its prelude was not an unparalleled series of events and that the process of exclusion of East African Asians in the aftermath of empire is only one example of demographic unmixing. It also offers the chance to de-exceptionalise African history and embed it in a wider global history of post-imperial unbundling. This could particularly help moving African History away from the margins of Area Studies and bring more attention to the African continent as a world region with global interdependencies.[17]

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[14] Akindès, Francis. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Socio-political Crises, 'Ivoirité' and the Course of History'. *African Sociological Review* 7, no. 2 (2003): 11–28. Banégas, Richard. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and other African modes of self-writing'. *African Affairs* 105, no. 421 (2006): 535–552. Banégas, Richard. 'La politique du "gbonhi" Mobilisations patriotiques, violence milicienne et carrières militantes en Côte-d'Ivoire'. *Genèses* 81, no. 4 (2010): 25–44. Marshall-Fratani, Ruth. 'The war of "who is who": Autochthony, Nationalism and citizenship in the Ivorian crisis'. In *Making nations, creating strangers: States and citizenship in Africa*. ed. Sara R. Dorman, Daniel P. Hammett and Paul Nugent, 29–67. African social studies series v. 16. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

[15] Jan Jansen, 'Unmixing the Mediterranean? Migration, demografische "Entmischung" und Globalgeschichte'.

[16] Brubaker, 'Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the "New Europe"'.

[17] There are some recent successful attempts to link African History with Global History, see among others: Bedasse, Monique A. *Jah kingdom: Rastafarians, Tanzania, and pan-Africanism in the age of decolonization*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017; Bertz, Ned. *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in Tanzania*. Honululu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015 Ray, Carina E. *Crossing the color line: Race, sex, and the contested politics of Colonialism in Ghana*. New African histories. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015.

Furthermore, by using the concept of demographic unmixing the processual character of exclusionary policies is being emphasised. This process becomes visible when analysing how certain medium-term policies created a route of exclusion. At the same time, it shows where Asians had the chance to integrate into society and reveal junctions at which policy could have gone in different directions. It offers a way of thinking about processes which are equally influenced by actors' choices as well as by social structures without analytically favouring one or the other. The following concentrates on the rapid speed-up of exclusionary policies, which was commenced by the pressure of the British voucher system as well as the implementation of the Kenya Immigration Act in 1967. The aim is not to find a culprit for the Asian expulsion. Nor is its purpose to illustrate the expulsion and in general the exodus of Asians from East Africa as an uncontrollable cycle of events. It rather intends to show that the expulsion had a prelude and specific preconditions, that the process of exclusion was influenced by decisions of state and non-state actors. It will be discussed how these actors faced the challenge of managing various expectations of independence as well as having to make realistic decisions to keep the local economy liable while reacting to global and regional developments concerning immigration regimes and concepts of citizenship.

Further, I follow Alison Bashford's request for deeper historical research into immigration policies of post-colonial nation-states and show how various pieces of immigration legislation were quickly implemented and became increasingly restrictive in the first decade after independence.[18] Moreover, it will be illustrated how a global race was triggered to tighten immigration legislation. This race stemmed from an outdated British migration regime focussed on the Old Commonwealth of former white settler colonies. In his research, Randall Hansen has shown how the British Nationality Act 1948 until recently shaped a contradictive British migration regime and British public debates on migration.[19] Chapter III.2 will illustrate how the following Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 and 1968 have been interconnected with East African immigration policies and how action and reaction by Ugandan, British and Kenyan state actors led to more and more restrictive immigration laws in the region. Further it will be discussed how Tanzanian politicians avoided restricting immigration policies while

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[18] Bashford, Alison. 'Immigration restriction: rethinking period and place from settler colonies to postcolonial nations'. *Journal of Global History* 9 (2014): 26–48.

[19] Hansen, Randall. 'The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968'. *The Historical Journal* 42, no. 3 (1999): 809–834. Hansen, Randall. *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain: The institutional origins of a multicultural Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Some other relevant work on UK immigration policies and how it developed historically evolved, see: Hampshire, James. *Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the politics of demographic governance in postwar Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Joppke, Christian. *Immigration and the nation-state: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

using economic policies to diminish the number of Asians on Tanzanian territory. The expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 can only be understood when analysing the process leading up to it.

The following chapters will illustrate the exclusion of Asians from the political space and ultimately from Ugandan soil as a process influenced by multiple state and non-state actors rather than an impulsive event by a single authoritarian leader. The 1972 expulsion was therefore never a self-contained event but part of a wider dispute surrounding imperial and national belonging within the borders of Britain's decaying empire and in the context of the Indian Ocean World. The exodus of Asians from East Africa must therefore be understood as only one example of post-imperial demographic unmixing. I argue that the decolonisation of Africa brought up new questions about national as well as imperial belonging, which originally stem from colonial migration. Everywhere in Africa the questions of belonging and responsibility for minorities were emerging. Often restrictive immigration laws and economic protectionism were the answer to those questions. The 1960s are therefore, despite all pan-African tendencies, also a decade of isolation. The expulsion had global repercussions as it triggered a refugee crisis which apart from the East African region also involved the UK, India, Pakistan, Canada, Sweden and, to a smaller extent, other European countries. It became the climax of a long-standing dispute about imperial and national responsibility towards the remains of empire. Most pressing in this dispute was the question of citizenship. East African Asians with British and Tanganyikan or Ugandan passports were often degraded to second-class citizens. Both sides, the former colonial power as well as the newly independent East African states, rejected responsibilities for the Asian minority in East Africa.

Citizenship in the making

Citizenship as a political instrument of exclusion and its role in conflicts has gained increasing popularity in historical research as well as in the field of social science. As such, citizenship, unlike other forms of categorisation such as race, gender or class, is still worldwide legitimately used as instrument of exclusion and stays "the great remaining bastion of strong categorical inequality in the modern world."[20] In its limited access, citizenship has recently been understood as a form of "inherited property."[21] Bronwen Manby even claims "that the denial of a right to citizenship has been at the heart of many of the conflicts of post-colonial Africa, and that it is

[20] Brubaker, Rogers. *Grounds for difference*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015.

[21] Shachar, Ayelet. *The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and global inequality*. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2009.

time to change the rules."[22] Dorman, Hammett and Nugent have pointed out that "some of the most important issues affecting contemporary Africa [are]: who belongs to the nation, what is the status of lower order identities and how are resources divided up and ring-fenced as a consequence?"[23] Edmond Keller believes that the central question in the context of citizenship is: "who has the right to claim legitimate inclusion in the postcolonial state or even a relevant subnational community?"[24] This question leads consequently to the more general question of who has the right to take up space within the nation-state.

Citizenship became a crucial issue at the eve of African independence as it defined who belonged to the new nation-state and who did not. As colonialism had left a "legacy of legal systems that had created a many-tiered citizenship structure whose central feature was racial discrimination,"[25] traces of this hierarchal structure were partly absorbed by the new concepts of belonging. In his work, Mahmood Mamdani claims that the colonial state had in most post-colonial African states never been removed but stayed intact and therefore transferred colonial social structures into the time of independence, still dividing its population into "natives" and "non-natives,"[26] yet reversing its hierarchy.[27]

One must ask how concepts of belonging were translated from the imperial context to the context of the post-colonial nation state. Notions of belonging have been manifested in ideas of citizenship as well as in the social status of the majority and the minorities within a society. As many Africans perceived the presence of Asian minorities in East Africa as legacy of British colonialism, the latter were routinely categorised as foreign and external. Here, we must enquire how Asians were incorporated or excluded from the national self of Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda by legal and cultural concepts of citizenship. As Edgar Taylor has pointed out: "Citizenship did not so much provide a clear legal cover for analytically and politically amorphous

[22] Manby, Bronwen. *Struggles for citizenship in Africa.* African arguments. London, New York: Zed Books, 2009. 1.

[23] Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent, 'Introduction: Citizenship and its Casualties in Africa', 4.

[24] Keller, Edmond J. *Identity, citizenship, and political conflict in Africa*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Idiana University Press, 2014.

[25] Manby, *Struggles for citizenship in Africa*, 4.

[26] The quotation marks here highlight that a term from the primary sources is used by Mamdani as such and to indicate that the usage of categories of practices for analytical reasons can be problematic.

[27] Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism.* Princeton studies in culture/power/history. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Mamdani, Mahmood. 'Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001): 651–664. While natives always held the subject status during colonial time, non-natives could be either subject or European settler.

racial categories as it presented another layer of contentious language for people to grasp and reshape."[28]

Following this point, it will be argued that the formal citizenship status did not automatically lead to the political, social and economic inclusion of Asians in the national space. Further, I divide the overall notion of citizenship into three categories: 1) *citizenship legislation*, 2) *citizenship culture* and 3) *citizenship practice*. *Citizenship legislation* is simply understood as formal requirements for attaining citizenship. In independent Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda, it could be achieved either through birth, through registration or through naturalisation.

By *citizenship culture* I understand the imaginary of citizenship: the norms and ideas about what a citizen should look like, what a citizen can and cannot, should and should not do. This contains their rights and obligations as well as their social interaction with each other. *Citizenship culture* includes what John Lonsdale calls "the local and provisional outcome of continuing societal struggle from top and bottom," which debates the question of "[h]ow citizenship is imagined, secured, and performed."[29] James Brennan and Emma Hunter have both discussed the imaginary of a good citizen – the *mwananchi* – for the Tanzanian case. A good citizen was supposed to be a nation-builder, a farmer (and not a city dweller), a champion of African socialism by fighting economic exploitation.[30]

Citizenship practice, in turn, terms the way citizens practiced their citizenship in everyday life. While *citizenship legislation* was used by state actors to distribute economic and political power – control of land, economic opportunities and the access to public office – in a favourable way for those actors,[31] the individual could equally try to use the law for their own interest.[32] Lonsdale has highlighted the determination of local communities to insist on their "exclusive rights as putative firstcomers."[33] At the same time, so called settler communities have

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[28] Taylor, Edgar. 'Claiming Kabale: racial thought and urban governance in Uganda'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 143–163.

[29] Lonsdale, John. 'Unhelpful pasts and a provisional present'. In *Citizenship, Belonging and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues between Past and Present*. ed. Emma Hunter, 17–40. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2016.

[30] Brennan, James R. 'Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75'. *Journal of African History* 47, no. 3 (2006): 389–413. Brennan, *Taifa*; Hunter, Emma. *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, democracy and citizenship in the era of Decolonization*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

[31] Manby, *Struggles for citizenship in Africa*, 21.

[32] Cooper has emphasised that "citizenship melds a person's rights and his or her obligations – military service, tax payments, obedience to laws – faces the fact that the same set of expectations and rhetorics on which its power is based also underscore the claims of individuals to certain rights.", Cooper, Frederick. *Citizenship between empire and nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960*. Princeton, N. J., Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014.

[33] John Lonsdale, 'Unhelpful pasts and a provisional present', 25.

tried to claim rights for themselves. In the context of East African Asians, it will be discussed how Asians used their citizen (or non-citizen) status to achieve the best possible outcome for themselves.[34] Here, Aihwa Ong's concept of flexible citizenship becomes relevant. Ong argues that flexible citizenship is developed as a strategy to accumulate capital and power.[35] This includes using legal loopholes to be able to access as many rights as possible. This leaves questions which Frederick Cooper has raised in his work on citizenship and empire in the context of French West Africa:

> "On what basis are the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion determined – and what sort of state includes or excludes certain categories of people from the status of citizen? What rights and obligations are associated with citizenship, and what combinations of state authority, judicial institutions, and actions by citizens – be they in the street or the voting booth – shape what those rights will be?"[36]

The analysis will show that *citizenship legislation, culture* and *practice* are exceedingly intertwined. While *citizenship legislation* started out to be highly inclusive after independence, it experienced some alteration over the first decade of independence and became more restrictive. This can be explained by the narrowing of *citizenship culture.* During the 1960s, the role of citizens was widely disputed; in this debate African state and non-state actors repeatedly and increasingly rejected ideas of integrating Asians as members of the nation. This happened via two different narratives: in Uganda, Asians were excluded based on ideas of the nation tied through kinship and blood ties; in Tanzania, Asians were framed as economic exploiters and therefore enemies of Tanzanian socialism. Both times the minorities were excluded from membership of the nation, in Tanzania on basis of their belonging to an economic class, in Uganda based on the idea of their racial affiliation. Moreover, as Asians felt their position within East Africa gradually becoming more fragile, they adopted different methods to secure their possessions and lifestyle by strategically using privileges they received through their citizen status (many Asian families held multiple citizenships between them). These *citizenship practices* were perceived as disloyal and further excluded Asians from the idea of ever becoming "real" citizens and ultimately influenced mainstream *citizenship culture.* This will be further

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[34] For instance, Edgar Taylor has stressed the active role of Asians in claiming rights and participating in legal actions in 1960s Kabale: Taylor, Edgar. Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life, 1959–1972. PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 2016. Taylor, Edgar. 'Claiming Kabale: racial thought and urban governance in Uganda'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 143–163.

[35] Ong, Aihwa. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1999.

[36] Cooper, *Citizenship between empire and nation*, 4.

discussed in chapter II.1, which shows that Ugandan concepts of citizenship and nationhood were based on ethnicity and territorial heritage and originated from a heavily heterogeneous and fragmented African society. The divisions in the African society meant that the questions around Asian belonging in Uganda became secondary. Only when the issue became a central question of a regional and global debate in the late 1960s did Uganda start to deal more intensively with the question. The Ugandan government therefore implemented restrictions more rapidly and often more radically than the Tanzanian government.

Here the comparison between Uganda and Tanzania offers a different perspective. It can explain how national space for Asians was narrowed both in Uganda and Tanzania, although only in Uganda did it lead to a tightening of *citizenship legislation*. In Uganda, a narrowing *citizenship legislation* was the result of its narrowing *citizenship culture* – the discursive restriction of the national in-group. Emma Hunter has shown for Tanzania that the dominance of the leading party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), formed the understanding that a good citizen was expected to be TANU member.[37] As this added an additional barrier and made the national in-group more exclusive, it rendered the closing of *citizenship legislation* unnecessary. After all, *citizenship legislation* was not perceived as the defining and legitimate way into the nation. In Uganda, on the other side, with no convincing mass movement, legal citizenship status was the only formalised legitimate indicator of national belonging; restricting it – by withdrawing citizenship from non-Africans – was therefore seen as an effective way of creating a more cohesive in-group.

Brubaker has emphasised that a system of citizenships with varying value creates inequality: the privilege of holding citizenship of a North American or West European country offers the status holder a wide flexibility on where to live, travel and work as well as access to comprehensive national welfare systems. Citizens from the Global South on the contrary often experience their citizenship as barrier leading to forced immobility.[38] Yet, the example of the Asian minorities in East Africa shows that citizenship not only creates inequality in comparison between two different national citizenships but also within the framework of the same national citizenship. This becomes clear when going beyond *citizenship legislation* and thinking about the imaginary aspects of citizenship, questioning how local *citizenship culture* can generate insiders and outsiders. The example of the East African Asians shows that the legal status as citizens does not necessarily translate to an equal and meaningful form of citizenship for the legal status holder. The following chapters will illustrate how *citizenship culture* (in East Africa but also in Britain) created a second-class citizenship which consequently led to the legal exclusion of status holder from national territory.

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37 Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 200.

38 Brubaker, *Grounds for difference*, 21.

In the first decade of independence in East Africa, citizenship concepts were based on two main factors: loyalty and origin. While some, including Tanzania's President Nyerere, argued that loyalty was the essence to be and become a citizen of Tanzania, many others in East African politics and society believed that citizenship had to be centered around origin. In fact, in the latter's logic origin could be used as proof for someone's loyalty, as, in contrast, Asians who had lived in East Africa sometimes for generations still connected to India and the former colonial power Britain by family ties and business interests and therefore could not be fully committed to the new nation-state. It was widely believed that the newly self-governed nation needed more commitment than some already established state. In public debates, the term origin was part of a racialised language which defined most of the African population as primordial and autochthon to the soil. *Mwananchi* – the Swahili term for citizen – means child of the land, which supports this notion of belonging. This confirms Manby's point that the "principal argument used to deny full citizenship to the (relatively) recent migrants to and within Africa is that they are not really 'from' the place."[39] Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson have shown that this form of excluding newcomers has been used by the more established members of communities even when they do not feature any other form of categorical differentiation (e. g. race, ethnicity, language) apart from the length of residence.[40] This demonstrates that the sense of autochthony is deeply ingrained in ideas of who is entitled to claim rights and who is not.

As Benedict Anderson has shown the construct of a nation is based on an imagined community which is limited in its nature.[41] By creating a community of peers, this boundary making automatically creates outsiders. Cooper, Holt, and Scott have stressed the importance of public debate to define who was an insider and who was an outsider:

> "There has always been a question of what sort of people were "in", what sort "out." But the act of abstraction – as well as the institutions in which people came into relations with each other as citizens – meant that this question did not have an immediate and obvious answer. It could and would be the subject of numerous debates and political mobilizations."[42]

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[39] Manby, *Struggles for citizenship in Africa*, 19; John Lonsdale similarly points out the focus of local communities on their rights as firstcomers: John Lonsdale, 'Unhelpful pasts and a provisional present', 25.

[40] Elias, Norbert, and John Scotson. The established and the outsiders. 3rd ed. Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2008.

[41] Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Rev. ed. London, New York: Verso, 2006.

[42] Cooper, Frederick, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott. Beyond slavery: Explorations of race, labor, and citizenship in postemancipation societies. 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

This implies a fluidity of the status of insider and outsider as it is dependent on current debates and political mobilisations. These further lead to a changeability of the idea of a nation. Benjamin Neuberger has pointed out that "there is no permanent national-self. […] It will be a function of time and context. […] Different times and different conditions may lead to different identities and to a different perception of 'us' and 'them.'"[43] In the following, the three layers of citizenship, therefore, understood as a process in motion. Hence, the analysis of citizenship in East African will concentrate on the process of citizenship making.

After colonialism, the formation of nation-states across the African continent was not inevitable. Frederick Cooper has recently illustrated how different versions of federalism were debated in French West Africa after World War II as possible alternative to empire or nation-state.[44] In East Africa, an East African Federation had long been the favourite replacement of the colonial state for Tanzania's first President Julius Nyerere.[45] We do not know if an East African Federation would have allowed more space for demographic diversity. The result of decolonisation in Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda was after all the nation-state and building a nation in these two new states was a challenge. Dorman et al. like others have argued that it needs an external other for fragile leaders to create or maintain a national cohesion:

> "For leaders in unstable and fragmented states, control over citizenship entrenches their position in the power hierarchy of the society. To maintain this position it is necessary for them to cast a negative other against which to rally their nation. Division must then be manipulated to exacerbate tensions and foster a strong sense of oppositional collective identity, or to overcome differences to strengthen and broaden the nation. […] The most effective means to maintain nationhood remains to play upon fear - through the creation of strangers."[46]

For Asians, more explicitly in Uganda than in Tanzania, it was in principle impossible to become real citizens as being a real citizen meant being racially African. While there was no equivalent to a Western style of scientific raciology ingrained in the way people thought of

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43 Neuberger, Benyamin. *National Self-Determination in Postcolonial Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986.

44 Cooper, *Citizenship between empire and nation*.

45 Nyerere offered to postpone Tanganyika's independence for a short period of time to wait for Uganda and Kenya to follow and join together to an East African Federation: Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 574.

46 Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent, 'Introduction: Citizenship and its Casualties in Africa', 20.

race as categories of people,[47] race was used to define and distinguish people and label them as different.

Insider and Outsider: Racial thought in East Africa

The case of the East African Asians complements histories of middleman minorities around the world.[48] Asians in Tanzania and Uganda not only fit the definition of what Edna Bonacich defined as middleman minority,[49] the term colonial middleman can also regularly be found in primary sources where it was used to defame Asians as disloyal and agents of colonialism. The specific *situation coloniale*[50] in which Asians had settled in East Africa enforced the centrifugal force which pushed the different groups within this society apart. Crawford Young has argued that the "colonial state imposed three axes of classification of the African subject: racially, as an African; territorially, as a native of the units of colonial partition; and 'tribal', as a member of an ethnic category."[51] This, according to Young resulted in a "trio of salient identities" at the end of colonialism, which faced the post-colonial society: pan-Africanism, territorial nationalism, and contemporary ethnicity.[52] Historians and social scientists time and again have emphasised the important role of colonialism in the shaping and enforcement of those identities. Yet, while older research on race and racism in the colonial context has focussed on the role of

[47] Jonathon Glassman shows notably how racial thought mostly based on cultural differences created a racialist society, in which transition between different racial categories was possible through cultural assimilation: Glassman, Jonathon. *War of words, war of stones: Racial thought and violence in colonial Zanzibar*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011. Yet, Western scientific raciology certainly influenced ways colonial societies thought about race even if only indirectly.

[48] John Furnivall has coined the term Plural Society for this specific situation of segregated populations living side by side but being integrated by the market: Furnivall, John S. *Colonial policy and practice: A comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*. New York: New York University Press, 1956.

[49] Bonacich ascribes following attributes to middlemen minorities: "a resistance to out-marriage, residential self-segregation, the establishment of language and cultural schools for their children, the maintenance of distinctive cultural traits (including, often, a distinctive religion), and a tendency to avoid involvement in local politics except in affairs that directly affect their group. They form highly organized communities which resist assimilation. These features, I contend, are related to an orientation toward a homeland.": Bonacich, Edna. 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities'. *American Sociological Review* 38, no. 5 (October 1973): 583–594.

[50] Balandier, Georges. 'La Situation Coloniale: Approche Théorique'. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 11 (1951): 44–79.

[51] Young, Crawford. 'Nation, Ethnicity, and Citizenship: Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in Africa'. In *Making nations, creating strangers: States and citizenship in Africa*. ed. Sara R. Dorman, Daniel P. Hammett and Paul Nugent, 241–62. African social studies series v. 16. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

[52] Ibid.

Europeans in importing racial thoughts and forms of racism to the colonies, recent literature has questioned this idea of a one-sided introduction of racism into colonial society. An outstanding example of research on local construction and shaping of racial thought driven by African actors is Jonathon Glassman's work on Zanzibar.[53] Glassman criticises:

> "Yet, much of the literature on the colonial world assumes, in contrast, that ethnic conflict arose more or less automatically from social structures that had been bolstered or even created outright by colonial rule: its emphasis is not on indigenous thinkers but on European policy makers who defined and divided their subjects by race and ethnicity."[54]

I understand race and ethnicity as categories of practice which are originated from the same practice of categorising. The reification of those categories is, as Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have pointed out, a social process as well as an intellectual practice.[55] This means that the "race-talk" and "nation-talk" of political actors will be analysed to illustrate how ideas of race were reified in politics and in everyday life. While the colonial society had made certain categories of practice such as race and ethnicity and to a lesser extent the notion of nation readily available, this did not automatically result in local actors using these categories to frame politics and shape post-independent society.[56] Here, my focus will lie on local actors to follow Glassman's example of shifting the emphasis away from the idea that racial thought is a European import. The question is rather, how African actors reacted to social realities which resulted from colonial migration regimes. In this sense, the analysis will concentrate on how public discourse and political actors have shaped ideas of race and nation considering all the requisites inherited from colonialism, especially if they defined nationhood using racial categories or abandoned them. How was the African claim for the abolishment of racialism retained while state-actors challenged and remodelled the social structure and the economic system through policies based on racial categorisation, in particular Africanisation programmes?

In this context, actors sometimes used contradicting methods. When the Tanzanian government abandoned racial categories in censuses in the early 1960s, it did not automatically stop

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[53] Glassman, Jonathon. 'Sorting out the tribes: The creation of racial identities in colonial Zanzibar's newspaper wars'. *The Journal of African History* 41, no. 3 (2000): 395–428. Glassman, Jonathon. 'Slower than a massacre: The multiple sources of racial thought in colonial Africa'. *The American Historical Review* 109, no. 3 (2004): 720–754. Glassman, *War of words, war of stones*.

[54] Glassman, *War of words, war of stones*, 7.

[55] Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 'Beyond "identity"'. *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 1–47.

[56] Brubaker and Cooper argue that the availability of categories does not consequently have to lead to these categories taking up "significant roles in framing perception, orienting action, or shaping self-understanding in everyday life:" ibid., 26.

using racialised language. Even though the language became more coded, racial references were still easily understandable for the general public as James Brennan has shown.[57] The reason for this was that the government needed to manage contradictive expectations regarding race relations. On the one hand Nyerere had always propagated the need of anti-racialism and the dissolution of racial thinking, on the other hand he had to offer some form of acknowledgement of economic misbalance along racial lines and possible solutions to hinder more radical segments within his own party and outside of it to gain support in the wider population, which was supporting the diminishment of Asian privilege.

By comparing the Ugandan and Tanzanian case, one can identify different ways of how political actors used categories of practice after independence. As Edgar Taylor has shown in his dissertation about Asians in Kabale government officials were consciously using these categories of practice.[58] The discourse about the Asian population in Uganda had been racialised. The idea of Ugandaness was intrinsically linked to notions of origins and biological heritage created by blood ties. This expressed itself in the repeated complaint that Asians did not marry Africans and therefore excluded themselves from being part of the Ugandan nation. Being Ugandan meant therefore being racially Ugandan. In the context of African socialism, the Tanzanian discourse evolved around the distribution of wealth and is consequently targeting the Asian minorities as economic elite. In both cases, restrictions and discrimination were the consequences. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian concept of a socialist society offered more opportunities to integrate than a society based on shared blood like in Uganda. Further, the introduction of Swahili as language of instruction in primary and later secondary school as well as establishing schools as a shared social space for Africans, Asians and Europeans in Tanzania led to stronger integration and the creation of Swahili as a joined language and identifying factor.[59]

Political background: Tanzania and Uganda in the 1960s

This analysis follows the assumption that independence did not mean a clear break from all colonial structures. The 1960s and 1970s rather sprang up directly from the late colonial period. The time since World War II until the early 1970s should be understood as a longer transition

[57] Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75'.

[58] Taylor. *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life*.

[59] The relevance of a shared language has been emphasised by Benedict Anderson in the context of what he called European linguistic nationalism: Anderson, Benedict R. O'G, *Imagined communities*, 44.

period from colonial rule to self-governance. The timeframe will therefore comprise the period from 1945 to 1972 – starting with the late colonial time and ending with the expulsion of the Asians from Uganda in 1972. Frederick Cooper expressed felicitously: “What lies between the ‘colonial’ and the ‘post’? Not an event, not a moment, but a process.”[60]

To understand the political context of this period as well as the situation of Asians in colonial East Africa, a brief historical outline about the history of Asian migration in East Africa as well as Tanganyikan/Tanzanian and Ugandan politics is appropriate at this point. Tanganyika’s and Uganda’s road to independence differed in many ways. The following sets out how both countries achieved independence in 1961 (Tanganyika) and 1962 (Uganda) and how parties and political leaders tried to consolidate power and established political institutions.

The end of World War II marked what is in general known as the second colonial occupation of Africa.[61] In East Africa, the post-war years came along with a stronger focus on Africanisation programmes by the British colonial administration, which had been initially introduced in the 1930s. The quest for more influence by Africans particularly those who had been educated in western institutions turned into claims for independence in the course of the 1950s. Yet, there are quite a few differences between the way Africans fought for independence and against colonial occupation in Tanganyika and Uganda. This will be a focus in chapter II.1, which discusses the role of Asians in the political process pre-independence and argues that the constellation of the independence movements and its imprint on the party and political system in the 1960s in Uganda and Tanzania immensely affected the integration process of minorities.

Tanganyika had become a British League of Nation Mandate in 1922 following the defeat of Germany in World War I and its forced surrender of all former colonies including Deutsch-Ostafrika. With the founding of the United Nations in 1945, Tanganyika became a United Nations Trust Territory. At that time, of all the East African territories, Tanganyika was reckoned to be the least developed and the furthest away from achieving self-governance.[62] Yet, in 1961 Tanganyika became the first out of those territories to achieve independence. From 1945 on, a strong nationalist movement developed in Tanganyika which reached all parts of African society and was unified under one single party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU had formed in 1954 out of the Tanganyika African Association under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. No other political party in colonial Tanganyika had similarly wide-reaching

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[60] Cooper, *Citizenship between empire and nation*, 4.

[61] Low, Donald A., and John Lonsdale. ‘Introduction: Towards the new order 1945–1963’. In *History of East Africa*. ed. Donald A. Low and Alison Smith, 1–63 III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 436f.

[62] In 1954, the United Nations Visiting Mission suggested 20 to 25 years until Tanganyika should achieve self-governance: UN report; Donald A. Low and John Lonsdale, ‘Introduction: Towards the new order 1945–1963’, 59.

support as TANU, which was proven by the landslide victory in the Tanganyikan Legislative Council (LegCo) elections in 1958. As result of the elections, almost all LegCo seats, which at the time were still based on a tripartite voting system with multiracial representation,[63] including the European and Asian seats, were filled with candidates who had been supported by TANU.[64] The issue surrounding the tripartite voting system was the biggest dividing factor in Tanganyikan politics. The United Tanganyika Party (UTC), the party supported by the few European settlers promoted an independent Tanganyika with an electoral system which would permanently treat the European and Asian minorities preferentially. While TANU in general supported the principle of one person one vote, the party had accepted a multiracial voting system under the prerequisite of it being temporarily to not hinder the timetable for independence. But the fact that Nyerere as TANU's leader had accepted the slower introduction of a one person one vote system led to a split-off in the party: Zuberi Mtemvu, one of TANU's former organising secretary, left TANU with his followers and formed the African National Congress (ANC).[65] The formation of the ANC, despite its little success at the ballot box, revealed the division between radical and moderate forces within TANU and the difficulty with which this mass movement with a variety of political wings could be held together. While the radical voices of TANU often came from the middle and lowers ranks of the party (often associated with trade unions), Nyerere surrounded himself with more moderate actors who he placed into leadership roles within the party and the government. Yet, under the pressure of the radical voices in the party, Nyerere felt impelled to step down as Prime Minister on 22 January 1962, shortly after the achievement of independence, following a heated party conference debate on Africanisation. After Tanganyika's transition to a republic on the first anniversary of Tanganyika's independence, on 09 December 1962, Julius Nyerere, however, returned as leader of the country, now as the President of Tanganyika.

In Uganda, due to Baganda separatism, there was never a nationalist mass movement supporting the independence struggle.[66] Uganda was the East African territory with the lowest number of European residents; apart from the Asian settler communities the Ugandan population was predominantly African. While this African population was highly heterogeneous, the Kingdom of Buganda (Baganda constituted for 17 per cent of the total African population in 1945) was economically and politically dominant. Baganda profited from the region's agricultural wealth, better infrastructure and more schools. The special status of Buganda in the colonial context

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63 The multiracial voting system will be discussed in more detail in chapter I.2.

64 Donald A. Low and John Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the new order 1945–1963', 59.

65 Shortly after, in 1959, some Muslim members of TANU broke away to build the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT), as they believed the Muslim population was not represented enough by TANU: Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 551f.

66 Ofcansky, Thomas P. *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

dated back to the Uganda Agreement of 1900 which retained certain autonomy for the Kingdom of Buganda under colonial rule. The Kabaka, the King of Buganda, since 1939 Mutesa II., relied upon ministers and the Lukiko, Buganda's Assembly, whose seats were taken by wealthy landowners. Due to this special treatment, Baganda politicians claimed Buganda's supremacy over other Ugandan ethnic groups and regularly rejected the interference of central government institutions especially the role of the Ugandan Legislative Council. Several times after World War II, this divergence led to conflicts with the colonial administration in Uganda. Baganda political actors such as James Miti, founder of the Bataka party, and Ignatius K. Musazi, leader of the Uganda African Farmer's Union (UAFU),[67] organised unrests in 1945 and 1949, which led to the ban of both organisations.[68] This – what Cherry Gertzel has called "inwards looking and tribal" – focus of Ugandan politics prevented the formation of any form of Ugandan nationalist mass movement as seen with TANU in Tanganyika.[69] David Apter, however, claims that the Bataka movement was the first to express a form of what he calls "modern" Baganda nationalism.[70] Whatever to call the political forces in Buganda before independence – tribal or national – they clearly rejected the idea of a unitary Uganda and often even a form of Ugandan federalism by claiming autonomy and independence for Buganda as political unit.[71]

With a new governor, Andrew Cohen, the colonial administration aimed at a faster pace for self-governance with an independent Uganda as unitary state at the end of the process. The government's intention of creating a unitary state and talks of the role of Uganda in an East African Federation led to the Buganda crisis in 1953, when the Kabaka rejected the idea of Buganda being part of a unitary state and requested a timetable for Buganda's independence. Consequently, the Kabaka was sent to exile in Britain by Governor Cohen who declared a state of emergency. Only in 1955, Mutesa II. was allowed back to Uganda following the Buganda Agreement between the Kingdom of Buganda and the colonial administration which technically turned Buganda into a constitutional monarchy and recognized Buganda as integral part of the Uganda Protectorate.[72] Relatively regular unrests in the Ugandan Protectorate, mainly in Buganda, last the Buganda Trade Boycott of 1959/60, affirmed the British colonial government's belief, that Uganda was not ready for independence and delayed the date further. Meanwhile, nationwide parties were

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[67] UAFU founded in 1941, see: Reid, Richard J. *A history of modern Uganda*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[68] More about the unrests of 1945 and 1949 in Buganda see chapter I.1.

[69] Gertzel, Cherry. 'Kingdoms, Districts, and the Unitary State: Uganda 1945–1962'. In *History of East Africa*. ed. Donald A. Low and Alison Smith, 65–106 III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.

[70] Apter, David E. *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1961.

[71] Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 314.

[72] Cherry Gertzel, 'Kingdoms, Districts, and the Unitary State: Uganda 1945–1962', 70–8.

established, although most of them kept some form of affiliation with local ethnic groups or religious denominations. Richard Reid has called the National Congress (UNC) established in 1952 a "typically pan-African movement"; yet, it was dominated by Baganda protestants like its founder Ignatius Musazi (the former leader of the UAFU), Joseph Kiwanuka and Abu Mayanja who had profited from elite educational structures. Still, the UNC had supporters from other ethnic groups such as the Acholi.[73] The Democratic Party (DP, 1955–56) while originally founded by and for Catholic Baganda started to reach out to Catholics of other ethnic affiliations with a commitment to democratic and national governance. The future ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC, 1960), came to the table relatively late, when future President Milton Obote and his allies split from the UNC due to conflicts with the Baganda in the party in 1959 merging with the recently established Uganda People's Union (UPU). For Obote, himself a Lango, and his UPC Northern Uganda was the most important support base, as Baganda hegemony claims had left Acholi and Langi people resentful. Political lines in general were deeply divided across the Buganda factor:[74] "[…] both DP and UPC tapped into widespread anxiety and anger across the north around Buganda's ambitions both for itself and for Uganda as a whole."[75] The founding of the Kabaka Yekka party (KY, "The King alone"), which represented royalist and traditionalist Baganda, in 1961 was further proof of this division.

As first East African territory, Tanganyika achieved independence on 09 December 1961, followed by Uganda a little less than a year later on 09 October 1962. Zanzibar was the last of the East African countries which had been under British influence to become independent following a revolution on 12 January 1964 overthrowing the Sultanate of Zanzibar, which had declared its independence from Britain in December 1963.[76] Shortly after the revolution in Zanzibar, Abeid Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi-Party and after the revolution President of the People's Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba, and Tanganyika's President Julius Nyerere came together and agreed on unifying mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar under a United Republic of Tanzania on 26 April 1964.[77] The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was supposed to be only the beginning according to Nyerere's plan. Plans for an East African Federation, which consisted of

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[73] Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 312f.

[74] Mutibwa, Phares M. *The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd, 2008.

[75] Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 316.

[76] On the revolution in Zanzibar see: Clayton, Anthony. *The Zanzibar Revolution and its aftermath*. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981. Lofchie, Michael. 'The Zanzibari Revolution: African protest in a racially plural society'. In *Protest and Power in Black Africa*. ed. Rotberg, Robert/Mazrui, Ali, 924–67. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. Kenya had become independent on 12 December 1963.

[77] Initially the new republic was simply called United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the name change to Tanzania was conducted in October of the same year.

Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Uganda and Kenya, had preceded independence and were held upright by Nyerere for some years after the foundation of Tanzania in 1964. The other two crucial East African states and their leaders Milton Obote and Jomo Kenyatta had lost interest in this idea earlier. With the political systems and leadership drifting apart from each other, an East African Federation became less likely in the course of the 1960s and – while a public discourse on it continued – was not seen as a viable option by the people in power at the beginning of the 1970s.

The years after independence in both states were politically defined by the attempt of the ruling parties to consolidate their power by limiting political space for their opponents. In January 1964, parallel to the revolution in Zanzibar, army mutinies took place in Dar es Salaam and Jinja. The claims of the mutineers in the two countries resembled. They demanded higher pay and faster Africanisation within the ranks of the military. In Tanganyika, the trade unions joined the protests and demands for Africanisation. Nyerere and Obote relied on the support of British troops to retain control.[78] These uprisings showed that both governments struggled with political instability.[79] This included Tanganyika despite the fact that TANU was the (almost) uncontested leading party. Being a mass movement TANU naturally consisted of a wide range of different political tendencies and was therefore highly heterogeneous in its political aims regarding its membership as well as its followers. This heterogeneity caused conflicts within the party regarding the direction the party and Tanzania as a country was supposed to take. These differences became especially apparent when it came to the pace of Africanisation. Demands for faster Africanisation were often – as the mutiny had shown – voiced by TANU members who had strong ties to the trade unions. The Tanganyikan army mutiny was used as justification to restrict the autonomy of trade unions and introduce a one-party system in 1965.[80]

The Tanzanian government published the Arusha Declaration (AD) in early 1967. The declaration written by Julius Nyerere himself represented Tanzania's official adoption of African socialism under the slogan of *ujamaa,* the Swahili word for familyhood, which Nyerere had increasingly used to envision Tanzania's future society.[81] The declaration was a turning point in Tanzania's domestic and foreign policies. It triggered a policy of *ujamaa vijijini* (villagization), the

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78 In Kenya, troops equally mutinied. For a wider analysis of the 1964 mutinies, see: Parsons, Timothy. *The 1964 army mutinies and the making of modern East Africa*. Westport, Conn., London: Heinemann, 2003.

79 Richard Reid has stressed the relevance of the Ugandan army mutiny as trigger moment for Obote's expansion of the armed forces specifically by recruiting soldiers from the north, his own community. With this close alliance with the military Obote hoped to consolidate his power: Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 323.

80 Aminzade, Ronald. *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa: The case of Tanzania.* Cambridge studies in contentious politics. 2013.

81 Nyerere had outline of his political philosophy of *ujamaa* previously in: Nyerere, Julius. *Ujamaa: The basis of African Socialism*, 1962.

establishment of *ujamaa* villages where in the 1970s Tanzanians either voluntarily or forcefully settled in newly built villages to work the soil and live by the principles of *ujamaa*.[82] More immediate was the move to a more socialist economy by the introduction of a wide-reaching nationalisation programme. TANU's new leadership outlined in the Arusha Declaration (1967) and adopted by the government were criticized by many in the party with leading figures like Bibi Titi Mohammed resigning from their leadership roles. This fracture in the party structure later ended in the arrest of Bibi Titi Mohammed, the former leader of Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika, TANU's Union of Women of Tanganyika, and the exile of former minister, Oscar Kambona, who were accused of treason for planning an alleged plot against the government.[83] After the army mutiny and even more so after the Arusha Declaration, the government shifted towards a more authoritarian rule. The application of socialism decreased the economic space for entrepreneurship and in particular affected Asians. Economic restrictions and other exclusionary steps further discussed in chapter III.1 led to the outflow of circa half of Tanzania's Asian population from East Africa. This left the number of Asians in Tanzania in 1972 at an estimate of 52,000.[84]

For Uganda, the division between the central government and Uganda's four kingdoms (Buganda, Bunyoro-Kitara, Busoga and Toro) was the biggest obstacle to political stability as Richard Reid has stressed:

> "[…] a series of great clefts lay at the centre of Uganda, a set of tectonic plates underlying the political order which left it profoundly vulnerable to chronic instability. The fissure of greatest significance was that between Buganda and Uganda."[85]

After the parliamentary election in April 1962, the Kabaka Yekka party became kingmakers in forming a coalition with Milton Obote's UPC and enabled Obote to become the first Prime Minister of an independent Uganda in 1962.[86] This coalition seemed politically bizarre, as KY embodied everything the UPC opposed – Buganda's claim for supremacy and autonomy in contrast to UPC's wider claim for Uganda as a national project. Yet, this coalition demonstrates

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[82] For more on villagization see: Lal, Priya. *African socialism in postcolonial Tanzania: Between the village and the world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

[83] Bibi Titi Mohammed was sentenced to life imprisonment but was pardoned two years later by Nyerere.

[84] Oonk states the number of Asians in Tanzania a decade later in 1984 as even lower as 30,000. For both numbers: Oonk, Gijsbert. *Settled Strangers: Asian Business Elites in East Africa (1800–2000).* New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2013.

[85] Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 322.

[86] Beforehand, Benedicto Kiwanuka, leader of the DP, had been Prime Minister for a period of only two months during the phase of transition from colonial rule to independence. The DP had won the previous General Assembly elections in 1961.

the means with which both parties were willing to secure influence, the UPC by leading the government and KY by weakening its strongest political opponent in Buganda – the Democratic Party.[87] The DP transformed into the most vocal opposition party in the first years of independence. Yet, the UPC-KY coalition did not last long, and fell apart when Obote allowed a referendum in 1964 on the question if the "Lost Counties" which had been annexed by Buganda in the late 19th century should rejoin the Kingdom of Bunyoro or stay with Buganda. As result of the referendum, the population of the "Lost Counties" decided to return to Bunyoro. This was the first visible sign that Obote tried to limit the political influence of Baganda actors.

In 1966, Obote ordered the military under the leadership of the commander of the Ugandan armed forces, Idi Amin, to storm the palace of the Kabaka at Mengo, which prompted the Kabaka to flee to exile in London.[88] The new constitution adopted in 1967 abolished all kingdoms and created a unitary state with a strong central government under the presidency of Milton Obote. The abolishment of the kingdoms marked the height of the power struggle between regional and central forces. It successfully suppressed Buganda's influence for decades to come. Obote declared a state of emergency and Uganda became a *de facto* one-party regime with many politicians of the opposition being incarcerated. The Ugandan government declared the "Move to the Left" when publishing the Common Man's Charter in 1969. Radical socialist transformations as seen in Tanganyika, however, failed to appear.[89]

More and more, the Obote government lost support in the population due to its increasingly authoritarian conduct. This is why the coup by Idi Amin, staged on 25 January 1971 was initially received with wide public support from within Uganda and from abroad. Yet, diplomatic relationships especially with Britain and Israel deteriorated quickly and so did support in the Ugandan population after Amin initiated killings in the northern regions of Uganda targeting mostly the Acholi and Lango population, Obote's former support base. On 06 August 1972, Uganda's new president ordered all Asians with British passports to leave Uganda within 90 days. He later extended this decree to all Asians in the country and triggered the exodus of an estimated 80,000 people. At the same time the expulsion went along with the complete erosion of British-Ugandan diplomatic relationships. After the deadline had expired only an estimated number of 3,000 to 5,000 Asians were left in the Ugandan territory.[90]

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87 Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 317.

88 This attack had been preceded by an allegation from a KY MP who claimed that the President, the cabinet and Amin had been involved in stealing gold from the DR Congo to fund armament: ibid., 323.

89 This will be further discussed in chapter III.1.

90 Kaur Hundle, Anneeth. 'Exceptions to the expulsion: violence, security and community among Ugandan Asians, 1972–1979'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 164–182.

History of Asian migration in East Africa

The coast of East Africa has been part of an Indian Ocean world since centuries. Bustling trade relations developed between the East African coast and the Indian subcontinent preceding European interference in the region.[91] Those connections within the Indian Ocean region not only led to the exchange of goods and produces but equally to the circulation of people and ideas. The European and especially the British presence in East Africa led to a substantial speedup and intensification of this trend. In 1894, Uganda became a Protectorate of the British Empire, one year later under the initiative of Carl Peters and his Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft the German government established Deutsch-Ostafrika on the territory of today's mainland Tanzania.[92] Yet, German colonial rule in the region was brief. After World War I, the British Empire continued colonial rule in what was henceforth called Tanganyika by formalizing it into a British League of Nations mandate. European Colonialism in sub-Sahara Africa did not only mean territorial occupation. The drastic social transformation changed African societies fundamentally and permanently. In the British Protectorates of East Africa, the migration of workers and merchants from the Indian Subcontinent was promoted especially in the beginning of colonial rule. The British administration favoured Asians as skilled workers and believed they were more useful than the indigenous African population. In fact, people from British India were already moving to mainland East Africa before the construction of the railway started in the 1890s. Migration from British India and Goa was most often a result of private initiative rather than due to promotion by the colonial state.[93]

Asians had started to settle on the Zanzibar archipelago in the 19th century and by 1879, 5,466 of them lived in Zanzibar.[94] From there, more and more migrated towards the mainland to extend their business opportunities. By the end of World War I, 9,000 Asians had settled in Deutsch Ostafrika, which shortly after became Tanganyika. The Ugandan census of 1911

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[91] Gilbert, Erik. 'Coastal East Africa and the Western Indian Ocean: Long-Distance Trade, Empire, Migration and Regional Unity, 1750–1970'. *The History Teacher* 36, no. 1 (2002): 7–34. More on the long-term connections across the Indian Ocean: Hawley, John C., ed. *India in Africa, Africa in India: Indian Ocean Cosmopolitanisms*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008.

[92] The most comprehensive historiography on Tanganyikan history from the 19th century up to independence is still John Iliffes' Modern history: Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*.

[93] Nanjira, Daniel. *The Status of Aliens in East Africa: Asians and Europeans in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya*. New York: Praeger, 1976.

[94] Gregory, Robert G. *India and East Africa: A history of race relations within the British Empire, 1890–1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

lists 2,216 Asians in the territory.[95] The construction of the Ugandan Railways,[96] which started in the 1890s in Kenya and brought an estimate of circa 32,000 Indian coolies to East Africa, counts in general as the trigger for the migration of workers and merchants from British India to East Africa. Yet, only 6,724 of Indian coolies actually stayed in East Africa after working on the construction, the rest returned to India or died during construction.[97] Yet, their presence brought other people from British India who established shops, in the vernacular *maduka*, along the newly built railway tracks to initially serve the workers demand in daily goods. Asian shopkeepers (*dukawallah*) rapidly spread to other areas including the territories of the Uganda Protectorate and Tanganyika. *Dukawallah* are often reckoned to have spread consumerism in the region, from major trading centres in urban areas to smaller settlements in remoter rural parts of the region.[98] While immigration from British India was initially endorsed by the British colonial administration, British approval of migration from British India ebbed away slowly especially from the 1930s onwards. However, the immigration of Asians was never fully restricted by the British colonisers. The minority grew due to a never-ending migration movement. In 1931, still half of the Asian population in East Africa had actually been born in India.[99] In Uganda, the Asian population of 14,150 was circa half the size compared to Tanganyika.[100]

During the 1930s the British administration realised the potential threat of Asian enterprise to European business interests in the region. The Governors of Uganda and Tanganyika therefore shifted their economic policies by supporting an initial programme of Africanisation to allow more Africans to engage in retail trade. These efforts, however, stayed mostly ineffective until independence. Yet, the economic situation for Asian businessmen (they were exclusively male) became slightly more restrictive. Migration networks between India and East Africa stayed intact until independence. However, as male immigrants had started to be able to marry within the Asian communities of East Africa instead of travelling to India to look for a wife, the Asian population started to grow from within. This led to a stronger anchorage in East Africa and started to loosen ties to India as homeland.[101]

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95 Ibid., 113.

96 The Uganda Railway connects Mombasa at the Kenyan coast with Kampala.

97 Ofcansky, *Uganda*, 26.

98 Brühwiler, Benjamin. 'Trustworthy Trader or Creditworthy Debtor? Competing Moralities and Trader Subjectivities at the Kariakoo Market in Dar es Salaam'. *Stichproben* 14, no. 27 (2014): 27–53. Prestholdt, Jeremy. *Domesticating the world: African consumerism and the genealogies of Globalization*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2008. see also chapter I.1.

99 Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 388.

100 Ibid., 394.

101 This will be further discussed in chapter I.2.

Gijsbert Oonk estimates that in 1969 the Asian population of Uganda was 74,000, slightly lower than the one of Tanzania, which was 85,000.[102] Everywhere in the region, Asians settled predominantly in urban areas, which led to an overrepresentation of Asians in towns and cities, especially in urban trading zones. According to the Ugandan Census of 1959 and the Tanganyika Report for 1960, 19,268 Asians lived in Kampala and 27,441 lived in Dar es Salaam in those years.[103] This overrepresentation in the urban population increased perception by Africans of an urban space dominated by an "Asian look."

After arriving in East Africa, the Asian immigrants became part of a three-level colonial society based on racist patterns of thought. British colonisers and other Europeans were on top of this hierarchy while Asians were positioned between the Europeans and the indigenous African population, who were situated at the lowest point of society.[104]

This hierarchic social order was reflected in the consequent social and spatial segregation which was drawn through every sphere of daily life: in urban planning, social space (e. g. clubs, practice of religion, and sports organisation), professional life and education. Therefore, this social division had a profound effect on the private and public space of Africans, Asians and Europeans. The economic sphere generated the primary space of contact between Africans and Asians. The Asian immigrants were – not necessarily forcedly – pushed into the role as middleman, who served as link between the colonisers and the colonised. The Asians worked in trade and commerce, as shop owners and craftsmen and in the middle ranks of the colonial civil service. Despite great economic success and aggregated wealth, their social and political position stayed fragile, as they were fully dependent on the goodwill of the British administration.

Asian heterogeneity and the making of an Asian minority

In the following, the term "East African Asians" and in the shorter version "Asians" is referring to individuals who came from the Indian subcontinent to East Africa. This includes people from the former Portuguese colony Goa as well as from today's national territories of India and Pakistan. One can find different terms for this group of people in secondary literature such as Indian, South Asian or the further division in subgroups. Yet, as the timeframe of analysis spans from the time of British India beyond the time of Partition and independence of India

[102] Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 217.

[103] United Kingdom, Tanganyika Report for the Year 1960: part 2, 5; Uganda, Uganda Census, 1959: Non-African Population, quoted in: Gregory, Robert G. *South Asians in East Africa: An Economic and Social History, 1890–1980*. Boulder (et. al): Westview Press, 1993.

[104] Asians sought the status as non-natives, which offered them wider representation and rights. This will be further discussed in chapter I.1.

and Pakistan, the term Asian is used to visibly include people from the whole Indian subcontinent.[105] The term Indian as category of practice in the historical sources was dropped by contemporaries in many cases after the Partition of India and was replaced by the term Asian. "Asian" was by far the most common term used as self-understanding as well as denomination by others in the public discourse to describe the total number of people having migrated from British India and Goa. As Margret Frenz has pointed out Goans enjoyed certain autonomy in the way they were treated during colonial time.[106] This exceptional position when it came to census and other policies and administrational aspects disappeared more and more and by 1969 Goan was not listed anymore as an own category in the Ugandan census.[107] Their social exclusiveness, however, did not vary exceptionally from other Asian minorities who defined themselves by difference of religion, language or social status. As they had to suffer the same restrictions economically and politically after independence, they are included in the term "Asians" in this analysis.

By using the term "Asians" or "Asian minority" it is not presumed that there exists a *sameness* among members of this group or category regarding characteristics, attitudes or behaviour.[108] Being aware of this particularly important to avoid what Brubaker calls *groupism* – "the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed."[109] I rather analyse how *sameness* was postulated by political and social actors within the public discourse and how this rhetoric was translated into policies and laws, particularly in regards to citizenship. In fact, I reject the notion of fundamental *sameness* of identity. It is necessary as Brubaker and Cooper have pointed out that instead of thinking of identity, we think of identification, underlining the processual character of such identification, which is based on situation and context in contrast to a supposed end product (which might not be the result of the process). Identification as process further directs us towards the agents performing identification.[110] While the state is certainly one of the most important agents of these identifying processes it is not

105 In the following the terms Indian or Pakistani are used when referring to citizens of these nations.

106 Frenz, Margret. *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World: The Goan Experience, c. 1890–1980*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014.

107 Ibid., 252.

108 Brubaker and Cooper, 'Beyond "identity"': 7. Padayachee and Morrell have stressed that by treating a 'racial group' as a unit of study this disregards the difference in class and other social status: Padayachee, Vishnu/Morrell, Robert. 'Indian Merchants and Dukawallahs in the Natal Economy, c1875–1914'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 71–102.

109 Brubaker, Rogers. 'Ethnicity without groups'. *Archives Européenes de Sociologie* XLIII, no. 2 (2002): 163–189.

110 Brubaker and Cooper, 'Beyond "identity"': 14.

the only one. It can be "carried more or less anonymously by discourse or public narratives. […] their force may depend not on any particular instantiation but on their anonymous, unnoticed permeation of our ways of thinking and talking and making sense of the social world."[111] Discourses and public narratives will therefore be discussed going forward. Another relevant aspect of how Brubaker and Cooper dismantle the term identity is by using the term self-understanding.

Indeed, most of the time, Asians did not understand themselves as a closed group. They were a highly heterogeneous group of people. There are countless examples where Asians organised themselves along other religious, caste or regional lines within the Asian minority. I will regularly use the term "Asian minorities" in its plural form to highlight this heterogeneity. The caste system survived the migration from India to East Africa and played an important divisive role within the Asian minorities in Tanganyika and Uganda.[112] Asians further had differing religious denominations: Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, which were then again divided in different sects within those religions.[113] As Indira Rothermund has stated, Asians who had migrated to East Africa came predominantly from three specific regions: Gujarat, Panjab as well as Goa. Consequently, they spoke different languages. Gujarati was the most dominant Asian language in East Africa but coexisted with Hindi and Urdu. Konkani and Portuguese were both spoken in the Goan community although as Margret Frenz points out those two languages lost importance over time when being replaced with English.[114] Rothermund further distinguishes the Asian population in East Africa into following groups: Lohana, Visha Oswal, Ismaeli Khoja, Ithnasheri Khoja, Bohra, Patel, Gujarati Brahmin, Parsee, Sikh, Panjabi Hindu, Panjabi Muslim and Goans.[115] While the stereotype of the Asian *dukawallah* stuck, Asians were present in a variety of jobs and professions. Goans and Patels were historically in a higher percentage represented in the civil service (partly because of their widely spread ability

111 Ibid., 15f.

112 Margret Frenz highlights a fragmentation along caste categories within the Goan community. Joan Haig emphasises the subtle influence of caste within social structures in the Hindu community in Zambia: Frenz, Margret. 'Migration, Identity and Post-Colonial Change in Uganda: A Goan Perspective'. *Immigrants & Minorities* 31, no. 1 (2013): 48–73. Haig, Joan. 'Situating Strangers: Understanding Hindu Community Life in Lusaka'. PhD, The University of Edinburgh, 2010. More on caste in East African Asian communities: Melady, Thomas P., and Margaret B. Melady. *Uganda: The Asians Exiles*. Maryknoll: Orbis, 1976.

113 On the diversity of Asian culture in the case of Kenya see: Salvadori, Cynthia. *Through open doors: A view of Asian cultures in Kenya*. Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 1983.

114 Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 284.

115 Rothermund, Indira. *Die politische und wirtschaftliche Rolle der asiatischen Minderheit in Ostafrika (Kenya, Tanganyika/Sansibar, Uganda)*. Schriftenreihe "Afrika-Studien" Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer Verlag, 1965.

to speak and write English),[116] while Patels and Lohanas were often associated with retail trade and industry, respectively.

Yet, while it is true that Asians in East Africa understood themselves rarely as Asians only, they shared the common experience of Asian settlers in East Africa. This shared experience was similar within the different colonies and the region in general. With Asians being targeted as one group by policies as well as pogroms, these experiences enforced a stronger sense of *groupness*. *Groupness* as a term was coined by Brubaker, who understands *groupness* as the event where a *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* is created or enforced – the reification of a group as the result of a social process.[117] When we understand groupness as event, we can concentrate on the actors of group-making, which we then recognise as political project. Brubaker has stressed the importance of experiences of violence for group-polarisation.[118] Jonathon Glassman shows in his work on racial thought in Zanzibar how the race riots in June 1961 constituted a transformative moment which provided personal experiences of racial divisions that changed ideas of race and race relations profoundly.[119] Similar points can be made for experiences of grievances as this was the case of Africans in East Africa. Following this, we will explore "the moderately durable ways of thinking and feeling" about race relations and belonging "that represent 'middle-range' legacies of historical experience and political action."[120]

In the following chapters, self-understanding by Asians is particularly important when discussing how "external categorizations, identifications, and representations may be decisive in determining how one is regarded and treated by others, indeed in shaping one's own understanding of oneself."[121] It includes the idea of how one as individual or as part of a group positions oneself in its social surrounding. This is particularly important when it comes to Asians' reluctance towards the African independence movement in the 1950s as well as towards taking up local citizenship in the 1960s. The way members of the Asian minorities understood themselves shifted over time. While the feeling of belonging to an "Asian minority" within East Africa increased steadily and through the generations, the close identification with India and Pakistan as the motherland decreased since Partition.[122] This development was a reaction to shared experiences, outside perception and *othering* on the part of African narratives formed by the public and enforced by local politicians.

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[116] Ibid., 17; Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 113.

[117] Brubaker, 'Ethnicity without groups': 166–8.

[118] Ibid., 171.

[119] Glassman, *War of words, war of stones*, 22.

[120] Brubaker, 'Ethnicity without groups': 171.

[121] Brubaker and Cooper, 'Beyond "identity"': 18.

[122] This is illustrated for the case of the Hindu community in Lusaka in: Haig, *Situating Strangers*.

Methods & sources

Methods

While there recently has been a various number of studies related to the Asian minorities in East African states, there has been very few research done which has included more than one national context. Notable exceptions are the works by Gjisbert Oonk who has analysed the global networks of the East African Asian business elite and Margret Frenz, who in her work has focused on the community networks and memory culture of the East African Goans.[123] Both of these projects mostly used a network approach. However, no comparative work on the subject has been conducted so far. Using a symmetric comparison, highlights aspects which would stay concealed when addressing the same questions for the cases of Tanzania and Uganda separately. By looking at the Tanzanian case, we can discover new perspectives on the Ugandan case and vice versa. The book follows Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, who have called to drop the juxtaposition of comparison and transfer for closer cooperation between comparative and entangled history approaches in transnational histories.[124] Werner and Zimmermann termed this approach a *histoire croisée,* which consists of a multi-perspective method. This means that those national histories are complemented with a regional as well as transnational perspective which looks at entanglement between the different cases. This approach can emphasise the interdependencies between domestic legislations and citizenship concepts. These interdependencies influenced the national and global context of the research question. I use the case of the East African Asians to highlight a development which I claim happens simultaneously as well as deferred at different places with different minorities which were perceived as non-indigenous in a similar context of decolonisation and as Rogers Brubaker claims in the general context of the reconfiguration of political space.[125] I, therefore, by illustrating one specific case, make a more general statement for the discipline of African and Global History.

The Tanzanian and Ugandan case are fruitful objects of comparison as they have enough similarities in colonial context and demography to be comparable, yet enough variance in their political development and elite structure to usefully complement each other and emphasise

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[123] Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*; Oonk, *Settled Strangers*.

[124] Werner, Michael, and Bénédict Zimmerman. 'Beyond Comparison: "Histoire Croisée" and the Challenge of Reflexivity'. *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006): 30–50.

[125] Brubaker, 'Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives'.

divergence. This means that by looking at both Tanzania and Uganda, comparing national policies while at the same time analysing synchronic regional developments, we can see other facets about the case of East African Asians in both of those countries rather than if we had treated them separately. For instance, by comparing the lead-up to the Ugandan expulsion to the less noisy outflow of Asians from Tanzania I point out that the Ugandan expulsion was not a unique sudden event but was part of a wider development in the region which was happening at other places at the same time even if still slightly less extreme. Further, I discuss the different adoption of socialism in varying national contexts. Tanzania's government implemented an own form of socialism, while the Ugandan government also diverted to socialism. Yet, it is clear by comparing Tanzania's and Uganda's approach to socialism that in Uganda where a more blatant racially defined idea of citizenship in the 1960s establishes socialism becomes a mean to implement a more nationalist agenda which is subliminally relying on racialised ideas of belonging. As I use a symmetric comparison, both, Tanzania and Uganda, as objects of comparisons are given the same amount of scrutiny. Yet, due to the different medium-term strategies the Tanzanian and Ugandan government used, e. g. a stronger focus on economic means in Tanzania compared to more emphasis on migration and citizenship legislation in Uganda, some chapters will focus more on one case than the other. Similarly, some of the chapters have a stronger emphasis on global entanglements and the relationship between the East African states, Britain and India.

Zanzibar is treated as part of Tanzania, which means that it is discussed when it differs from the mainland policies and public discourse, yet it does not ascribe the same amount of space in the analysis and is not treated as a third object of comparison. For the sake of context, however, the political developments in Zanzibar before the union with Tanganyika will be discussed when necessary.

The following analysis makes claims about the way Asians were systematically excluded from the political and economic space of the new nations. The definition of space in this context follows Doreen Massey who understands space as a vast complexity of interlocking and articulating nets of social relations.[126] When talking about the political space, I refer to the various spheres in which political actors discussed, negotiated and shaped politics, polity and policies. Equally, the economic space is defined as the sum of nets of social relations in which economic life happened. Place as a term, on the other hand, will be defined according to Massey as a particular set of social relations which interact at a particular location.[127] Access to political and economic space is negotiated within the structural compound of race relations inherited from colonialism.

126 Massey, Doreen. *Space, Place and Gender.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
127 Ibid.

In the following chapters, the exclusion of Asians from the political and economic space is understood as a process which started as an exclusion from the imaginary national space (*citizenship culture*) and moved on to physical places such as trading centres and eventually (in Uganda) the state territory. The defining public discourse on *citizenship culture* ultimately circled around the question of who has the right to and realistically can take up space in the era of decolonisation. In the social structure of independence this scrutinizes by which attributes (racial, ethnic and/or class) roles within society are distributed. Here, what is thinkable consequentially forms legal as well as political structures. When the good citizen is defined as African within the imaginary sphere, *citizen legislation* follows suit. This process of exclusion from the imaginary of national space left East African Asians out of space and out of place.

Primary sources

This analysis works with a wide variety of published and unpublished primary sources. The first main pillar of primary sources is archival material like government files and correspondence. Government documents from the Ugandan National Archives in Kampala and the Africana Archives at Makerere University, Kampala, as well as from The National Archives UK in Kew are analysed focussing on citizenship legislation, economic policies and immigration policies. As the Ugandan material is often fragmentary due to the state of Ugandan archives with material not being preserved or subsequently destroyed and the resulting lack of a consistent collection over time, the British sources serve as a base to reconstruct political and social developments. This is particularly useful as there was regular correspondence between London and the High Commissions in Tanzania and Uganda including reports on issues relevant for the posed research questions. Because the British government had naturally a strong interest in the case of the British passport holders in the East African region a lot of material can be found on that matter. For chapter I.2 on Asians in politics during the 1950s the monthly political intelligence reports on Tanzania and Uganda by the Colonial Office offer detailed information on the activity of Asian activists as well as Asians' role in collaborating with British colonial rule. At other times the documents of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office are used to analyse the perspective of the British government regarding the question of Asian British passport holders and economic nationalisation. It further gives insight into back-room diplomacy and the way the British government tried to renegotiate policies behind closed doors.

The SOAS archives as well as the Weston Library Oxford provide a wide variety of personal documents and in case of the SOAS archive also a collection of the Conference of British Missionary Societies (CBMS) with letters from the CBMS missionaries in Uganda, which complement the CBMS collection of the Africana section at Makerere University. The CBMS had

established a support system for Asians in Uganda already before the 1972 expulsion to assist individuals to leave East Africa mostly for Britain. These letters and reports help to reconstruct the struggle of Asians on the micro level and help to understand the impact of state-directed exclusionary measures on the lives of those affected.

The second main pillar of sources is printed material. I rely heavily on local English and Swahili newspapers to depict the public discourse regarding the Asian minority, citizenship concepts, immigration legislation as well as exclusionary measures in economic policies. Because of the limited offer of secondary literature on the political and economic history of the region, newspapers – while their information taken with necessary caution – are also highly relevant for the reconstruction of a chronology of events in the main part of this book. The 1950s and the early 1960s in Tanzania were a short window of diversity in print media, which opened due to the movement towards independence in the 1950s and was closed by the development of a more authoritarian regime after the Arusha Declaration.[128] For Tanzania, the book uses the Swahili and English newspapers *Uhuru* and *The Nationalist*. Both newspapers were owned by the leading party TANU and often used radical language. *Uhuru* with an estimated readership of 100,000 was according to this number the most popular newspaper in Tanzania, compared to 22,000 estimated readers of its English equivalent *The Nationalist,* which had the same editor as *Uhuru*.[129] Emma Hunter has pointed out that this distinct character of the Tanzanian public sphere, in which the government party dominated the print media served continuously "as an important site for the working and reworking of political concepts."[130] I follow Hunter when using newspapers "to trace continuity and change in the ways in which those who participated in that public sphere conceptualized society and politics."[131] Further sources from the *Tanganyika Standard,* which was rebranded *The Standard* after the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, will be analysed. *The Standard* was the most expensive daily newspaper in the country. In 1970, The Standard was nationalised and Frene Ginwala, a South African Asian and anti-Apartheid activist, was appointed by Nyerere as its editor.[132] The paper consequently shifted to radical left-wing reporting with a more internationalist yet anti-Western outlook than the Nationalist due to a number of foreigners in the editorial staff.[133]

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[128] Scotton, James F. 'Tanganyika's African Press, 1937–1960: A Nearly Forgotten Pre-Independence Forum'. *African Studies Review* 21, no. 1 (1978): 1–18.

[129] Condon, John. 'Nation Building and Image Building in the Tanzanian Press'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, no. 3 (1967): 335–354.

[130] Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 27.

[131] Ibid.

[132] For an analysis of Frene Ginwala's impact on *The Standard* see: Roberts, George. 'Politics, decolonisation, and the cold war in Dar es Salaam'. PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2016, 193–198.

[133] Ibid., 194.

Kiongozi, the fortnightly Swahili newspaper published by the catholic missionary in Tanzania, is also used as source. While John Condon has claimed that the press in 1960s Tanzania was mainly introverted and reported little about the world abroad,[134] the analysis of Tanzanian newspaper articles used in this book showed that the Tanzanian public discourse extensively contextualised domestic policies such as the issue of the Asian minorities in East Africa with global developments and international relations.

The situation in Uganda looked less variegated. At some point during the analysed timeframe, there was only one national newspaper, the English *Uganda Argus*, which existed during most of the time (it was founded in January 1955). The media was under stronger scrutiny by the government, and the linguistic fragmentation of the Ugandan territory meant that less newspapers addressed a national readership, as there was no nation-wide spoken vernacular language, and the publication of those newspapers were in English. The *Argus* pushed aside the long-established *Uganda Herald*, which had mainly served the settler communities. The *Uganda Argus,* partly funded by the Aga Khan, had a directorship in which Africans, Asians and Europeans could be found, yet before Ugandan independence it was still under control of a British editor. After the nationalisation of the *Uganda Argus* in 1972 Uganda's main newspaper turned into a propaganda instrument of the Amin regime.[135] The *Ugandan Nation* was a short-lived newspaper which had been established at the time of independence but could compete with the Argus and after big financial losses closed down. Uganda's government party, the UPC, established a new newspaper *The People* as its mouthpiece. All newspapers, in Tanzania as well as Uganda, followed some self-restraint by the editors.[136] As addition to the national newspapers, we gain some regional perspective on the question of Asian belonging and local citizenship by looking at the regional Swahili and English newspapers *Baraza* and *The East African Standard,* which were published in Nairobi.

Parliamentary Hansards and public speeches offer an insight into the narratives used by MPs and the government. They are used to analyse the way concepts of citizenship; ideas of Africanisation and notions of nationhood were discussed by political actors. Party and government pamphlets from Tanzania and Uganda which are stored in the Commonwealth Institute are used to analyse strategies and ways policies were publicised. Tanzanian and Ugandan government reports stored by the East Africana Library in Dar es Salaam as well as by the CAS collection of the university library in Edinburgh help to analyse economic and social developments.

The subject of African History struggles with the lack of and limited access to archival collections. Additionally, as Derek Peterson and Edgar Taylor have emphasised, archival collections

[134] Condon, John. 'Nation Building and Image Building in the Tanzanian Press': 341–50.

[135] Taylor. *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 284f.

[136] Nelson, Daniel. 'Newspapers in Uganda'. *Transition* 35 (1968): 29–33.

such as the Ugandan National Archives represent a consciously perforated collection of documents and in the case of the Amin era (1971–1979) hardly record real development on the ground.[137] This is equilibrated by consulting European archives such as the British National Archives. This automatically leads to an overrepresentation of European voices. As a result, these sources have to be read with even more caution. With some exceptions, the letter writers were mostly white Europeans with their perception of local events and global developments being influenced by their experience of whiteness and their own colonial reality. The reality of African archives means that many of the sources are written from the colonialists' and/or European perspective. This is why published sources like newspapers and pamphlets are specifically relevant, as they represent African and Asian voices. The readers' letter section of newspapers is used in particular to analyse the imaginary and perception of local Africans and Asians on central aspects of race relations. Certainly, these African voices belonged to a literate elite, who were either part of the political class or otherwise involved in the public written discourse. This written discourse was largely restricted to the upper and middle classes. There are also almost no documented female voices we can rely on in the writing of this history. Yet, I tried to include aspects of gender whenever this was possible.[138] Of course, we are limited to a small circle of readers, yet because of the way newspapers were read and the way its information was passed on in 1960s East Africa these written words would have reached people beyond its circulation numbers. As Emma Hunter has pointed out the world of newspapers "did not exist in a vacuum, they emerged in dialogue with other discussions carried out."[139] This means that while we will be able to grasp aspects of daily life through the written word directly as well as indirectly, there will be facets which stay hidden.[140] Furthermore, the Swahili and English newspapers are particularly important as they reflect a public discourse which goes beyond the local and reflects on concepts of citizenship and nationhood on a national, regional and sometimes global level.

Structure of the book

This book follows a rough chronology which is split into three main parts. Those cover (I) the late colonial time from 1945 until independence, (II) the initial years of independence until the

137 Peterson, Derek R., and Edgar C. Taylor. 'Rethinking the state in Idi Amin's Uganda: the politics of exhortation'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 58–82.

138 Joan Haig has given us some valuable insights in the working of gender within East African Asian communities: Haig, *Situating Strangers*.

139 Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 29.

140 Ibid.

Arusha Declaration 1967, (III) the late 1960s until the expulsion of the Asian minority from Uganda in 1972.

The first part sets the scene by discussing race relations in the late colonial period shaped by a tripartite social structure. This part serves as an introduction to East African race relations and examines expectations of independence. Chapter I.1 shows how the economic experience was dominating race relations and everyday perception. It is doing so by analysing the East African *duka* – the equivalent to the British corner shop – traditionally run by an Asian *dukawallah* as the primary shared space shaping perceptions of race relations and experiences of difference and grievances. The chapter further discusses the African perception of Asian wealth and success and contrasts this with Asian settlers' realities of economic risk and failure. The chapter closes by analysing how economic grievances which stemmed from mentioned experiences developed into regular economic protests. Those economic protests often materialised in racial violence against Asians, which helped to enforce Asian groupness. Chapter I.2 then discusses the role Asians held in the political sphere and how they positioned themselves in the context of the African independence struggle. Similarly to the diversity within the minority one can observe a wide scope of action when it comes to Asians' political activities. The chapter will discuss the different positions from collaboration with the colonial system to political apathy and activism within the independence struggle. I highlight a dominating predicament which defined Afro-Asian relations: the communities' political fragile status brutally experienced through racial violence during events such as the Buganda Trade Boycott made many members of those communities more reluctant to get involved in the independence movement in any form. This then again made the minorities' status after independence even more fragile and resulted in long lasting resentment within the African population and cast doubts on the loyalty of Asians when it came to nation-building.

The second part of the analysis focusses on the time of independence and the initial years of self-governance with the most pressing issues being local citizenship and Africanisation. Chapter II.1 explores how a specific concept of local citizenship was formed which exceeded the pure formality of *citizenship legislation*. Apart from legal aspects of citizenship, this notion was influenced by what I call *citizenship culture,* which was formed in a continuous debate defining an active form of citizenry with a wide range of obligations and limitations. In doing so, it created an ever-modifying image of the ideal citizen. I further analyse *citizenship practice,* by which I mean the strategies of how East African Asians used legal frameworks to achieve the best possible outcome resulting from their often diffuse social position. The chapter explores how the three layers of citizenship intertwined and shows how *citizenship culture* and *citizenship practices* ultimately shaped *citizenship legislation* by narrowing the idea of who could be a citizens into a tighter framework and ultimately excluding Asians from the venture. Chapter II.2 analyses the claim for Africanisation programmes which were initially

supposed to solve the problem of how the new independent states could redistribute economic opportunities. In this chapter, discourse surrounding the need for localisation (Tanzanisation/ Ugandanisation) in contrast to Africanisation will be closer examined as it picks up on issues of belonging which are interconnected with citizenship based on loyalty and/or origin. The chapter further explores how specific power structures in Uganda based on the kingdom question reduced the impact of Africanisation policies significantly.

Part three focusses on the lead-up to the Ugandan expulsion in 1972 and the increasing economic restrictions in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration 1967 which led to the emigration of more than half the Asian population of Tanzania by the mid-1970s. In chapter III.1 I discuss the impact of the newly established narrative and practice of African socialism in Tanzania and Uganda. The chapter examines the differences between the Tanzanian Arusha Declaration and the Ugandan "Move to the Left" as means to take control of the local economy and their effect on the Asian minorities. It does so by illustrating the public discourse around the economic imbalance between Africans and Asians and specifically shows how in Tanzania TANU and other political players framed Asians as exploiters by categorising and targeting them as an economic class. The chapter discusses how the economic policy of Uganda despite the new label of socialism was rather used as a vehicle to remove Asians from Ugandan soil and was complexly intertwined with immigration reform. It will explore how nationalisation legislations (since 1967 in Tanzania and since 1970 in Uganda), the Uganda Trade Licensing Act (1969) and the Tanzanian Acquisition of Buildings Act (1971) worked within this framework of socialist rhetoric. Chapter III.2 further analyses the process of exclusion of Asians from political space and ultimately from Ugandan territory. This process will be put in a global context of a wider debate surrounding imperial and national belonging which concerned most newly independent societies not only in East Africa but on the whole African continent and in other post-imperial states. Debates in the UK and East Africa about belonging and state responsibility are central topics of this chapter. Theoretical considerations which place the exodus of Asians from Uganda into the theoretical framework of post-imperial demographic unmixing following Rogers Brubaker are part of this analysis. The chapter further illustrates how the narrowing of political and physical space for Asians in East Africa, especially in Uganda, affected the daily life of Asians on a micro level.

I 1945–1961: A multi-racial society on the road to independence

I.1 Perception and experiences of the colonial middleman: Economy as shared social space

Nothing else has shaped the African perception of Asians more than their role in the East African economy. Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere and Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta referred to Asian traders in East Africa as bloodsuckers and leaches,[1] referring to their economic success, and when Idi Amin expelled the ca. 80,000 Asians living in Uganda, he accused them of milking the cow but not feeding it.[2] The Asian dominance in sectors of the East African economies was indisputably real. Despite growing numbers of African traders after World War II, Asians still dominated retail trade handling two thirds of all the business in Tanganyika and three quarters in Uganda.[3] Asian businesspeople held similar monopolies in the Ugandan cotton ginnery and sugar industry as well as in the Tanganyikan sisal industry. The wholesale, however, was mainly in European hand.

This chapter reflects on long lasting prejudices about Asians in East Africa and explains how those prejudices and perceptions could develop and establish a widely accepted image of Asians in East Africa. Further, the chapter discusses how certain social patterns, attitudes and social practices in the economic sphere shaped commonly accepted hostility against the Asian community which led to racial violence on a recurring basis. To understand the roots of those biased opinions and economic race relations during the late colonial period, some events before 1945 will be discussed. Further, the function of the Asians as colonial economic middlemen will be continuously readdressed in this chapter as it was one of the major accusations made, particularly in the time directly after independence, by Africans when questioning Asian loyalties.

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1 Bharati, Agehananda. *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1972.

2 Asians milked the cow: They did not feed it – Gen Amin, *Uganda Argus*, 07 August 1972.

3 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 448; Morris, Harold S. *The Indians in Uganda*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

After analysing the *duka*[4] as central space where shared experiences of race relations were formed, I examine the narrative of Asian success by discussing the rise of one of the most successful Asian families and enterprises in East Africa, the Madhvanis, and their role as beneficiary as well as influencer in colonial time and during the early years of independence. In a third part, this chapter analyses different labour protests, their underlying motives, and the consequences for race relations in the workspace. In this context, the question why many of those labour protests developed into racial violence targeting the Asian minorities, with Asian shopkeepers as most common victims, is evaluated.

The *duka* as central space

No other place than the East African *duka* symbolises the unequal relationship between Asians and Africans more strikingly. The *duka* – the East African equivalent to the British corner shop – was the (often only) place where Africans and Asians met regularly as most of the colonial public space was segregated along racial lines. The economic sphere was the primary space which was shared by all Asians and Africans.[5] But even here regular points of contact in African and Asian daily life during the late colonial period were rare especially for the rural population which formed the vast majority of the African inhabitants. Still, every smaller town and a considerable number of villages had an Asian *duka*: a place where African housewives bought their food and kitchen supplies, where African producers could sell their crops and other produce and where *dukawallah* offered their goods to a wide range of people; in a nutshell: a place where Africans and Asians met on a daily basis. Hence, the *duka* was the set up where Africans and Asians primarily met during colonial time. It was the principal place where racially defined prejudices were created and reinforced.[6] As Edgar Taylor has emphasised, African-Asian interaction was not linear but multifaceted and could include friendly interaction and hostility at different times:[7] "The physical infrastructure of small

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[4] *Duka* (plural *maduka*) is the Swahili word for shop most likely run by an Asian shopkeeper, the *dukawallah*.

[5] Brennan, *Taifa*, 70; This can be seen in most societies with economic middlemen due to willing or unwilling segregation, see: Bonacich, 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities': 586, 592; Nair, Savita. 'Shops and Stations: Rethinking Power and Priviliges in British/Indian East Africa'. In *India in Africa, Africa in India: Indian Ocean Cosmopolitanisms*. ed. John C. Hawley, 77–93. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008.

[6] Voigt-Graf, Carmen. *Asian Communities in Tanzania: A journey through past and present times*. Hamburg African Studies. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1998.

[7] Taylor. *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life*, 2–4.

towns enabled racial exclusivity and class difference to be openly performed and contested in some spaces while rendering them less visible in others."[8] Yet, while different urban contexts offered some individuals based on their class and gender the chance to cultivate interracial relations in different settings such as bars and social clubs, this was not the case for the majority of East Africans. Furthermore, even for those who developed friendships in those settings, when it came to the shop verandahs and *maduka* these experiences were quickly overridden by the socio-economic setting of racial inequality.[9]

Apart from the singularity of the *duka* as a shared social sphere its distinct practice of trading and its close family networks made it vital in constructing imaginaries and perceptions and shaping race relations in the long run. In the following, we will see how the *duka* functioned as a meeting point for Africans and Asians and how its specific trading practices helped to confirm and strengthen long-existing abstract prejudices in African everyday life on the one side and how it consolidated Asian forms of self-identifications on the other side.

During the territorial colonial expansion in the beginning of the last century, *maduka* had spread along the newly constructed Uganda Railway tracks into the hinterland. Asian traders had settled for a short period of time or more permanently at stations along the tracks and later also at main roads, connecting different trading centres, and in villages off the beaten track. That way Asian *dukawallah* often reached places European colonialists had not advanced to yet. The Asian shopkeeper handled the demand of coolies from British India as well as of the local workforce. As the majority of the African population lived in remote villages in the East African periphery, the *duka* was often the first form of colonial expansion Africans experienced.[10] Therefore many Africans associated the arrival of the Asian trader in their village with the beginning of colonial occupation, while the European colonialist stayed a fairly abstract concept. The European administrators rarely encountered the remote East African hinterland or came in touch with the rural African population and even kept their distance in the colonial towns and cities where they lived. Later, the Asian communities of East Africa took pride in and based political claims on the creation of the East African Indian enterprise.[11] The establishment of *maduka* in the periphery had laid the foundation for regional and transregional trade on a much larger scale.[12] However, the Asian *duka* was not just a catalyst for the expansion of Asian trade and commerce from the long accessible coast of the Indian Ocean into the East African hinterland, which until then had remained mainly

[8] Ibid., 153.

[9] Ibid., 153, 194.

[10] Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 75.

[11] Mangat, Jagjit. *A History of the Asians in East Africa: c. 1886 to 1945*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

[12] Ibid., 55.

untouched from colonial expansion. At the same time, it was a product of the East African territorial expansion, namely of the construction of the Uganda Railway. Later, in the last decade of colonial rule, with the introduction of trading zones for non-natives by the colonial administration, the dispersion of *maduka* over the East African periphery decreased considerably as many Asian shopkeepers and their families moved to the urban centres, notably in Uganda where the threat of racial violence against Asians in the remote areas became more common as will be discussed later.[13]

In his *duka* the (almost exclusively male) Asian *dukawallah* sold his goods, bought local produce and lent money. He then resold the local produce such as ivory, hides and skins, maize, dried lentils and other crops either directly abroad – mainly to British India and the colonial metropolis – or to a wholesaler who exported the goods further. Even many African traders bought their goods at a local Asian *duka* which proves its monopoly status.[14] That way the *duka* became "the department store for all who live in [East] Africa – Africans, whites, and their fellow Asians"[15] as well as an important node in the networks of local, regional and transoceanic trade.[16]

In bigger towns many *maduka* could be found lined up next to each other at an Indian bazaar only separated by a few centimeters to leave space for an open sewer. In trading centres, the Asian shops often but not always specialised on specific items.[17] If the *dukawallah* lived alone – as was typical for a newly established business,[18] he slept and had his meals in a little room in the back of his small shop. Later if he earned enough money, he would move into a building which could accommodate the shop on the ground floor and a private flat on the floor above. This gave him the chance to start a family or send for an existing one he had left behind in India.[19] In smaller towns or remote villages *dukawallah* often started a general store in a simple clay hut with a thatched roof. If successful they would move into a more permanent building with adjoining private rooms.[20] Typically for

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13 Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 114; Morris, *The Indians in Uganda*, 134.

14 Mamdani, Mahmood. *Politics and class formation in Uganda*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

15 Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 104.

16 Morris, *The Indians in Uganda*, 135.

17 Ibid.

18 Gijsbert Oonk emphasises that only successful business owners sent for their family in India, while the failed attempts of establishing a shop or business resulted in the shop owner returning to India. These are stories which have not been entrenched into the minority's own historiography of Asians in East Africa and therefore is often overlooked: Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 36f. Oonk, Gijsbert. *Asians in East Africa: Images, histories & portraits*. Arkel: SCA Producties, 2004.

19 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 46.

20 Ibid., 47.

the economic middleman in various countries, a *dukawallah* worked long hours, often from 7 am until 9 or 10 pm, seven days a week.[21] Next to the frugal lifestyle, the *dukawallah* led a very economical business with little spending. The profit margin was usually low. Expenditures were only made reluctantly; most of the profit was redirected back into the business.[22] The staff were typically members of the family or distant relatives, which reduced labour costs to a minimum, yet made the implementation of Africanisation policies after independence more difficult.[23]

Most *dukawallah* started their business as one-man operation. It was not uncommon that the business stayed a sole family affair. Once the shop owner had established a certain success, he would think about employing an assistant. This would be most likely a relative, often a son or a new arrival from British India with no financial means, giving them a chance to gain their first experience in the retail business. A few years later, these newcomers would often be able to open their own shops (independent or as franchise) a certain distance from the initial *duka* by getting financial and logistical support from their former employers.[24] Thus, wide trading networks were built which offered new nodes for import and export and facilitated the transport of goods within the region time and again. Famously rich Asian families of East Africa like the Mehtas, the Madhvanis, the Visrams, and the Karimjee-Jivanjees had all started their business with a single *duka*.[25] At the same time, a *duka* did not automatically bring wealth; on the contrary, the majority of the *dukawallah* lived in very simple living conditions. Poverty and bankruptcy were common occurrences.[26]

Another aspect of the relationship between the *dukawallah* and the local population – in addition to their relationships as customers and produce sellers – occurred if the Asian shop owners decided to employ local African workers as assistants. Once again it was the Asian *dukawallah* – in this case in his role as employer – who kept the upper hand in the relationship. He could decide on the salary and end the employment at any time. In this additional function, the *dukawallah* added to the imbalance in the African-Asian relationship and reproduced the feeling of economical inferiority within the African population.

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21 Bonacich, 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities': 586; Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 48.

22 Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 103.

23 See chapter II.2.

24 Campbell, John R. 'Culture, social organisation and Asian identity: Difference in urban East Africa'. In *Identity and Affect: Experiences of identity in a globalising world*. ed. John R. Campbell and Alan Rew, 169–98. London: Pluto Press, 1999. Morris, *The Indians in Uganda*, 135.

25 Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 107; on Allidina Visram, the "uncrowned king of Uganda": Desai, Gaurav. *Commerce with the Universe: Africa, India, and the Afrasian imagination*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

26 Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 68.

For Europeans who worked for the colonial administration the Asian *duka* offered at least basic import supplies which they would have lived without otherwise.[27] Especially for the bigger European settler populations in Kenya and Tanganyika who often lived in more remote areas than the European administrators and colonial civil servants the local *duka* was the only place where they could buy their articles of daily use and other necessities. According to Robert Gregory, those transactions were often handled on credit with no interest rates charged but with the Europeans farms set as guarantees.[28]

A great irritation for the African customers resulted from the Asian pricing policy. One typical characteristic of the *duka* was that the Asian retailer did not mark his goods with fixed prices. The *dukawallah* and his customer rather negotiated a price individually until they reached agreement. This distinguished the *duka* from European shops or businesses. It was also one of the biggest causes for grievances in the African community. Because the prices for certain goods could vary from one customer to another and from one day to the next, African buyers would feel cheated by the *dukawallah* if they found out that they had paid more than their neighbour. However, price bargaining for the retailer did not always result in a high profit. The price could sometimes be much higher and sometimes lower than the original purchase price.[29] Nevertheless, for African customers who had not been used to price bargaining the constantly changing prices for goods seemed random and the practice therefore dishonest.[30] The setup of the *duka* meant that goods were displayed behind the counter without them being accessible to the customer. As Taylor has pointed out, this served as a visible barrier (controlled by the *dukawallah*) to consumer goods which at the time were "the material expression of class mobility."[31]

Not only was the *duka* an important node in the trading network of the region, it also fulfilled a very important role in the East African colonial administration, as it was the only place where Africans could trade their produce for cash. Especially outside of major towns, bartering was the standard way of trading. The expansion of *maduka* into the East African periphery supported the transition from a barter-based to a monetary economy.[32] The *duka* therefore held a vital function for the colonial administration, because it enabled the African

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27 Beachey, R. W. *A History of East Africa: 1592–1902*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996.

28 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 104.

29 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life*, 201.

30 Voigt-Graf, *Asian Communities in Tanzania*, 108.

31 Taylor, Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life, 201.

32 Aiyar, Indians in Kenya, 37; Mangat, A History of the Asians in East Africa, 55; Morris, The Indians in Uganda, 144; Ghai, Dharam P. 'An economic survey'. In Portrait of a minority: Asians in East Africa. ed. Dharam P. Ghai, 91–111. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965.

population to pay their hut and poll tax.[33] Thus, the *dukawallah* enabled colonial rule and strengthened his role as a colonial middleman. The link between Asian retailers and the East African monetary economy also becomes apparent when scrutinising the local currencies. Asian businesses had started to use the Indian rupee for trading due to convenience and the lack of a local currency. Later the first currency in Uganda and Tanganyika, the East African rupee, was actually named after its Indian counterpart.[34] The association of retail shops with the Asian minority is not only found in the name of the first East African currency, but also in the Swahili language, the *lingua franca* of East Africa. Many words referring to the retail sector such as *duka, dukawallah* but also *daftari* (account book) are loan words from Gujarati, Hindustani or Kachchhi.[35] This kind of language was an expression of the broad association of the business world with the Asian minorities in East Africa and the region's economy in the minds of the local African population. As the words became more frequently used in the English and vernacular languages the association continued to get more prominent.

Apart from paying taxes, African costumers were now also able to buy goods with the money they received from the sales of their local produce. With the introduction of cash, consumer goods became increasingly popular with the African population. While Africans used to directly trade their produce for food or other convenience goods, after the establishment of *maduka* in their village or town, they were now attracted by more and more consumer products such as bicycles, hats, clothes, and cigarettes.[36]

A letter from the District Commissioner's Office in the district of Karamoja, Uganda shows the important role which *dukawallah* played in putting the local population in the countryside in a state of dependency and therefore making them accessible as labour force for the colonial system. The author of the letter refers to some cases of Asians who had illegally entered the Uganda Protectorate and now worked as assistants for some *dukawallah* in the Karamoja region:

> "To deport these shop assistants is a very serious matter for this district because all the distribution of food etc is done through these wholesale shops and if the shopkeepers are are [sic!] deported the smaller retail shops must close down. It is all the more serious because we are trying hard to get the natives to sell their cattle voluntarily and to take up work as labourers. The best way of carrying out this policy is to encourage them to spend their money and therefore it is essential to have shops. The Karamojong are not

33 Aiyar, Indians in Kenya, 75.

34 Ibid., 37.

35 Brennan, Taifa, 71.

36 Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 75.

> sufficiently advanced to act as shopkeepers and it is essential to employ Indians for his work."[37]

As the *duka* remained the only place where the average African was able to exchange produce for money, a strong dependency developed particularly in the villages, as there was often only one *duka* per village for many Africans who wanted to sell their produce. In her work on the political history of Asians in Kenya, Sana Aiyar emphasised the role of the *duka* as an intermediate space for African customers between their homesteads and the colonial state, where Asians could exchange produce into currency needed to pay taxes.[38] Another common trading practice increased this dependency on the Asian retailer: the *dukawallah,* holding more leverage than the African producer, was often only willing to buy the latter's produce if the African seller bought something from him in return.

The *duka* offered African customers broad access to consumer goods for the first time and that way changed the East African consumer behavior and consumption habits during colonial time, that way for Asians the African peasants as consumer was equally important as the peasant as producer.[39] Notably bigger cities like Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Mombasa – where many imported goods were offered by the Asian traders – became centres of consumptions, in turn consumption became a symbol of wealth.

Because Africans increasingly purchased consumer products together with their convenience goods, more and more Africans took on debts to be able to afford those goods directly from their *dukawallah* who also served as money lender. Unlike the European farmers, Africans could not offer their land as security as it was native land which could not be passed over to a person with non-native status. Instead, Asian retailers asked for the African's labour or future crops for a guaranteed fixed price which the Asian lender would set.[40] This way Africans lost their bargaining chip for future price negotiations and the *dukawallah*, again, kept the upper hand in the long term. Another practice was that the African debtor had to pay back their debts by buying even more goods which then would be worth up to five times as much as the original sum they borrowed from their Asian creditor.[41] That way a circle of "perpetual indebtedness" – as James Brennan has called it – started which was almost impossible to break out

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37 Letter from the District Commissioner's Office, Moroto, Karamoja to the Commissioner of Police, Kampala, 06 September 1946, Immigration cases of illegal immigration 1946, Series CL/26/C.1656/3, UNA.

38 Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 76.

39 Thompson, Gardner. 'Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945'. *African Affairs* 91, no. 365 (October 1992): 605–624.

40 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 105f.

41 Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 75f.

from and which kept African customers permanently dependent on their local *dukawallah*.[42] Brennan further stresses that there were different reasons in addition to the obvious lack of money, for this common practice of lending and borrowing. The Asian shop owner felt simply an urgent necessity to lend: "Few shops could afford *not* to lend."[43] Otherwise they would lose most of their customers.

At the same time, in the major towns more and more pawnshops opened which were run by Asian businessmen. The *duka la poni* was frequented multiple times a month by African customers. Ironically, the circle which had been put in motion by the introduction of monetary economy and consumer goods finally resulted in the use of money becoming less and less common, because most of the transactions were made on credit. In the beginning of the month, long queues of African workers would appear in front of the towns' *maduka ya poni* who wanted to pay back their debts:[44]

> "When the African wage earner received his paycheck […], he would first pay off debts amounting to between one-third and one-half of his salary accumulated toward the end of the month. He would then purchase, on credit, a supply of rice and cassava to last him the coming month, spend the remainder on perishable foodstuffs or luxuries such as tea, and exhaust his funds by the twentieth of each month; many went without food for the final two or three days."[45]

In the eyes of the African population, the *dukawallah* became the stereotype of East African Asians for many reasons and would in the future influence a *citizenship culture* which depicted the Asians as counterexample of the good citizen. Locals (and the European colonisers) were often speaking of the members of the Asian minority in East Africa as if all Asians were retailers. There are at least two reasons for this misconception:[46] first, the vast majority of Africans lived in the countryside and not in the town centres. Their only experience with Asians was

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42 Brennan, *Taifa*, 70; Cooper, Frederick. *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

43 Brennan, *Taifa*, 74.

44 Ibid., 73. Prestholdt has stressed the importance of Asian businessmen in financing consumption as well as providing goods: Prestholdt, Jeremy. 'On the Global Percussions of East African Consumerism'. *The American Historical Review* 109, no. 3 (2004): 755–781. Prestholdt, Jeremy. 'East African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization'. Doctor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2003; Prestholdt, *Domesticating the world*.

45 Brennan, *Taifa*, 74.

46 Twaddle, Michael. 'Was the Expulsion inevitable?'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 1–14. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

often limited to their villages, where there was sometimes only one Asian family who owned the local shop. *Maduka* were spread over the East African periphery; they simulated a false homogeneity of Asian professions, because wholesalers, teachers, doctors, *fundi* (craftsmen) and clerks worked where the vast majority of Asians lived: in the central cities and trading centres such as Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar Town, Jinja and Tanga.[47] Second, even in the major town centres the *duka* constituted the most common meeting point for Africans and Asians. Here it was where racial prejudice were constituted and confirmed. Africans were often irritated by Asian attitudes towards them as Bharati pointed out: "The Africans are viscerally aware of these attitudes, and the neglect and impoliteness, as well as the mercatorial exploitation the Asians wrought upon them, are felt to be clustered up with this latent disrespect toward the autochthonous population."[48]

The practice of bargaining prices created a general feeling of suspicion towards the Asian retailers within the African population. This suspicion seemed proven by occasional reports about fraud committed at bazaars. In a letter to the president of the Central Council of the Indian Association in Uganda and the President of the Indian Merchant's Chambers, Kampala on 27 August 1942, J. L. Panchpatia, a member of the Uganda Supply Board, warned about irregularities in East African bazaars across the whole region:

> "[…] I wish to bring to your notice that since some days past a profiteering racket is going on in the bazar on a large scale in respect of a number of piece goods lines and those who do it include respectable Indian firms, as a result of the condition in Bombay market, shipping etc. This is also the case in Mombasa and other parts of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Since the question is looked upon from a political stand point [sic!] as well, I should be failing in my duty if I did not bring this to your notice before it is too late. I feel that the Indian trading Community has no right to behave in a manner which is likely to leave a stigma on the name of the whole Community and their progeny in this Territory. It is time that the responsible leaders like yourselves took a hand in the matter and stopped it."[49]

Panchpatia further feared consequences especially for the small Asian retailers who would "be the first to suffer (in the event of being found out) on a [scale] he does not fully realise."[50]

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[47] Rothermund, *Die politische und wirtschaftliche Rolle der asiatischen Minderheit in Ostafrika (Kenya, Tanganyika/Sansibar, Uganda)*, 3, Appendix map.

[48] Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 115.

[49] Letter from J. L. Panchpatia to the Chairman of the Central Council of Indian Associations in Uganda, Kampala, 27 August 1942, Price of Goods regulations, Series CL/24/C.2705, UNA, 2.

[50] Letter from J. L. Panchpatia to the Chairman of the Central Council of Indian Associations in Uganda, Kampala, 27 August 1942; Price of Goods regulations Jafer, CL/24/C2705, UNA, 2.

Although this episode ended with the accused people denying the issue and the addressed organisations dropping the charges, it shows that Asians involved in trading were conscious about their vulnerable situation and this even before the Buganda Trade Boycott of 1959, which increased this alertness further as discussed later. The fear of a stigma which would affect every member of the Asian minority due to the wrongdoing of a few was understandable with newspaper articles about misconduct by Asian retail traders and Asian underground activities being regularly published.[51] East African Asians tried to publicly defend the community, e. g. on 19 May 1951 in The Colonial Times:

> "It has become a fashion in East African territories to condemn the entire Indian merchant community for the misdeeds of some unscrupulous members of it. No one claims that the Indian businessmen are saints, but it is wrong to suggest that all of them are thieves and rogues. No Indian supports the action of any businessman in cheating his illiterate customers: so far as the common man is concerned, the cheater to whatever community he belongs deserves no sympathy."[52]

Nevertheless, rumours and clichés together with reports about the criminal offences committed by individual *dukawallah* supported the African perception of Asian dishonesty and exploitation.[53] At the same time, the *duka* was also a space where Asian preconceptions about Africans were reinforced. The reluctant repayment of their debts by the African customers confirmed the long-established prejudice of the unreliability of Africans in the mind of many Asians.

Underlying clichés were confirmed by the fact that *maduka* were enforcing mechanisms of dependencies between Africans and Asians due to their exceptional practices of trading. At the same time, the *duka's* staff policy highly favoured migrant Asian relatives over local African workers. *Dukawallah* became salespeople, traders for local African produce, employers, as well as creditors. At the same time, they held the role as colonial economic middlemen for the British administration fulfilling central functions in the colonial economic system and society. The fact that Africans relied on the Asian *duka* for their everyday groceries meant that all Africans could relate to the *duka* experience which made it so central in the race relations between Africans and Asians and constituted a common experience of economic imbalance. The *duka* created an African imaginary which linked the Asian minorities in East Africa lastingly to the retail business. This imaginary was a powerful parameter which later

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[51] Rice 'black market' in Kenya alleged – Uganda merchants warned, *Uganda Argus*, 15 May 1955.

[52] Uganda Indians, The Colonial Times, 19 May 1951, excerpt in FCO141/18101, UKNA.

[53] Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 103.

impacted the counterimage of the good citizen and influenced East African *citizenship culture* permanently.[54]

Stories of success and failure, wealth and poverty: The emergence of two contradictory experiences

We could continue in listing the different sectors in which Asians were successful and held an over proportionate share of business. Apart from their central role in retail trade in East Africa they played an important part in specific industrial areas such as the sisal, cotton, and sugar industry some of which will be discussed later. Asians also often were lawyers, advocates, accountants, physicians,[55] etc. as well as civil servants.

Yet, those dry numbers will tell us little about the African perception and the Asian experience of their role as economic middleman; and it is this perception by Africans and shared experience by Asians which had a strong impact on race relations in East Africa and the way African politicians and other influential individuals thought about and discussed issues on race relations and economic privilege in public space. Ultimately, it shaped narratives, policies as well as *citizenship culture* and *practices* in the medium- and long-term perspective. In the following, I therefore discuss the way Asian wealth was perceived by the majority of Africans by analysing the narrative of Asian success. Further, the difference in the African perception of Asian wealth and the Asian experience of professional "trial and error"[56] will be examined by illustrating stories of Asian economic failure and the permanent peril of bankruptcy.

The Asian minorities in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda were diverse and comprised different religious denominations, regional backgrounds, and social strata. This diversity can also be observed in the way Asians took up professions and worked in different economic sectors. Traditionally, the different Asian communities concentrated on different economic niches. While Goans were predominantly working in the colonial civil service, Lohanas were more commonly found in industrial sectors and Patels were often working as merchants and traders.[57] Of course, professional vocation, rather than reflecting a specific

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[54] See chapter II.1.

[55] John Iliffe estimates that at least two thirds of the 300 private practitioners working in Kenya in 1961 were of Asian descent, with another source claiming that there were 459 Asian practitioners in Kenya in 1962. In Tanzania, in 1961, 80 per cent of the 403 practitioners were Asian. Those numbers can also give us some idea of the situation in Uganda: Iliffe, *East African doctors*, 121.

[56] Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 68.

[57] On the Goan experience see: Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*; Frenz, 'Migration, Identity and Post-Colonial Change in Uganda: A Goan Perspective'.

ethnic attribute, can in fact be traced back to historically grown social structures of class, religious traditions, and the Indian caste system. This is equally true for the general context of Asians in East Africa, their position in trade and industry and their role as economic middleman. Gaurav Desai has warned of a racialised or ethnicised form of entrepreneurial history writing:[58]

> "But to note these qualities among a group of entrepreneurs in East Africa is not to suggest that such qualities are either the exclusive attributes of a particular ethnic community or that they are in some ways essential qualities of those ethnicities. Rather they are to be understood as traits that are invoked, nurtured, and indeed developed historically through the actual performance of the commercial exchange."[59]

In the case of the Asian minorities in East Africa this danger is prevalent and hard to mitigate. Yet, it is important to see the role as economic middleman as direct consequence of the complex social structure defined by racialism as well as economic policy by the colonial administration. Those policies opened up distinct economic opportunities for this small group of people defined by their racial affiliation and excluded the local population and other immigrants of neighbouring places from those opportunities.

Further, Subrahmanyam and Desai discuss the danger of hagiographical readings of biographies of businesspeople in his work on Afrasian imagination.[60] Despite some variations, similarly to a hagiographic storyline as well as other standardised biographical narrations, the story always follows the same pattern and has a narrative strand with set rules. Desai points out how those stories resemble each other starting with a young man – often still a boy – arriving alone at the East African coast where he becomes an apprentice of an already established relative or otherwise acquainted merchant who takes him in and later on helps him to set up his first business which then starts to blossom through the help of the existing trade networks as well as further expansion with the help of his own family members who had been sent for from India.

The image of Asian wealth and economic success was pervasive and a common base for African grievances, claims of fraud and resentment. Maybe unexpectedly, at the same time the most successful and richest Asian business families enjoyed prestige and some degree of

58 Desai, *Commerce with the Universe*, 115.

59 Ibid., 116; Desai refers to what Subrahmanyam's calls the classic trap "of cultural givens that one is to assume remain stable": Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 'Foreword'. In *Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea*. ed. Lombard, Denys/Aubin, Jean, v–ix. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

60 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Foreword', vii; Desai, *Commerce with the Universe*, 115.

popularity within the African population. Two of the most famous and wealthy Asian dynasties were the Madhvanis and the Mehtas; both had initially become rich through the sugar industry in Uganda and had then extended their business elsewhere.

The beginning of the Madhvani family's success resembled the common narration: when founder Muljibhai came to East Africa in 1908, only 14 years old, he started working for the business of his uncle, Vithaldas Haridas & Co. Upon his arrival in 1893, Vithaldas Haridas himself had commenced his career with an apprenticeship at the firm of Alidina Visram, one of the founding fathers of Asian trade in East Africa.[61] Over the next years, Muljibhai worked his way up in his uncle's company and gained more and more responsibilities. After he had acquired 800 acres of land near Jinja in Kakira for the company,[62] he opened what would become the centre of his future business operations, Vithaldas Haridas & Co's first sugar plantation and factory, Kakira Sugar Works, in 1930. Kakira Sugar Works became the second oldest premise for sugar production in Uganda after Nanji Kalidas Mehta had founded the Uganda Sugar Factory in Lugazi six years earlier. The sugar business at that time was highly risky and required a big amount of capital to start with. Those two Asian families, who had initiated the industrial sugar cultivation, would until the time of independence and beyond, maintain the most important sugar producers in Uganda.[63] In 1965, all sugar produced in Uganda still came from either Madhvani or Metha plantations.[64]

In 1947,[65] Vithaldas Haridas & Co was divided between its partners. Muljibhai, managing director by now, had taken over Kakira Sugar Works which became the heart of the Madhvani enterprise. When Muljibhai died with 64 on 11 July 1958, according to the newspaper *Uganda Argus* "the procession of mourners stretched for nearly a mile along the route."[66] Many local communities took part in the congregation.[67]

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61 More about Alidina Visram, see: Frenz, Margret. 'Visram, Alidina (1851–1916), businessman and philanthropist'. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (03 October 2013). https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/102435.

62 On land acquisition by non-Africans in Uganda see: Ahluwalia, *Plantations and the politics of sugar in Uganda*, 50–70; Frenz, Margret. 'Madhvani, Muljibhai Prabhudas (1894–1958), entrepreneur and philanthropist'. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (03 October 2013). https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/102432.

63 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 279.

64 Dharam P. Ghai, 'An economic survey', 103.

65 1947 is the most often stated date in the sources while Gregory says the dissolution of Vithaldas Haridas & Co. already happened in 1946: Gregory, Robert G. *Rise and fall of philanthrophy in East Africa: The Asian contribution*. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 2014.

66 Hundreds mourn Mr Madhvani, *Uganda Argus*, 12 July 1958.

67 Ibid.

By the time its founder Muljibhai died in 1958, the family business had expanded to seven different companies with 12,000 African and 400 Asian employees.[68] Yet, his son Jayant became the real tycoon who transformed the Madhvani's into one of the two biggest enterprises in the region. In the first years of Jayant's leadership he bought a number of companies and extended the enterprise substantially.[69] When Jayant died on 25 July 1971 with 49 – too early as many in Uganda claimed – he had developed the Madhvani enterprise to a multimillion dollar business constituted of 70 industrial and commercial units scattered all over the East African region with strong family and business ties.[70] At the time, the Madhvanis employed 22,500 Africans with invested capital of £ 16.7 million and a turnover of £ 26 million. The reactions to Jayant's death were similarly mournful as thirteen years earlier when his father had died. Idi Amin, who only a year later would expel most Asians from Uganda, claimed in his letter of condolence to the Madhvani family:

> "Jayant has been the Son of Uganda whose activities and ways of life will always be remembered. His greatness of mind, his generosity and unselfish consideration for others, his spirit, his simplicity, his devotion to services for humanity, his ability to plan for development, are but a few of the many superb qualities in Jayant we can never forget."[71]

The reason for the popularity of the Madhvani family was its wide-reaching charitable engagement. From early on, the Madhvanis had made a name for themselves by supporting infrastructure projects like schools and hospitals, different social clubs, and societies. Contributions of the Madhvani family comprised donations to sport and leisure clubs (the Uganda National Council of Sports, the Jinja Recreation Club, Federation of Uganda Football Associations), prestigious building projects mainly in Kakira and Jinja (the Kakira Muljibhai Madhvani Hall, Jinja Town Hall, Jinja Clock Tower, Jinja Vithaldas Haridas Pavilion, Jinja Coronation Park) religious organisations (the Church of Uganda, the YMCA of Dar es Salaam), healthcare

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68 Frenz, 'Madhvani, Muljibhai Prabhudas (1894–1958), entrepreneur and philanthropist'.

69 "Jayant acquired the Nile Breweries Limited in 1958, and btw 1959 and 1960: Emco Glass Works Limited, Chande Industries Limited, Steel Corporation of East Africa Limited, Kenya Glass Works Limited, Kilimanjaro Breweries Limited, Rasha Rasha Estates Limited, the Sweet Factory and the Soap Factory in Arusha.": Mubiru, Joseph. 'Economic Colossus'. In *Jayant Madhvani*. ed. Robert Becker and Nitin J. Madhvani, 55–60. London: The Folio Society Ltd, 1973.

70 Joseph Mubiru, 'Economic Colossus', 55f. One of Jayants sisters married J. K. Chande one of the wealthiest and most influential Asians in Tanganyika in 1959. He had that way merged his own business with the Madhvani enterprise whose representative in Tanzania he subsequently became: Gregory, *Rise and fall of philanthrophy in East Africa*, 83.

71 Letter of condolence received from The President of Uganda General Idi Amin Dada, quoted in: Becker, Robert and Nitin J. Madhvani, eds. *Jayant Madhvani*. London: The Folio Society Ltd, 1973.

(President's Polio Appeal Fund, nurseries), and educational institutions (Makerere University, the Girls' School in Jinja, Lohana Eudcation Trust, Senior Secondary School, multiple scholarships).[72] In 1949, Muljibhai founded the first commercial school in Uganda, The Muljibhai Madhvani Commercial School, which admitted Africans specifically to attain the business skillset.[73]

Jayant continued his father's funding, he invested intensely in the development of Africans in commerce and industry and employed disabled Africans in his factory.[74] According to Gregory, the Madhvani enterprise employed a much higher percentage of Africans in the management levels than other Asian businesses and gave jobs to disabled workers.[75] With their outgrowers scheme the Madhvanis offered the local farmers a chance to sell their crops to a fixed rate and borrow equipment like tractors and bulldozers from the factory. Joseph Mubiru, the Governor of the Bank of Uganda, called Jayant Madhvani posthumous a "real friend and a genuine friend of the Africans." According to Mubiru, Jayant had shown "a very great understanding of the African view point and this enabled him to appoint many of them in senior positions in the Group."[76] Kakira, the site of Madhvani's sugar factory, developed into a small town as the Madhvanis offered housing, free schooling, health care and recreational facilities around the premises of Kakira Sugar Works for the workers of the factory and their families.[77] After independence, one of the most notable donations was the one of the Muljibhai Foundation Trust which had been established in 1958. Jayant donated the trust and its headquarter building in Kampala to the Ugandan government.[78]

However, despite their extensive charitable munificence, the Madhvanis also worked closely with the colonial administration. First Muljibhai and then Jayant held economically influential posts during colonial times. Jayant had been sent to secondary school and University in Bombay. He became the political representative of the family taking up post in colonial institutions, while his father was still alive. In the 1950s, Jayant regularly represented Ugandan business interests on international conferences.[79] Moreover, he sat on many boards of societies

72 Gregory, *Rise and fall of philanthrophy in East Africa*, 55f.; Joseph Mubiru, 'Economic Colossus', 57f.

73 Joseph Mubiru, 'Economic Colossus', 57f.; Frenz, 'Madhvani, Muljibhai Prabhudas (1894–1958), entrepreneur and philanthropist'.

74 Gregory, *Rise and fall of philanthrophy in East Africa*, 55f.

75 Ibid.

76 Joseph Mubiru, 'Economic Colossus', 57f.

77 Frenz, 'Madhvani, Muljibhai Prabhudas (1894–1958), entrepreneur and philanthropist'.

78 The building was valued Shs. 4 million and the trust had an annual income of Shs. 400,000: Gregory, *Rise and fall of philanthrophy in East Africa*, 55f.

79 Joseph Mubiru, 'Economic Colossus', 56.

and institutions related to business, employment, and training.[80] He was further an alderman in the Jinja Municipal Council. From 1954 to 1958 he sat in the Legislative Council of Uganda together with the future Prime Minister and President, Milton Obote. It was there where he made important connections to African politicians. The Madhvanis sometimes used their influence to change colonial policies, yet they never requested a full change of the status quo. Only late in the game of the Ugandan struggle for independence did the Madhvani family donate to political parties.[81] Certainly, one could not call them opponents of the colonial system.

Muljibhai and Jayant were aware of their community's fragile position in the country. Despite the huge amount of capital, the Madhvani family invested in the region as well as donated to local charities and benevolent institutions, they also prepared for the risk of a political breakdown or a sudden flight from Uganda. The Madhvanis built a security network for the family with great amounts of assets abroad.[82] Next to their major operations in the East African region the enterprise had operated in the UK, India and Canada.[83]

The reactions to the death of both father and son were similar, yet in-between lay a decade of independence and radical social and economic change. Still, the Madhvanis were able to hold on to their privileges and wealth and became even more successful and affluent. Jayant Madhvani had transformed a strong enterprise into a regional giant. What made the Madhvanis so resilient? What does the story of the Madhvani family tell us for the wider frame of our story? And what does this part of history leave untold? The Madhvanis were the epitome of Asian economic success. Over the years they had not only acquired what for most Africans (and in fact Asians) was an unimaginable amount of wealth, but also a wide range of soft power through charity work, philanthropy, and market dominance, with their influence reaching the colonial administration and in the years after independence the leading politicians, not least the leader of the country, Milton Obote. This soft power went beyond national borders. The Madhvanis had become relevant players influencing politics and their enterprise had become a crucial factor in the region's economy. They economically not only survived the first decade of independence but managed to exponentially grow their business over these first years of self-governance. Jayant and the rest of the family built on what their father had begun during colonial time. They gained important access to powerful politicians and institutions. Most

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80 Uganda College of Commerce, Federation of Uganda Employers, Minimum Wages Advisory Board, Planning & Develoment Committee, the Steering Committee of Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Uganda Agricultural Society, Export Promotion Council, Uganda Technical College, the Uganda Institute of Management: ibid.

81 See chapter II.2.

82 Seidenberg, Dana A. *Mercantile adventurers: The world of East African Asians 1750–1985*. New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, 1996.

83 Frenz, 'Madhvani, Muljibhai Prabhudas (1894–1958), entrepreneur and philanthropist'.

immigrants (from first to third generation) were less successful; some were poor and could hardly make ends meet. Mahmood Mamdani has pointed out that the initial Ugandan Africanisation policy after independence was much more focussed on what he called the Asian petty bourgeoisie, so effectively mainly *dukawallah* and Asians in the professions including the civil service with low or medium incomes.[84] What Mamdani called the Asian commercial bourgeoisie was originally spared from any form of state intervention. As I will discuss later in chapter II.1, this also protected the Madhvanis and their business.

Gijsbert Oonk researching the bankruptcy court cases in the Zanzibar archives has shown how different the Madhvani family chronic is to those of many different individuals who tried to make their luck far away from home. Oonk describes the initial phase of building a business as a trial-and-error process in which only a small number of families actually succeeded.[85] For many *dukawallah,* even those who had already settled in East Africa a long time ago, daily survival was a struggle:

> "Some small traders passed through various stages in a few years. They went from being independent traders, earning a substantial living, to bankrupts who were fed by their mothers or brothers and had to beg for small jobs."[86]

Almost all newcomers had to take up loans or in some form had to be supported by an established Asian merchant to open their first business. Newcomers' biggest asset was their family relations and reputation. Creditors offered loans on the basis of the good name of a family rather than on the basis of fiscal securities as the vast majority of new starters of business had none of the latter.[87] Oonk shows how those first economic encounters in East Africa often ended in bankruptcy or debtors not being able to pay back their debts.

Immigrants from India who had spent some years in Africa could also experience the rejection of residential permits which forced them to return to the Indian subcontinent.[88] In fact, immigration regulations became more restricted in the 1940s. After the Second World War, no-one was allowed to permanently settle in Tanganyika or Uganda without a relevant licence. As the case of a headmaster for the Government Indian Primary School, D. Ram, described in a letter to the Chief Secretary in Entebbe shows, those theoretical regulations could yet be

[84] Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 260f. Yet, the average low Asian income was still higher than the average low African income.

[85] Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 95.

[86] Ibid., 97.

[87] Ibid., 99.

[88] Immigration Declaration Harish Chandra Arya 1949, Seriec CL/28/C.3490/04 UNA.

overcome by using personal connections to the relevant authorities.[89] According to the unnamed letter writer, Ram had tried to get his brother-in-law, Mr B. C. Markandeya, a job in the Judicial Department by contacting a friend Mr Golwala who was working in the department as clerk. Yet, Markandeya only had a three-month visitor's visa and was now illegally in the country and not eligible for work. This episode shows how already established Asians attempted to get their family members into East Africa and tried to provide them with employment at a time when this was already increasingly difficult. The letter stated that individuals finding loopholes was a bigger issue in the colonial government employment than in the private sector:

> "It is known that the Immigration Law is very strictly applied in the case of public- i. e. in case of private commercial & business firms who wish to bring any new man for joining their firms, whereas in the case of Government itself it is quite contrary which is not understood."[90]

Not only locally established Asians tried to use their connections to influence the decision of the colonial authorities. In 1946, the Aga Khan, the religious leader of the Ismaili Shia Muslims, asked the colonial governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda for help. In a letter from 01 July 1946, he inquired whether 60 Ismaili families who had so far lived on the Zanzibari islands Unguja and Pemba could resettle on the mainland. The Aga Khan stated as reason for the resettlement his followers' deteriorating economic situation:

> "These people are in a precarious condition and unless they can migrate they and their children will be thrown on to the streets without any means of livelihood and I am, therefore, appealing to Your Excellency to assist them to go over to the mainland where they will be able to make their living. Our Investment Trust and other financial arrangements I am making will assist them in starting trades and small industries and will give them such capital as will enable them to come prosperous."[91]

As these two examples have illustrated, many Asian immigrants struggled with immigration controls and the high risks which their economic endeavours entailed often facing poverty as the last case has shown. Yet, stories of Asian failure in economic enterprise were rarely part

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[89] Letter from unknown to the Chief Secretary in Entebbe, 17 October 1946 (in-box), Immigration cases of illegal immigration 1946, Series CL/26/C.1656/3, UNA.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Letter from the Aga Khan to the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 01 July 1946, Immigration Aga Khan's followers 1946, Series CL/26/C.1656/2, UNA.

of the public narrative of Asian economic role. Those untold stories did not influence the African perception of the Asian middlemen. This shows how different the stories of sojourning and settled Asians could be and the variety of their experiences. Success stories like the one of the Madhvanis' created the perception of everlasting Asian success and endless wealth. It also shaped the idea that Asians were able to generate a great amount of money out of the local economy for their own benefit while sending vast sums of their capital abroad. This perception supported the stereotype of the Asian economic exploiter. Still, the policies implemented supposedly to stop exploitation, to balance economic grievances and to offer economic opportunities to Africans affected the smaller more modest living Asians who were not able to send money abroad far more than the wealthiest ones. This is particularly true for Uganda where industrialists like Madhvani kept substantial economic and political influence during the first decade of independence, while in Tanzania the Arusha Declaration changed this directive in 1967.[92]

We see therefore a crass contradiction between the two different narratives of success which were nurtured by the perspective of the African population in East Africa and by the Asian communities themselves who believed economic success was a possible but not guaranteed outcome of hard work and sacrifice. In the Asian immigrant experience, stories of success and wealth were always complemented by stories of failure which ended in poverty and/or in the return to the subcontinent. This meant that Asians did not see their economic success as self-evident but as the product of their hard work, endurance, and Spartan lifestyle. Consequentially, this could make them less receptible towards their own privilege. Africans on the other side saw this as proof of Asian feelings of economic entitlement which ignored the discrimination of the local Africans. This divide was further strengthened by economic conflicts which became more prevalent in the late colonial time and partly ended in racial violence, as will be discussed in the following.

Frictions in a divided society: Racialised strikes and labour protests

The Asian minorities in East Africa were closely linked to their economic activities, so much that the entire group of Asians in East Africa was often reduced to its role in the colonial economy. As consequence of this limited scope, protests resulting from long standing economic grievances often escalated into racial violence against Asians. Political protests, at the same time, could enforce group identity when individuals acted within a "mono-racial" group. This enhanced an experience of what Rogers Brubaker has termed *groupness* within a group of

[92] This will be discussed further in chapter II.2.

people who could identify along racial lines.[93] Consequently, economic protests often resulted in stronger fissure of the colonial society along racial lines.

One of the first widely organised economic protests helped to shape a more unified Asian identity. In 1923, for the first time, the Asian merchants and shopkeepers in Tanganyika presented themselves as a territory wide united interest group when they went on strike in the manner of the Indian National Congress (INC). A *hartal* was directed against colonial administration laws restricting the use of languages other than Swahili or English in bookkeeping. At the same time, the *hartal* aimed to support the Indian National Movement, in particular the INC. The territory wide shutdown of shops was only ceased after 54 days when the Asian retailers finally succeeded in putting off the introduction of the law in question. However, they also generated deep hostility from the locals when trying to hit the colonial administration. The *hartal* ended in wide-spread resentment within the African population who – due to their economic vulnerability – was most affected by the strike.[94] Suddenly, Africans could not purchase food or other goods of daily use at their local shop, with prices for food up to fourfold more expensive than usually. Neither was there anyone left who they could sell their own produce to.[95] The strike of 1923 was the first time that Asian Muslims and Hindus (later even joined by Goans and Arabs) acted as a social and political group and represented themselves to the public as such. This increased the external and internal perception of Asian shopkeepers as a united group in Tanganyika and in the rest of the region. It was also the first time that Africans felt their dependency on Asian retailers in such a crucial way which they struggled to compensate with own resources. Whilst the local population might have been aware of being dependent on their individual *dukawallah* before, this was the first time their individual *dukawallah* was visibly part of an economic trading system in which the Asian retailer was crucial for Africans' survival. The *hartal* of 1923 exemplifies the misconception between African and Asian colonial realities rather clearly. By Asians it was remembered as a success story of anti-colonial protest, for Africans on the contrary it was directly proof for their colonial repression which resulted in their economic dependency on the Asian middleman. For Africans, the strike symbolised once more the arrogance as well as ignorance of Asian immigrants towards the local population and their precarious living conditions. The fact that the *hartal* was carried out during Ramadhan and hence disrupted the religious celebration for the mostly Muslim population in the East African coast region added an extra pinch of disrespect in the eyes of Africans.[96]

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93 Brubaker, 'Ethnicity without groups': 168f.

94 Voigt-Graf, *Asian Communities in Tanzania*, 78f.; Brennan, James R. 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956'. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* XIX, no. 2 (1999): 24–39.

95 Brennan, *Taifa*, 71.

96 Ibid.

The history of labour protests in Uganda and Tanganyika during the late colonial period highlights these differing realities even more. Because recruitment of workers and employees happened was racialised,[97] Asian and African employees in bigger companies as well as in the civil and public service stayed segregated. Common rooms and even toilets in colonial administration buildings were segregated with three different facilities each assigned to Africans, Asians and Europeans.[98] The workplace was therefore rarely a meeting point for Africans and Asians working for the same employer. Hence, a feeling of collegiality between Africans and Asians could hardly develop. Salaries, too, were allocated to employees not solely based on expertise and experience but also on racial categories which meant that African and Asians had different salary schemes. The lack of interracial collegiality in the workspace and the difference in working conditions were some of the reasons why joint African-Asian strike actions against European employers or within the civil service were never organised.

In Tanganyika and Uganda, African workers were protesting the rapid increase of the cost of living during multiple strikes in the years of the Second World War. It was the starting signal for continuous labour protests in the East African region. In Uganda, in 1945, the employees of the Public Works Departments in Masaka, Entebbe and Kampala initiated a protest which soon expanded to all regions of the protectorate.[99]

In Tanganyika (as well as in Kenya) the strikes initially concentrated on the dockyards, but the third Dar es Salaam dockworker's strike in 1947 spread over the whole territory and became a general strike, suddenly not targeting employers anymore but rather the colonial government.[100] In Tanganyika therefore dockworkers, according to John Iliffe, developed into the "vanguard of Tanganyikan labour as a whole"[101] with major port cities such as Dar es Salaam and Tanga (and in Kenya Mombasa) becoming centres of East African labour protests in the postwar years.[102] Increasing inflation rates and food shortages had boosted African grievance which stirred up the strikes.[103] Some of the demands included higher wages, the Africanisation of civil service positions as well as the elimination of racial based salary scales.[104] In 1947, after more than a month of strike action, the African workers emerged victorious, at least partly:

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97 Job advertisements were addressed directly to a specific racial group (sometimes also indicating gender) for instance in the advertising sections of newspapers: *Uganda Argus*, 25 January 1955, 5.

98 Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 118.

99 Thompson, 'Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945': 606.

100 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 402; Herzog, Jürgen. *Geschichte Tansanias: Vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart*. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1986.

101 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 401.

102 Mombasa dock strikers returning to work today, *Uganda Argus*, 09 March 1955.

103 Thompson, 'Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945': 614–6.

104 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 403.

wages depending on the industry were raised by 30 to 50 per cent. The strike of 1947 also initiated the creation of trade unions in Tanganyika, some members of which later became leading activists of the struggle for independence.[105] This development led to the formation of unions and interest groups organised along racial lines. Asians were rarely involved in coordinated strike action.[106] Partly as reaction to the achievements, especially the substantial raise of daily wages which had been reached during strikes in Mombasa and during the Dar es Salaam dockworkers' strike, a general strike also broke out in Zanzibar in 1948.[107]

The strikes in mainland Tanganyika, as N. S. K. Tumbo has stressed, stood "as illustrations of frustrated challenges to employer-government hostility towards African trade unionism."[108] When African workers picketed and struck for higher wages and equal treatment, Asians often supported their European employers and helped to compensate the lost workforce. In the eyes of Africans this was proof of Asian allegiance with the European employer and the colonial state and undermined the efforts of African trade unions. Nevertheless, not only Asians held back, not every African worker supported the strikes either. Some volunteered to meet the gaps in the workforce instead, just as Asian employees did.[109] Whether special financial incentives were needed to keep some Africans in the work force is not clear.

The Asian minorities, while holding many privileges due to their "non-native" status in colonial society, had always been aware of their fragile position which was highly dependent on policies implemented by the colonial administration. The violence which Asians experienced increasingly from 1945 on would influence their behaviour as a group and made them more cautious in the political arena. After independence, the reluctance to stand up for the African independence movement would be used as a constant reminder of the Asians' disloyalty by those who wanted to deny Asians an equal status in post-independent society. Yet, this reluctance – or "fence-sitting" how it was often described – was a reasonable survival strategy in the context of late colonial racial violence as Asians were the most likely targets of this violence.

Violence against Asian *dukawallah* as byproduct of economic protest and political unrest was a common occurrence. One of the first examples of wider spread violence of this kind happened in Uganda during the already mentioned labour protest which had started at the Public Works Departments in Masaka on 05 January 1945. The strike turned into riots spreading

[105] Ibid., 404.

[106] Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 153.

[107] Clayton, Anthony. 'The general strike in Zanzibar, 1948'. *Journal of African History* 17, no. 3 (1976): 417–434.

[108] Tumbo, N. S. K. 'Towards NUTA: The search for permanent unity in Tanganyia's Trade Union movement'. In *Labour in Tanzania*. ed. N. S. K. e. a. Tumbo, 1–20. Studies in Political Science 5. Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977.

[109] Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 401f.

through the whole of the Ugandan territory. Actions included the looting of *maduka* and assaults against Asian shopkeepers. It took the colonial government three weeks to get the situation under control.[110]

Staff in all government departments started to strike, disrupting infrastructure. The strikes extended to the private sector; shops and businesses were affected; Asian property was looted. The strike reached the oldest Ugandan newspaper, the *Uganda Herald*.[111] This phase lasted for a week in which property was destroyed and Asians were attacked. On 17 January, the unrest reached areas outside of Buganda like Jinja, Mbale and Toro. The sugar factory owned by the Mehta family was similarly affected. Asians were physically attacked during the time of labour unrests. In the third week of protest, some labour walkouts occurred but business mostly went back to normal. The newspaper *Uganda Herald* reported on the looting of Asian shops and the death of the civilian, Manilal Hirji, who was hit by a stone when travelling by car from Mukono to Kampala.[112] Asians in Kampala allegedly volunteered as special constables from 16 January on to patrol the town: "Many Indians, carrying sticks, voluntarily organised themselves into security squads and assisted to keep order."[113] According to the newspaper eight Africans had been killed by 24 January without stating how many by protesters and how many through the hands of the authorities, which as the paper acknowledged fired in the crowd.[114] A common narrative by the authorities and Europeans in the region was that many Africans who wanted to continue work had been coerced into striking by some organised picketers.[115] Those Africans who had ignored the call for the strike had according to the *Uganda Herald* suffered from food shortage "though very creditable efforts have been made by certain Indian shop-keepers to supply the boys with poshs and beans as an emergency ration."[116] The newsmakers clearly had an interest in demonstrating inter-racial unity by portraying Africans who helped their European employers in the light of violent threat. Yet, it is clear from later narratives of the strike that the unrests rather widened the gap between Africans, Asians and Europeans.

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[110] Gardner Thompson divides the unrest in three phases. First, smaller strikes and labour protests occurred in the Public Works Department in Masaka on 05 January, more minor strikes arose in the following days in Entebbe and Kampala. On 15 January 1945, the second, violent phase started according to Thompson. In the third week of protest, which Thompson categorises as the third phase, some labour walkouts occurred, mostly however business went back to normal: Thompson, 'Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945'.

[111] Due to the strike actions by its printers the *Uganda Herald* was only able to publish a reduced version of its paper: Widespread strikes in Kampala, *Uganda Herald,* 17 January 1945.

[112] Strike situation easier, *Uganda Herald*, 24 January 1945.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid.

Accounts of the unrest can be found in a letter from 20 January 1945, Reverend Canon A. M. Williams who was stationed in Namirembe near Kampala and recounted the riots to his colleague Reverend H. D. Hooper. This letter similarly reports that organised African protesters used violence to stop other Africans from breaking the strike. It is worth quoting the letter at length:

> "I had no knowledge that anything was in the air, and so far as I know had anyone else, but on Monday (15th) morning I heard that all the labour in Kampala, i. e. Township Authority and P. W. D. labour had come out on strike […], next that they were parading the town insisting on all Africans in paid jobs leaving their work, i. e. houseboys of Indians and Europeans, garden boys, shop and office runners, shop assistants, clerks, bus drivers and conductors, railway and post office workers and everybody else. By Tuesday they were running round with sticks, and their number being steadily increased, intimidating and beating boys and men who would not join in. By Wednesday practically all African employees in Kampala were out. We suffered in Namirembe in the same way. On Monday afternoon as I got back to the office […] my labour gang, with the cathedral labour and various garden boys, 20 or so balthogether [sic!], waited for me outside my office to demand more pay. […] [I] promised my men that I would pay whatever was agreed as a result of whatever negotiations might be going on at Kampala. I expected they would all be at work the following morning. They did not turn up. During that morning bands of malcontents, all armed with sticks, visited the premises of the various houses on the Hill to drive away the house boys and house girls."[117]

Williams recollects that the unrest had started as a labour dispute. While he describes the first day being affected by non-violent walkouts by workers and employees in different sectors, the second day turned violent according to Williams' testimony. He further recounts that by far not all African staff was actually involved in the strike action and if they were, they had been coerced into it. Williams describes violence of "malcontents" against African employees to stop them from working. He further tells a story of a violent attack at the hospital nearby, targeting a European and two African nurses:

> "Two or three men jumped on the European and beat him about the head drawing blood and he was greatly bruised and bleeding on the arm. He eventually freed himself and saw

[117] Letter from Rev. Canon A. M. Williams (in Namirembe Kampala) to Rev H. D. Hooper, 20 January 1945, CBMS 281, SOAS Archive.

> two of the African nurses attacked. […] The trouble is fairly widespread though things are quieter in Kampala."[118]

This widespread protest was answered by the colonial government with African troops being called out and armoured cars from Kenya which had to be deployed according to the author of the letter who further praised the police force for their "extraordinary restraint" as well as the remarkable loyalty of "many boys on the Hill":[119]

> "To-night for instance as I write my cook has come back through a mob at the foot of our hill but he has had to leave the food he has brought for himself and his bicycle as the rabble would not let him through with them. Last night he brought us a fish, remarkably disguised, and on other occasions he has brought us eggs and other things, carrying them inside his shirt!"[120]

Williams' recollection surely has to be taken with caution. He suggests that some of his employees especially the house staff were forced to stop working rather than deliberately walked out. Despite the fact that Williams was certainly interested in showing himself in the light of a good employer who was liked by his staff, his story hints that there was some form of coercion at play during the protest and that not all African staff in general had an interest in striking but sometimes were more or less violently coerced into participating. It is very likely that some form of coercion was used by strike-organisers to discipline fellow Africans who wouldn't willingly participate in the strike actions.[121] What we also can learn from this narration is that violence was directed against Europeans and Africans who refused to go along. While Williams does not mention any victims of Asian origin – which is most probably because the missionary had mainly Europeans or Africans working there – it is most likely that Asians were even more at risk to become victims of violence, as they were in a more vulnerable position and easily provoked economic grievances.

After the 1945 strikes, the colonial administration together with the British controlled *Herald* were eagerly pushing the responsibility away from themselves by pointing out that higher

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118 Ibid.

119 Williams refers to Namirembe which is like many boroughs in Kampala located on a hill. In 1945, Namirembe did not yet belong to Kampala and was an own municipality.

120 Letter from Rev. Canon A. M. Williams (in Namirembe Kampala) to Rev H. D. Hooper, 20 January 1945, CBMS 281, SOAS Archive.

121 Edgar Taylor discusses similar strike methods for the Buganda boycott in 1954 and the Anti-Asian Boycott of 1959/60: Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life*, 54; 88–97.

African wages would not automatically lead to an improvement of the local population's economic situation:

> "I am inclined to agree with the majority of those who think that, unless the control of prices is conducted in a far more rational and stringent manner than has been the case in the past, prices will rocket once more until the position is just as bad as ever."[122]

By blaming the African grievances on the high prices of goods and food which were in fact related to the ongoing Second World War, the colonial government pointed the finger without any doubt on the Asian minority:

> "Trading profits are too high and too many. Those people who for years have lived on discounts and commissions will claim, of course – "But we must live", to which I answer "Why"? Why should any small class live at the expense of the general public? Why should exploitation receive not only legal sanction but apparent encouragement?"[123]

A reader who called himself Pourquoi supported the claim made in the *Herald* comment and blamed the Asian middlemen for the high prices of goods:

> "[…] goods pass quite unnecessarily through too many hands, and why should the unfortunate purchaser have to pay high prices just to give a living to the middlemen who do nothing useful in either the production or the distribution of goods – they just sit in a low rent shop pay 1/- for an article and sell it for 2/-; and some of these intermediate parasites never even see the goods!"[124]

The public discourse in the newspaper echoed the official line of the colonial government which was that the Asian retailer was purely an additional, unnecessary part of the supply chain who did not contribute any specific value.[125]

Gardner Thompson has analysed the events and the motivation behind the protests and riots in great detail. He concludes that against some accounts the main motivation behind

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122 Aftermath, Topical Topics by Sundowner, *Uganda Herald*, 07 February 1945.

123 Ibid.

124 Bouquet for Sundowner by Pourquoi, Correspondence, *Uganda Herald*, 07 February 1945.

125 Recent Troubles by Tito Kidokyaluyira, Correspondence, *Uganda Herald*, 14 February 1945.

the protests had been economic and not political.[126] Like in Tanganyika, the workers were originally fighting for substantially higher wages. An additional demand was a better price for African crops. Both claims stem from grievances related to the economic situation during and after World War II. In the perception of the African population those grievances were directly related to the Asian retail traders who bought their local crops and sold food as well as consumer goods. Prices for consumer goods in particular had partly more than doubled during the wartime years while wages had stagnated.[127] The reason for this price increase in manufactured goods which without exceptions were produced overseas can be found in the sharp drop in imports mainly due to wartime restrictions.[128] Although prices for local produce had risen, they had not risen nearly as quickly and as much as prices for imported consumer goods. Therefore, in the eyes of the local population the Asian retailer made a profit at the expense of the Africans. The end of the war still did not bring an end to high living costs. In Dar es Salaam, for instance, prices for food kept increasing between 30 to 100 per cent between the years 1949 and 1951.[129] While there are no reliable numbers for prices on and the extent of the shadow economy, many complaints about the criminal offenses on the underground market can be found in colonial reports and in readers' letters in local newspapers which indicates the dimension of the shadow economy. Africans were calling loudly for more price control by the colonial government, but strict controls were extremely difficult to implement. Many Africans blamed the price policy of Asian *dukawallah* for the high prices of food and goods.[130]

Four years after the unrests of 1945, when the so-called Buganda riots broke out, Asians and their role in the economy were again singled out as main cause for the protests. The riots which took place in April 1949 again had started due to economic grievances. This time the protests were directed against the Asian ginners who served as middlemen between the African cotton producer and the wholesalers. Ginners and shopkeepers were attacked.[131] The *Herald* reported further about the organization of a system of guards by cotton ginnery employees similarly to the protests four years earlier. The newspaper denied the reports of lootings of Asian shops in

[126] Thompson, 'Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945': 610. This, however, does not change the fact, that the protest itself has been political as Mamdani remarks when he defines the riots in 1945 and 1949 as moments of class formation: Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 183.

[127] Thompson, 'Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945': 615f.

[128] Ibid., Table 1, 615.

[129] East Africana Library, Dar es Salaam, Report Tanganyika under the UK Trusteeship for the year 1951 (1952), 273.

[130] Political Intelligence Summary for Tanganyika, April–June 1949, CO 537/4717, UKNA.

[131] Ramchandani, Ram. *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise: A study of the Role of the People of Indian Origin in the Economic Development of Ugandan and their Expulsion 1894–1972.* Bombay: United Asia Publications, 1976.; Cotton Ginners' Patrols, *Uganda Herald*, 30 April 1949.

Bombo. Asians living in remote areas however had to flee and stayed in places like Kampala where they organised an own night-patrol. During the Buganda Riots an estimated 19 people died.[132]

The *Herald* tried to downplay the involvement of the local Baganda population throughout its coverage.[133] The European controlled newspaper described the riots rather as the planned plot of "a small group of Baganda agitator, inspired by outside influences."[134] Yet the fact that the military was called for help to patrol in Buganda contradicts this story of events. It is added that on 29 April nearly 60 per cent of the unskilled labour force went back to work which clearly indicates that the strike had completely paralysed the country and economic production.[135]

In a letter, Ignatius K. Musazi, who was named one of the ringleaders of the riots in 1945 and 1949, described the Buganda riots in 1949 as "a continuation or a revival of the 1945 disturbances."[136] Musazi claimed in a letter which was intercepted by the local British authorities that the protests found its origin in economic grievances:

> "[…] the real causes of the unrest in the country to-day [sic!] are *economic* rather than political. When it is remembered, however, that economics and politics are separated but by a very thin layer, it is not surprising to find an issue which at its initial stage is essentially economic, ending as a political one."[137]

Musazi, leader of the Uganda African Farmers' Union (UAFU), explained that the state of the cotton industry was unacceptable. While in Tanzania cotton production played no significant role, in Uganda, in contrast, cotton was by far the most important cash crop and accounted for 94 per cent of Ugandan exports in 1925 and for 36 per cent in 1960 while the total numbers were still rising.[138] Furthermore, it was the most important industry in the East African region

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[132] Musazi, Ignatius K.: Some observations on the Kingdom Report, Uganda African Farmers' Union, April 1950, CAS Edinburgh, Uganda Box 4, 2.

[133] Widespread acts of violence around Kampala, *Uganda Herald*, 28 April 1949; Kampala proclaimed Disturbed Area, *Uganda Herald*, 27 April 1949.

[134] Strike threat fails, *Uganda Herald*, 26 April 1949.

[135] Cotton ginners patrols, *Uganda Herald*, 30 April 1949.

[136] Musazi, Ignatius K.: Some observations on the Kingdom Report, Uganda African Farmers' Union, April 1950, CAS Edinburgh, Uganda Box 4, 2. Jonathon Earle dedicated a chapter in his book on political thought in colonial Buganda to Ignatius Musazi: Earle, Jonathon L. *Colonial Buganda and the End of Empire: Political Thought and Historical Imagination in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[137] Underlining by Musazi.

[138] Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 118.

during the interwar years.[139] Asians held different positions in the cotton business; they had started as middlemen buyers, agents (often *dukawallah*), who bought the cotton crop from the producer and sold it and transported it to the ginnery, transporters and exporter, while the growers of cotton who were often African, only gained a minimum share in the trading price.[140] The rise of Asians in the cotton ginnery business started in 1918, when the colonial administration changed the cotton trade licences regulations in accordance with European interests and only allowed ginneries (mostly owned by European) to buy cotton directly eliminating the independent intermediary agent (who were mostly Asian) from the trading process. Had there been 18 ginneries in 1914/15 (13 European/5 Asian), in 1925 there were now 165 ginneries of which 107 were Asian and only 58 European owned;[141] and by 1938 Asians owned 85 per cent of the working ginneries.[142] While the majority of those Asian ginneries were acquired with local capital, many had financial support from India.[143] A Cotton Commission report released one year before the Buganda riots in 1948 stressed the necessity of reform in the cotton sector.[144] Political scientist and contemporary G. F. Engholm made the colonial government responsible for the failure of the official co-operative scheme and the founding of the Uganda African Farmers' Union as a "radical channel for the expression of peasant grievances."[145]

The decision of eliminating the middle agent also had consequences for Africans who might have been interested in joining the cotton business. As the position as middleman buyer was most easily accessible because it needed little capital to enter the business, the change to a closed buyers' market shut out possible African entrepreneurs from the business completely.[146] By the 1940s Asian ginners on the other hand had pushed many Europeans out of the business and were dominating the cotton ginnery industry until independence.[147] This exclusive elite carried weight when it came to decision making processes in the Asian community of Uganda.[148] Asian owners of cotton ginneries built an exclusive circle in the Asian community.

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139 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 275.

140 Hollingsworth, L. W. *The Asians of East Africa*. New York: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1960.

141 Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, Tabe 4.5, 128. The size of those Asian ginneries was mostly the same as those of European owned ginneries.

142 Ibid., 131.

143 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 277.

144 Engholm, G. F. 'The decline of immigrant influence on the Uganda Administration 1945–52'. *Uganda Journal* 31, no. 1 (1967): 73–88.

145 Ibid., 78.

146 Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 133–6.

147 Mamdani points out the reasons for the decline in European owned ginneries: Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 99.

148 Engholms speaks of cartel arrangments among the cotton ginners and a high degree of co-operation between the ginners and the colonial administration: Engholm, 'The decline of immigrant influence

Therefore, the majority of Asians did not profit from the cotton business. As African cotton growers became more and more aware of how important their work was for the industry, the UAFU based on these grievances fought for a stronger participation of African farmers in profits. Ignatius Musazi argued in the already quoted letter along the same lines:

> "He [the African farmer] has also realised how most inadequately he is paid for undertaking to play that part; and how much, in addition, he is cheated by the buyers. In his restless mood he has appealed to the Government to investigate into the Cotton Industry. Commission after Commission have been appointed and the findings of each confirm the grower's view, namely, that he does not get what is due to him."[149]

Musazi further claimed that cotton growers (who in general were African farmers) were "filched" by ginners and their buyers through illegal practices. Musazi demanded the following agenda to improve the economic status of the African farmer:

> "[…] first, by liquidating the middleman, i. e., the Indian – whose exploitation of the African has reached immeasurable dimensions and, second, by establishing direct dealings between the African traders and overeseas markets. […] The first duty of the Union was to stop the ever-increasing cheating over weights by cotton buyers."[150]

The rationale Musazi uses was a common theme in debates surrounding economic grievances: the Asian middleman was identified as the direct obstacle to African progression in the economy and therefore had to be removed from its structure. Musazi continued in describing the work of inspectors who according to Musazi the UAFU had convinced the Government to set up at all cotton buying centres. Yet, he pointed out that Asian buyers were still able to extricate themselves from any consequences by bribing the authorities:

> "One of these inspectors detected an Indian buyer cheating two pounds and arrested him. The matter was reported to the British Police Officer who re-weighed the cotton and confirmed the inspector's finding. The actual weight was 48 lbs. but the Indian had recorded only 46 lbs. Later, the Indian was acquitted by the police on the ground that the cheating of 2 lbs. was not sufficiently grave to have him indicted. This, of course, could

on the Uganda Administration 1945–52': 73f.

149 Musazi, Ignatius K.: Some observations on the Kingdom Report, Uganda African Farmers' Union, April 1950, CAS Edinburgh, Uganda Box 4, 2.

150 Ibid., 21.

> only be interpreted by the U. A. F. U. as well as the cotton growers that the police had been *favourably "approached"* by the buying firm."[151]

Musazi's records often forgot to mention the fact that the whole economic system was based on colonialism and therefore marginalised Africans from any form of emancipated participation. The fact that some of the leading voices of the riots in 1949 blamed the Asians' role as middlemen primarily for the deprived situation of African farmers indicated the centrality of the negative image of Asians in the perception of the economic system. The colonial middleman, rather than colonialism itself, was seen as the responsible player. Part of this was certainly the fact that open criticism of the colonial system was more dangerous but Musazi's comments clearly show that Asians were internalised as the enemy of African prosperity and therefore targets of any form of economic protests and violence resulting from those protests.

The cotton ginners suffered some cutbacks in the aftermath of the 1949 riots. Legislation was changed and the British administration put a stronger emphasis on supporting African participation in the ginning industry as well as the co-operative movement.[152] The colonial administration reversed its former policy and tried to encourage Africans to open ginneries.[153] In this respect, the riots of 1949 initiated by the UAFU (founded in April 1948 by Ignatius Musazi) had an effect in the anticipated direction if not fulfilling all its claims. Beginning in the 1950s in particular, Asian ginnery owners had to compete with newly established African co-operative ginneries which were supported by the colonial administration.[154] African co-operative unions starting with one ginnery in 1950/51 owned 16 ginneries by 1962 and dealt with 48 per cent of the total lint cotton sold in the same year.[155]

The protests in Uganda in 1945 and 1949 which spread from Buganda to various districts in the Uganda Protectorate threatened the Asian ginnery monopoly and ultimately transformed the cotton industry through legislation. The protests resulted in violence against Asian *dukawallah* and ginners. Similar outbreaks of violence towards the Asian minority yet in a more limited frame could be observed in the context of the dockworkers' strike in Dar es Salaam and unrests in Zanzibar. Those protests showed how fragile the Asian minorities in Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar were and how quickly economic grievances could revert to racial

[151] Ibid. Underlining by Musazi himself.

[152] This includes the government proposal for African participation in the ginning industry from 1951 and the reorganisation of the 'official' co-operative movement in 1952: Engholm, 'The decline of immigrant influence on the Uganda Administration 1945–52': 78.

[153] Acquisition of Ginneries Ordinance and the Cotton Ordinance 1952,see: Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 140.

[154] Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 120.

[155] Ibid., 141.

violence. Those strike actions not only showed that African strike-leaders did not understand Asians as natural allies against the European colonial system but on the contrary portrayed them as opponents in an economic battle for access to resources and jobs.[156]

Conclusion

By analysing the economic role Asians – specifically the Asian *dukawallah* – had played in the colonial system and its decisive influence on the way Africans perceived Asians in society it became apparent that the economic space had constructed long lasting Asian stereotypes of Asian wealth and greed which impacted race relations in the long term.

The Asian *duka* was a central and often the only space in which Africans and Asians regularly met and was shaped by economic misbalance. The *duka* was no equal playing field for Africans and Asians to meet and therefore shaped ideas of race relations through the experiences of difference and grievances. Stories of wealth based on some successful Asian families strengthened the idea of Asian exploitation and accumulation of wealth at the expense of the common African, yet at the same time enabled some privileged Asian families to extend their influence widely in the economic and political sphere. Asian poverty and economic failure did not play a role in creating Asian stereotypes despite the fact it unquestionably existed and affected many Asian entrepreneurs. Next to all the successful stories were always stories of economic failure and stories of the return to India. This meant that Asians did not see their privilege as self-evident but as product of their hard work, endurance and Spartan lifestyle as well as taking substantial economic risks, while Africans often believed Asians were destined to economically succeed due to their colonial privilege and some form of cheating. In the African perception, Asians often seemed blind towards their own privilege.

Economic grievances were regularly expressed in protests which could quickly turn violent. Asians were often the targets of that violence. This shows the close connection between economics and race relations as part of the *inbetweeness* of Asians as economic and colonial

[156] While there was cooperation between some individual Asians and African strike leaders, as Sana Aiyar has illustrated for the case of Kenya, these singular cases did not change the wider perception of Africans. Kenya was further influenced by a different social structure with European settlers as visible reminders of British dominance on the ground: Aiyar, Sana. 'Empire, Race and the Indians in Colonial Kenya's Contested Public Political Sphere, 1919–1923'. *The Journal of the International African Institute* 81, no. 1 (February 2011): 132–154; Aiyar, Sana. 'Anticolonial Homelands across the Indian Ocean: The Politics of the Indian Diaspora in Kenya, ca. 1930–1950'. *American Historical Review* 116, no. 4 (October 2011): 987–1013.

middlemen who functioned as a social buffer.[157] Further, violence enforced the insecurity and anxiety in Asian communities and forced them to constantly sustain an exit strategy, which then earned them the accusation of not committing fully to a life in East Africa as will be discussed in the next chapter. This becomes especially important during the uncertainty of late colonialism and early independence and later makes them easy targets of accusations of not committing to the nation and nation-building not having fought for independence and sitting on the fence. Protests rooted in economic issues were often diffused with racial issues and resulted in a deeper fissure in local race relations or even in racial violence. In the public remembrance, these events were generally remembered as wide-spread violence rather than an expression of economic grievances.

[157] Blalock, Hubert M., JR. *Toward a theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York/London/Sidney: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1967. Ocaya-Lakidi, Dent. 'Black attitudes to the brown and white colonizers of East Africa'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 81–97. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

I.2 Asians in political transit: Collaboration, apathy and political activism

Asian settlers in East Africa effectively became independent from Britain twice. Although many Asians living in the region had migrated prior to Indian (and Pakistani) independence in 1947 or were part of a second and third generation of Asians in East Africa, the events on the Indian subcontinent provided the Asians with their first experience of decolonisation, albeit from afar. East African Asians experienced independence a second time in the 1960s, in the place they had migrated to via imperial channels of migration. However, this wind of change brought along complex questions for the Asian minorities in Tanganyika and Uganda, who found their status exposed and their wealth and economical influence at risk.

The time after World War II until the beginning of the 1960s has to be understood as a period of rapid change. While it was most often talked about as the late-colonial time, the decade of the 1950s was one of constant political transit with independence much faster approaching than colonial officials had anticipated at the beginning of the decade. Not even the African advocates of self-governance had predicted how abruptly *uhuru* would come in the end.

Most Asians stayed politically quiet and did not get involved in politics. This was down to different factors, mostly Asians' own fragile status in colonial society and an anticipated increase in this fragility after introduced African self-governance. Hence, the Asians' role in the political transition from the colonial system to Tanganyikan and Ugandan self-government was complex and not one-sided. It went from collaboration with the British administration over passive apathy to political support for the independence struggle. Political participation did not only have many different forms but also multidimensional motivations.

Established historiography depicts Asian political participation through most of the colonial time as predominantly consisting of fighting for their own "quest for equality."[1] While there was no structurally perpetuated political cooperation between Asian and African actors in the early years of independence, this narrative has recently been contested by historians, such as Sana Aiyar who explored interracial political participation in colonial Kenya as early as the early 1920s.[2] Political participation and representation happened through various channels and with differing motivations. Lobbying to achieve the same rights as Europeans in East Africa had been a political undertaking for Asians initially. Later Asian actors attempted

[1] Robert Gregory has called this political participation the quest for equality, see: Gregory, Robert G. *Quest for equality: Asian politics in East Africa, 1900–1967*. Hyderabad, A. P: Orient Longman, 1993.

[2] Aiyar, Sana. 'Empire, Race and the Indians in Colonial Kenya's Contested Public Political Sphere, 1919–1923'. *The Journal of the International African Institute* 81, no. 1 (February 2011): 132–154.

to preserve the privileges and rights they had fought for, especially when over time the government put a stronger emphasis on Africanisation programmes. This focus on vested interests for the Asian minority shifted after the Second World War in the 1950s when a smaller group of second and third generation East African Asians started to engage in politics and endorsed African nationalists in their struggle for more representation. The African independence movements in Tanganyika and Uganda relied on Asian financial support as well as Asian owned newspapers which spread the cause of self-government. Some, often younger, Asians actively participated in the fight for independence as TANU backed members of the Legislative Council or in political groups such as the Uganda Action Group. At the same time the Indian and Pakistan Governments – after having achieved their own independence in 1947 – and other representatives of the home countries tried to influence the political role of Asians in East Africa.

Secondary literature has in the past highlighted certain behaviours of Asian actors – by portraying them as *the* Asians – to corroborate a narrative of Asians as willing allies of African nationalism, of Asians as colonial exploiters and collaborators,[3] and therefore enforced existing narratives which have been used over time to legitimise identity politics. Yet, the analysis of the role Asians' played in late colonial politics can only be a collection of differing political conduct by individuals, not a set of static collective behaviour by a group of people.[4] Evidently, the fact that some Asians were actively participating in the African nationalist movement for independence does not contradict the behaviour of other Asian individuals who strengthened colonial institutions. The relevance of examining the political actions of individuals belonging to the Asian minorities however lies in the question of how certain political behaviours have shaped stereotypes projected on these minorities. In the following, this chapter discusses Asians' fragile position in colonial society and the tendency of the Asian minorities in Uganda and Tanganyika to stay politically apathetic; how representatives of India tried to influence race relations in East Africa by addressing the local Asian communities; participation by some leading members of the Asian communities in colonial institutions and why this led to the accusation of being agents of colonialism or colonial collaborators, as well as political activism by a number of Asian actors who supported the cause of African independence.

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[3] Brennan has criticised the often one sided approaches regarding this topic in: Brennan, James R. 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956'. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* XIX, no. 2 (1999): 24–39.

[4] Both Andrew Arsan and Edgar Taylor have pointed out that categorising Asians as either coloniser or colonised, overlooks the individuals' contexts of everyday life: Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 21; Arsan, Andrew. *Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014, 123.

Segregated lives: Asians' fear and political apathy

Colonial society was segregated along racialised lines separating the African, Asian and European population. The tripartite system meant that Asians and Africans lived with the exception of the economic sphere, separated from each other. This was particularly true for urban centres where a higher number of Asians and Europeans lived. As there was often only one Asian trader and their family living in a village, Asians in the countryside mixed easier. Yet, at the same time, in rural areas Asians were lacking the protection of the seclusion of their own community. In towns and cities, the number of Asians was high enough for Asians to settle in a specific "Asian" area. In fact, British (and in Tanganyika formerly German)[5] plans for segregated colonial cities, while not stringently followed, were used as guidelines for segregations in major towns such as Dar es Salaam, Kampala, and Stone Town.[6] Though, during the 1930s and 1940s, poorer Asians moved into African quarters, either as tenants of African landlords or as new owners of houses, originally owned by Africans who had to sell them when they had run up too much debt.[7] This form of gentrification, which James Brennan called the encroachment of Asian residents, added to economic grievances felt by African residents towards their new Asian neighbours.[8] Again, – like in the economic sphere – this created an additional space of contention where Africans felt in rivalry with Asians for affordable housing. Ironically in this case the effect of less segregation – more Asians living in African quarters – led to more conflict. These rivalries developed between those who were closest to the socio-economic status of the African population; the poorest and least educated Asians this is. Andrew Burton has further pointed out that in the case of Dar es Salaam the Asian community was particularly present and visible in the densely populated bazaar. This examination can be extended to other urban centres. There "the identification

[5] In 1891, the German administration introduced the Building Ordinance which established the future shape of the segregated city: Brennan, James R., and Andrew Burton. 'The emerging metropolis: A history of Dar es Salaam: circa 1862–2000'. In *Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis*. ed. James R. Brennan, Andrew Burton and Yusuf Lawi, 13–75. 2007.

[6] Lusugga Kironde, J. M. 'Race, class and housing in Dar es Salaam: The colonial impact on land use structure, 1891–1961'. In *Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis*. ed. James R. Brennan, Andrew Burton and Yusuf Lawi, 97–117. 2007. on segregated lives in the colonies and urban planning: Myers, Garth A. *Verandahs of power: Colonialism and space in urban Africa*. 1st ed. Space, place, and society. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003.

[7] Brennan, *Taifa*, 39–41; Brennan, James R. 'Between segregation and gentrification: Africans, Indians, and the struggle for housing in Dar es Salaam, 1920–1950'. In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*. ed. John Breuilly, 118–35. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[8] Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 29.

of communal space was probably significantly stronger than that among Europeans in the suburbs sprawling to the north of the town." This made them "the readiest target for African resentment."[9]

Margret Frenz has stressed that the spatial racial segregation was less pronounced in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda than it was in Kenya due to the interests of the Kenyan European settler community.[10] Unlike some portrayal, complete segregation did not exist, although hygiene reasons were often used as excuse for segregated spaces like hospitals, educational facilities and hospitals.[11] Among the main instruments for social segregation in Tanganyika were colonial building and sanitation codes.[12] Taylor has illustrated how local administrators tried to manage urban space through licensing regulations, construction codes, and sanitary department inspections in smaller towns such as Kabale.[13]

When World War Two led to serious food shortages in East Africa, the colonial government introduced a racialised system of food rationing. This meant that the administration decided which kind of food products were sufficient for the three separated communities defined by racial categories. John Iliffe has argued that the system of racialised food rationing increased racial consciousness in Tanganyika during the World War II years further.[14] It dictated diets along perceived racial food traditions. Moreover, in some ambiguous cases of racial identification, individuals tried to move between racial categories to be able to receive food of higher quality or variety, since naturally the colonial administration granted Europeans in general items which were perceived as more luxurious than Africans. Asians once again found themselves somewhere in-between those too.

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9 Burton, Andrew. *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam*. Eastern African Studies. Oxford/Dar es Salaam/Athens, OH: Ohio University Press; British Institute in Eastern Africa in association with; James Currey; Mkuki na Nyota, 2005.

10 Frenz, 'Migration, Identity and Post-Colonial Change in Uganda: A Goan Perspective': 52.

11 J. M. Lusugga Kironde, 'Race, class and housing in Dar es Salaam', 97f.; 104; Tilley, Hellen. *Africa as a living laboratory: Empire, development, and the problem of scientific knowledge, 1870–1950*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2011. Rapando Murunga, Godwin. 'Segregationist Town Planning and the Emergence of African Political Protest in Colonial Nairobi, 1899–1939'. Doctor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2006.
In Tanganyika, segregation was prohibited according to the League of Nation mandate: Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 45f.

12 James R. Brennan, 'Between segregation and gentrification', 119.

13 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 168.

14 More on rations: Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 29. In Tanganyika, racialised prison diets reflected the believe that Europeans, Asians and Africans should rely on different diets: Nanjira, *The Status of Aliens in East Africa*, 113.

Social life such as leisure and sports clubs were equally organised along the colour bar.[15] Referring to the Goan experience Margret Frenz emphasised that social clubs and associations "produced and were products of social and material practices in a colonial society."[16] While spatial segregation was certainly not the only factor why Asians struggled to integrate in a dominantly African society, it added to the alienation between Asians and Africans and further enhanced separated strong communal identities.[17] Many scholars have named the Indian caste system as reason for the strong Asian tendency to stay exclusive.[18] Certainly one consequence of these forms of social segregation identified by Africans as one of the biggest obstacle to Asian integration was that Asians rarely married outside their own community. This is a regular phenomenon not only confined to the Asian community but to religious denomination and social class often along caste lines.[19] While this is especially true for later generations of East African Asians, this was slightly different for the first wave of Asian immigration due to practicality. According to census data, by 1948 of 33,500 people listed in the category "Indian" who lived in Uganda 14,800 were female. In Tanganyika the Indian population consisted of 20,100 Indian women and 24,100 men. In the Ugandan census of 1931 these numbers had looked even less balanced with 8,517 males and 4,509 females.[20] Interracial relationships were clearly happening between Asians and Africans, as well as between Africans and Europeans. Offsprings of these connections bore witness of these relationships which broke the rules of the segregated colonial society.[21] In an interview held by Margret Frenz one East African Goan

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15 Desai, Niranjan. 'Revisiting the 1972 Expulsion of Asians from Uganda: Oral History'. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 7, no. 4 (2012): 446–458. Robert Gregory, in contrast, calls it a "very mild form of segregation" in all three East African territories: Gregory, *India and East Africa*, 492. For more on segregated social life see: John R. Campbell, 'Culture, social organisation and Asian identity'; Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 140.

16 Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 154.

17 Frenz, 'Migration, Identity and Post-Colonial Change in Uganda: A Goan Perspective': 52.

18 Melady and Melady, *Uganda: The Asians Exiles*, 69; John R. Campbell, 'Culture, social organisation and Asian identity', 185; Humphry, Derek/Ward, Michael, *Passports and Politics*, 12.

19 For the Goan case: Kuper, Jessica. 'The Goan Community in Kampala'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 53–69. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

20 This does not include Goans or Arabs who are listed separately: Census Minute Paper Non-Native Census General 1948, Secretarial Topic 22/C/Census/B2, UNA.

21 The census report of 1948 discusses that "half castes" had to be categorised depending on their tax status. If they paid the non-native income taxed, they would have to be included in the non-native category of the census: Letter from The Census Officer, Protectorate Agent's Office, Kampala, to All District Commissioners, Protectorate Agents, and Executive Officer, Township Authority, Entebbe, February 1948: Ibid. On marriage Asian practices in Tanzania see: Nagar, Richa. 'Communal Discourses, Marriage, and the Politics of Gendered Social Boundaries among South Asian Immigrants in Tanzania'. *Gender, Place & Culture* 5, no. 2 (2010): 117–139.

admitted that while Goans who had married Africans were not "openly ostracized […] people were – quite frosty towards them."[22]

In practice, interracial relationships were fairly common occurrences in the colonial setting of Africa as was discussed for the Ghanaian case by Carina Ray and for Nyasaland by Christopher Lee in some of the most recent works on the topic.[23] Although many Asian traders went back to India to marry (often a woman who had been chosen for him by his remaining family in India), there had been relationships and sometimes marriages between Asian traders and African women when Asian men had first started to come to East Africa in higher numbers. However, with increasing numbers of Asian women coming to the territory, the interracial marriages between Asian immigrants and local women diminished. In addition, in the second generation, East African Asian men often married Asian women from their own community who equally had been born in East Africa. Of course, the low rate of interracial marriage was not only low in the case for the Asian minorities. Christopher Lee has illustrated how intermarriage was discouraged by the colonial administration, while interracial relationships prevailed particularly in Nyasaland of the early 20th century.[24]

A segregated colonial school system enforced racial segregation from the early years. It therefore was possibly one of the first public spaces in which children learnt the social structures of racialism. Africans, Asians and Europeans were not only educated in separated schools; school funding for the tripartite education facilities varied defined by categories of natives and non-natives, which was then further divided between European and Asian.[25] The unequal funding of educational institution was regularly contested by Asians in their aim to achieve the same status as Europeans. Further, the curriculum in those three different school systems differed by racial category as well. Within the Asian school system (until the late 1940s often still talked about as Indian schools) additional divisions were manifested, as schools were often further divided along religious denomination (especially Islam, Hinduism and Christianity) and/or language of instruction (especially Hindi or Gujarati). These segregated education systems further fragmented the local Asian communities from within.

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22 Margret Frenz Interview with Philipp, UK, 2004, quote in: Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 162.

23 Lee, Christopher J. *Unreasonable Histories: Nativism, multiracial lives, and the genealogical imagination in British Africa*. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2014. Ray, Carina E. *Crossing the color line: Race, sex, and the contested politics of Colonialism in Ghana*. New African histories. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015.

24 Lee, *Unreasonable Histories*, 39.

25 Morrison, David R. *Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case*. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1976.

Apart from the economic sphere of trade and employment Africans and Asians rarely met if they were not leading members of their community and/or part of the colonial administrative elite and held office or seats in one of the colonial institutions such as the Legislative Council and Municipal Council.[26] Although, even those political institutions, had only slowly allowed African representatives on its boards and councils. In Tanganyika, for instance, only in 1945 a limited number of African members were permitted.[27] Yet, in the 1950s, with an increase of African representation in the administrative and political body of colonial society a small number of the Asian and African elite consisting of community leaders and African chiefs shaped a space of cooperation often by voting in line with one another. This initial political cooperation sometimes resulted in distinctive political friendships or partnerships which lasted until the time of independence. Milton Obote for instance cultivated close ties with Asian business magnate Jayant Madhvani who he knew from their time at the Uganda Legislative Council. Julius Nyerere fostered many such relationships with former members of the Asian Association from the early 1950s on, as will be discussed later.

Race relations – especially in the years during and after World War II – had become tensed; this was even more the case for regions like Buganda and Zanzibar. Shortly after the war, economic protests and strikes in Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar had partly spiralled to racialised violence as discussed in chapter I.1. Because of these localised outbreaks of violence and retrenchment of their economic privileges once the colonial administration attempted to promote Africanisation programmes, Asians were constantly aware of their fragile status in the colonial state. With African self-governance on the horizon, the general atmosphere among Asians in Tanganyika and Uganda was characterised by uncertainty about their future in the region.

Many Asians living in Tanganyika and Uganda started to fear not only the loss of their position but also systematic discrimination and retaliation for the decades during which Asians were privileged and held higher ranks than their African neighbours. Most Asians expected that their situation would worsen once Africans took over from the colonial administration. This particularly affected the older and more conservative generations of Asians both from Hindu and Muslim communities. Becoming subject to African majority rule was perceived as a threat to Asians' security and political privileges.[28] Those fears were comprehensible, as the local population had shown hostilities directed at the Asian economic dominance. Resentments against Asians had increased during World War II when prices for food and goods

[26] John R. Campbell, 'Culture, social organisation and Asian identity', 179.

[27] Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 26.

[28] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 107.

spiked. Although the rise in food prices resulted from war related disruption in the commodity chain, as *dukawallah* were the sellers of these goods a lot of the impounded frustration of African consumers were directed at them as the obvious target.

Especially in Uganda, during the late colonial time anti-Asian attacks and racial violence, spontaneous and more organised, were regular occurrences.[29] This included protests which were related to economic grievances such as the Buganda riots in 1949 as discussed in chapter I.1 as well as conflicts between the colonial government and African politicians such as the Kabaka crisis between 1953 and 1955 which were used as occasion to attack Asian *maduka*.

Only a few years before Uganda achieved independence, radical African politicians initiated the boycott of Asian and Europeans shops and consumer goods which would become known as the Buganda Trade Boycott. This boycott started in 1959 and lasted until the next year. Yet, the boycott was far more than just a rejection of the Asian and European trade and production monopoly. The boycott actions went along with regular organised violence against Asians mainly in the Buganda region.

Between 04 and 20 April 1960 13 attacks with self-made bombs had taken place, centring around Kampala and at trading centres nearby. The bombs were exploding outside of Asian shops and some African bars which sold European beer. The attacks left two Asian women injured while other people had been injured during shootings in March and April 1960 which colonial administrators also linked to the trade boycott:[30]

> "Increased use of firearms, and direct attacks upon Asians, is causing such disquiet amongst the Asians that a delegation called upon the Governor to discuss the present security situation and the future of the Asian communities."[31]

Especially Asians who lived in the countryside further away from towns and economic centres were threatened by assaults. The British Governor Sir Frederick Crawford advised Asians to leave for the bigger urban centres where there was a stronger Asian community so they could defend themselves.[32] Already before Crawford's advice, Asian villagers had started moving to the towns due to the higher threat level in rural areas. The countryside had proven to be less

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[29] However, there had already been anti-Asian riots before this period, in Dar es Salaam for instance in 1918, 1929, and 1937: Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 29.

[30] Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 31 May 1960, CO 822/2064, UKNA; Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 30 June 1960, CO 822/2064, UKNA.

[31] Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 31 March 1960, Uganda, CO 822/2064, UKNA.

[32] Ibid.

safe for Asian residents compared to the inner cities where they could live more protected within a bigger Asian community. Many Asian families in Uganda left rural areas and joined the Asian communities in towns such as Kampala, Jinja, Masaka and Kabale, where they comprised a substantial part of the population. This increased the urban population of Asians further and meant that the impression some Africans had voiced in public discourse about the dominance of Asians in the townscape was even more augmented. At the same time, more Asian parents sent their children abroad to study – mainly to India. Yet, correlations with the growing fear fuelled by the trade boycott are not clear; some archival material indicates that the main reasons for this were the rising living costs in Kampala.[33] The Central Council of Indian Associations in Uganda organised mass meetings in which Asians discussed options for defence and reacted to the violence in forming something like a neighbourhood watch.[34] The Democratic Party, which tried to gain votes within the Asian population, condemned the trade boycott.[35]

As Edgar Taylor explains the Buganda Trade Boycott "profoundly [strained] social and commercial relationships among Asians and Africans in these rapidly expanding small towns and trading centers."[36] However, this does not mean that the boycott found support through the entirety of the African population. Taylor convincingly depicts a system of intimidation and threats by the boycott organisers: "They aimed to discipline participants in urban commercial and social life by putting people under surveillance, circulating threats, and inflicting violence anonymously."[37] While Asians became the target of violence, Taylor points out that non-Baganda Africans – "collectively accused of breaking the boycott" – often had to attain more serious mob violence than the Asian population.[38]

While the trade boycott was mainly limited to the Buganda region, from time to time it spread to other parts of the country and increased the fear of East African Asians of losing their economic standing in general. In Tanganyika, although there were not that many reoccurring organised violent attacks against Asians, members of the Asian community also had been targets of racial violence. For instance, in 1960, during Diwali, one of the most important religious festivities of Hinduism, cases of riots and "incidents" were reported.[39]

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33 Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 31 January 1960, CO 822/2064, UKNA.

34 Thompson, Gardner. 'The Ismailis in Uganda'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 30–52. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

35 Important to register, says D. P., *Uganda Argus*, 09 September 1960.

36 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 91.

37 Ibid., 97.

38 Ibid., 123.

39 Mr Baghdelleh, Tanganyika Hansard, 06 December 1960, 33.

Pogroms directed against the Arab and Asian population of Zanzibar in 1961 and 1964, as well as attacks on the European population in the Congo, demonstrated to Asians everywhere in East Africa at the eve of independence how fragile their situation really was.[40] Glassman has pointed out that pogroms in Zanzibar in June 1961 were used from both sides as chosen trauma which produced and reproduced narratives of racial violence repetitively. Those narratives travelled from the small Island at the coast of the Indian Ocean to the mainland Tanganyika and further to Uganda. It is important to emphasise that these stories of localised violence were perceived as regional phenomenon and indicated to Asians that these forms of violence could happen to them, no matter where they lived in East Africa, in the context of the African struggle of independence. Stories of violence towards non-Africans in the process of decolonisation amplified the fear in the Asian communities of East Africa.

Mahmood Mamdani has blamed the social exclusivity and an intense racial consciousness for Asians' political disinterest and described them as "*apolitical* class."[41] But it is wrong to disregard the constant uncertainty of their social and political status when factoring in the reasons for the political apathy by the vast majority of Asians in East Africa. As a result, the vast majority of Asians kept passive, awaiting what would come next, behaving like a silent audience without getting involved.[42] Being aware of the fragility of their political status, most Asians tried to stay out of politics especially when the political field became more contested in the 1950s. It was not only a question whether they should support the colonial government or the African independence struggle. Divisions between different African actors made any form of involvement seem even more dangerous to Asians who were used to being the target of remorse when the political atmosphere shifted once again. Whilst African party leaders promised to keep Asians safe after independence, most Asians stayed wary.[43] There was great insecurity about what the consequences of African self-governance would look like for the Asian community. The MP for Maswa, Joseph Wambura, addressed this feeling of uncertainty during his comments in the Tanganyika National Assembly:

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[40] During riots in Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, 1959 African rioters attacked Europeans: Tanganyika Monthly Intelligence Report, October 1961, CO 822/2062, UKNA; Glassman, *War of words, war of stones*, 230ff.; Glassman, 'Sorting out the tribes: The creation of racial identities in colonial Zanzibar's newspaper wars': 423; Jessica Kuper, 'The Goan Community in Kampala', 57; Assurances for non-Africans, *Uganda Argus*, 10 September 1960.

[41] Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 109.

[42] An Intelligence Report for Tanganyika describes the Asians as being apathetic in their political situation: Tanganyika Monthly Intelligence Report, April 1960, CO 822/2061, UKNA.

[43] Mr Sebalu of the Democratic Party promised non-Africans: "We shall protect your liberty and your property when we come into power and make sure that another Lumumba does not spread chaos.": Important to register, says D. P., *Uganda Argus*, 09 September 1960.

> "[…] when we talked of responsible Government there were fears among non-Africans that perhaps when we will celebrate our responsible Government, their shops and properties would be attacked, because the African will then know he is the Bwana of this country. […] We do not want these people to go on fearing again, the more we keep on saying independence or Uhuru, the more our people are going to the shops and saying "Ngoja uhuru ukija mtatuona" [Wait for independence, when you come to see us] and as a result these people will continue to fear."[44]

Fear or uncertainty was regularly the reason for Asians abstaining from political participation as a document from the Uganda National Archives in Kampala shows.[45] In the run-up to the 1960 Ugandan LegCo election, colonial officials were concerned about the low voter registration of Asians in Buganda. The supervisor of elections explained he had approached the leader of the local Ismaili Community as well as Legislative Council member B. K. S. Verjee who had both advised their communities against registering as voters in Buganda and Kampala "until agreement had been reached between the Protectorate Government and the Kabaka's Government on the holding of elections." Verjee had explained to the supervisor of elections that "people in the rural parts of Buganda might be jeopardising their future by openly going against the "Buganda line." This conversation happened during the height of the Buganda Trade Boycott. The government official further commented that this risk was understandable in the small trading centres, "but I could not see that it had the same force in Kampala, Masaka and Entebbe."[46] This again emphasises the fragility of the rural population in Buganda in particular.

Different political organisations lobbied for a higher voters' registration, among them the Democratic Party who addressed potential Asian voters at an "Indian meeting" in Kampala. Paul Semogerere, DP's publicity secretary, and Laurence Sebalu, the party's assistant whip, guaranteed Asians at the meeting "safety of their lives and property" in case of a DP election victory.[47] During the meeting Semogerere moved on in motivating Asian voters to register: "[…] if individuals believed in democracy and freedom they had every right to decide the fate of the country they lived in by going to the polls and voting for the candidate of their choice."

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[44] Joseph Wambura, MP for Maswa, Tanganyika Hansard, 14 October 1960, 183.

[45] Similar reporting in the *Uganda Argus* quotes the president of the Uganda Kenya African Association, Aggrey Willis, who points out that this fear was also felt by potential African voters who were from Kenya and lived in Buganda: Slow London talks 'causing state of fear in Buganda', *Uganda Argus*, 06 September 1960.

[46] Political Apathy: voter registration in LegCo elections 1960, in: Registration of Voters – Europeans and Asians 1960, 09 September 1960–06 October 1960, Series CL 4/CL.028/1960, UNA.

[47] Important to register, says D. P., *Uganda Argus*, 09 September 1960.

He further promised the attendants that in case of a DP victory the party would pass a citizenship law after independence which would offer non-Africans the chance to acquire citizenship and would allow those who did not acquire citizenship the chance to "remain in this country, to be treated as other aliens in other civilised countries of the world."[48]

That Asians in the Buganda region were specifically at threat of anti-Asian violence had two reasons. First, Buganda had a higher Asian population than the other regions in Uganda and therefore naturally in total numbers violence against Asians occurred more often. Second, Buganda was politically highly contested and always had been more at risk of political conflict due to its specific political status and Buganda's claim for autonomy under the leadership of Buganda's king, the Kabaka.

Indian connections and India's influence on Asian local politics

Indian independence, which predated the East African self-government by more than ten years, marked a turning point in the political relations of India and the East African Asian communities. Disconnecting ties between Indian officials and East African Asians were central for the self-identification of Asians in East Africa as it was already shown in the economic context. Connections with India loosened, and Asians in the East African region developed more and more an own East African Asian identity with social, political, and economic networks independent from their place of origin and a stronger orientation towards Britain. Asian politics in East Africa therefore have to be understood in a context of loosening ties between East African Asians and their homeland.[49]

Asian men of the first or second generation typically had gone to India to look for a wife of their own caste whom they took with them to East Africa. There were two entangled reasons for this kind of bridal practice. Long distance relationships between Asians in East Africa and their families could be maintained which made it possible for both sides to establish stable and reliable transoceanic business relations. Family ties between East Africa and India also meant that homeland traditions were kept alive and regional and religious divisions originated from the homeland were constantly reproduced within the Asian communities of East Africa. These strong lasting connections with India entailed that the Asians' political interest in the Indian homeland was stronger than in African politics. In the late-colonial period, we find a shift in this bridal practice. Asian men from East Africa started looking for wives

48 Ibid.

49 More on the various forms and peculiarities of ties with the Indian homeland, see Joan Haig's PhD dissertation on the Hindu community in Lusaka: Haig, *Situating Strangers*, 174–8.

within their own East African community. On the one side, it was a logical consequence of the changing demography of Asian communities in the East African Protectorates. As there was a growing Asian population born and raised in East Africa, there were simply more Asian women of marriageable age living in East Africa during the 1950s than during the 1920s. On the other side – at the same time effect as well as consequence – did the East African networks become more and more important for business as well as social life which a marriage with women of the East African Asian community could help tighten. The upcoming trend of marrying within the East African Asian community supported the shift to an independent East African Asian identity which we can see later reflected in autonomous East African Asian politics.

This shift away from India as point of reference can also be observed in educational practices. While many Asians of the first generations still sent their children to school and University in British India, for later generations Britain became the centre for the education of wealthy East African Asians. The Aga Khan gave one important impulse when he told his followers, the Ismaili Khojas, in 1952 to exchange Gujarati-based education with English-based teaching.[50] By swapping Asian languages with English as the language of instruction, Asian students in East Africa had a wider access to British culture which made it easier for them to trade and invest in Britain when they started to work for their family business. The growing importance of English for the Asian community reduced old divisions of regional identity within the Asian community. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the Asian community became fully unified, although it helped younger Asians to identify as East African Asians as such.

Apart from a decreasing cultural and social contact with India, loosening economic ties and the fact that most of the Asians arrived in East Africa prior to Indian and Pakistani independence and found it difficult to identify with the new independent Indian/Pakistani state led to alienation with the motherland and a reorientation towards Britain and/or East Africa.

After Indian independence, ties between the homeland and the East African diaspora were loosened. At the same time the Asian communities put down deeper roots in East Africa,[51] not only within Uganda and Tanganyika itself but also across the East African region. This meant that the experience of Indian independence was not predominant due to a lack of connectivity to their home country. It separated Asians from Indian society and generated a stronger East African Asian identity.

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50 Aga Khan instructed Ismaili Khojas to move from Gujarati-based to English-based education in 1952: Brennan, James R. 'Politics and Business in the Indian Newspapers of Colonial Tanganyika'. *Africa* 81, no. 1 (2011): 42–67.

51 Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 177.

Yet, Partition and the military conflict between India and Pakistan were carried into the diverse Asian communities of Uganda and Tanganyika.[52] The border war between India and Pakistan was a constant news story in the East African newspapers with a strong Asian readership. Categories in local census were in fact a contested issue as is shown in the report on the census in 1948. At the time of Partition colonial officials were pointing out that the categories India and Pakistan as places of birth could be met with contestation by the Asian communities and would be therefore mainly disregarded in the data and instead be replaced with the region of birth.[53] Furthermore, India's takeover of Goa was widely discussed in East African Goan newspapers. The incorporation of Goa into India did not alter the self-image of Goans as different from and more westernised than the rest of the Asian communities.[54]

Indian state actors over time attempted to influence East African policy as well as the political actions of East African Asians. India had a long-lasting interest in the East African region. While still under colonial rule themselves, after the end of World War I, Indian politicians – prominently supported by the Aga Khan – unsuccessfully lobbied for the former German East Africa to be declared an Indian colony as a reward for India's sacrifice in the war.[55] After achieving independence, India changed course and pursued a policy of supporting Africans in their struggle against colonial rule. This was part of the cooperation between non-alignment states in which India and its Prime Minister Nehru held a leading role. In this context the question of Asian belonging and loyalty was brought up continuously not just by African politicians but also by representatives of the Indian and Pakistani government.[56] Already in 1949, during his visit to Arusha, the first Indian Commissioner in East Africa, Apa Pant, urged closer co-operation and friendship between Africans, Asians and Europeans. In Uganda, he pressed for integration as *tranquillizer* against attacks on Asians such as the Buganda riots in 1949.[57] He also recommended to Asians in East Africa not to apply for Indian passports but to keep their status as British subjects or British Protected Persons.[58] In Tanganyika, Apa Pant

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[52] Maini, Amar. 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 112–24. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

[53] Letter from The Census Officer, Protectorate Agent's Office, Kamapala, to All District Commissioners, Protectorate Agents, and Executive Officer, Township Authority, Entebbe, February 1948: Census Minute Paper Non-Native Census General 1948, Secretarial Topic 22/C/Census/B2, UNA.

[54] Jessica Kuper, 'The Goan Community in Kampala', 58.

[55] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 105.

[56] Ibid., 108; Gupta, Anirudha. 'India and the Asians in East Africa'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 124–39. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

[57] Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 115.

[58] Ibid., 115f.

urged Asians to help Africans "in every way possible and [to] not exploit them."[59] India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and other representatives of the Indian government publicly asked immigrants of Indian descent in East Africa and in other world regions to identify with their host countries:

> "[…] those who have made their homes abroad must give their complete co-operation in the all-sided balanced development of the countries of their adoption, taking the keenest interest and actively participating in the material, moral and spiritual progress of the country."[60]

Nevertheless, in the same statement, which was printed in all Hindu newspapers published in East Africa, complete loyalty to the British crown was expected by Indians living in the East African Protectorates. The Indian Government under Nehru modified this notion regarding loyalty ten years later in a press release which was published in the *Tanganyika Standard*, pointing out the importance of the support for the African struggle: "Mr. Nehru has urged people of Indian descent in Africa to 'identify themselves with African freedom movements.' It was not only the right thing to do but 'desirable in their own interest.'"[61]

Other public figures like the Aga Khan, representing the religious community of Ismaili Muslims, advertised loyalty to East Africa. During the period of decolonisation, Aga Khan III and after his death in 1957, his successor Aga Khan IV visited the region multiple times. Already in the beginning of the 1950s, the Aga Khan III told his followers to mingle with the Africans and identify with their country: "he said that they could not hope to continue in Africa unless they succeeded in winning the esteem of the African people. […] When you live permanently in a country you become a member of that country".[62] At the same time though, the religious leader advised his followers in Tanganyika to "resign from the Asian societies and seek their future within Tanganyika as Ismailis, thereby destroying the possibility of a united

59 Tanganyika Political Intelligence Summary, October 1953, CO 22/380, UKNA.

60 Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulletin for the period ending 20 August 1951, Uganda, FCO 141/18101, UKNA.

61 Support uhuru aims, Indians told: Nehru to hold talks with African leaders, *Tanganyika Standard*, 19 September 1961. Before, in 1952, Nehru and the Indian Government supported the defence of Mau Mau fighters by Indian lawyers: "This […] would give the Africans great confidence in the Indians and would go a long way to furthering a better relationship between the African and Indian communities." Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending the 20 December 1952, Uganda, FCO 141/18101, UKNA.

62 Ismailia Discussion, *The East African Star*, 22 June 1951, in: Uganda Asian Affairs Monthly Bulleting September 1950–September 1953, FCO 141/18101, UKNA.

Asian community."[63] It was political attitudes like this that made a unified Asian political effort to support the Tanganyikan independence movement more unlikely. It was commonly known that Aga Khan III and the Tanganyikan Governor Twining were good friends and there were rumours circulating that the Aga Khan donated money to the British backed United Tanganyika Party (UTP).[64] With the accession to office by Aga Khan IV the strategy of the religious leadership changed. Aga Khan IV openly advised his followers to support African independence directly.

In Uganda, Aga Khan IV did not openly take a side for one specific nationalist party, still a monthly intelligence report by the Colonial Office from May 1961 points out that he "is believed to have advised his followers confidentially to support the U. P. C. [Uganda People's Congress] rather than the Democratic Party whose long term chances he did not rate highly."[65] The Ismaili community stood out with its common political approach compared to other Asian communities in the region. Gardner Thompson has stressed the crucial role of the Aga Khan as external leader who held widely respected authority in this.[66] This sort of leadership was unique to the Ismaili and was lacking in the other Asian communities.

Although most official visitors from India and Pakistan urged the Asian communities to integrate, some also suggested transferring their financial assets abroad to protect wealth in case of an African government targeting Asian property after independence.[67] After Tanganyika (in 1961) and Uganda (in 1962) reached African self-government, Indian representatives urged the Asian immigrants of those countries to acquire Tanganyikan and Ugandan citizenship and integrate in the new system as full members of its society. The young African nations maintained good diplomatic relationship with the Indian subcontinent. Visits by representatives of both African states and the Indian and Pakistani government were carried out regularly. However, India and Pakistan repeatedly pointed out that the relationship between Asian immigrants and the indigenous African population was a domestic issue and had to stay a purely East African business. Indian and Pakistani governments were evidently passing on responsibility for people of Asian origin first to Britain and after East African independence to Tanganyika and Uganda.

African politicians were equally interested in keeping good relationships with Indian politicians, as they hoped to receive some political guidance from Indian political actors who

63 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 478.

64 Gregory, Robert G. 'Co-operation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role, 1890–1964'. *African Affairs* 80, no. 319 (April 1981): 259–273.

65 Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending the 20 December 1952, Uganda, CO 822/2064, UKNA.

66 Gardner Thompson, 'The Ismailis in Uganda', 41.

67 Tanganyika Monthly Intelligence Report, January 1961, CO 822/2061, UKNA.

had more experience in organising political parties and governing a decolonised country. An example of this cooperation is a letter written by John Kakonge, Secretary General of the UPC, to India's Foreign Secretary Mukul Mukherjee in which Kakonge congratulated Mukherjee on her party's electoral victory and asked if the UPC could send a student studying at Dehli University, Ally Kirunda, to a two months training in the practice of Party Organisation.[68]

Collaboration with the British administration

In their situation of political fragility, Asian community leaders were keen to protect their members' interests and rights. The vast majority of Asians had made East Africa their permanent home. Although they might have arrived as sojourners, they had become settlers often in second or third generation, a transition illustrated by Gijsbert Oonk.[69] The majority of Asian settlers planned their long-time future in the region. Over time, until the early 1950s, Asian organisations in colonial East Africa had three main political interests: supporting the Indian independence movement until it was accomplished in 1947;[70] fighting for equal rights and treatments with Europeans in the region; and retaining the status quo they had finally reached.[71] Especially in the last two decades of colonial rule – on which this chapter is concentrating on –, Asians were eager to keep the rights and privileges which they had fought for in the decades before. As long as African self-government seemed unlikely or generations away,[72] most Asians believed they could retain their status in the three partite society of East African colonialism. To achieve this, leading Asian actors were advocating for representation in colonial institutions. This representation at the same time meant legitimising these institutions. There was a smooth transition between using colonial institutions to lobby for Asian vested

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68 Letter from John Kakonge, Secretary General UPC to Mukul Mukherjee, Foreign Secretary of India, 05 March 1962: Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/13, UNA.

69 Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 28–33.

70 Aiyar, Sana. 'Empire, Race and the Indians in Colonial Kenya's Contested Public Political Sphere, 1919–1923'. *The Journal of the International African Institute* 81, no. 1 (February 2011): 132–154. especially 134–141. Aiyar, Sana. 'Anticolonial Homelands across the Indian Ocean: The Politics of the Indian Diaspora in Kenya, ca. 1930–1950'. *American Historical Review* 116, no. 4 (October 2011): 987–1013. Aiyar has further emphasised importance of the interracial cooperation between Africans and Asians in the anti-colonial movement in the case of Kenya. However, while some Asian individual certainly engaged in such cooperation as Aiyar has shown, the vast majority of Asian associations and organisations did not have East African independence at its heart until the early 1950s.

71 Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 200.

72 Still in 1955, not only British administrators but also leaders of the independence movements expected Tanganyika's independence to be at least one generation away: Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 517.

interests and enabling colonialism. This enforced the impression of Africans that Asians, already defined by their role as economic middlemen, were further politically collaborating with the colonial state to secure their own interest.[73] The motivation of Asian actors was multi-layered and varied heavily. Those motives were often more inward looking towards the Asian communities themself and the individuals' own personal status within the Asian community or religious or ethnic sub-group. Asian actors could influence colonial policy in a preferable way for one's own community. As this could mean that some Asian communities had more influence than others, Asian community leaders competed for representation opportunity in these institutions. Engaging in colonial institutions such as boards, councils and other bodies could therefore bring benefits in one's own social ranking. However, their influence on the colonial state remained marginal and was limited to the soft powers of economic capital, lobbying and campaigning. Charity donations as described in chapter I.1 were another means by Asians to extend influence on the colonial society. Rather than clearly categorising Asians' behaviour, the following examination of how Asian actors moved within colonial institutions is crucial to understand the spectrum of behaviours by Asian individuals and how it affected divisions within the Asian communities in Uganda and Tanganyika as well as African perception of Asians as enablers of colonialism.

Before World War II, Asian associations and organisations had actively lobbied for equal legal status of Asians and Europeans. Leading members of the Asian communities had been trying to reach these political goals by participating in colonial institutions. Consequently, by using these channels of political influence Asian actors confirmed and legitimised the colonial state. At the same time, they gained some form of institutional power through representation which Africans received much later and disproportionately to their population to a much lesser extent.[74] Asians' membership in the local legislative councils as well as in other colonial institutions like the Chamber of Commerce and township authorities gave them some leverage especially when it came to economic policies.

In his research on cinema culture in the urban space of Tanzania, Ned Bertz has illustrated how in the 1930s members of the Indian Association (IA) in Tanganyika sturdily lobbied for

[73] Edward Steinhart referring to possible colonial collaboration by Africans in Western Uganda has described collaboration with colonialism as "a fluid and creative response by African ruling groups and individuals to a situation of inherent conflict and compromise." Following Steinhart's definition I will use the term collaboration as a political process for actors to be able to react to their perceived needs and objectives: Steinhart, Edward I. *Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890–1907*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

[74] The first time Africans were represented in the Tanganyikan LegCo was in 1945, while Asians were already represented in LegCo in the 1920s: Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 26.

representation on the censorship board which decided if films were suitable for being screened in front of the local population. By arguing twofold that Asians were trustees of the African population and that Indian films were difficult to be understood by non-Asians, the IA used a narrative that depicted Asians as preservers of the colonial paternalistic society as well as culturally different to the rest of the colonial society.[75] This claim of Asians being part of the civilising mission of Africans confirmed ideas of Asians as agents of colonialism. Especially the older generation of Asians who had been representing the Asian minority in colonial institutions, were opposed to the support of African nationalism by some of the younger members of the Asian minorities[76] Further, emphasising Asian cultural exceptionalism made any form of commonality between the different races in East African society even harder to believe in. Bertz further depicts the education system pre- and post-independence and how Asians actors exercised their influence to enjoy educational privileges including better school funding than the African population.[77] Although campaigning united for some privileges, Bertz also shows how other issues ran along religious and ethnic divisions within the Asian minority, like the question of separate schools for Muslims and the question of Ismaili "separatism."[78] While Bertz analyses the Tanganyikan case, similar developments can be seen in the Ugandan system.[79] Asians had advocated for being categorised as "non-natives" in the 1920s, as this gave them a much more privileged status entailing more rights, which allowed them their own school system. The fact that they were allowed to use their own languages of instruction was met with some criticism even by Europeans. Cyril Handley Bird, at the time President of the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, criticised that in practice Asians maintaining their own language in business and school "places a grave handicap on the enforcement of responsibility, thus according them special privilege."[80] Bird further refers to the issue of conscription during World War II:

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[75] Bertz, Ned. *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in Tanzania*. Honululu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015.

[76] Letter from C. H. Hartwell to F. D. Webber, Colonial Office, London 24 January 1959, CO 822/1360, 1957–159, UKNA.

[77] Morrison also discusses political lobbying by Asian communities to receive privileges in education: Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 50.

[78] Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean*, 70–75; 83–88.

[79] Application for Incorporation under the Trustees (Incorporation) Ordinance 1939. The Mjanji Indian Education Society of Mjanji, 11 April 1951, Mjanji Indian Education Society, 1951, Series CL/1/V212, UNA.

[80] Bird was President of the Uganda Chamber of Commerce (1942–1946), a Member of the Uganda Legislative Council (Representative 1947–1955), and Minister of Commerce and Works for the Uganda Government (August 1955–October 1958). He was also a founder member of the Uganda

> "This special privilege was most marked when the question of conscription arose, the Europeans being ruthlessly conscripted both for active and non-combatant service, while it was only towards the end of 1942 that any attempt was made to conscript Asiatic manpower for non-combatant service only, and that was only half-heartedly enforced."[81]

As this example shows, the lobbying of interests by Asians could lead to conflicts pertaining to the social order of the colonial state. Some Europeans, like Bird, still managed to depict Asians as over-privileged, despite holding the most privileged position within colonial society. One contested issue was immigration regulations. Here too, Bird had identified Asian privilege over the European status. He claimed that "while a European would be ruthlessly deported" deportation to India "was not enforced."[82] The colonial state tried to tighten migration from the Indian subcontinent to East Africa increasingly after the Second World War. As the majority of immigrants came from the Indian subcontinent these measures were directly aimed at the Asian minorities in the territories who still had family members join them from India. New regulations were met with rejection by official Asian bodies and the vast majority of Asians across the different territories. A defence regulation from 1944 was replaced by a new ordinance in 1948. Both were introduced to reduce immigration in the East African region drastically. Representatives of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya opposed the new rules in the East African Indian National Congress in Mombasa. Even government loyalists like H. K. Jaffer, a prominent member of the Ithnasheri community in Jinja, criticised the new regulations in the Uganda LegCo which he was a member of.[83] In Tanganyika, many prominent members of the Asian Association (AA) were protesting against the amendments proposed to the Immigration ordinance in 1954. R. B. Thaker opposed the changes at a public meeting of the AA. D. K. Patel, one of the founders of the AA and President of the Indian Merchants' chamber and Amir Jamal, later one of the fiercest Asian supporters of TANU, equally showed strong opposition towards the Immigration Bill.[84]

This form of campaigning for vested interests was aimed at reaching equality between Europeans and Asians but left Africans out of the equation. Often, this was combined with a strong emphasis on Indian nationalism and linked with the Indian independence movement abroad.

Electricity Board (1948–1955): Bird Correspondence East Africa & Rhodesia and publications 1943–1959, 01 March 1944, GB 0162 MSS. Afr. s. 1674, Weston Library, Oxford.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 114f.

84 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

Brennan calls these different forms of political participation "overlapping nationalism."[85] The neglect of African issues when it came to Asians' political campaigns left a lasting impression on the African public in the post-war years and enhanced ideas of Asians excluding themselves from the local society and following foreign and self-centred interests.

In Uganda and Tanganyika, different Asian bodies competed over the prevalence of representing the Asian communities in each region. A mushrooming of public bodies and the question of Asian representation led to conflicts between different personalities in the Asian community.[86] In Uganda there was a strong division along religious lines when it came to representation. In 1947, after the founding of a Central Council of Muslim Associations in Uganda, the new Council sought separate representation of Muslim Asians in the Uganda Legislative Council.[87] Together with the Central Council of Muslim Associations (CCMA) and the Kampala Indian Association it was then the most prominent Asian body in Uganda. The Constitutional Committee toured Uganda to collect information for the independence process and the creation of a constitution for independent Uganda. Apart from political parties and colonial institutions like the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, which included some influential Asian businessmen, the Committee also sought advice from various Asian organisations including the long-established Central Council of Muslim Associations as well as the only recently founded Uganda Action Group.[88] With exception of the latter, these associations were led by conservative Asian leaders who were mostly reluctant to the change the independence struggle brought.

In Tanganyika the approach was slightly more centralised than in Uganda. During World War II the established Indian Association (IA) fell apart after the body had stated that it did not represent Pakistanis.[89] This shows how divisions within Asian communities in East Africa reproduced the conflict lines of the Indian Partition. In 1950, the Asian Association was formed in Dar es Salaam to replace the IA. The founders aimed for a stronger political focus of the new Association. Among the initiators were mostly Asians from a younger generation who had been born and/or brought up in East Africa of which some would later play a crucial role in the Asian support for African nationalism. Yet, the AA was joined by more

85 Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 34.

86 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 113.

87 Gardner Thompson, 'The Ismailis in Uganda', 39.

88 R S Allen for G. B. Cartland (absent) at Chief Secretary Office Entebbe to Sir Handley Bird, 20 October 1959, in: Bird: Correspondence East Africa & Rhodesia and publications 1943–1959, GB 0162 MSS. Afr. s. 1674, WL, Oxford.

89 Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 30.

conservative Asians after its foundation and not all of the founders were equally supportive of African nationalism. D. K. Patel, founding member, for instance, was a moderate, while not backing Tanganyika's leading party TANU, he did not support the movement either.[90] This younger generation also bridged religious differences and represented most religious groups within the Asian community.[91] Although, after the Asian Association had aligned with the African nationalists from the Tanganyika African Association which later morphed into the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) almost all Ismaili Khojas left the AA. According to Robert Gregory, Ismailis acted on advice from the Aga Khan.[92] The British government linked a further reluctance of joining the AA to the doing of the conservative Ismaili leader who also stood in service of the colonial government, Valimohamed Mohamedali Nazerali. An intelligence report in the British National Archives believed him to be a "staunch supporter of Government" and "instrumental in dissuading Ismailis from joining the Asian Association.[93]

There were certainly some Asians who used their social and political status beyond lobbying for the Asian community and took over a rather influential position. While it is difficult to draw clear lines between campaigning for the own community and colonial collaboration, there have been cases where individual actors from the Asian communities were serving the colonial administration in high positions. The possibly closest Asian ally for the British colonisers in Uganda was Amar Maini. For his service he was rewarded with a knighthood in 1957. He was one of those Asian settlers who identified with the region of East African rather than with Uganda as a nationalist concept. Born in Kenya, he had been politically active there before moving to Uganda in 1939 where he quickly became a member of the Township Authority of Kampala and then was appointed by the British as Mayor of Kampala from 1950 to 1955. From his arrival in Uganda until independence Maini served on various boards, committees, and other bodies. He had also been appointed to the Legislative Council in 1944 where he served on the government benches until after the Buganda Trade Boycott, thus long after African self-governance in the near future had become inevitable. After the boycott was finished, he still took up the post as Speaker of the East African Central Legislative Assembly in Nairobi, of which he was a member from its establishment in 1948 on. In hindsight, in a contribution on the 1972 expulsion, he reflects on his personal experiences during colonial time, and concludes:

90 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

91 Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 264.

92 Ibid., 265.

93 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

> "Perhaps it was foolish to accept the offer but at the time the central institutions were still intact and they covered a range of activities […] that seemed to represent a considerable transfer of power by the new states of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya."[94]

Until the end of colonialism, Maini was clearly an enthusiastic representative of the colonial system.[95] According to his own words, he was concerned about being "more than merely an 'Asian politician' in East Africa."[96] From his actions, one can assume that Maini's loyalties mostly laid with the British Empire. Of course, as previous research has discussed, identity is not fixed but much more fluid and multi-layered.[97] However, there is much to be said that Asians of the older generation were often more embedded in regional networks crossing borders and expanding to the whole of East Africa, whether this was related to established economic and social networks – based on trade, community, family or professional ties which were entrenched within the structures of the British Empire.[98]

According to files in the British National Archive in Kew, Maini had regular meetings with British administrators and informed them in detail about the political actions of the Asian communities in Uganda. These briefings included personal information about individuals and their political attitudes.[99]

In Tanganyika, leading members of Asian communities held prominent positions in colonial institutions. A. Y. A. Karimjee of the Bohra community, who also had been President of the Indian Association, held the office of Deputy Mayor of Dar es Salaam by appointment four times from 1950 on and was Speaker of the Tanganyika legislature for a decade. The British intelligence reports describes him as "staunch supporter of Government" who the government trusted with the post of director of the company which took over the Government's Swahili newspapers.[100] Ebrahim Sheriff Dewji, leader of the Ithnasheri community in Arusha, sat on the Arusha Town Council. Despite being one of the Vice Presidents of Arusha's Asian Association he was supportive of the colonial government which appointed him to LegCo in 1957 shortly before the first LegCo election for which he did not run. Iqbal Chopra, after being newly appointed on the Executive Council, was sent to the UN by Governor Twining in 1955 to report

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94 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 118.

95 He was knighted by the Queen in 1957 for public services.

96 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 119.

97 Brubaker and Cooper, 'Beyond "identity"'.

98 Frenz reflects on these transnational ties in the context of the Goan minority in East Africa: Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*.

99 For instance: Letter from C. H. Hartwell to F. D. Webber, Colonial Office, London 24 January1959, CO 822/1360, 1957–159, UKNA.

100 Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 260; Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

that Tanganyika would not be ready for independence for another 25 years.[101] Many of these Asian community leaders received honours for their government support by the Queen.[102] Often this generation of Asians, born before 1915, had migrated to East Africa. Iqbal Chopra for instance had been born in Punjab and was educated in the UK where he even married a British national. As children of the empire their loyalty lay with the British Empire rather than with a slowly crystallising East African nation. This also became apparent in the support some Asians of this generation gave to the government-loyal political parties.

The United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was founded under the instruction of Tanganyika's Governor Edward Twining in 1956.[103] The UTP was backing the colonial government and its plan to establish a political system of multiracialism with various safeguards to maintain settler influence of the settler European and Asian communities. The party further rejected the idea of a rapid African independence process. A number of leading members of the Asian communities joined and/or supported the new party. A. Y. A. Karimjee, a member of the superrich Karimjee family, became one of UTP's Vice Presidents. Hassanali Kassam Virani, a leading Ismaili in Moshi, was a local organiser of the UTP from 1956 on and travelled to the UK in 1957 as part of an UTP delegation. Virani, also a UTP member, clashed with Moshi's TANU branch over his claim that the Wachagga welcomed a multiracial government.[104] Iqbal Chopra was another prominent Asian of the older generation who joined the UTP. The leader of the Ismaili community, V. M. Nazerali, was according to Gregory in support of the UTP, apparently though not a member of the party.[105] At the time there were rumours that the Aga Khan had donated money to the UTP, yet, the religious leader never openly endorsed the party.[106] The UTP – while it enjoyed moderate enthusiasm from members of the minority communities – was only able to generate very insular support within the African population. UTP's concept of multiracialism basically declined a democratic rule by the majority – which consisted of Africans – in the longer future.[107] As main rival of the UTP, anti-multiracialism was therefore TANU's most important cause at least until 1958. This reflected deep-rooted African fears of a

[101] Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 265.

[102] Iqbal Chopra (Tanganyika) and B. K. S. Verjee (Uganda) received a CBE, K. K. Radia (Uganda) and C. K. Patel (Uganda) received an OBE. C. K. Patel and Iqbal Chopra were also made Queen's Council.

[103] Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 265.

[104] The Wachagga were one of the politically most influential if not the most influential ethnic group in Tanganyika from the Kilimanjaro/Moshi region.

[105] Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 266. Other Asian UTP members were K. M. Patel, S. M. Patel, R. C. Amin, J. D. M. Shah and M. S. Desai: Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

[106] Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 266.

[107] Pratt, Cranford. *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968: Nyerere and the emergence of a socialist strategy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

continuation of settler dominance beyond independence. According to Pratt it also generated an African sense of racial pride.[108] After the heavy defeat of the first Legislative Council elections against TANU in 1958 the UTP lost any political support. The party was quietly dissolved in 1962.

Political activism for an independent East Africa

Those who openly supported the colonial administration were often part of more conservative Asians from the older generation. Some middle-aged and younger Asians, mostly men, who had their formative years in the time in the 1940s, during the time of a changing empire, were willing to back the African cause for independence. These Asians had stronger connections to East Africa than to India and felt more accountable to the East African society than to a British colonial power. Yet, motives varied and were multi-layered and political support was in most cases not solely based on morale conviction. As much as the motivation varied so could the forms of cooperation with the African nationalist movements; it extended from smaller financial support to extensive political involvement in political parties and/or movements.

Political multipliers: Support from Asian donors and publishers

Asians were associated with their economic role and wealth in general, as discussed in chapter I.1. Their economic success was regularly perceived as exploitative by the African population which was embraced by the narrative used by the colonial government. Due to their economic strength, it is reasonable to suggest that the Asian communities were an attractive source of financial support for the growing African nationalist movement in Tanganyika and Uganda. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) as well as the Ugandan parties of the 1950s and early 1960s tried to activate this financial asset. According to a retrospectively written article by Amar Maini in 1975, after the expulsion of Asians from Uganda, this form of political funding was widely spread:

> "All that was needed could be obtained from a small number of people but in every small town in the country there were to be found Indian traders who assisted African political

[108] Ibid., 35.

> parties and African leaders. This was done not only by providing useful organizational know-how and assistance with transport but with canvasing expenses too."[109]

Later, after independence was achieved, the Asians were accused of buying themselves free of real political commitment in the independence struggle and nation-building.[110] Nevertheless, in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the African parties actually relied on this financial support. According to a Monthly Intelligence Report for Uganda the acquisition process varied from persuasion to coercion: "During the past few weeks, considerable sums of money have been collected from Asian businessmen by African spivs – either by straightforward extortion or by promises of *protection* in return for cash received."[111] As this source stems from the colonial administration, who certainly had an interest portraying any form of Asian support as coerced, it should be taken with considerable amount of scepticism. How far financial support was giving voluntary or under coercion is hard to determine for the individual case. It is likely that there have been different levels of voluntariness from full conviction to persuasion.

The Uganda National Congress (UNC) tried the softer way of persuasion in 1953, one year after its foundation, when circulating a pamphlet to leading Asians. Yet, the appeal subsided mainly unheard. According to the report, only two Asians gave Shs. 500 each. At the same time, the UNC and other parties took up loans from Asian businesspeople. In one case the president of the UNC, Ignatius Musazi, failed to pay back a Shs. 15,000 loan which damaged his reputation amongst the local Asian communities and decreased UNC's chance of taking out a new loan.[112] It is certain that there were some Asians who had been giving money, sometimes substantial sums, to the African nationalist cause very willingly.

While struggling in the beginning of the 1950s to acquire money for their political fight, with the years passing and independence becoming only a question of time, Asians got more involved in financing political parties. Like this comment by Uganda's colonial administration in August 1960 pointed out: "It has become clear during recent weeks that Asian leaders, both Muslim and Hindu, are now taking positive action to win the sympathy of political leaders."[113] The two richest businessmen in Uganda, Jayant Madhvani and M. K. M. Mehta contributed "a

[109] Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 117.

[110] Brennan, *Taifa*, 183.

[111] Extract from Uganda Monthly Intelligence Appreciation dated 13 October 1955, III. Asian Affairs, CO 822/1192, UKNA.

[112] Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 20 February 1953, Asian/African Relations, Uganda, FCO 141/18101, UKNA.

[113] Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 31 August 1960, Asian Affairs, Uganda, CO822/2064, UKNA.

very large sum of money for the benefit of an African political party."[114] Furthermore, Madhvani invested £ 150,000 in an English newspaper in Jinja "which will reflect the policy of the U. P. C."[115] Some Asians donated smaller sums to political parties. The example of V. D. Patel from Jinja shows this. V. D. Patel had donated Shs. 25 to the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) on the occasion of the birth of his son and received a thank you letter in May 1962 from the Publicity Secretary of the Party, Wadada Musani.[116]

In Tanganyika, with only one widely popular party existing, funding the independence movement was less precarious. Often donations were tied to specific occasions, such as travel plans of TANU delegations: Allibhai J. Bhatia donated Shs. 900 to an African delegation to the Asian Socialist Conference at Bombay in 1956; A. G. Abdulhussein contributed Shs. 50 to the same cause. A number of local and international trips made by Julius Nyerere were partly funded by Asian supporters: Amir Jamal contributed to the cost of Nyerere's crucial visit to the United Nations in 1955;[117] Tribhovandas Bechar Sheth gave money for Nyerere's travel to the UK in 1956; Umed Kothari collected money for Nyerere's trip to the US in 1957; and C. K. Patel was said to have provided transport on Nyerere's visit to Mwanza.[118] The largest financial contributions given to TANU came from Asians based in Dar es Salaam.[119] Financial support also went to different TANU funds and other organisations led by African nationalists.[120] Shyamji Trikemji Thanki gave £ 75 to the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in September 1957 and had collected Shs. 2,000 from members of the Asian communities for a TANU school in Lindi.

Some prominent and wealthy Asians organised sundowners for TANU, in particular for Julius Nyerere. By organising and paying for this particular form of network and campaign event, Asians used their often well-connected position to promote TANU's cause. It was another way for Asians, who were not allowed to join TANU at the time, to present themselves as advocates of African nationalism without directly going into politics. These events were initiated mostly in the mid-1950s after TANU and Nyerere had established a certain reputation, yet before they had achieved any form of electoral representation. A. G. Abdulhussein welcomed Nyerere back from his trip to the UN in September 1955 with such a sundowner. Two months later a similar event was organised by Shyamji Trikemji Thanki, again in honour of Julius

[114] Ibid.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Letter from Wadada Musani, Publicity Secretary Uganda People's Congress, to V. D. Patel, Jinja, 07 May 1962, in: Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/13, UNA.

[117] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 108.

[118] Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

[119] Brennan, *Taifa*, 146.

[120] C. K. Patel donated to the TANU Building Fund: Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

Nyerere. The phenomenon of the sundowner events shows how crucial Julius Nyerere was for TANU to get support from prominent political actors in the Asian communities.

Asian funding was not limited to party donations, travel grants and event organisation. When Nyerere was put on trial for criminal libel in 1958 he was firmly supported by TANU supporters within the Asian community. Umed Kothari collected donations for his defence and was present at the hearings.[121] Other Asian professionals also offered their professional services to African nationalists. Mahmud Rattansey and Kantilal Jhaveri, both lawyers, provided free legal advice to TANU from the mid-1950s on. Dr Baldev Krishna offered free medical services to Africans.

A number of Asian newsmakers and publishers who endorsed the African nationalist parties or the national independent movements in general played a crucial role as political multipliers. Some Asians held influential positions in the newspaper business of East Africa. Initially, Asian newspapers targeted an Asian readership. The Asian owned English newspapers later opened up to African readers as well and started to publish not just in English and Gujarati (some of the newspapers were bilingual) but also in Swahili (or less often in Luganda). These publishers and journalists had the means to form and spin public opinion. Communication was an influential factor in the struggle for independence. Although, word of mouth communication was still the most important way of political communication in East Africa of the 1950s, newspapers and radios were powerful opinion formers.[122] While the British colonial administration was holding the radio monopoly, there were numerous newspapers with different ownership in the region.

While most of the European and Asian newspapers had begun writing for their own smaller communities, they opened up for a wider audience in the long term and started to employ African journalists. With more and more Africans learning how to read and write in their vernacular language but also in English (especially in Tanganyika where the literacy rate was higher than in Uganda), most newspapers were able to increase their readership. This was reflected in rising circulation numbers.[123] By employing African journalists and incorporating topics which would raise the interest of the African population the European as well as Asian editors were adapting to the changing situation. This pro-African attitude developed over time and is rather a sign of successful adaptation to a shift in public opinion than of active participation in the independence struggle.[124] A certain scepticism towards English and Asian owned press

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121 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

122 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 532.

123 Scotton, 'Tanganyika's African Press, 1937–1960': 10.

124 The new Uganda Argus published by the British-owned Standard-Group had a multiracial directorship and addressed all races. However, one prerequisite was that its editor was from the UK and as Daniel Nelson claimed in 1968 (at the time of writing editor of the UPC loyal *The People*) "in no way

such as the *Tanganyika Standard* prevailed within the African society, as some claimed they were one-sided. In general, African nationalists felt the need to have an independent African press which represented the African side of stories and African grievances.[125] While there had been publications by Asians criticising the colonial government before the 1950s, those had been focused on criticism against the UK's course of action in India and had mainly covered the Indian independence movement.[126] This was part of the representation of vested interests in which leading members of the Asian communities of East Africa had participated as early as the 1920s. Yet, in the 1950s a new form of Asian involvement in the media evolved, with Asians owning a press and/or having the financial means supporting the publication of African nationalist newspapers and literature.[127] In July 1955 the Asian Association which during various occasions had supported TANU openly launched its own Bulletin, *The Tanganyikan,* which endorsed independence.[128]

Shyamji Thanki financed the publication of the party newspaper *Sauti ya Tanu* (Voice of Tanu) in 1958. Possibly the most important publisher for TANU was Randhir Thaker who took up most of TANU's printing work by 1955. Although Randhir Thaker charged for some printing work, he kept working for TANU without receiving payments according to an intelligence report by the colonial police:

> "He is owed a great deal of money (about Sh. 60,000 in January 1958) by TANU, the Trade Unions and the African Newspaper Company, and although the debts continue to increase, still continues to work for them."[129]

The same report described Randhir Thaker as an advocate and "intimate friend of most of the African leaders, including Nyerere" from the mid-1950s on and as "a genuine and ardent supporter of African nationalism."[130] He also facilitated his office as space for polit-

was it comparable to the early African-owned nationalist papers.": Nelson, Daniel. 'Newspapers in Uganda'. *Transition* 35 (1968): 29–33.

125 D. P. K. Makwaia, Tanganyika Hansard, 15 May 1956, 170.

126 One exemption was the publisher M. D. Patel who had founded the *Tanganyika Opinion* in 1924, published the first Asian owned Swahili newspaper *Habari za Dunia* (News of the World) in 1939. The newspaper next to local news also consisted of letters from Africans and sometimes editorials which addressed Africans' grievances. *Habari za Dunia* did not survive for long; it closed down over paper shortage and the lack of African support: Scotton, 'Tanganyika's African Press, 1937–1960': 7; Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 181.

127 Mangat, *A History of the Asians in East Africa*, 176f.

128 Jhaveri, *Marching with Nyerere. Africanisation of Asians*, 11.

129 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

130 Ibid.

ical discussions by African nationalists.[131] The Swahili newspaper *Mwafrika* (The African) was funded by the brothers Surendra and Randhir Thaker. According to Aminzade TANU had withdrawn its support from *Mwafrika* in 1959 because of the paper's continued racial nationalist positions.[132] Subsequently, the Thaker brothers founded their own Swahili newspaper *Ngurumo* (Thunderstorm) in April 1959[133] which was backed by TANU, adopting "a more moderate position on racial questions."[134] The newspaper landscape had been more diverse in Tanganyika than in Uganda. There had been less involvement of Asians in Ugandan newspaper publishing than in Tanganyika and Kenya.[135] The lack of smaller printers might be one reason why this form of political endorsement by Asian publishers was missing in Uganda.[136]

Political participation

Although the vast majority of Asians in Tanganyika and Uganda did not politically participate in the African struggle for independence for a variety of reasons, there are exceptions to the rule. Not only did Asians donate money and provide their professional support for the cause, but some Asians were also seeking political office themselves or campaigned very closely with those Africans who were seeking office. Political activism for African nationalism varied in Tanganyika and Uganda due to the different political landscapes. In Tanganyika, because of TANU's dominance, support by Asians was much more institutionalised enabled by membership in the pro-TANU Asian Association. Support was mostly given to TANU, with only very few exceptions by Asians who supported the African National Congress (ANC). In Uganda, in contrast, the political landscape was much more scattered, and it was harder for political conscious Asians with a pro-African nationalist attitude to choose who to back. This meant that institutionalised support only started with the formation of the Uganda Action Group (UAG) in the end of the 1950s, while some individual support for African nationalist parties occurred before.

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[131] Thaker further collected donations for TANU: Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

[132] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 109.

[133] Jhaveri, *Marching with Nyerere. Africanisation of Asians*, 66.

[134] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 109; Gregory, 'Co-operation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role, 1890–1964': 265.

[135] With the exception of the *Uganda Argus* which was partly founded by the Aga Khan until its nationalisation in 1972: Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 284.

[136] Nelson, Daniel. 'Newspapers in Uganda'. *Transition* 35 (1968): 29–33.

Backing TANU: Asians as political candidates during Tanganyika's transition phase

The independence movement in Tanganyika, which was unified under the dominating organisation of TANU and its leader Julius Nyerere, found support in parts of the Asian community. From the beginning of the 1950s, leading members of the Asian Association (AA) engaged with members of the Tanganyika African Association which renamed itself in 1954 to Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).[137] Most of these active members of the AA had been born in Tanganyika or had at least grown up in East Africa. On these grounds they claimed Tanganyika as their permanent and future home. Some of them had been abroad, either to India or the UK for educational reason. In 1952, the AA experienced a mass exit by almost all Ismaili members who had been advised by the Aga Khan to withdraw from the Association due to its support for African nationalists. This was instigated by V. M. Nazerali who backed the colonial government, as discussed earlier.[138] Several members of the AA openly criticised the Ismaili community for this move. Umed Kothari attacked the Ismaili community during a public meeting by the AA on 30 March 1958 for its reluctance to back the independence movement. Amir Jamal, certainly the most prominent Asian politician of the time and an Ismaili himself, instructed younger members of his community in 1958 during a series of seminars "in his brand of left-wing Socialism," as an intelligence briefing by the colonial police reported.[139] Jamal had resigned from the Asian Association intermittently in 1956 in the conviction that the Association did not go far enough in endorsing the independence struggle. Yet, by 1958 he had re-joined becoming one of the AA's Vice Presidents. He had been working in the family business in Dar es Salaam after returning from university in India in 1943. Jamal was highly committed to African nationalism, rejected political multiracialism early on and was close friends with Julius Nyerere who he had supported from the early 1950s on.[140] Despite his support for African nationalism, the British administration saw him as a reasonable force within the TANU orbit and evaluated his role in September 1958 as follows: "Although a staunch supporter of TANU, he is a realist and shrewd politician. His influence in future will probably be considerable but it is unlikely to be extremist."[141] Together with Jamal, Mohamed Nasser Rattansey a close political confident of Jamal and Nyerere,

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137 Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 108.

138 Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalism in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914–1956': 32.

139 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

140 Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 51f.

141 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

was fighting for African independence and nationalism. His views were seen as more critical by the colonial government and categorised as partly extremist. According to the same report, Rattansey already in 1958 had unsuccessfully advocated for non-African membership of TANU, which Nyerere failed to introduce at that time. Like Jamal, Rattansey had studied abroad, in Bombay, Beirut and London where he married a British national. He was active in the Asian Association from 1951 on.[142]

Shyamji Trikemji Thanki who was described as firm believer in TANU's cause by the British and Randhi Thaker both supported the TANU campaign. With most of these Asian activists and politicians TANU-leader Julius Nyerere had a personal relationship. A few of the other leading African nationalists fostered similar ties – though, not as successful. Rashidi Kawawa, in many aspects TANU's number two and future Prime Minister of Tanganyika, was friends with Thanki for instance.[143] Yet, it is apparent that more so the personal relations Nyerere maintained with many of the leading members of the Asian Association was crucial for the close cooperation between TANU and the AA.

The Asian Association played a significant role in channelling support for TANU during the foundation of both organisations in the 1950s.[144] In 1955 Nyerere travelled to the UN in New York to advocate for Tanganyikan independence. Government-loyalist Iqbal Chopra was also part of the Tanganyikan delegation. Chopra was holding an Asian seat on the government benches in the Legislative Council (at that time still not elected but appointed by the Governor). He supported the British administration in its claims and declared Tanganyika not ready for self-government, claiming to speak for the whole Asian community of the Protectorate. Nyerere quickly informed the Asian Association in Tanganyika about the incident and the AA promptly sent a telegram to New York clarifying Chopra would not represent the Asians in Tanganyika and rejected his claims.[145]

During the transition phase to self-government, in which the colonial administration allowed more and more political representation in a still racially divided political system, the role of Asians and Europeans loyal to TANU's main goals was important for the party. While members of the Legislative Council used to join the council by appointment, the newly introduced elections for the Legislative Council in 1958 and 1959 were based on a tripartite voting system in which every constituency was represented by three seats, which were held by a

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[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid.

[144] In fact, the Asian Association started to work closely with African nationalist prior to the rebranding of TANU with TANU's predecessor the Tanganyika African Association.

[145] Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 109; Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 522; Jhaveri, *Marching with Nyerere. Africanisation of Asians*, 4.

member of the African, the Asian, and the European community.[146] The electorate – consisting of Africans, Asians and Europeans alike – was able to vote for all three seats per constituency which meant that Africans were also able to vote for Asian and European candidates. At the same time Asians and Europeans could vote for African candidates. TANU supporting the "one man, one vote" system officially rejected this multiracial electoral system as undemocratic. Nevertheless, the party stood for election as boycotting the elections would have most likely slowed down the process of self-governance substantially. According to the voting system, TANU – whose membership was only open to Africans – could not send its own candidates unless it also supported one candidate per constituency of the other races.[147] Hence, the party reached out to non-African candidates who would support TANU's main goals, including its claim for the implementation of a fully democratic electoral system in return. As there had been co-operation with certain members of the Asian Association before, it was a logical step for TANU leaders to engage with this political organisation. As a result, the Asian Association and TANU arranged to back each other's candidates.[148] Asian candidates included personalities such as Amir Jamal (Eastern Province), Mahmoud Rattansey (Western Province), who was President of the Asian Association at the time, Kantilal Jhaveri (Dar es Salaam), Al-Noor Kassum (Central Province), and as only female Asian candidate Sophia Mustafa (Northern Province), who was not a member of the Asian Association. The candidacy of Sophia Mustafa was an interesting case. She openly advertised a peaceful non-racial Tanganyika and praised Nyerere's vision shortly after independence in her memoirs "The Tanganyika Way." Yet, she was never a member of the Asian Association and had been only approached to become an independent candidate with the backing of TANU due to an inner friction within the local AA branch.[149] After her initial election in 1958, the British government further ranked her as pro-British and as exemplary citizen.[150]

During the election campaign, African, Asian and European candidates who were supported by TANU were campaigning together, speaking in front of big crowds mainly consisting

146 These were the first ever elections in colonial Tanganyika. During the election in 1958, 15 members were elected in 5 constituencies. Another 15 LegCo members in 5 constituencies were elected in 1959: Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 39.

147 Mustafa, Sophia. *The Tanganyika Way*. Dar Es Salaam, Kampala, Nairobi: The Eagle Press, 1961.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid., 3f.

150 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA. After independence, Mustafa published her memoirs in which she emphasised the role of interracial cooperation in the independence movement: Mustafa, *The Tanganyika Way*. On her accounts see: Steiner, Tina. 'Translating between India and Tanzania: Sophia Mustafa's Partial Cosmopolitanism'. *Research in African Literatures* 42, no. 3 (2011): 132–146; Asian African Literatures.

of Africans. The events were generally carried out in Swahili.[151] Mustafa recounts how her lack of Swahili meant that her speech had to be translated from English for the audience. This illustrates the linguistic barriers which often existed between Asians and Africans. Whenever Asian and European candidates held their speeches in English, they were translated for the African crowds into Swahili. Although the voting system did not represent the Tanganyikan people accurately, practically dividing the population into three and giving minority communities wider representation, the campaign run by TANU was supposed to symbolise national unity. The Asian candidates called upon their fellow community members to support TANU and identify as Tanganyikans rather than hold on to communal divisions and racial identities.[152] The Asian electorate was more relevant to TANU than might be expected as the requirements which qualified someone as voter were set deliberately extremely high by the government so that Europeans and Asians were much more likely to fulfil the requirements than Africans. Because of these requirements only 60,000 voters registered out of a population of over 9 million.[153]

The competing UTP with its British backing and a far more conservative multiracial programme did not stand a chance.[154] TANU won each election before independence by a landslide. In August 1960, the party had already won before the vote was cast because too many of its candidates went unopposed.

Only in February 1963, TANU opened its doors to non-Africans. According to Gregory, half of the members of the Asian Association joined TANU shortly after.[155] Amir Jamal was the first non-African applicant for TANU membership, directly followed by his European cabinet colleague Derek Bryceson.[156] The Asian Association was subsequently dissolved.

Apart from the much wider support by Asians for TANU, especially in the last years before Tanganyika's independence, a very small minority of Asian political activists advocated for the more radical positioned African National Congress (ANC). One of them was Rajani Haridas. Haridas, also a member of the Asian Association, was according to a British report radical in his beliefs, a close friend of ANC's leader and unionist Zuberi Mtemvu and attended ANC meetings as an honoured guest.[157] He, however, remained an exception.

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151 Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 29; Mustafa, *The Tanganyika Way*, 23.

152 Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 108.

153 Voters had to prove an annual income of a minimum of £ 150, Standard Education VIII, or employment in certain specified posts highly restrictive: Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 39.

154 Jhaveri, *Marching with Nyerere. Africanisation of Asians*, 59.

155 Gregory, *Quest for equality*, 110.

156 Non-Africans Join TANU, *Tanganyika News Review,* February 1963.

157 Asian who is who, 1958, FCO 141/17862, UKNA.

In general, political commitment to the Tanganyikan cause by Asians was at the time not welcomed by all members of their own community as Ronald Aminzade stressed: "Conservative Asians, from the Hindu and Muslim communities, […] denounced members of the Asian community, such as Amir Jamal, who lent their support to the independent struggle as "TANU stooges" and "traitors" to their community."[158] Many of those Asians who publicly did not approve were themselves member of the government backing UTP. Nevertheless, with independence steadily approaching most Asians realised that African self-governance would happen more rapidly than initially anticipated by Britain. The fact that TANU in Tanganyika was an African nationalist mass movement under one leadership made the decision to back the independence struggle easier.[159] This also meant that Asian support could be channelled easily via more established institutions like the Asian Association and TANU.

After independence, only Amir Jamal and Al-Noor Kassum, who later represented Tanzania at the UN, were able to achieve long lasting careers in Tanzanian politics. Jamal was MP until 1985 and served with interruptions between 1961 and 1983 as Minister with different portfolios in Nyerere's cabinet, most of the time as Minister of Finances. The other members of the Legislative Council who had backed TANU's goals as well as other Asian supporters of the independence movement were politically marginalised shortly after the introduction of self-government in 1961,[160] often due to majority mechanism of the newly installed system they themselves had fought for.

Ugandan Asians and the independence movement

In Uganda, the situation for Asians who would have liked to get involved in the political process of independence was more complex. As there was no leading party like TANU who Asians could have followed jointly, it was not clear which of the many African parties formed in the 1950s aiming for self-government would eventually win the power struggle and become the ruling party after independence. Unlike Tanganyika, where there was only one big African party to back, in Uganda there were many different political camps, with the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) being contestants on a national scale and Kabaka Yekka (KY) supporting Baganda autonomy with a stronghold in Buganda. All three parties

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[158] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 107.

[159] In July 1954, TANU already had a membership of 15,000 which constantly increased: by September 1955 to 40,000–45,000, by December 1956 to 100,000 and by December 1957 to an estimated 150,000–200,000: Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 35.

[160] Gregory, 'Co-operation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role, 1890–1964': 266.

competed for the Asian urban vote.[161] In brief, the political situation in Uganda was much more convoluted than in Tanganyika.

Supporting a specific party – financially or politically – posed a great risk of backing the wrong horse for Asians individually and as a community. This meant that most Asians did not take a side – and in the event they did, they kept quiet about it – not wanting to choose the wrong one, and consequently they stayed mostly passive. This behaviour was particularly encouraged by the leaders of the older conservative Asian associations such as the Central Council of Muslim Associations and the Central Council of Indian Associations. Only later when the odds were clearly in favour of Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC), did a bigger number of Asians support the UPC more openly. Aga Khan IV. had already secretly advised his followers to support the UPC as he considered Obote's party to have the biggest chance to succeed.[162] Low has pointed out that unlike in Kenya, Tanganyika and other African states with considerable Asian minorities, "where non-African political organisations provided an invaluable stimulus to modern African political movements, there were in Uganda no such organisations for Africans to emulate."[163] Not only was the African independence movement in Uganda splintered, so were the Asian communities in Uganda (even more so than in Tanganyika). All of this made it hard for the Asian communities in Uganda to identify a common African cause they could get behind in support.

Political parties in Uganda did try to get support from members of the Asian communities, specifically in urban areas. The DP and the UPC promised Asians in Uganda stability and protection for their life and property in case of an electoral victory. In contrast to the DP, which initially did not accept non-African members, the UPC membership was open to all races from the start. Some Asians took up the opportunity and became UPC party members. A letter from the UPC Publicity Secretary, Wadada Musani, was addressed to Sadrndin Natha from Busia who had applied directly with the UPC headquarter to join the UPC as a party member. Musani gave instruction of how to apply with the regional headquarters in Mbale and informed Natha about the USh. 3 enrolment and USh. 2 annual membership fees.[164] That there were indeed several Asian UPC members shows another recommendation letter signed by John

161 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 123.

162 Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending the 20 December 1952, Uganda, CO 822/2064, UKNA.

163 Low, Donald A. *Buganda in modern history*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971.

164 Letter from Wadada Musani, Publicity Secretary Uganda People's Congress, to Sadrndin [probably a misspelling of the Asian name Sadrudin] Natha, Busia, 22 January 1962 in: Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/13, UNA.

Kakonge, Secretary General UPC, for Mr. Bhupender Singh "our Party's keen supporter."[165] This recommendation letter further demonstrates – even though we do not know its specific purpose – that Asian UPC members used their association with the party for social leverage in some form.

The DP originally did not allow Asians access to its membership. In 1960 Paul Semogerere from the DP blamed "legal and technical difficulties" for the fact that the DP allowed African membership only.[166] A year later the DP finally opened the doors to/for Asians and Europeans. The UPC criticised the DP for its initial reluctance to welcome non-African members in a press statement and claimed that the fact that the DP only now let non-Africans join the party was proof of the DP's racialised thinking:

> "D. P. has by a mere resolution invited non-Africans to join them. U. P. C. from foundation has had the constitution that all above 18 years of age whatever they are could join. It is clear that D. P. thinks in terms of races whereas U. P. C. thinks in terms of the democratic entity in the individuals."[167]

UPC, DP and KY all had a limited number of Asian candidates for the National Assembly elections in 1961 and 1962. In the run-up to the Ugandan parliamentary election in April 1962, apart from English broadcasting, Asian candidates for the DP and UPC used political party broadcasting in Hindustani on Sundays to seek Asian voters.[168]

Once the UPC had crystallised as a party which would constitute the first independent African government, Asian individuals and associations became more willing to endorse the UPC. In a letter from 28 March 1962, G. A. Kassim Lakha, the President of the H. H. Agakhan Shi Imami Ismailia Supreme Council for Uganda, congratulated Milton Obote on behalf of the whole Ismaili community on Obote's electoral victory in the parliamentary elections:

> "I am sure with co-operation and goodwill from all sides we shall be able to enrich Uganda with peace prosperity and happiness. The most recent public statement made

[165] Recommendation letter signed by John Kakonge, Secretary General UPC, for Mr. Bhupender Sing, 13 November 1961, Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/13, UNA.

[166] Important to register, says D. P., *Uganda Argus*, 09 September 1960.

[167] Press release, UPC National Headquarters, not dated (most likely 1961), Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/13, UNA.

[168] John Kenyon, Head of Programmes, Uganda Broadcasting Service, Kampala to UPC 31 March 1962, Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/13, UNA. DP broadcasting: J. K. Patel, J. S. Patel and D. A. Patel. UPC broadcasting: K. K. Khosla, Dr. M. M. Patel, Kampala; Narender Patel, Mbale. Kabaka Yekka broadcasting: Sherali Bandari Jaffer, Kampala.

> by your goodself is very encouraging and I would say that it portrays matured statesmanship on your part. With yourself as leader of members of your Party, I am most hopeful that our country shall not fail to obtain its objective with fullest co-operation and unity."[169]

Lakha stressed successful cooperation between his Asian community and the African government to achieve peace and prosperity, two conditions the Asian communities feared to lose after full independence. G. A. Kassim Lakha, the author of the letter, himself became in fact a specially elected member of the National Assembly after this election.

From a party structure point of view this made the UPC more inclusive than Tanganyika's TANU which only opened the doors to Asians after independence in 1963; and even the DP accepted non-African members earlier than TANU. Although there were some contextual reasons for this membership policy. TANU had very rapidly developed into an African mass movement without any struggle to recruit members. The UPC and the DP, however, were parties with a far weaker loyal following and therefore had to fight for membership. Due to the strong political competition by multiple parties, neither party could simply rely on a widespread backing from the African population. For parties in Uganda, it was therefore indispensable to mobilise support wherever they could find it. This included the Asian electorate and possible Asian membership. The Asian communities were particularly strong in the urban areas where the Asian population made up a substantial and vital percentage of the electorate and therefore could be decisive in future elections. Yet, unlike TANU, within the multiracialist system of LegCo elections, neither the UPC nor the DP ever had a comprehensive party strategy for how to include Asian actors in the independence process and make them advocates of the African nationalist movement.

Young Asians and the Uganda Action Group

One outstanding example for organised Asian activism on the side of African nationalism is the formation of a new political group, Uganda Action Group (UAG) at the end of the 1950s.[170]

[169] Letter from G. A. Kassim Lakha, President of the H. H. Agakhan Shi Imami Ismailia Supreme Council for Uganda, to Milton Obote, 28 March 1962, Uganda People's Congress National 1961, PO 9/23, UNA.

[170] The Uganda Action Group is rarely has not been widely discussed in recent research on Uganda's political development. It is, however, briefly mentioned in: Gregory, 'Co-operation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role, 1890–1964': 269.

Some younger Asians joined together to form the UAG[171] whose self-proclaimed purpose it was to create a free and democratic nation based on equality of opportunity and of political, economic and social rights, aiming for universal fellowship and nothing less than world peace.[172] The group – although theoretically open to all races – consisted solely of Ugandan Asians. They were mostly younger Asians between 20 and 30 years old, although another source claims their average age to be 19. Many of them had recently returned from and had been influenced by Fabian socialism and avant-garde literature.173 These younger Asians saw Uganda and East Africa as their home, or mother country as it was expressed by one of the founders, Shaffiq Arain.[174] They demanded a schedule for African self-government, believing that the identification with the African population was the only reasonable option for Asians in East Africa.[175] At the same time, they declared there would be no need for special minority safeguards in the new independent state, as long as there was universal adult suffrage after independence giving Ugandan Asians the right to vote.[176]

It was no surprise that the UAG's views did not represent those of the more conservative members of the Asian community. In a meeting, Sir Amar Maini, at the time still on the government benches of the Uganda Legislative Council,[177] informed the British Governor about the political inside of the Asian community and its attitude towards the UAG: "Maini did not think that the Asians in Uganda as a whole have any sympathy (because of their vested position in Uganda) in premature self-government, or with the aspirations of the Uganda African nationalist politicians."[178]

The range of opinions within the Asian communities in Uganda was however more complex. A report written for the Colonial Office about the initial meeting on 04 January 1959 shows

[171] The files of the Colonial Office names following individuals: Shaffiq Arain; B. A. Misri; Rajat Neogy; V. V. Radi; G. S. Ahluwalia; M. M. Patel and Jimmy Verjee (nephew of B. K. S. Verjee member of LegCo): Secret: Letter from C. H. Hartwell Chief Secretary's Office, Entebbe to W. L. Gorell Barnes, Colonial Office, London; 15 April 1959, CO 822/1360, UKNA.

[172] Minority safeguards not needed, says Action Group, *Uganda Argus*, 15 April 1959, CO 822/1360, UKNA.

[173] Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 75.

[174] Young Asian Association, Background, 04 January 1959 Meeting, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 3.

[175] Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 117.

[176] Minority safeguards not needed, says Action Group, *Uganda Argus*, 15 April 1959; Jinja Association drops demand for safeguards. Asians confer on common roll Muslims seek concerted policy, *Uganda Argus*, 14 April 1959, in: CO 822/1360, UKNA.

[177] Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 118.

[178] Letter from C. H. Hartwell to F. D. Webber, Colonial Office, London 24 January 1959, CO 822/1360, 1957–159, UKNA.

this. During the meeting the formation of the new political group was discussed (then still called the Young Asian Association) and resulted in the foundation of the Uganda Action Group thereafter. An ad hoc committee consisted of Shaffiq Arain, B. A. Misri, Rajat Neogy, V. V. Radia, Jimmy Verjee,[179] with Gurdial Singh Ahluwali as the appointed Secretary of the Young Asian Association. They had invited 100 Asians including members of the established different Asian bodies to the meeting of which 60 participated in the end.[180] The committee had circulated the terms on which they planned to form this new political group which included membership regardless of race and religion and the resolution to make the group "a truly nationalist one."[181] During this meeting, a range of different opinions where expressed. The members of the ad hoc committee all, as expected, supported the formation of a new group initiated by Asians to support African independence. In contrast, especially leaders of the old associations, like B. K. S. Verjee and Major Din, rejected the need for such a new group and believed in the effectiveness of the established Central Council of Muslim Associations and Central Council of Indian Associations. S. C. Desai suggested a stronger cooperation between the old two existing Central Councils to "present a united front." Major Din further pointed out that "Africans were not prepared to accept Asians into the political life of the country."[182] This idea was shared by other attendees who believed that the new group should concentrate on preserving the rights and interests of the Asian community.[183] This was de facto what the established associations already did, while the younger generation of Asians who had initiated the meeting were aiming for a wider national outlook instead of the representation of vested interests of a small minority. National in this case referred to the African nationalism which these younger Asians supported. Shaffiq Arain claimed that the existing Central Councils of Indian and Muslim Associations had "failed miserably to produce a feeling of security and unity." The initiators of the meetings believed that Asians had to come together behind the African cause. Rajat Neogy explained that he had already received an assurance from Ignatius Musazi "that Africans would support any move to form an Asian Group which would side

[179] Jimmy Verjee was the nephew of B. K. S. Verjee, leader of the Council of Muslim Associations who had a more conservative outlook on the matter.

[180] M. M. Patel was elected Chairman of the meeting.

[181] Young Asian Association, Background, Intelligence for December 1958, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 2.

[182] According to the report Din stated that "no Asian would ever become Prime Minister of a free Uganda": Young Asian Association, Background, 04 January 1959 Meeting, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 2.

[183] Equally, Mr Mansoor from Masaka supported the new group while claiming that it should only be open to Asians and "guard the rights and interests of the Asians." S. L. Markandey "said that Africans have no desire to share their political future with other races." Markandey was not clear if he was supporting the formation of the new group: ibid., 3.

with Africans."[184] Several participants supported the idea. P. I. Patel, a member of the Kampala Municipal Council, expressed "that Asians had failed completely to form a united front and that they had suffered a great deal as a result of this."[185] There were other attendees who took a central position and urged a cautious approach like R. J. Mehta, President of the Central Council of Indian Associations, who praised the idea but suggested to "feel out the people outside Kampala."[186] The meeting participants followed Mehta's suggestion and planned to discuss the issue further in the existing associations within the next month together with the members of the ad hoc committee.

This debate reflects an underlying problem which Asian actors encountered if they tried to unite the Asian communities in Uganda behind one single organisation. It shows how leaders of the different established associations dreaded the loss of influence and therefore persisted on keeping the old system of representation alive. Representatives of the more conservative and older generations of Asians such as R. J. Mehta and B. K. S. Verjee tried to moderate the objectives of the group probably also to secure their own personal influence as well as that of their religious communities in the political affairs of the Asian community in Uganda. Older representatives also mostly didn't share the ambitious objectives the committee had set out. B. K. S. Verjee in his role as LegCo member, for instance, had previously, in 1957, opposed a motion in demanding complete independence by 1961.[187] It was unlikely his attitude would have changed fundamentally by 1959. The report about the meeting refers to the underlying tensions between the different religious fractions of the Asian communities in Uganda in particularly within the older generation.[188] Yet, the report further illustrated how the way the young Asians had opened the conversation demonstrated a new form of possible cooperation within the Asian communities itself:

> "Whilst it is apparent that the younger set, both Hindus and Muslims are determined to form this association, most of the older members of the Asian communities feel affronted that the existing Indian ad Muslim Associations, which they themselves formed long ago, are considered so inadequate by the rising generation. There is still no indication of

[184] Ibid., 2.

[185] Wahid Karim, Hasmukj I. Pandya and P. I. Patel (a member of Kampala Municipal Council) and Sultan Jaffer all supported the formation of a new group. The latter though believed group's membership should be only open for Asians: ibid.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Taylor, Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life, 70.

[188] "The Hindus feel mildly resentful that the Assistant Indian Commissioner should be so friendly with a Muslim, while the non-Khoja Muslims distrust [Jimmy] VERJEE because of this friendship.": ibid., 4.

> the readiness of Asians to sink their religious differences, in order to attain the necessary unity for the formation of a political party capable of expressing one voice."[189]

The formation of the UAG displayed a generational change within the Asian population regarding their perception of African nationalism. In fact, one of the main criticism members of the UAG voiced was that the Asian establishment had lost the right to speak for the whole of the Asian community as they were too focussed on fractional communalism.[190] In October 1959, the UAG claimed the whole of the Asian community had, in fact, never been fully represented by the old existing associations: 'The most that these sectional bodies have ever succeeded to represent is the top, has seldom got within hearing distance of the conventional Asian "leaders."'[191] This shows that the formation of the UAG not only reflected a shift of political opinions but at the same time disentanglement from the old forms of Asian political organisations.

The Colonial Office was warned not to underestimate the "very considerable, and still growing, tide of pro-African opinion amongst the 20–35 age group Asians."[192] Although the colonial administration did not feel particularly threatened by these young Asians at the time, they kept an eye on the Uganda Action Group. In a meeting in January 1959 with Governor Frederick Crawford Amar Maini voiced no concern about the seriousness of the activities of this group. Yet, he urged for further observation "particularly as there has always been a tendency for young Asians born or educated abroad to import strange doctrines, even Communism, into Africa."[193] In his statement, Maini framed the members of the UAG as a somehow external, foreign problem – incorrectly stating that most of the UAG had been born abroad.[194]

He himself believed that the UAG's motivation was to a great extent down to political aspiration and attention seeking rather than political commitment to a national cause, and therefore had tried to encourage these young Asians "to begin at the bottom and seek office on the lower-level public bodies and municipal councils, thus equipping themselves for membership of the Legislative Council."[195] Similarly, the intelligence report on the meeting discussed the surprisingly prominent role of M. M. Patel who was chairing the meeting. The report

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[189] Ibid.

[190] Gardner Thompson, 'The Ismailis in Uganda', 40.

[191] Quoted in: ibid., 41.

[192] Young Asian Association, Background, October 1958, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 1.

[193] Letter from C. H. Hartwell to F. D. Webber, Colonial Office, London 24 January1959, CO822/1360, 1957–1959, UKNA.

[194] The members of the UAG were part of a younger generation mostly born and raised in Uganda.

[195] Letter from C. H. Hartwell to F. D. Webber, Colonial Office, London 24 January1959, CO822/1360, 1957–1959, UKNA.

concluded – without stating where this conclusion was drawn from – that the reason for Patel's engagement with the Young Asian Association, the future UAG members, was "that he was trying to bring himself once again before the public eye and to regain a little of the prestige which he has lost in the last few months."[196] In general, this form of reporting on the attitude of Asian political actors emphasises an intrinsic self-serving motivation for political activism on the side of the African cause, often disregarding the possibility of political conviction as motor for political action. At the same time, British sources contradicted this point by stating the fact that "there is growing up, here in Uganda, a "younger set" which has every intention of early integration with African nationalist aims'"[197] The generational conflict between the younger and the older members of the Asian communities in Uganda, yet, not only proved a change in Asian attitude by some younger Asians, it once more confirmed the unwillingness of more conservative Asians to align themselves with African nationalism. This, however, does not negate the fact, that some Asians were more than willing to support the African cause and were active advocates for African self-governance. In Uganda this group of people was mainly found within the UAG.

The UAG actively supported Obote's faction of the Uganda National Congress (UNC) and according to Gregory, contributed to Obote's rise and to the founding of the UPC in 1960. The UPC lost the election in February 1961 to the DP but won the final election before independence in 1962. After the dissolution of the UAG in 1961, most of its leading members joined the UPC, where especially Gurdial Singh was engaged closely in the further struggle for self-government and political power.[198]

During the LegCo elections in 1960 mentioned before, in which the potential election boycott by Buganda prevented potential Asian and non-Ugandan African voters from registering, the Uganda Action Group urged not only all Asians but all residents of Kampala constituencies to register to vote.[199] Yet, vice-chairman Shafiq Arain blamed "inadequate publicity and a rather unsatisfactory registration programme" for the lack of registrations. The UAG issued 5,000 pamphlets with information on the registration process and the make-up of the Kampala constituencies. The UAG further lobbied for an extension of the registration deadline.[200] Arain explicitly criticised "certain Asian leaders" for a "lack of courage and political foresight"

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[196] Young Asian Association, Background, 04 January 1959 Meeting, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 4.

[197] Young Asian Association, Background, October 1958, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 1.

[198] Gregory, 'Co-operation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role, 1890–1964': 269f.

[199] UAG urges Asians to register, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1960.

[200] Slow London talks 'causing state of fear in Buganda', *Uganda Argus*, 06 September 1960.

who were "once again misleading the masses and advising them to adopt a policy of wait and see regarding registration." Arain blamed bad leadership within the Asian communities for Asians' fence sitting "because their leaders failed to support the right cause, fearing that they might antagonise people in power." In this statement Arain already anticipated that Asians' political apathy would be haunting Asians after independence. The activists of the UAG therefore urged people to form their own communities, to take a political side instead of "biding their time to jump on the winning bandwagon."[201] This claim was harshly rejected by the president of the Central Council of Muslim Associations, B. K. S. Verjee, who pointed out that Asians outside of Buganda were in fact registering "as fast as they could."[202] This showed according to Verjee that the only reason for slow voters' registration (including African voters) was due to the "events as they exist in Buganda." He further accused the Uganda Action Group of using the low registration numbers for "cheap publicity through making unwarranted attack on Asian leadership," while playing UAG's following down saying it was "very questionable." Similar reaction came from J. F. Dastur, who replied in the *Uganda Argus* on behalf of the Central Council of Indian Associations in Uganda: "It seemed that the U. A. G. wanted to make "capital" on the registration question by a tirade against Asians and their leaders. Mr. Shafiq Arain should desist from making "malicious propaganda.""[203] Dastur further defended the Asian community by saying that they had never sat on the fence but stated unequivocally, without reserve and on many occasions that their loyalty would always be to their adopted country and its people."[204] Again, this conflict between UAG members and members of the older Asian bodies exemplifies one of the biggest obstacles of Asian support for the independence movement, at least in terms of practicality: the divisions and factionalism within the Asian communities in East Africa.

Barriers to Asian political participation

The Asian actors who tried to mobilise the Asian communities to get involved in the African nationalist cause experienced a number of obstacles. There were two main barriers to Asian support and participation in the African independence movement: first, division within the Asian communities; second, African attitude towards Asian participation. The biggest obstacle for unified support of the independence movement which would find wide backing in the

[201] UAG urges Asians to register, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1960.
[202] UAG attacks on leaders 'unwarranted', *Uganda Argus*, 09 September 1960.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.

Asian communities was its own discord and fragmentation boosted mainly by the conflict between Hindus and Muslims but also by conflicts within these different religious communities such as generational divide.[205] The Asian communities were highly diverse and not always did they act along racial lines as James Brennan has shown for the Muslim community in Dar es Salaam, investigating "alternative Islamic forms of belonging in a pluralist colonial society politically dominated by race and socially dominated by sect."[206] Current affairs in India including the conflict with Pakistan, were followed attentively by the East African press. Those and other frictions between the different Asian communities based on religious or traditional differences led to difficulties, when leading East African Asians tried to unify the Asian community to become engaged in the African independence struggle. Amar Maini in retrospect stated: "The Asian community in Uganda never got down to any systematic discussion and analysis of the implications of independence so as to decide upon any concerted approach to it."[207] Unity was an obstacle which Asian politicians such as Sophia Mustafa referred to when addressing their fellow Asians:

> "They [Asians] could have a voice only as one compact entity. […] Asians must first attempt to remove the distinctions and classes among themselves and, after doing so, should proceed further and identify themselves completely with the country as Tanganyika citizenship and Tanganyika loyalty."[208]

Gregory says about the state of the Asian communities in the 1950s: "The Asian community […] was more fragmented and weaker than at any time in its more than three decades of political activity in East Africa."[209] Religious, caste and class based factionalism met with a generational divide and made it impossible for the Asian community to find a common ground on political issues. One example of this division was an Ismaili separatism.[210] The fear of an older generation represented by the leaders of the establish association such as B. K. S. Verjee

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205 Young Asian Association, Background, 04 January 1959 Meeting, Special Branch Monthly Digest Kampala, CO 822/1360, UKNA, 4; Letter from C. H. Hartwell Chief Secretary's Office, Entebbe to W. L. Gorell Barnes, Colonial Office, London 15 April 1959, CO 822/1360, UKNA.

206 Brennan, James R. 'Constructing arguments and institutions of Islamic belonging: M. O. Abbasi, Colonial Tanzania, and the Western Indian Ocean world'. *Journal of African History* 55, no. 2 (2014): 211–228.

207 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 117.

208 Mustafa, *The Tanganyika Way*, 79f.

209 Gregory, 'Co-operation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role, 1890–1964': 263.

210 Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean*, 70–5.

in Uganda and V. M. Nazerali in Tanganyika to lose influence within their own communities and in the political system of the region.[211]

Another obstacle Asians faced who believed in African self-governance and were willing to support African nationalism was the attitude some African nationalists would address them with. The fact that for a long period of time Asian political action had been reduced to the lobbying of vested interest of the Asian communities had made Africans wary of Asians' political claims. Moreover, the passivity most Asians had displayed in regards of political issues which concerned the African population had been partly interpreted as collaboration with the colonial state and had therefore meant that Africans had no trust in the possibility of future African-Asian cooperation. Most of the African population stayed sceptical towards Asian financial support and political participation in the independence movement as a British official observed: "No African party has yet made any whole-hearted attempt to welcome Asian members or to cash in on their considerable financial resources."[212] African politicians seemed reluctant to ask for and accept Asian money.

While the Asian politician Jhaveri calls TANU and the Asian Association in his memoirs natural political allies,[213] the majority of TANU members did not want the Asian communities to get involved in Tanganyikan politics. This was one reason why TANU opened its doors to non-African members only after independence. Nyerere's close co-operation with members of the Asian Association was viewed suspiciously, as Ronald Aminzade stressed previously: "Although some nationalist leaders actively welcomed the support of Asian-Tanganyikans, most were wary of Asian supporters and favored exclusion of Asians from membership in TANU."[214] In Uganda, the UNC and the Progressive Party had asked the Aga Khan during one of his visits to tell his followers not to interfere in African politics.[215] Initially, membership of political parties was almost exclusively open to Africans. After its late formation following the split of Obote and his allies from the UNC in March 1960, the UPC allowed non-Africans among its members from the start. Yet, this exception only came very late in the political transition phase and is therefore not symptomatic for party membership access in general. The reluctance to allow non-Africans into political parties is one indication that Africans struggled with a non-racial approach towards independence.

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211 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 113.

212 Asian Affairs – Monthly Bulleting for the Period ending 30 September 1960, Uganda, CO 822/2064, UKNA.

213 Jhaveri, *Marching with Nyerere. Africanisation of Asians*, 60.

214 Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 107.

215 Uganda Monthly Intelligence Report, For the period ended 31 October 1957, 12 November 1957, FCO 141/18104, UKNA.

Indeed, African and Asian attitudes towards each other intertwined vastly. The behaviour of the majority of Asians ranged between a policy of "wait-and-see" and a pro-British attitude. At the same time, most Africans saw Asians as economic middlemen of the British colonialism, an impression which was ostensibly confirmed by Asian behaviour. In Buganda, Asians keeping silent during the Kabaka crisis was a formative moment which led to further deterioration of the remaining trust African nationalists especially chiefs and people in the Kabaka's cabinet had in the Asian communities. Amar Maini admitted that he like most other leading Asian figures had not intervened to bring Mutesa back from his exile in Britain. He later claimed that any form of intervention from the side of the Asian minority would have come to nothing, though.[216] This led to a more negative attitude of Africans towards Asians, which in the worst case led to open discrimination, such as the Buganda Trade Boycott 1959/1960, as well as violent attacks, and therefore increased Asian fears and general political apathy.[217]

Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika and Ugandan political leaders mostly from the DP promised to leave racialism behind. Nyerere stressed in April 1960 that "the People of Tanganyika […] are endeavouring to establish a peaceful non-racial society based on justice, human dignity and fundamental human right."[218] Yet, resentments towards Asians ran deep as discussed in chapter I.1. Hence, many African actors either believed that Asians supported the wrong side and therefore were not to be trusted, or that Asians effectively had no right to a political opinion and participation. The last point refers to an underlying concept which linked political representation and participation to origin. This goes beyond the idea of majority rule. Apart from Africans being the majority and therefore should be leading the political transition, some African politicians claimed to be native to the land, autochthonous. This is a point already made in 1950 by Ignatius Musazi, the alleged ringleader of the Buganda riots of 1949:

> "According to the constitution of Uganda, there are no European or Indian settlers in the country; and no member of these two communities can claim, *as of right*, citizenship of Uganda. Both the Europeans and Indians are conscious of this fact, and their interest lies elsewhere. Because of this they have always kept their mouths shut when it comes to what they term "African politics". One fails to see, therefore, why members who have

216 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 122.

217 Robert Cohen has discussed how fear can lead to a stronger group-mentality in the case of the Jewish community: Cohen, Robert. 'Diaspora and the nation-state: from victims to challengers'. *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 507–520.

218 Julius Nyerere, Tanganyika Hansard, 27 April 1960, 55.

> deliberately declined to assist in developing a constructive public opinion should enjoy such a privilege of creating the laws of the country."[219]

Citizenship in this context must be understood as membership in the political body of the colonial state. This statement entails a combination of the two arguments (origin and political apathy) and leads to an argumentative vicious circle: because non-Africans could not claim citizenship, they were not interested in politics, and as they "deliberately declined" to be involved in politics, they should not hold the privilege of making politics. The Swahili term for citizen, *mwananchi* translates as child of the land and alludes to this notion. This exclusion from political discourse due to foreign origin would play a central role in the question of citizenship in the wider context of *citizenship culture* and the specific way images of citizenship were depicted based on racial belonging as will be discussed in the next chapter.

In Tanganyika, similar claims were made by the radical African National Congress (ANC). Asians started to be more concerned with independence when the policies which the ANC voiced became more popular.[220] While it did not result in any electoral victory for the ANC, the opinions were partly replicated in the middle ranks of TANU which forced the leadership to incorporate some of those claims in the party's policies. The more moderate approach by TANU leaders, above all Julius Nyerere, who had been appointed Chief Minister after the elections in 1960 was criticised to favour multiracialism.[221] Further, Asian political support for TANU was very much linked to the personal relationship with Julius Nyerere and a limited number of other public figures. This made it particularly fragile as Asians' inclusion in political structures and institutions were mostly missing.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the political role of Asians in the independence struggle was complex. From the early years of Asian settlement in East Africa on, Asians had used colonial institutions to lobby for their own privileges and represented vested interests of the Asian community. This cooperation with the colonial state made the Asian communities in general prone to the suspicion of colonial collaboration. While most Asians stayed politically passive, some leading members of the Asian communities in Tanganyika and Uganda could be categorised

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219 Musazi, Ignatius K.: Some observations on the Kingdom Report, Uganda African Farmers' Union, April 1950, CAS Edinburgh, Uganda Box 4, 27f.

220 Tanganyika Monthly Intelligence Report, January 1961, CO 822/2061, UKNA.

221 Tanganyika Monthly Intelligence Report, November 1960, Ibid.

as loyal imperialists. On the other side, a number of Asian businesspeople provided considerable amount of financial support for the nationalist parties in East Africa in the 1950s, which helped with logistics (travel funds, campaign events), communication (newspapers) and general party funding. Moreover, some Asians – mostly from the younger generation – participated actively in the political process of decolonisation as the examples of TANU backed Asians in the Legislative Council elections and the Uganda Action Group could show. The biggest barriers to participation of Asians in the independence struggle were the Asian communities' own fragmentation and partly the negative African attitude towards Asians in local politics. Furthermore, the differing political landscapes of Tanganyika and Uganda added different challenges. In Tanganyika, Asians knew who to follow if they wanted to join the independence struggle, as TANU built the core of the independence movement. However, Asians' participation was critically linked to the personal relationships between African politicians, mostly Julius Nyerere, and lacked wider acceptance within TANU. In Uganda the political situation was more complex. Asians were afraid of backing the wrong party which could have led to serious consequences for the Asian community once a party asserted itself. This meant that less Asians were willing to support the African struggle and become public figures representing the Asian communities in the joined fight for Ugandan self-government. Consequently, this led to a stronger reluctance of African parties to include Asians in their fight, while the lack of mass membership in all parties opened up party membership for Asians much earlier than in Tanganyika. In Tanganyika, Asians and Europeans campaigned together with TANU members for the Legislative Council elections in the end of the 1950s and although they could only join TANU in early 1963, they were included in the movement and in the Legislative Council by their African counterparts.

Furthermore, it does not come as a surprise that the political sphere if occupied by Asians was male-dominated and therefore a highly gendered space with a few rare exceptions such as the case of Sophia Mustafa. The limited representation of Asian women in 1950s and 1960s politics would later be replicated in local *citizenship culture* which mostly ignored Asian women as autonomous actors.[222]

By analysing the different ways Asians reacted to the surge in anti-colonial activities, we saw a wide range of responses within the Asian communities. The line between lobbying and collaboration with the colonial system, and between support for African nationalists and full

[222] While African women were not proportionately represented in East African politics, there were powerful exceptions such as the Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania, the women's wing of TANU led by Bibi Titi Mohammed a prominent TANU leader until her arrest in 1969 when she was accused of an attempted coup. More on female political activism within TANU: Geiger, Susan. *TANU Women: Gender and culture in the making of Tanganyikan nationalism, 1955–1965*. Portsmouth, NH/Oxford/Nairobi/Dar es Salaam: Heinemann, 1997.

political activism were fluent. After independence, however, the latter was mostly forgotten. The political apathy and the reluctance to take sides displayed by the majority of Asians were perceived as rejection of African self-governance. This narrative influenced ideas of Asian disloyalty and had a lasting effect on local *citizenship cultures* in the years after independence as discussed in the following chapter. In the eyes of many Africans, Asians had failed in this first and crucial step of the nation-building process.

Further, Africans believed Asian participation was an opportunistic strategy, which Asians only pursued after they had realised independence was inevitable. This would certainly explain the long hesitation of most Asians especially in Uganda and also the recommendation of the Aga Khan. Furthermore, it is most likely true that opportunism is one important factor of the Asian behaviour towards the African political movement in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Yet, there is certainly not just one reason for Asians' behaviour at the time. We rather found a synthesis of different motivations which also includes genuine support of African self-government.

II 1961–1967: Defining national and economic space

II.1 Negotiating citizenship

One of the most pressing issues at the eve of independence was the question of citizenship – categorising who belonged to the new nation and who did not. Like in all nation states, official membership of a society was first and foremost defined by a person's status as citizen, while the status as foreigner excluded the status holder from central rights and obligations. By defining citizenship and setting legal requirements, a specific idea of nationhood was formed. In this chapter, I follow John Lonsdale by assuming that citizenship as a concept "can only be the local and provisional outcome of continuing societal struggle from top and bottom."[1] Previous work on citizenship and racial thought has successfully demonstrated how political thought was shaped in the local context of East Africa. Existing research further demonstrated that citizenship in East Africa cannot be solely understood as the adaptation of imposed Western ideas,[2] but was rather "incorporated into local context and developed in ways specific to that context."[3]

Thus, this chapter analyses this societal struggle by breaking citizenship down in three different layers – the legal, imaginative and practical – which all play their part in shaping citizenship concepts. First, the new Tanganyikan (later Tanzanian) and Ugandan state had to make legal arrangements and set requirements which defined who qualified as a citizen and who remained a non-citizen; in short it established *citizenship legislation*. Second, post-independence societies engaged in a discourse defining what the state and fellow citizens expected from a citizen of the new state and in doing so created an ever-reproducing image of the ideal citizen; in the following I will call this *citizenship culture*. Third, East African Asians depending on their personal economic and social situation used different strategies – hereafter called *citizenship*

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[1] John Lonsdale, 'Unhelpful pasts and a provisional present', 18.

[2] Brennan, *Taifa*; Earle, *Colonial Buganda and the End of Empire*; Glassman, 'Slower than a massacre: The multiple sources of racial thought in colonial Africa'; Glassman, 'Sorting out the tribes: The creation of racial identities in colonial Zanzibar's newspaper wars'; Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*.

[3] Hunter, Emma. 'Dutiful subjects, patriotic citizens, and the concept of 'good citizenship' in twentieth-century Tanzania'. *The Historical Journal* 56, no. 1 (2013): 257–277.

practices – to reach in their eyes the best possible outcome resulting out of their often diffuse social position. In this analysis, citizenship understood as continuously in motion will be discussed in its dynamic character focussing on the process of *citizenship making*.

The following chapter will analyse how *citizenship legislation* and *citizenship culture*[4] as well as *citizenship practices* intertwined. I will demonstrate how the public discourse around *citizenship culture* and *practices* ultimately shaped *citizenship legislation* over the first years after independence. Firstly, I will illustrate the development of the *de iure* concept of East African citizenship allowing the different African and British stakeholders in the negotiation process to speak. *Citizenship legislation* only limitedly influenced the overarching concept of citizenship; I will further illustrate how different notions of national and imperial belonging shaped the social discourse about citizenship within the post-colonial society. While it is possible to observe how ideas of citizenship and therefore a specific *citizenship culture* were formed from above by political representatives, this chapter also shows examples demonstrating that *citizenship culture* and the notion of ideal citizenry was at the same time formed from below in everyday practice and social interaction. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the different doubts of Africans in Tanzania and Uganda concerning the ability of Asians to be "real" or "good" citizens in contrast to simple "paper citizens". In this context the question of civic loyalty and solidarity is going to be discussed. In regards to the Asian minorities, those questions arose especially when Asians' behaviour differed from the understanding of what a citizen was supposed to do or to be – which the development of a specific *citizenship culture* had formerly determined. This narrowed the space for Asians in the political space as well as in society in general. While political nonparticipation was still construed as indifference, as seen in the previous chapter, the political space had been closed for the majority of Asians due to a narrow understanding of citizenship defined often by racial categories. The chapter therefore ends with discussing *citizenship practices* of Asian individuals within their room for manoeuvre and how these practices were perceived by the African majority population and therefore again fed the culture of good versus bad citizens.

Making *citizenship legislation*

As part of the independence negotiations between the British colonial administration and the newly elected local representatives which included Africans, Asians, and Europeans the

4 *Citizenship culture* can partly be understood as what Emma Hunter calls the language of citizenship, it however comprises more than simply citizenship rhetoric. It also includes expectations which the state and fellow citizens had of an individual and what requirements this individual had to fulfil to truly become a citizen: Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 20.

question of citizenship was debated intensely. Of the three East African British territories, Tanganyika was the most likely candidate to gain independence first. In the metropole, British civil servants and ministers were aware of the fact, that Tanganyikan citizenship legislation, would work as precedence and would shape citizenship legislation in the region as a whole.[5]

British concerns were mainly circling around the European minority in East Africa; British passport holders from former British India were only mentioned as a side note in the initial considerations. They were keen to secure dual citizenship for this minority group of Europeans. Tanganyika would set an example for the East African region and even if Tanganyika itself did not host a huge number of European settlers its neighbouring colony Kenya did. Following telegram from the Governor's office in Tanganyika illustrates British officials' concerns:

> "Our Brief shows that refusal of dual nationality has precedents in other parts of the Commonwealth but implications, as (?we) understand them, of its adoption in multi-racial communities with settlers populations in East and Central Africa seems very dangerous and likely to cause political trouble at home."[6]

The British government was eager to prevent any form of legislation which prohibited dual citizenship, as it feared that European settlers would be reduced to a status of non-citizens otherwise and therefore lose certain property and residency rights if they decided to not give up their British passports. A ministerial briefing from June 1961 reads:

> "We are mainly concerned with a number of people of U. K. stock. […] Whether this option would subject such a person to discrimination in Tanganyika would depend largely on other legislation which the Tanganyika National Assembly might subsequently pass; but it might be assumed that such a person would be debarred from the Tanganyika franchise, and this in turn might have an effect on the relevance in future in the Tanganyika Constitution of the existence of reserved seats for Europeans. Generally speaking such a person might well find himself treated in practical respects as an alien in Tanganyika,

[5] Letter from Morgan to Ross, February 1961, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA. This happened in the case of Ghanaian independence in 1957 and the adoption of similar citizenship laws by Nigeria three years later. Not only in West Africa, also in the negotiations on citizenship in Tanganyika, Ghana's example was consulted. British drafts about Nigerian and Ghanaian citizenship negotiations were actually used as blueprints for the Tanganyikan case. Administrators simply crossed out the words Nigeria, Ghana or Sierra Leone and replaced them with Tanganyika in handwriting but did not change much more in the documents: "Appendix Tanganyika ~~Sierra Leone~~: Commonwealth Citizenship and British Nationality", CO 822/28061960–1962, UKNA.

[6] "(?we)" in original: Telegram No 148, Tanganyika to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 March 1961, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

> and would be likely, if discriminatory laws were to be passed at all, to be more vulnerable to such laws than Tanganyika citizens."[7]

The statement clearly shows that the Asian minorities in East Africa were never the main priority in the attempt to secure dual citizenship for British settlers "of U. K. stock" and protect their status in a decolonized East Africa but rather another technicality. The situation of Asians in Tanganyika mostly interested British officials in regards to possible compensation claims by Asian civil servants and was therefore more of a financial matter.[8]

At the same time, the British administration realised that whoever was left without local citizenship would be left in an even more fragile status than independence itself would possibly bring anyway. While pushing for the, in British eyes, best possible outcome,[9] the UK representatives anticipated a different position on the matter of citizenship by the African representatives from Tanganyika, the briefing continued: "If Tanganyika Ministers insist on prohibiting dual citizenship, (and we cannot prevent them) while agreeing that this will have eventual repercussion for East Africa generally, we think it will be tolerable."[10] Even though, most civil servants in the British administration thought that a prohibition of dual citizenship in Tanganyika would not lead to major problems for the few Britons in Tanganyika, they realised that Tanganyika would set a precedent in the whole region, which raised concerns about the situation of the large number of settlers in Kenya. M. B. Chitty from the Commonwealth Relations Office expressed the view that the need for dual citizenship in Tanganyika was less strong than in Kenya where there was a strong European settler community, while Tanganyika's British passport holders were predominantly Asian.[11]

Indeed, the representatives of the transitional Tanganyikan government had very different opinions on the topic. Before the March conference, the Tanganyikan government circulated

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7 Tanganyika Citizenship, Brief for the Secretary of State, 15 June 1961, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

8 Citizenship, Supplementary Brief for S/S, 14B, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

9 The paper, which the British government circulated before the March meetings presenting the British position on the citizenship issue, described the permission of dual citizenship as the best possible outcome for the British government. As the second-best outcome the brief named the Nigerian and Sierra Leonean legislation "whereby Minister may deprive dual citizen other than one born in territory […] who does not at request renounce other citizenship". The Ghanaian example was termed as the third best outcome "whereby Minister deprive any (repeat any) dual citizen who does not at request renounce other citizenship": Telegram from Leslie Monson to J. C. Morgan, UK delegate at the Tanganyika pre-Independence discussions, 24 March 1961, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

10 Ibid.

11 Mrs M. B. Chitty, Commonwealth Relations Office, to J. C. Morgan, 16 June 1961, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

a paper for the consideration of the conference, listing two basic principles of Tanganyikan citizenship. Apart from accepting the principles of Commonwealth citizenship, it stated "that Tanganyika citizens should not be permitted to possess dual citizenship."[12] Richard Turnbull, Tanganyika's Governor, had agreed on circulating the paper and later explained to the Colonial Office he had not been able to change the mind of the rest of the Tanganyikan government on the matter of dual citizenship: "Indeed I have not made any attempt for to do so would be likely to create suspicion."[13]

On 28 June 1961, at the fourth plenary session on discussing Tanganyikan independence with the Tanganyikan and UK delegations, the future citizenship legislation was debated. Julius Nyerere, who held the position of Chief Minister at the time of the conference, declined the British request for dual citizenship. In the minutes of the meeting he is quoted:

> "Tanganyika was creating a new citizenship, and it was important that her citizens should be clear in their own minds where their loyalties lay and should be required to make a clear-cut choice between the citizenship which were open to them. The importance of requiring such a decision was much greater in a new country than an old-established country. As for the category of persons mentioned by Mr. Monson [those who might deliberately elect to remain UK citizens even if they were to all intents and purposes Tanganyikans], it seemed unlikely that they could claim to be true Tanganyikans if they judged it to be in their own interests to retain United Kingdom citizenship to the exclusion of Tanganyika citizenship."[14]

In this quote, the notion of full commitment – being truly Tanganyikan – by only committing oneself to membership of the Tanganyikan nation already played along. The Tanganyikan government, with Nyerere as leading figure, had decided to prohibit dual citizenship in the Tanganyika Citizenship Bill which they presented to the National Assembly in October of the same year only two months before the day of independence on 09 December 1961.

Negotiating citizenship was a passionate issue, as it allowed African politicians, for the first time since colonial time, to decide on the status of citizens (and non-citizens) within the state and their role within a post-colonial society. The debate shows that it went beyond legal issues and reflects the forming of local *citizenship culture*. It is evident that Tanganyikan

[12] Tanganyika Constitutional Conference Tanganyika Citizenship, Item No. 7A T/C.6/61/A.1, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

[13] Telegram No 254, Turnbull addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 07 June 1961, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

[14] Tanganyika pre-Independence Discussions, 4th Meeting, 28 June 1961, 1, CO 822/2806, 1960–1962, UKNA.

parliamentarians took the matter very seriously. While debating the Citizenship Bill, a fierce discussion broke loose with two opposing sides clashing. The issue they were fighting about was race, and therefore indicated the most pressing conflict regarding the introduction of equal status for all.[15] With this debate and the following vote in the Tanganyikan National Assembly a template of citizenship legislation was created, which was used by Uganda and Kenya when those states adopted their own citizenship laws. Tanganyika's Citizenship Bill consequently shaped citizenship concepts in the whole region.

In the vivid debate, the terms loyalty and origin reflected the two conflictive models of citizenship. While members of the government pointed out that citizenship should be tied to undivided loyalty, more radical opponents responded, that members of the Asian or European minority could not be loyal to Tanganyika or an African government due to their racial background. More moderate opponents like M. M. M. Kamaliza, the MP for Kilosa, raised doubts about whether the "immigrant races" were able to fully commit to Tanganyika and leave their heritage behind:

> "Now we want to know from our colleagues the non-Africans, "Have you really an interest in Tanganyika?" "Do you want to stay here?" "Are you with us?" […] we want to find out, if there is a war between this nation and another nation […] for instance, India for that matter. Would the Indians shoot the Indians in India for the sake of Tanganyikans; that is what we want to know. […] We do not want people to have one leg in Tanganyika and one leg in Bombay."[16]

The mental image of legs standing in different countries was commonly used and echoed the *in-betweenness* of Asians living in East Africa. It was seen as the biggest obstacle for Asian loyalty by Tanganyikan MPs. The government led by Julius Nyerere advertised racial harmony and deemed the waiver of dual citizenship incorporated in the Citizenship Bill as sufficient to guarantee the loyalty of even the non-indigenous part of the population. Nyerere believed that if Asians committed themselves to Tanganyika in the form of local citizenship they could integrate as citizens into the overall society. According to his expectations, this would protect the Tanganyikan state from "fair-weather" Tanganyikans. There was opposition to this notion on different levels. Multiple times during the debate, discussants suggested that granting citizenship for non-Africans meant that they would also receive the same rights as the African population and hence there was no way to weaken the Asians' dominant position in the economic sector and to hinder them from accessing resources and land. The argument against equal

[15] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 115.

[16] M. M. M. Kamaliza, the MP for Kilosa, Tanganyika Hansard, 18 October 1961, 364.

citizenship for non-Africans due to their economic dominance shows the strong influence that claims for Africanisation and economic control had on the shaping of citizenship legislation. The MP from Mpanda, C. S. K. Tumbo warned:

> "[…] there is every danger that citizenship might fall into wrong hands. […] I have not sighted a clause where there are these two words "indigenous African". Therefore I emphasize that Tanganyika is an African State and the interests of the African people must be paramount, and it follows therefore that it is the African people who should be citizens."[17]

The MP from Mbeya, J. B. M. Mwakangale, became offensive and demanded that the non-African Members of Parliament drop their mandates. When referring to the East African Asians he added: "They are just bluffing us, cheating us, doing all sorts of things, showing that they are friends but I know –"[18] before he could finish his sentence he was interrupted by the Speaker of the House and asked to calm down. Thereafter, Prime Minister Julius Nyerere tried to inculcate in the present delegates that loyalty and not skin colour should be the foundation of the Tanganyikan citizenship concept:

> "They are asking us, Sir, to base citizenship not on loyalty to our country, but on colour. […] If we begin now in Tanganyika saying that all people in Tanganyika are equal except the Indians, and the Arabs, and the Europeans, and the Chinamen who happen to live in Tanganyika, we shall have broken a principle. […] If we in Tanganyika are going to divorce citizenship from loyalty and marry it to colour, we won't stop there, Sir. […] They are beginning to draw a distinction between Africans too. This is the beginning of breaking that major principle and going downhill until you break up the country. […] If we base citizenship on colour we will commit a crime. Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against. […] They are preaching discrimination as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. We glorify human beings, Sir, not colour."[19]

By characterising race and ethnicity as dividing factors, Nyerere invoked an integrative form of communality. After further discussion the Tanganyika Citizenship Act was adopted, not least because Nyerere had threatened the resignation of his whole government, which would have most likely led to further delays in achieving independence. As a result, the new Citizenship

17 C. S. K. Tumbo, MP from Mpanda, Tanganyika Hansard, 18 October 1961, 117.

18 J. B. M. Mwakangale, MP from Mbeya, Tanganyika Hansard, 18 October 1961, 332.

19 Julius Nyerere, Tanganyika Hansard, 18 October 1961, 334.

Act contained a very inclusive concept of citizenship. Almost all inhabitants of Tanganyika of Asian origin automatically became citizens or could apply for citizenship. Dual citizenship, however, was prohibited against the wish of the former British administration. Asian children of two parents, who were born in Tanganyika, could register as citizens. Everyone else with Asian origin and British passport could apply for citizenship within a two-year grace period. In both cases, they had to officially renounce their existing citizenship in writing within this period, however; and this was the nub of the matter as will be discussed in chapter III.2.

As expected, Tanganyika's citizenship law was formative for the way Ugandans and Kenyans thought about their own citizenship concepts. Some issues, such as the waiver of dual citizenship integrated into Tanganyika law, was not even seriously discussed but directly adopted during the committee meetings of the Uganda Independence Conference 1962 which discussed citizenship issues. The Ugandan representatives[20] officially used Tanganyika's legislation as a blueprint for the new Ugandan law,[21] as during the Tanganyika Independence Conference, British representatives tried to convince the Ugandan side to grant automatic Ugandan citizenship for all persons who were registered or naturalised as Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC). Like in the Tanganyikan case, these efforts remained unsuccessful; the Ugandan delegation accepted the same terms as the Tanganyikan citizenship law outlined giving the respective persons the unconditional right to register as Ugandan citizens within the first two years of independence.

In Uganda, the rumour had spread, that the new Citizenship Law was supposed to entail a paragraph which required the knowledge of a local language to be able to register or apply for Ugandan citizenship. Such a requirement would prove to be a great hindrance for Asians in Uganda. Different to Zanzibar and Tanganyika, where Swahili had been promoted as a universal language of national communication since the rise of the TANU movement in the 1950s, there never had been one vernacular language in Uganda which offered the advantage of universality. While a majority of Asians lived in Buganda's bigger towns such as Kampala and Jinja where the knowledge of Luganda would have been of some use, most Asians did not see the need to speak a local African language as Ugandans themselves often did not speak the same language and therefore referred to English when interacting with each other. A reader of the *Uganda Argus* from Kampala who called himself "Want to be a Ugandan citizen" reacted to the above-mentioned rumour by saying:

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20 The committee comprised Godfrey Binaisa (future first attorney general), Grace Ibingira (UPC, Justice Minister after independence), D. A. Patel as representative of the Ugandan opposition (DP), Abu Mayanja (UNC) and W. Jayawardena as representative of Buganda: Uganda Independence Conference 1962, Citizenship Committee Terms of Reference and Composition, 13 June 1962, DO 168/32, 1962, UKNA.

21 Citizenship – wrong notion, *Uganda Argus*, 03 August 1962.

> "It is by act of goodwill and justice, and as a gesture of confidence […] the government should extend a hand of friendship to the people of all denominations, and ask them to become citizens of the country in which they live. This should be done without any discrimination of colour, caste or creed, and even without any so-called-linguistic test barriers."[22]

A week later, Joachim from Jinja replied to "Want to be a Ugandan citizen" accusing the latter of exaggerating the issue and therefore flaring up fear arguing that the Prime Minister had already denied such a plan.[23] A commentator in the *Uganda Argus* emphasised that a language test would make the access to Ugandan citizenship unnecessarily more difficult for certain groups:

> "Clearly there must be some form of qualification and Uganda citizenship cannot be sold over the counter to everyone who asks for it. But it should nevertheless be available to people who are an asset to this country and who are prepared to give their allegiance to it."[24]

In the end, Ugandan politicians made concessions on behalf of non-indigenous residents by alternatively allowing an adequate knowledge of English to count as necessary language qualifications next to the vernacular languages. The MP for Kampala South, D. A. Patel (DP), had unsuccessfully tried to further amend the paragraph during the committee stage to include Urdu, Gujarati and Swahili as vernacular languages. His demands were answered with laughter from the Government to which Patel retorted by pointing out that "all of these languages were printed on East African currency notes."[25] During the parliamentary debate, Mahendra Mehta (UPC) had asked for Hindi to be included in the list of vernacular languages: "Because a person has been living in Uganda for years, and yet cannot speak English, it means therefore that he would not be suitable to become a citizen of Uganda."[26] Of course, for some of the African politicians this was exactly the reason to include a language requirement. While there were still some Asian residents whose English skills were very limited, the

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22 Letter to the editor, Extend a hand of friendship by "Want to be a Uganda Citizen" from Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 16 July 1962.

23 Letter to the editor, Citizenship by Joachim from Jinja, *Uganda Argus*, 23 July 1962.

24 Statement on citizenship, *Uganda Argus*, 31 August 1962.

25 Citizenship Bill is approved, *Uganda Argus*, 19 September 1962.

26 Ibid.

fact that the new legislation included English as a language, meant that naturalisation was open to far more people.[27]

Despite attempts from some African politicians, the Tanganyikan Citizenship Bill and in the following the Ugandan one as well, were highly inclusive and at least theoretically offered Asians easy access to become a full member of the Tanganyikan (and Ugandan) society.[28] Yet, analysing the debate on the Tanganyikan Citizenship Bill of 1961 presents us with some major points raised by a great number of delegates: doubts concerning the loyalty of Asians towards the new independent state; the ability of Asians to show solidarity or communality with the African community; the claim that Asians while they should actively take part in the community and in nation-building, at the same time should not be allowed to occupy influential roles in politics as they had less right to be politically represented due to the fact that they were not indigenous. In the end, this was all deeply rooted in a general disbelief in the ability of Asians to integrate in the new society. At the same time this integration was seen as a one-way street without African co-responsibility. The focus on language in the Uganda debate stemmed from the fact that the Tanganyikan case had largely closed the question of dual citizenship as a focus point of discussion. It further shows that language as a unifying or dividing factor was a central aspect not only concerning the Asian minority in Uganda, but in general concerning the process of finding a consensus in the nationhood question. By approaching citizenship concepts in Tanganyika and Uganda from a comparative perspective, we can see the regional evolution of *citizenship legislation* in the context of decolonisation. Moreover, the debates surrounding the creation of the first citizenship law reflects a parallel development of local *citizenship cultures* in Tanganyika and Uganda which contained many shared aspects for instance the focus on loyalty, yet, held some distinct characteristics which will be discussed further in this chapter. Further, in both countries the newly adopted citizenship law did not solve the major problem of contradicting ideas within those local *citizenship cultures*. Questions on loyalty and origin in particular became reoccurring issues in public opinion as well as political propaganda whenever the discussion started to revolve around citizens with Asian origin in East Africa in the following decade.

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[27] Yet, the newly established citizenship legislation still followed a strict logic of patrilineality, which discriminated on the basis of gender. Only women, and not men, who were married to a Ugandan citizen, could register for citizenship in the first two years after independence. Further, those whose father (not mother) "becomes a citizen of Uganda, or would have become one but for death, would automatically acquire Uganda citizenship.": Citizenship – wrong notion, *Uganda Argus*, 03 August 1962. Discrimination by gender in citizenship legislation has a long tradition worldwide. See for instance: Bredbenner, Candice L. *A nationality of her own: Women, marriage, and the law of citizenship*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1998.

[28] See further: Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 189.

Shaping *citizenship culture*

Emma Hunter has illustrated that "two competing understandings of political society and its conditions of membership"[29] existed in the case of mainland Tanganyika/Tanzania. She shows that while the *de iure* understanding enabled anyone with the legal status as a Tanganyikan/Tanzanian citizen to access political membership, the development of a language of universal citizenship in Tanganyika/Tanzania led to a narrower understanding of citizenship which was highly restrictive. Hunter illustrates that this ever-narrowing other understanding connected the status as citizen with the membership of TANU.[30] The Tanganyikan parliamentary debate exemplifies competing ideas of citizenship and shows how a specific *citizenship culture* starts to crystalise on the eve of independence. Hunter has demonstrated that this defined the relationship between the citizen and the state and with it the ruling party in a narrower sense. As discussed in chapter I.2 Asians were able to join TANU only after independence, and therefore could not be identified as citizens in this narrow sense Hunter referred to. While passivity and political apathy in the context of the Asian minorities were regularly interpreted as disloyalty to the nation, at the same time the interpretation of political space as racially African hindered Asians' political representation and their compliance with citizenship norms.

Yet, next to the relationship between state and individual which is defined by citizenship concepts, citizenship equally determines the relationship between two individuals living in this respective state. Being a citizen not only comprises obligations towards the state and in return the civil rights the state offers its citizens; it also comprises the idea of how citizens should interact: within the norms of harmony, solidarity, communality, equality and fairness.[31] The Tanganyikan parliamentary debate reflects this double track meaning of citizenship. These norms of civic interaction became central in the construction of *citizenship culture* as it reflected the idea of an all-embracing nation-building project which would start from scratch and rebuild a free and decolonized society with all citizens to be part of the joint effort. In the following, we will discuss how *citizenship culture* was shaped in reference to first the citizen's relationship with the nation and consequentially with the state and second the relationship between citizens within the decolonised society. Here, two main narratives become apparent: loyalty to the state and solidarity with one's fellow citizens.

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 189–93.

[31] These were norms (explicitly or implicitly) commonly referred to within the public discourse on *citizenship culture*.

Loyalty: *Citizenship culture* and the nation

Many ideas which influenced *citizenship culture* were shaped by the imaginary of the nation and nationhood. By comparing Tanzania and Uganda, we can refine the distinctions between the two national contexts we are looking at. In Tanzania nationhood was discussed amid the union between mainland Tanganyika and the archipelago of Zanzibar with pressing issues of further integration of the two dissimilar parts of the new country. Especially in the early 1960s, nationhood was conceptualised with ideas of pan-Africanism.[32] Yet, the new form of a loose constellation of a political union left leeway for independent policies on the mainland and Zanzibar while the common Swahili language offered a uniting factor. Especially on the mainland the early dominance of TANU had led to a unifying rather than dividing movement most Tanganyikans were willing to get behind. While members of some ethnicities held more political posts than others, there had never been an overpowering ethnic group which was able to claim rule. Therefore, party formation did not proceed along ethnic lines.[33] For a decade, Tanganyika had been shaped by TANU, a political mass movement, which was able to form a universal idea of Tanganyikan independence without being disturbed by conflicts with other surging political parties. It was, therefore, able to construct an African movement – only in 1964 did TANU allow non-African members – which was open to all African Tanganyikans.[34]

Uganda was different. Uganda's path to independence as has been shown in chapter I.2 was characterised by the struggle for power by multiple parties after independence – in particular between the UPC and the DP – and what Phares Mukasa Mutibwa calls the Buganda factor.[35] Political parties had used division in the population to seek votes from different ethnic groups and that way deepened divisions between different groups within the African population. This prevented a common idea of *Ugandaness* and confirmed a lack of a universally shared idea of Ugandan citizenry after independence. The early 1960s in Uganda, therefore, unlike in Tanganyika, were characterised by the (only partly successful) attempt of shaping a Ugandan identity. Because state and non-state actors first of all concentrated on bringing Ugandan Africans

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[32] Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 574.

[33] Ibid., 571.

[34] This, however, does not mean there was no initial dissent. Brennan has shown that the early 1960s have experienced a vast range of political opinions within TANU: Brennan, James R. 'The short History of Political Opposition & Multi-Party Democracy in Tanganyika, 1958–64'. In *In search of a nation: Histories of authority & dissidence in Tanzania*. ed. Gregory Maddox and James Giblin, 250–76. Oxford: James Currey, 2005. Giblin, James. 'Creating Continuity: Liberal Governance and Dissidence in Njombe, Tanzania, 1960–61'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40, no. 1 (2007): 27–50.

[35] Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics*.

together under one idea of nationhood, this social boundary-making led to a notion of African *Ugandaness* based on African heritage. Uganda's ethno-territoriality "in terms of territorialised ethnic spaces"[36] centred on the ideas of ethnic communities with a "native" homeland within the territory of the state. This, according to Ruth Marshall-Fratani who has analysed ethno-territoriality in the context of the Côte d'Ivoire, "perpetuates an absolutist conception of the foreigner, or stranger, as anyone from outside these territorialised communities"[37] excluding consequently any non-Africans from the idea of the new nation.[38] We can see in Uganda in parts what Sanjib Baruha has observed for North-East India: As the notions of territoriality and indigeneity were formed by a colonial spatial order, indigenous groups in fear of losing their rights defended "the fences and walls that colonial rulers had erected."[39]

Holger Bernt Hansen has stressed the importance of the ethnic dimension in the political continuity from Obote to Amin.[40] This had two consequences on the Ugandan discourse on nationhood which becomes apparent when compared to the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian example: First, the discourse is dominated by the question of how to create and sustain a Ugandan identity free from tribal competition.[41] Second, because there was no clear idea of what an African Ugandan was, the question of the role of non-Africans in Uganda was rarely posed as it could not be contrasted with a clear African role. This is reflected in the public discourse on citizenship and the Asian community which did not get the amount of attention this topic found in the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian press. This only changed in the second half of the decade especially after the successful power grab by the Obote regime and the preliminary elimination of the Baganda claim to power with the storm on Parliament and the introduction of the new constitution in 1966. In fact, one outstanding difference between the Ugandan and the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian debate in the early 1960s was that Uganda's discourse of nationhood circled around the question of how the different ethnicities and kingdoms could be integrated and the threat of secession be reduced,[42] while the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian debate was much more focused on questions of race relations.

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[36] Ruth Marshall-Fratani, 'The war of "who is who": Autochthony, Nationalism and citizenship in the Ivorian crisis', 39.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Amor, Meir. 'Violent Ethnocentrism: Revisiting the Economic Interpretation of the Expulsion of Ugandan Asians'. *Identity* 3, no. 1 (2003): 53–66.

[39] Baruah, Sanjib. 'Territoriality, Indigeneity and Rights in the North-East India'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, 12/13 (2008): 15–19.

[40] Hansen, Holger B. 'Uganda in the 1970s: a decade of paradoxes and ambiguities'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 83–103.

[41] Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*, 311–29.

[42] Letter to the editor, Our worst enemies – disunity and lack of confidence by Joseph W. Mukasa from Kitovu, *Uganda Argus,* 22 March 1962, Letter to the editor Use tribalism as a basis by H. M. Grace

In an essay in *Transition*, a new progressive journal published in 1960s Kampala founded and edited by former Uganda Action Group founding member Rajat Neogy, the author, Rev. Fred Welbourn, broached this quest for a national identity:

> "The majority of men do *not* think of themselves as Ugandans; they are still primarily Baganda or Acholi, Catholics or Protestants. The solution to this political problem is to be found only in the spiritual field – it requires a convincing answer to the question, 'Who am I?' – an answer which makes men feel, from the bottom of their unconscious minds, 'I am Ugandan' – not because I have consciously, rationally, decided to accept Uganda citizenship, *not* because I have done this voluntarily, of my own free will: but because I feel that, ultimately, I have had no choice in the matter. I am committed to this by a destiny as ineluctable as that which made me the son of this particular father."[43]

Welbourn stresses the importance of a quasi-natural feeling of belonging as Ugandan, not a constructed one, by comparing the feeling to family bonds, which has not been reached in the country. One ostensive example for the focus on tribalism as peril to Ugandan unity is the reader's letter in the *Argus* by J. M. Mubiru from Kampala which deals with the question of loyalty in a very different way to the Tanganyikan parliamentary debate:

> "What is most essential for us to live as people of one nation is that we should cease to regard ourselves as citizens of Buganda, Bunyoro or Lango but as citizens of Uganda who happen to be Baganda, Bonyoro or Lango. As citizens of Uganda we owe primary allegiance not to Buganda or Bunyoro, Busoga or Toro but Uganda. […] True loyalty to Uganda is not a piece of garment to be worn on intermittent occasions and then, like the uniforms of army reserves, be laid aside until the next crisis."[44]

In the first years after independence, racial unity was not a priority on the Ugandan nation-building agenda. This priority setting which left Asian citizens largely invisible in the discourse would have clear implications for the way Ugandans thought about citizenship and who was considered for citizenship. The disunity between the different kingdoms and ethnicities which according to the *Argus* reader Henry Kiwanuka was rooted in the religious,

from Kimmeridge, Dorset, *Uganda Argus*, 06 June 1962; 'No one will secede', *Uganda Argus*, 12 July 1962; 'Secession talk will not help', *Uganda Argus*, 28 July 1962.

43 Welbourn, Fred: Who Am I?: An Essay on Nationalism and Identity, *Transition* No. 12 (January–February, 1964), 34.

44 Letter to the editor, Loyalty to Uganda first by J. M. Mubiru from Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 23 May 1962.

linguistic and cultural division as well as "age-old mutual suspicion, distrust, animosities and even hatred":[45]

> "Hitherto, it must be admitted, there has been a superficial feeling of oneness among the citizens of Uganda. […] many of us have fallen […] prey to tribalism and linguism. […] Everybody knows that from the time immemorial Uganda did not exist as a single nation. It is by accident that Uganda was shaped into a political unit under the British central government. […] It failed to integrate the Ugandans in the full sense of the existence of common patriotic feelings among them. Our task is to make the peoples who are diverse and divided, one people, politically united, patriotic, loving and working for the country as a whole."[46]

The way Ugandan Africans discussed nationhood, as the reader's letter by Henry Kiwanuka shows, did not even consider non-indigenous people as part of one people. Paradoxically as it seems, the fact that a lack of national unity was bemoaned within the African population meant in the consequence that the question of Asian belonging in the Ugandan nation did not even take place. When Henry Kiwanuka continued to make a plea for unity he was thinking of African unity as the former paragraph has shown:

> "This unique feeling of oneness ought to be kept up even after the joys of the independence celebrations. We have joined hands to throw off the yoke of colonialism and should keep them welded together if we are to perpetuate our hard-won freedom. We must educate not so much the already sophisticated adults, but our young generation in schools and colleges to feel that they are citizens of a single nation destined to cooperate in the struggle for her economic independence."[47]

While there was certainly an interest by the Obote government to marginalise Baganda forces within politics and beyond and therefore to keep a spotlight on the ethnic question, at the same time, as we could see from the public discourse, the divisions between African Ugandans were perceived strongly by the people participating in public exchange. Later, when the Asian minority was moved to the spotlight, they were used as antithesis of *Ugandaness*. Citizenship alike was therefore used as a divisive instrument rather than an integrative one.

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[45] Letter to the editor, We must have unity by Henry Kiwanuka in Trichinopoly, *Uganda Argus*, 19 May 1962.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

One of the most common themes of the general discourse on citizenship in both countries was the question of loyalty. According to Julius Nyerere the question of who was a good citizen and who was not was determined by whether the person showed loyalty to the state of residence even if he or she was not of African heritage. Following Nyerere's statement citizenship was therefore more to be understood as a state of mind and a commitment in one's actions rather than determined by origin – meaning race or ethnicity. Yet, several MPs, as well as a big part of the African public, believed that Asians would never fully commit to the African state.[48] Many believed that Asians would feel more attached to their country of origin rather than their place of residency. Others argued – as the parliamentary debate already showed – that due to their rootlessness Asians were not able to show any loyalty no matter to which country. This goes back to the perception of Asians residing in East Africa primarily for economic reasons while keeping family and business ties with Indian subcontinent and sending their children to school and their wives to hospitals in India or the UK. They were regularly accused of standing "with one foot in Africa and another in India."[49]

In most contexts, loyalty was an umbrella term that was used to highlight certain behaviours by Asians, which in the eyes of their critics were counterexamples of loyalty. The roots of this perception lay in the late colonial time and the behaviour of the vast majority of Asians towards the independence struggle, which ranged between a policy of "wait-and-see" and a pro-British attitude as we discussed in chapter I.2. The accusation of fence sitters was one Asians would never be able to rid themselves of.[50] Many Africans believed this was evidence that Asians in East Africa did not really believe in the new independent state. Yet, it should rather be seen as evidence that Asians did not necessarily believe in their own future within those new states, a distrust which had been born out of a strong feeling of insecurity fuelled by anti-Asian rhetoric and outbreaks of violence during the late colonial period and the early time of independence. Through this vicious circle, the disintegration of Asians in the new state was a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The biggest proof of loyalty was first and foremost the willingness of non-Africans to give up their old imperial or racial ties to Britain or India and Pakistan which practically meant to take up local citizenship and renounce their old ones. The fact that so many Asians showed reluctance to become Ugandan or Tanganyika/Tanzanian was believed to strengthen the argument against dual citizenship. In a review of Tom Mboya's book "Freedom and after", a Ali Mazrui reflected on the question of citizenship. While he refers to the case of Kenyan Asians his thoughts can be equally ascribed to the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian and Ugandan cases. Mazrui

48 Letter to the editor, Divided loyalty, *The Standard*, 21 February 1967.

49 Evidence of Asians' disloyalty, *Uganda Argus*, 17 November 1962.

50 Asians must come of their fence, *Uganda Argus*, 25 October 1962.

approves that Mboya and others in East Africa want Asians to become citizens and expresses understanding for the irritation of Africans seeing Asians applying for British passports:

> "Inseparable from the issue of the limits of Africanness is the question of citizenship for those who are not racially "African". Some African nationalists do at times succumb to the temptation of making things difficult for immigrant races as a way of encouraging them to *leave*. Mboya, instead, appears keen on making things difficult for immigrant races as a way of blackmailing them to *stay*. […] Those long queues of Asians in Nairobi in search of British passports before Kenya's independence must have taken Mboya right back to the yardstick postulated in his book – he must have been interested to note how many immigrants were still keen on retaining the ticket of immigration. It appeared to be a perfect case of the *fear of belonging*. A passport is a document for the traveller – and here were *Asians of Africa* desperate for British passports."[51]

Yet, Mazrui asked for understanding from Asians for the precarious situation Asians found themselves in:

> "And yet, perhaps those Asians were not afraid of belonging as such – they were afraid of half belonging. Half a chapatti may indeed be better than no chapatti, but it might be preferable not to belong to Kenya at all than to belong to it as only half-a-citizen. What was involved was the vicious circularity of the Quest for Reassurance. Should Asians reassure Africans by becoming citizens of Kenya? Or should Africans reassure Asians by abandoning the blackmail-slogan of "Become Citizens – or else!?"[52]

Mazrui's analysis mirrors the dilemma which made a reciprocal trust between the Asian communities and the African majority almost impossible. The fact, that at the beginning of the 1960s most African politicians had assured the Asian communities that they could continue their life in East Africa even without local citizenship had not resolved scepticism.[53] Like Mr Wambura, the Regional Commissioner for East Lake in Tanganyika, many African politicians called upon Asians to decide on their citizen status. The *Sunday News* quoted Wambura: "People living in Tanganyika who, because they considered the Government had not made clear its

[51] Mazrui, Ali: Reviews: After Freedom …? Freedom and after, by Tom Mboya (Andre Deutsch): *Transition*, No. 12 (January–February, 1964), 52.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Politicians of the ruling party UPC pointed out that non-Africans could freely chose if they wanted to become citizens or not, and that they would not be forced in doing so: All will have a chance, *Uganda Argus*, 15 September 1962; Citizenship Bill is approved, *Uganda Argus*, 19 September 1962.

policy, lacked confidence in the country should decide now whether they thought Tanganyika [is] no place for them."[54]

In Uganda, the different Asian associations were reluctant to give their members categorical advice in favour of taking up citizenship. The Central Council of Indian Associations for instance invited all associations to confer about the matter of local citizenship with their members.[55] The purpose of these meetings was to discuss "advantages and procedures". This utilitarian approach to citizenship, the way Asians *practiced* citizenship and the reluctance of endorsing local citizenship by Asian organisations left some impression on the African population. In contrast to local associations, the Aga Khan urged his fellows, the Ismaili Khoja, to fully identify themselves with their host country and to integrate into African society. The *Tanganyika Standard* called the Aga Khan "a living symbol of that supra-racial, supra-religious co-operation which this young nation has set as its goal."[56] Indeed, it was predominantly Ismaili Khojas, who were ready to take up local citizenship and let go of their foreign passports. There was a shift in policy from backing the colonial government in the early 1950s to supporting the Africanist movement and later the new local government which can be roughly dated back to the accession by the new Aga Khan IV. Nevertheless, consistency in the messaging was that Ismaili Khojas should find their political centre in the state they lived in instead of a constructed distant homeland.

Sherali Bandali Jaffer, a member of the Uganda National Assembly for Kampala West (Kabaa Yekka) and an Ismaili Khoja, advised his fellow Asians in October 1962 to take up Ugandan citizenship immediately instead of applying a "wait and see" attitude:

> "They must adjust themselves according to changing times, and realise that we are now living in an independent Uganda. "We are loyal to this country and we must show our loyalty in our every deed and action. There is no time to linger on the old policy of sitting on the fence. On the contrary, the Asian community must give a lead and apply forthwith for citizenship."[57]

In the same speech, Jaffer also predicted a heavy rush of applications before the end of the two-year period. This prediction turned out to be off the mark: Most Asians did not apply or register for local citizenship and Jaffer himself, after Idi Amin had taken power, had to flee

[54] Nervous must decide now, *Sunday News*, 10 June 1962.
[55] Asian views sought on citizenship, *Uganda Argus*, 21 December 1962.
[56] Imamat Day, Opinion, *Tanganyika Standard*, 12 August 1961.
[57] Asians must come of the fence, *Uganda Argus*, 25 October 1962.

Uganda ten years later and experienced the expulsion of the Asian community from his exile in the UK.[58]

The individual case of Sherali Bandali Jaffer is exemplary for many of those Asians who fully committed themselves to their East African home and had given up foreign citizenship for the sake of Ugandan or Tanganyikan/Tanzanian citizenship.[59] As most Asians had decided against actively attaining local citizenship – for whichever reason – this was seen as the norm and any Asian – citizen or not – was equated with this reluctance to opening up towards the new state. The smaller number of Asians who had applied for local citizenship was seen as an exception to the rule. Their personal loyalty, proven by deciding in favour of local citizenship, did not outweigh the Asians' collective disloyalty which had been associated with the Asians as a community of outsiders.

In Uganda, only a month after its independence, a statement allegedly made by India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru caused some irritation within the African public. According to reports, Nehru had claimed that Indians in Africa had double loyalty to their African host country as well as to India.[60] The Indian government controverted the statement by having the Acting Indian High Commissioner in Uganda, A. S. Dhawan, explained:

> "They [Indians in East Africa] owe their loyalty completely and unswervingly without reservation only to the country of their adoption – to Uganda or to any other country in Africa or elsewhere which has given them shelter and where they have grown up and prospered. These persons owe no loyalty as such to India. Their relationship with India is only through sentimental attachment like the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders have for Britain."[61]

Yet, only a day later, the ruling party UPC announced: "It is inconceivable that the so-called citizens at least of Uganda should be expected to have extraterritorial loyalty reaching beyond the borders of Uganda."[62] The UPC understood Nehru's alleged comment to

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58 Revisiting the life of Fairway hotel owner Bandali Jaffer, *The Observer* (Uganda) 09 January 2015; Parliament pays tribute to Sherali Bandali Jaffer, *New Vision*, 19 February 2015.

59 Other well-known Africans, who took up local citizenship, were Tanganyika's finance minister, Amir Jamal, and the Ugandan politician, Narendra Patel.

60 Indians' loyalty, *Uganda Argus*, 16 November 1962. Hugh Tinker has discussed Nehru's thinking about the Indian diaspora further: Tinker, Hugh. 'Indians abroad: Emigration, Restriction, and Rejection'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 15–29. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

61 Ibid.

62 Evidence of Asians disloyalty, *Uganda Argus*, 17 November 1962.

prove Asian disloyalty for which "we have already formidable evidence." The party further threatened to withdraw Asians' membership. Double loyalty could not exist, as loyalty to another country could and should only be interpreted as disloyalty to Uganda. According to the UPC brief the comment of the High Commissioner proved exactly the point it was objecting:

> "What is the legality for an envoy supposed to represent the interests of the Indians in India to be the spokesman of the Indians here guaranteeing their loyalty to this country? If the hopes and aspirations of the Asians here can both be expressed by the Indian Government as well as our Government here what else can we call dual loyalty."[63]

This episode demonstrates the complex situation of belonging that most Asians found themselves in; it shows the convoluted legal and cultural understanding of belonging based on contradicting categories of race and territoriality which resulted from the transition from imperial to national belonging against the background of the legacy of an imperial migration regime. Neither Britain, nor India and Pakistan really felt responsible for the Asian minorities in East Africa but on the rare occasions that they addressed the issue of their precarious membership of the African states, this was seen as proof that Asians really did not belong to the East African host countries. The UPC used the abraded phrase saying that Asians could not live "with one foot in Africa and another in India." Asians' disloyalty towards the new state was directly connected to imperialism and the Asian minority was depicted as a foreign body when the UPC claimed that "Africans are not going to accept 'fifth columnists' in their midst."[64]

Several public figures of the Asian community, as well as the Indian High Commissioners in the respective countries and India's President Jawaharlal Nehru, denied this accusation and urged East African Asians to pledge allegiance to the new independent states they lived in, like Indian High Commissioner in Uganda, A. S. Dhawan did during the episode described above:

> "There has never been any question about the loyalty of persons of Indian origin who have made their homes in Africa or elsewhere to give their complete loyalty to the country of their adoption and to indentify [sic!] themselves with the country in every way and to sacrifice, if necessary, any privileges that they may enjoy."[65]

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Indians' loyalty 'never in doubt', *Uganda Argus*, 16 November 1962.

This episode shows how Asian integration was viewed as absolute. Integration as such was in the eyes of many Africans only accepted when it went along with the total renunciation of the connection with the migrant's homeland.

Apart from the symbolic step of taking up local citizenship, loyalty to Uganda and Tanganyika/Tanzania was believed to be expressed in other contexts which will be discussed in the following. Special occasions to show loyalty openly were public events and public holidays. To have reached independence was an electrifying experience for Africans in East Africa and was extensively celebrated on the day of independence as well as on the yearly anniversaries. From big cities to small towns, everywhere big celebrations in various forms – dances, tree-planting ceremonies, football games, processions and many more – could be found during those special days.[66] Those holidays were used to show unity and always drew big crowds to the street. The church newspaper *Kiongozi* reported on Tanganyika's Independence Day on 09 December 1961:

> "On the Independence Day, Dar es Salaam was filled with all types of people: black, white, brown, short, tall, officers, representatives [from various organisations], and young and old. […] Foreigners and locals of the city of Dar were all united in one word: LOVE. Indeed, the whole city was full of love."[67]

While *Kiongozi* emphasised the unity and diversity of the crowd, Asians were regularly defamed as not having participated (enough or at all) by African politicians or by the media. The alleged lack of participation regarding such celebrations was seen as further evidence for Asian indifference or even resentment towards the new political reality. For many Africans it showed that Asians did not identify with the new nation. In Tanga, the Regional Commissioner, Rashid Abdallah, in a meeting with Asians, Europeans and Arabs vilified the two minorities for not participating enough in community actions:

> "Mr. Abdallah yesterday called on members of immigrant races to co-operate with the people of Tanganyika in all aspects. […] In his address, the Regional Commissioner

[66] The celebrations of Tanganyikan independence lasted from 07–12 December 1961 in Dar es Salaam: For the timetable of celebration in Dar es Salaam see: TANU Mipango ya sherehe za Uhuru mjini Dar es Salaam, TANU Souvenir Independence Day 09 December 1961, 28, PP.TZ.TANU 18, ICS; Parades, speeches and dances, *Tanganyika Standard*, 09 December 1961.

[67] Translation by the author: "Siku za Uhuru mji war Dar es Salaam ulijaa watu wa kila aina: weusi, weupe, maji ya kunde, wafupi, warefu, maofisa, Wajumbe, na wadogo kwa wakubwa. […] Wageni na wenyeji wa mji wa Dar wote walikuwa kitu kimoja mbele yao wakitanguliza neno: MAPENDO [sic!]. Naam, mji mzima ulijaa mapendo." in: Tuangaze huku na huko, *Kiongozi*, 01 January 1962.

> criticized Europeans, Asians and Arabs for not co-operating with the Africans in various community activities including attending mass meetings and other national festivities. Mr. Abdallah warned that if the immigrant races kept aloof and continued isolating themselves from the people they might suffer in future."[68]

This shows that African politicians already in the early days of African self-governance drew connections between Asians' active efforts in participating in community action and their fragile political status in Tanzania in the long run. This equation contradicted a purely legal concept of citizenship; it rather shows that citizens were expected to be active citizens.

Asians were aware of this rhetoric and often tried to show their support by organising their own processions on special national holidays. Noticeably engaged in such activities was again the Asian community of Ismaili Khojas. For the first anniversary of Tanganyikan independence, the Aga Khan Ismailia Council organised special prayers in Moshi as the Tanganyika Standard reported: "Prayers were offered for the prosperity and happiness of Tanganyika and for happiness and long life to the President. […] The National Anthem was sung by the girls of the Aga Khan School."[69] The *Tanganyika Standard* (later renamed *The Standard*) and its Sunday equivalent the *Sunday News* were committed to report about such celebrations by Asians to give the impression Asians were actively participating in nation-building, while newspapers such as *The Nationalist* and *Uhuru* often openly criticised the "immigrant races" for their passivity. Asian businesses, such as the famous Mehta and Madhvani enterprises from Uganda, regularly put advertisements in East African newspapers or in party and government pamphlets to congratulate the nation on anniversaries or other achievements.[70] In Tanzania many of those advertisements were written partially or fully in Swahili.[71] The *Ugandan Nation* which was part of the Nation group and owned by the Aga Khan ran a "supplement on the Ismaili community" on 08 December 1962, a day before Ugandan independence, to emphasise the Ismailis' achievements in Uganda and calling them "pioneers of racial harmony."[72]

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[68] Immigrant races must cooperate, *The Nationalist*, 04 May 1964.

[69] Ismailis Pray, *Tanganyika Standard*, 18 December 1962.

[70] Advertisement: The Mehta Group of industries – An enterprise that helps Uganda, Mehta Group; Advertisement: Uganda's independence and the country's wealth, Muljibhai Madhvani & Co. Ltd., both in: UPC Independence souvenir 09 October 1962, PP.UG.UPC. 3, ICS.

[71] Advertisement: Chapa Simba, A. Ahmad Jaffer Advertisement: Tarmal Oil Mills & Soap Factory; (signed rafiki zenu [your friend]), both in: TANU Souvenir Independence Day 09 December 1961, PP.TZ.TANU 18, ICS.

[72] Supplement on the Ismaili community, *Uganda Nation*, 08 December 1962: It is not quite clear to which extent this was addressed to an Asian readership or a wider audience also including Africans.

Especially in times of crisis, the loyalty of the good citizen was requested. In Tanzania, after the failed military mutiny in 1964,[73] TANU organised demonstrations in most towns to show support for the Nyerere Government. In Morogoro, many Africans were discontent because Asians allegedly had not participated in those demonstrations. The newspaper *The Nationalist* reported:

> "[…] almost the entire African population of Morogoro turned out for the full-scale anti-plot demonstration […] Business came to a standstill as a virtually endless crowd marched through the semi-deserted streets of the town to Kingo Ground, where the Regional Commissioner and other dignitaries addressed a mass rally. Mr Kapilima [Regional Commissioner for Morogoro] continued that the object of the demonstration was to show the world the depth of "our unshaken loyalty in the President and the Government of the United Republic and how determined the Tanzanians are to crush the imperialist intrigues."[74]

Kasian Kapilima, the Regional Commissioner for Morogoro, ordered all Asian shops in the town centre to be closed on 18 November 1964 "because Indians did not take part in the anti-plot demonstration here today."[75] TANU had claimed that the mutiny was directed by the West to overthrow the Tanzanian Government. This led Kapilima to predict that "even if Tanzania was attacked with bombs, the Indians would not defend her." He summoned local leaders of the Asian communities to a meeting where they were to justify the absence of their community members during the demonstration under the threat that without a satisfactory explanation Indian shops would be closed indefinitely. As the official TANU party and government line was that the mutiny had been directed from abroad, this connected anyone who did not oppose the mutiny with the alleged plotters who were called imperialists or colonialists. Asians therefore once again were associated with their role as colonial middlemen.

The way Asians were portrayed exemplified their social position of *in-betweeners* – not full members of society but not completely foreign either. While their foreignness was constantly emphasized, any form of non-allegiance was seen as even worse than committed by an outsider as in fact they should be allegiant to Uganda/Tanzania. Their social status constantly floated between the external and internal other. Politicians and commentators regularly emphasised Asians' outsider status when talking about the continuous presence of imperialists

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[73] More on the Tanzanian mutiny see: Parsons, *The 1964 army mutinies and the making of modern East Africa*.

[74] Indians fail to join march, *The Nationalist*, 17 November 1964.

[75] Ibid.

in the country – which comprised the European and Asian minorities alike.[76] By characterising non-Africans as imperialistic, some Africans, like the *Uganda Argus*'s reader A. K. Musoke Kitutenamube from Masaka, argued for them to leave the region: "We can no longer tolerate any Imperialists' denomination and the sooner they quit the continent the better. Our continent is prepared to harbour all non-Natives on condition that they are loyal and willing to co-operate on business and social concerns but not as administrators."[77] Musoke Kitutenamube also denied Asians any form of political interferences. This reflects the narrowing of political space as being racially African. At the same time, the writer links Asian behaviour (loyalty and cooperation) to their right to remain in the country. By talking about all non-indigenous, he also included those whose residency rights should have been protected by their legal status as citizen.

Apart from confirming stereotypes there were some real consequences to the neglect of civic duty in some documented cases. An Asian shopkeeper complained in front of the Tanzanian Permanent Commission of Enquiry about being arrested for not attending a public meeting and keeping his shop open. According to the commission's report, an Area Commissioner had ordered everybody to attend the meeting and all shopkeepers except for the arrested *dukawallah* had closed their shops. The TANU Youth League saw the *dukawallah* keeping his business open and complained about it to the Area Commissioner who consequently called upon a police officer to arrest him for the time of the meeting.[78]

While citizens were seen as responsible for the inner functioning of society, there was also the matter of outward representation. Holding a Tanzanian or Ugandan passport was perceived as an honour and responsibility. Debating the delay in issuing passports, Uganda's Minister of Internal Affairs, Basil Bataringaya, justified the delay by stressing the ministry's responsibility to ensure the integrity of people the ministry supplied with Ugandan travel documents:

> "We do not want to see people we consider to be bad fellows in Uganda going to on a travel document, and it discredits Uganda, outside Uganda. […] it is in the interest of the nation that the man who is going out carrying our banner, the passport of Uganda, should be a person who will not disgrace or dishonour our State."[79]

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[76] The role of imperialists/capitalists in the East African context of the Cold War dichotomy, Capitalism versus Socialism, will be discussed in chapter III.2.

[77] Letter to the editor, For Africans, by A. K. Musoke Kitutenamube from Masaka, *Uganda Argus*, 10 December 1962.

[78] Annual Report of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry July 1967–June 1968 Case No. 646, Tanzania, CAS Edinburgh, 47.

[79] Basil Bataringaya, Hansard Uganda, 08 February 1968, 2753.

This resembles the Tanzanian perception of obligation to decency within *citizenship culture*. One reason why the external representation of the nation was so relevant was that showing that Tanzania and Uganda had "cultivated" decent citizens was proof of a functioning post-independent society capable of self-reliance. Independence was therefore not only presented as a success but was retrospectively justified. How to be a (good) citizen, however, it was believed, had to be learned and would not necessarily come naturally. In Uganda, civil servants attended courses on citizenship. The proclaimed aim of these classes was "to give those attending it background and basic knowledge about modern Uganda society and to suggest how the citizens of that society can most actively take part in it."[80]

Asians' connections abroad were also relevant in another context. Asians' loyalty was being repeatedly questioned since many rich Asian businessmen sent part of their assets abroad. Like most newly independent countries, Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda lacked capital; foreign investment was limited as independence meant political and economic uncertainty for investors. The fact that especially the leading economic figures in the Asian communities held vast assets abroad was a thorn in the side for many African politicians and was used by the press to point out Asian disloyalty towards the universal nation-building project.[81] In the run-up to independence visitors from India and Pakistan "advised wealthy Asian businessmen to transfer their funds outside the Territory."[82] This was seen as an insurance policy by rich Asians who did not fully commit to the country of residence where they actually had made their wealth. In contrast, Asian businesspeople who had invested the majority of their money in the Ugandan or Tanzanian economies or properties had to experience the loss of their entire fortune during the nationalisation policy after 1967 in accordance with the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania or due to the expulsion of the Asians from Uganda during the Amin regime in 1972.[83] Most Asian businesspeople either invested their capital abroad or at least kept their assets easy it to liquidate or portable, which is a characteristic of economic middlemen.[84] This was seen as another proof that Asians did not commit to their host country. Although a large number of Asians in East Africa were not rich or even well-off, this allegation left a stain on the wider Asian communities.

The Tanganyikan Regional Commissioner for East Lake (Maswa), Richard Wambura, explained in the budget debate of the National Assembly in June 1962: "We cannot tolerate

80 Course on Citizenship, *Uganda Argus*, 27 November 1962.

81 Letter to the editor, Support for Kenya over Asian issue by A. G. Okurut, *The People*, 11 April 1969.

82 Tanganyika Intelligence Summary January 1961 Synopsis, CO 822/2061, UKNA, 7.

83 See chapter III.2.

84 Bonacich, 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities': 585. See also: Horselitz, Bert. 'Main concepts in the analysis of the social implications of technical change'. In *Industrialization and Society*. ed. Hoselitz, Bert F./Moore Wilbert E., 11–31. Paris: Mouton, 1963.

having thousands of people here with their money if they are not prepared to use it."[85] A statement by one of Uganda's leading party, the UPC, discussed earlier, quoted records that Asians had "exported out of this country currency worth £ 22,000,000 since the middle of 1959." Although it is unclear where these numbers came from, the account shows that African politicians perceived capital outflow as a major problem. Asian businesspeople, according to the UPC, had demonstrated "their utter loss of faith in a country they pretend to give full loyalty."[86] That way they were sabotaging the Africans' "effort to develop our economy and intergrated [sic!] society."[87] Many East African politicians claimed that sending assets abroad directly damaged the ordinary African citizen who was, especially in Uganda, often called the common man – a term which became even more important in the rhetoric surrounding African grievance in the late 1960s. In a debate on the Cotton Amendment Bill 1962 in the National Assembly, MP O. K. Omadi (UPC North Bukedi), described the Asians as double-minded hinting at the "alleged double allegiance to both India and East Africa" as the *Uganda Argus* explained to its readers. Omadi claimed that Asians "were sending the money produced by the African common man to India, while "the middle-man had contributed nothing towards the improvement of cotton in this country."[88] The wealthy Asian business elite was regularly blamed for this economic development which endangered the East African states' attempts to stay solvent. Understandably, the more fragile the political situation for Asians became, the more assets wealthier Asians sent abroad to secure an impending future outside of East Africa. Therefore, the problem increased during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Therein, African politicians saw the proof of Asians' disloyalty having never really seen their host countries as their home:

> "The Mwanza Regional Commissioner went further and warned of his intention to clamp hard on price racketeers and businessmen whose preoccupation was found to be to scuttle away to [a] foreign country the country's meagre wealth in contravention of Exchange Control Regulations. He said that such businessmen should have their concerns taken over, and the intensity with which his audience endorsed the view that such people should be economically strangled is a measure of their impatience at the exploitation."[89]

85 Nervous must decide now, *Sunday News*, 10 June 1962.

86 Evidence of Asians disloyalty, *Uganda Argus,* 17 November 1962.

87 "[…] the U. P. C. states. It is clear, despite the denials that may be forthcoming, that our effort to develop our economy and an intergrated [sic!] society are meeting with sabotage by people who cannot be expected to have full loyalty to Uganda", in: ibid.

88 Middle-men attacked in cotton debate, *Uganda Argus*, 23 November 1962.

89 Ending exploitation, *The Nationalist*, 17 January 1967.

According to officials this sort of behaviour had a crippling effect on the economy.[90] Asians, according to the narrative, looked at East Africa not as home but rather "as a fitting market for foreign mercantilism [sic!], where they could come in for a quick economic kill and drain the country of its wealth."[91]

While this opinion was widely spread, it did not remain uncontested. There were some Africans who came to the Asians' aid and argued that Asians had widely invested in the region by developing the economy and providing employment. In a reader's letter in the *Uganda Argus*, Edward Kiyingi from Kampala accentuated the role Asians had in developing infrastructure and economy in Uganda:

> "There are so many Ugandans if not all who for quite long have been complaining that Asians have robbed us by earning a lot of money from us and shipped it to India. Such people are misled by so thinking, I do not mean to deny that Asians have not earned through us but have not shipped the bigger amount to India. We must bear in mind that most of the money earned by these people are [sic!] kept in Uganda for the development of this country. Now let us look to our lovely Kampala town, most of the beautiful buildings where all offices and trade businesses are run belong to Asians."[92]

Kiyingi further referred to the Asian industrialist M. M. Mehta: "he now tries to enlarge his estate and establishing [sic!] new factories, not because he wants to rob money from Africans or Ugandans but to develop the country and to get more employments for us."[93] According to Kiyingi, African Ugandans should acknowledge the part Asians had played in the development of Uganda.[94] Such praise for Asians' achievements in East Africa, while rare, occurred from time to time.[95] If Asians' role in local nation-building was discussed this almost exclusively referred to their economic accomplishment or funding of infrastructure projects like hospitals and schools. The last point was most frequently mentioned in the context of the Ismaili Khoja community in both countries. Asians highlighted their achievement by posting advertisements in local newspapers. Asian owned newspapers regularly reported of openings of new schools or hospitals built thanks to the charity of Asian organisations.[96]

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Letter to the editor: The Asians by Edward B. Kiyingi from Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 26 July 1962.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 A similar defence had been made by Y. M. Chemonges in a Parliamentary debate on 02 April 1963: Y. M. Chemonges, MP for Sebei and Bugisu North, Uganda Hansard, 02 April 1963, 434.

96 Pioneers of racial harmony, *Uganda Nation,* 08 October 1962.

During a parliamentary debate, the MP for Masaka North-West, E. Babumba brought the two issues together by questioning the intention of nation-building if Asians still sent money abroad:

> "Mrs. Visram said that Asians have been building this country. I agree. That is quite true, and they have done very well. They have done a nice job, and we thank them very much. But at the same time, […] why, if this is going to be a country for our friends who have lived here for a long time and have contributed to the building of this nation, why is it that now they take away money to India from this country? […] I agree that not all do, but everybody who has determined to stay in Uganda should work for Uganda, that is all right, keep the money here."[97]

Financial contributions of Asians also played a role when discussing taxation in the context of decolonisation. Emma Hunter has demonstrated that even during colonial times African writers rejected tax avoidance as a direct contradiction of being a good citizen.[98] During the decolonisation era paying tax as civil duty traversed various meanings and contexts. Before independence, TANU compared its membership fees to taxes as they provided social services not facilitated for by the state.[99] Shortly before independence the question of who should pay income tax was widely discussed.[100] During colonial time, income tax was only paid by those in the population who were categorised as "non-natives", ergo Europeans and Asians. In 1961, the Ugandan government stopped excluding Africans from income tax. However, even then, only 12,400 individuals paid income tax in Uganda. Dharam Ghai assigned part of this low number to the widespread practice of tax evasion and under-declaration by businesspersons.[101] The Uganda Income Tax Assessment for 1963, which represented the income of the year 1961, showed that Asians contributed 55.9 per cent of the total amount of income tax. Europeans, however, paid most proportionately to their population size. While this was the first year of Africans paying income tax, only 838 of Africans were affected by the new regulation.[102] The Ugandan Chamber of Commerce stressed the necessity of extending taxation to a bigger group

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97 E. Babumba, MP for Masaka North-West, Uganda Hansard, 03 April 1963, 491.

98 Hunter, 'Dutiful subjects, patriotic citizens, and the concept of 'good citizenship' in twentieth-century Tanzania': 266.

99 Ibid., 270.

100 Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 197f. For more on new tax regimes as consequence of decolonisation: Ghai, Dharam P. *Taxation for development: A case study of Uganda*. Eastern African Studies 23. Nairobi/Kampala: East African Publishing House, 1966.

101 Ghai, *Taxation for development*.

102 Ibid., 242.

of people: "There is no room for extending direct taxation in Uganda, if the burden is going to fall mainly on a small section of non-Africans as it has in the past."[103] Because after independence all citizens were supposed to be equals, paying tax became even more of a civil duty. Some Africans objected to the withdrawal of the tax exemption for Africans. During a fiscal debate in the Ugandan parliament in July 1962, the UPC MP for West Nile and Madi, A. Y. Lobidra, warned that although the government could not run without the people paying their taxes, it should first assess if the people who were being taxed actually had the money to pay tax. Lobidra explained that the bulk of the money was in the hands of the Asians and not the common man.[104] Here, as so often, the common man was used synonymous with African. In his comment, Lobidra's however did not make any reference to the fact that Africans only constituted a very small percentage of taxpayers compared to their overall population size. We can therefore assume that the comment was rather aimed at substantiating the racialisation of economic grievances. After a verbal attack on the Asian minority in the Uganda National Assembly, the European MP Mr. Simpson defended them by reminding the other MPs of the tax burden Asians carried in the country: "I am not going to take up the hon. Member on the Backbench opposite on his attack on a particular community […]. I may ask him however to note that that community might pay about 75 per cent of the income tax in this country."[105]

At the same time, opinions differed when it came to taxation of women – no matter if indigenous or non-African – who before had also been exempted from taxation. The advocates for tax payments by women argued again on the basis of equal rights for everyone:

> "If women are claiming equal rights like men, then why not participate in increasing the country's revenue? […] Women who earn monthly wages are liable to pay taxes if they still claim an equal superiority and rights like men in a country whose expenditure is vast with little income."[106]

This debate shows that indeed some members of the public stressed the importance of colour and gender-blindness and a notion of territorial citizenship which understood every resident of Uganda or Tanganyika/Tanzania first of all as a person with equal rights, as well as duties. This reflects the notion of citizenship based on *citizenship legislation*. In the same way, only

[103] All races must pay this tax, *Uganda Argus*, 24 March 1962.

[104] Brotherhood united Uganda, *Uganda Argus*, 13 July 1962.

[105] While it is not quite clear, where the number of 75 per cent comes from, these comment shows how paying taxes was used to show that one contributed to the nation: J. T. Simpson, Hansard Uganda, 17 December 1962, 945.

[106] Letter to the editor, Wise decision on tax, by E. Batorogwa from Mbarara, *Uganda Argus*, 23 July 1962.

the guarantee of equal rights then led to the obligation of equal tax duty. Yet, there was still a vociferous camp which advocated for unequal treatment of Asians and Africans which would see Africans enjoy tax advantages because of their current disadvantageous economic position.

The notion of loyalty as the defining category of *citizenship culture* in the first decade after independence shows that it was not simply enough to be a law-abiding citizen and never get in touch with the authorities, even though this might be the idea of a good citizen in contemporary European democracies.[107] Part of this wider reaching understanding of the role and duties of citizens is reflected in the use of the Swahili term *mwananchi,* the decent citizen.[108] In the Ugandan context, the Swahili term *mwananchi* was only rarely used. After Obote's "Move to the Left" the concept of the "Common Man" comes closest to the idea of *mwananchi.*[109] The term *mwananchi* implies more than simple legal aspects of origin but an active form of belonging and solidarity in contrast to the less often use of the term *raia* which is originated from Arabic and is limited to legal aspects.[110] Emma Hunter expanded on James Brennan's research of the Tanzanian *mwananchi* by displaying how concepts of citizenship went through a transformation resulting in the concept of patriotic citizenship. This can be observed in the linguistic shift from the usage of the Swahili terms of *raia* and *mwananchi*.[111] *Raia*, a passive citizen, obliged to the rules of the society, originating from an older imperial concept of citizenship.[112] *Mwananchi,* in contrast, was a moral construction as much as a political one;[113] *mwananchi* was an active nation-builder representing a patriotic citizenship. Hunter argues that those two concepts existed in parallel in the 1960s.[114] Following this conceptualisation, an Asian Tanganyikan could have been a *raia* but not a *mwananchi*. Still, on the question of Asian integration, Asians were expected to be fully committed to the new state and nation while at the same time the *citizenship culture* strongly relied on ideas of *mwananchi* which branded the Asian as the counterexamples of the good citizen. Brennan has demonstrated that African nationalism in Tanzania in the early post-colonial period was understood above all as the

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[107] For a wider discussion on the development of citizenship in a global context see: Cooper, Frederick. *Citizenship, inequality, and difference: Historical perspectives.* Lawrence Stone lectures. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018.

[108] Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 211; Scotton, Carol. 'Some Swahili Political Words'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 3, no. 4 (1965): 527–541.

[109] See Chapter III.1.

[110] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 118 ; Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 194f.

[111] Hunter, 'Dutiful subjects, patriotic citizens, and the concept of 'good citizenship' in twentieth-century Tanzania'.

[112] Ibid., 271.

[113] Ibid., 274.

[114] Ibid., 276.

elimination of exploitation (*unyonyaji*).[115] In a way, Asian capitalists automatically became the prime adversary of African nationalists. In Uganda, Asians were similarly seen as exploiters.[116] In the case of Tanzania the debate about exploitation was directly linked to ideals of citizenry, as Brennan points out:

> "Defining exploitation was also a way to define who was a good citizen and who belonged to the nation. At its root, the ideal national citizen was someone who was "African"; someone who was an urban laborer or preferably a rural farmer; and someone who not only refrained from but actively fought exploitation."[117]

These prerequisites made it hard for Asians to take on and fulfil the role as citizens. The early 1960s in Tanzania saw a public discourse strongly directed by the ruling nationalist government which shaped a *citizenship culture* in which individuals did not receive full citizenship by acquiring the legal status of a citizen, but through (unpaid) work for the nation and the fight against exploitation.[118] Emma Hunter has shown in her research on post-colonial voluntarism that this narrative of virtuous citizenship was supposed to present a society free of hierarchy, "a new nation of equal citizens", where everyone was equally volunteering for the nation.[119] However, in practice the non-participation of Europeans and Asians as well as salaried Africans raised criticism and "drew attention to the persistence of race and class cleavages."[120] The previous section has shown how local discourse and practices have shaped *citizenship culture* regarding the question of the relationship between citizens and the nation. In many cases, the nation was equivalent with the state.[121] Yet, *citizenship culture* also consisted of the question

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[115] Brennan, *Taifa*, 160.

[116] J. O. Olwedo, Letter to the editor, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1969. Their role in the cotton and sugar industry was especially criticized: Middlemen attacked in cotton debate, *Uganda Argus*, 23 November 1962. More on the cotton and sugar industry see chapter I.1. In the beginning of the 1970s a rising sugar price resulted in intensified discussions about Asians taking advantage of their economic monopoly and damaging the common African worker and farmer: Letters to the editor, Who are the sugar culprits?, by Karambuzi from Entebbe, *Uganda Argus*, 17 March 1972.

[117] Brennan, *Taifa*, 160.

[118] Carol Scotton has translated the prevalent use of *kazi ya kujitolea* as "voluntary work in nation building" which became a requirement of full citizenship: Scotton, 'Some Swahili Political Words': 530; Hunter, Emma. 'Voluntarism, Virtuous Citizenship, and Nation-Building in Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial Tanzania'. *African Studies Review* 58, no. 2 (2015): 43–61.

[119] Hunter, 'Voluntarism, Virtuous Citizenship, and Nation-Building in Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial Tanzania': 57.

[120] Ibid., 56.

[121] For the Tanzanian case, Emma Hunter stressed that the concept of good citizenship "could also be used as a starting point from which to imagine alternative conceptions of citizenship, focused on

on how to interact with each other in a post-independent society as we will discuss in the following.

Solidarity: *Citizenship culture* and the people

East African *citizenship culture* did not only demand abidance by civic duties towards the state, the early post-colonial society in Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda had a clear conception of how citizens should interact: in solidarity to one another and in respect for one's fellow citizens. Nation-building was not only understood as building a new state and an independent economy but likewise a free and equal society – in contrast to the former unequal colonial society. This was especially relevant in Tanzania which turned more and more to socialism and where still today most people address strangers on the street with *dada* and *kaka*, the Swahili words for sister and brother. Hence, disrespectful behaviour towards Africans counted as evidence that Asians were not willing to show solidarity to the national community and that way excluded them from being part of the imaginative community of the nation. Though, some Africans disagreed: One *Argus* reader pointed out that using the fact that Asians called their servants "boy" against them was unfair, as Africans did the same with their servants.[122] The first decade of independence therefore saw several expulsions of non-African individuals accused of rudeness or disrespect towards Africans.[123]

Arrogant and rude attitudes by some Asians were a common subject of many letters to the editors of East African newspapers.[124] The disrespectful behaviour towards a single African person was interpreted as the proof of disrespect towards the whole of the African society and the African state at large. MP M. O. K. Omadi (Bukedi North) complained that Asians were calling Africans "toto" [from Swahili *mtoto* – child] and "boy".[125] A *Uganda Argus* reader, R. J. Odoa from Kampala, requested from the government to pass a law "that it should be an offence to call or to degrade an African as a 'boy'." Odoa appealed further: "Let us identify ourselves and work together as a team for the betterment of humanity without hindrance."[126]

loyalty to a group or community not synonymous with the state." Loyalty to TANU became as relevant as the loyalty to the state: Hunter, 'Dutiful subjects, patriotic citizens, and the concept of 'good citizenship' in twentieth-century Tanzania': 271.

[122] Letter to the editor by African in Nakasangola, *Uganda Argus*, 24 November 1962.

[123] Readers write, They argue against expulsion, Sunday News, 21 January 1962.

[124] Letter to the editor, by John Mwazeka, *Uganda Argus*, 15 January 1972; Disrespect towards Africans, *Uganda Argus*, 22 November 1962.

[125] Brotherhood united Uganda, *Uganda Argus*, 13 July 1962.

[126] Letter to the editor, Hapana Boyi! by R. J. Odoa in Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 26 October 1962.

In Swahili newspapers the term *mwananchi* was often used for the ill-treated African in the respective story to contrast the behaviour of the Asians with the righteousness of the African citizen.[127] Still, years after independence had been achieved; insults or insensitive behaviour of non-Africans towards Africans when occurred were met with outrage. In March 1969, the Ugandan newspaper *The People* reported that about 50 African employees came out on strike for an hour to demand the dismissal of their European manager and his Asian storekeeper. The workers claimed that an African member of staff, G. W. J. Semakula, had been wrongfully stopped by Smith for allegedly stealing some meat after the storekeeper Joshi had reported the incident to Smith.[128] After the staff member showed a receipt for the goods, according to the allegations, "instead of apologising Smith called Semakula a black monkey and threatened to sack him."[129]

Other complaints were made about not being served in restaurants, hotels or shops. The Ugandan MP J. H. Obonyo, Acholi South-East, complained about the time when an Asian shopkeeper refused to serve him and his friend beer according to Obonyo because of being African:

> "We were tired, and we wanted to have a glass of beer. We could see the beer there but the Asian said there was no beer. We could see it and we said, "What about that?" and he said, "No, you can't drink this." We said, "Oh, we can go under a tree in our car." But no. I think that if we had been Asians or white skinned, then the case would have been different. We said, "If that is the case, we'll leave."[130]

These African experiences of perceived and/or actual racism in everyday life made Africans partaking in public discourse angry and upset. According to these public voices this proved that racism was strongly ingrained in Asians' attitudes towards Africans even if the radical change of external circumstances (e. g. independence) did not bring about a change in their attitudes. Some, like the *Uganda Argus* reader Natolo Massaba claimed that Asians after independence had only extended their respect to the few Africans in power and that their disrespect towards the common African was now even picked up by this new African elite:

> "Even after October 9 most of the African educated class and the foreigner (I mean the non-African) in Uganda do not know that we are now living in an independent country.

[127] Lazima akae Mhindi?, *Uhuru*, 21 July 1962.

[128] Smith was commonly used as a synonym for a European or white person (so was Patel for people of Asian origin). Considering that the shopkeeper Joshi is apparently named in this source, it is not totally clear if the name Smith is used as a synonym or as the actual name of the European in question.

[129] One hour strike for calling African monkey, *The People*, 12 March 1969.

[130] J. H. Obonyo, Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 175.

> […] The non-Africans have resumed their game of recognising only black ministers, national assembly members and any others whom they think have responsibility somewhere in an office but have neglected the ordinary black just in the same way as they used to recognize the white man when he was a boss here before uhuru. Uhuru is meaningless if it is only for a small group of educated fellows. We should not only seek votes from the dirty ordinary man but also give him what he deserves."[131]

In this context, the reader also indirectly revealed to us their own definition of citizens as racially African by equalling non-Africans and foreigners. These accusations of alleged racism committed by Asians reveal as much of the denouncer's racial thinking as of the alleged perpetrator.

Everyday race relations were a delicate matter in 1960s East Africa. Some cases in Tanzania and Uganda saw non-Africans being expelled due to disrespectful behaviour towards an African citizen. How easily non-Africans could face deportation in those early years was displayed by an episode discussed in Ugandan Parliament. A European referred to by the Minister for Internal Affairs as Mr Blackie had shot a dog on his property. The dog belonged to Blackie's African neighbour, Mr. Njuki. The MP for Mubende North, J. W. Kiwanuka, had further concerns about the incident which had happened in Muyenga Hill, Kampala, a quarter traditionally inhabited by Europeans. Kiwanuka claimed the shooting of the dog was for racist reasons: The dog had been shot "because the non-African could not tolerate his [Blackie's] dog associating with the dog of an African."[132] Kiwanuka therefore demanded the European dog owner should be deported for racial discrimination to "see that this practice of racial discrimination by shooting at an African-owned dog – it might have been a man – is not repeated."[133] The Minister for Internal Affairs, Felix Onama, explained that he was aware of the case that, however, the accused had claimed to have shot the dog unknowingly of the owner:

> "Mr. Blackie owns a bitch which was on heat and was tied up on his verandah. Mr. Njuki's dog broke through the mosquito netting on the verandah and mated with the bitch and Mr. Blackie, thinking the dog was a stray one, shot it. He afterwards discovered that it had a number on its collar and decided to look for the owner and he found Mr. Njuki to be the owner and so he apologised and offered to pay compensation."[134]

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[131] Letter to the editor by Natolo Massaba in Mbale, *Uganda Argus*, 05 November 1962.

[132] J. W. Kiwanuka, MP for Mubende North, Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 153.

[133] Ibid., 153f.

[134] Felix Onama, Uganda Hansard, Vol. 9, 25 March 1963, 153f.

According to Onama, Mr. Njuki had not accepted the apology; therefore, the police was investigating relating to the unlawful killing of an animal. Other MPs got involved in the debate and demanded punishment. Onama, however, dismissed the claim of racial discrimination: "[…] to begin with, I do not think there is any racial discrimination involved since dogs don't belong to any race." Kiwanuka demanded to be informed about the nationality of Mr. Blackie after wiping away Onama's reference to the police investigation by claiming that it had "already been established that there has been discrimination."[135] Meanwhile, Felix Onama remained consistent: "The law has not yet established whether this man has committed an offence and if he did not, it is not necessary for me to get up in Parliament and say that he is going to be deported." D. B. Barisigara, MP for Kigezi West, asked to be updated about the matter "in view of the fact that this shooting of the dog reflects racial discrimination insofar that the dog belongs to an African and that is why it was shot." Yet, Onama, again rejected the idea, that racial discrimination had already been proven. The debate went further into obscure race theories from the Minister of Internal Affairs: "There might, of course, be a European type of dog although it is not possible for dogs to be identified as being European or African." A last time, Onama explained one had to wait for the police investigation to be finished, a comment which outraged the MP for Mengo Central, Y. M. Musitwa: "Is the Minister aware that one day this man in question will shoot African children in the neighbourhood for associating with his children when playing hide and seek?"[136] This parliamentary debate shows how heated the climate of race relations was. Suspicions of any form of racial discrimination by non-Africans were treated very seriously and could end in the respective suspect's removal from the country. Small incidents could be scandalised by politicians and the public at any time. In this case, the relevant minister kept a cool head and referred to the ongoing investigations, which was, however, not always the case.

A common reaction in the face of alleged racial discrimination was the claim to deport the suspect as various examples in parliamentary debates and newspaper coverage shows.[137] Non-Africans could be deported for "using abusive language to the African community."[138] Minister for Internal Affairs, Felix K. Onama, demanded that non-Africans who would be rude towards an African should be deported. The referenced case was about a non-African who had declined to sit at the same table as a minister:

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135 Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 154.

136 Ibid., 155.

137 The case of alleged racial discrimination at Kilembe Mines was extensively discussed in the Ugandan parliament. Many MPs demanded the deportation of the responsible managers: Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 176.

138 Felix Onama, Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 157.

> "If that can be established, the next Comet that leaves Entebbe will carry such a person. We are not going to tolerate such behaviour here. Even if people state that we will frighten away capital if we try to stamp out racial discrimination by deporting people, we will do that because if this sort of thing is allowed to go on for many years it is bound to create a lot of bad feeling and we are bound to suffer in the long run."[139]

Another MP, J. O. Anyoti (Teso West), backed Onama saying that "when we find a man of that type of discrimination against us in our own country he must be deported."[140]

Complaints about arrogance towards Africans were often voiced in the context of educational background. The segregated school system was in fact a major concern. In the eyes of African nationalists, the system needed reform to fit the purpose of an independent nation. Shortly after independence, in the beginning of 1962, Tanganyika opened its schools to all pupils with admission based selectively on academic ability rather than race and introduced a common curriculum. The government herewith reacted to a request made by an education commission three years earlier.[141] Initially, the new regulations did not affect the language of instruction and school fees which therefore maintained available instruments of exclusion. Secondary schools where English was the medium of instruction opened up to all races. In contrast, Gujarati-, Punjabi-, and Urdu-medium schools, although theoretically open to all, practically restricted entrance to those with the specific language skills. This meant that Asian pupils continued to go to the same schools, in particular at the primary school level.[142]

Moreover, former European schools charged significantly more than former Asian schools and Swahili schools. This preserved a form of segregation and exclusivity which had only opened the back door to a limited number of wealthy Africans and was still closed for the majority of the local population.[143] This allowed a slight shift in perception perceiving barriers in the education system more as class than racial barriers.[144] Yet, the new TANU government

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139 Ibid.

140 J. O. Anyoti, Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 162.

141 Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean*, 132.

142 Ibid., 138. In Tanganyika, the government made English and Swahili the only media of instruction in 1963. Urdu, Gujarati and other Asian languages were even removed from the school curricula as optional studies: Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 163f.

143 Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean*, 138; Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 165. Yet, Bertz discusses that nevertheless some interracial friendships existed on the school bench: Bertz, Ned. 'Educating the Nation: Race and Nationalism in Tanzanian Schools'. In *Making nations, creating strangers: States and citizenship in Africa*. ed. Sara R. Dorman, Daniel P. Hammett and Paul Nugent, 161–80. African social studies series v. 16. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

144 Morrison argues that in Tanganyika during late colonial time the educational system opened class as another dimension of political interaction: Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 64.

anticipated potential grievances arising from the continuation of a segregated system and subsequently in 1963 notified the abolishment of Asian languages as an instruction medium. Only Swahili and English were allowed as languages of instruction from then on. The government further started to regulate primary school fees to adapt to a standardised level and abolished secondary school fees.[145]

In Uganda, the government only moved slowly away from the segregation of the colonial school system, despite regular criticism about systemic inequality. A few months before independence, a reader of the *Uganda Argus* from Kampala, who called themself Nationalist, complained about the English language barriers to Nakasero School which prevented many African and Asian children from attending. Nationalist claimed that English as language of instruction was used as an entrance barrier for non-whites. He stressed that racial exclusion is the main motivation and substantiates this by referring to the fact that:

> "non-White children who speak English as their first language have in the past also been rejected at Nakasero School "as a result of tests ---"or because "they are too shy" […] I am sure that I am not alone in feeling the pangs of this discrimination. […] The kind of discrimination and humiliation to which non-White parents and children are subjected on seeking admission to Nakasero is actually worse than that of Little Rock, because in the latter case you know exactly where you stand before you start, whereas at Nakasero one is encouraged to apply while the interviewing committee already knows that it will nonetheless reject the child with a smile on the face and with friendly pat on the back, which is more frustrating."[146]

The same "Nationalist" praised Asian schools which "are already vigorously implementing the government policy of integration."[147] The fact that the school system in Uganda after independence was still partly segregated angered many Africans. However, the discourse on this issue focused mostly on admission by religious denomination rather than race. During a parliamentary debate in November 1962, the problem of insufficient numbers in schools which admitted Muslim pupils was discussed and a commission to review the Ugandan educational system was set up.[148] The government had prohibited grant-aids for schools whose admission scheme discriminated by race or religion earlier in the year. According to the Buganda Minister for Education, Abu Mayanja, the practice of admitting by denomination left 40,000 urgently needed

[145] Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean*, 139.

[146] Letter to the editor by Nationalist from Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 15 May 1962.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Commission on pupils' acceptance, *Uganda Argus*, 21 November 1962.

primary school places unoccupied.[149] In the Ugandan case religion played a major part in the discourse on equal opportunities in the education system despite a much smaller Muslim population than the one in Tanganyika/Tanzania. TANU had managed to establish a movement which incorporated the population mostly regardless of their religion, which is likely the reason why religion was less of an issue in Tanganyika/Tanzania than in Uganda. In Uganda, on the contrary, the political African movements had enforced existing ethnic divisions and had therefore created fertile soil for not only racial but also religious grievances.

In Zanzibar, the newly established Revolutionary Government introduced a more radical form of distribution of school places to tackle African pupils' underrepresentation, especially in secondary schools, by distributing places proportionately along racial categories from 1965 on.[150] This left children from minority communities like the Asian and Arab communities who had been traditionally overrepresented at Zanzibari secondary schools suddenly without the prospect of education. Yet, not only in Zanzibar but to a lesser extent in Tanganyika and Uganda, Asian families saw their children's educational opportunities diminish.[151] Those Asian families, who could afford it, often sent their children to the UK for schooling, for which a British passport was beneficial.

Formerly segregated schools and educators felt the wind of change and tried to promote unity and racial harmony, at least to the outside. This was willingly depicted by the conservative media who had been the mouthpiece of the immigrant communities. For Christmas 1962, for instance, the *Tanganyika Standard* printed pictures of children of all races in a nativity play.[152] The Ismaili community in Tanga had already opened its schools to all races in 1948.[153] However, in the case, where Africans and Asians went to school together, it was difficult to overcome long lasting prejudice.[154]

Not everyone was supportive of forceful state intervention. Joseph K. Shija from Tabora, a reader of the *Tanganyika Standard*, opposed the idea of too much state intervention in the education of children: "[…] the State cannot take over the education of the child arguing, as

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149 No aid for sectional schools, *Uganda Argus*, 25 September 1962.

150 The 480 available places were supposed to go accordingly to 380 Africans, 75 Arabs, 20 Asians and 5 Comorians: Elimu katika visiwa vya Unguja na Pemba: Waafrika Kwanza, *Uhuru*, 23 February 1965.

151 Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 35.

152 The role of the three kings, however, remained reserved for three white boys: *Tanganyika Standard*, 20 December 1962.

153 Tanga Ismailis praised for school policy, *Tanganyika Standard*, 27 December 1962.

154 Morrison refers to some Africans, who had complained that Asian students were arrogant and uncivil, and that a minority of Asian teachers had claimed that Africans were "slow learners" and had "no manners:" Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 166.

do Communists, that the child is born a citizen, and so the child's education is a matter for the State to decide. What an absurdity!"[155] Finally, Shija argued, where and how to educate a child should be decided by the parents.

High importance was attributed to the role that education played in nation-building. It was the place where future citizens built friendships and a sense of unity. Racial unity, as promoted in official policy lines by Uganda's UPC and Tanganyika's TANU, therefore, was supposed to be reflected in this initial shared space through which children and youth entered society. The continuation of educational segregation completely contradicted the ideas of racial unity. Apart from the question of a shared or segregated social space, schools were also a means to form political attitudes and belief systems. Both, the Ugandan and Tanganyikan/Tanzanian governments stressed the role schools played in shaping notions of citizenship and nationhood. Andreas Eckert further highlighted that, similar to colonial practice, politicians in Tanzania used an educational narrative in alignment with coercive methods to justify and implement state interventions such as the villagization programme. They also had the role of forming new and capable nation-builders. *The Nationalist* printed a picture of African and some Asian college students with the caption: "Students listen attentively [and] take their notes which they will mull over in the evening hours in private study. Not one precious minute can be wasted. The time learning is short and a nation is waiting for them after they are conferred with their degrees."[156]

Baganda politician, Abu Mayanja, claimed that "[n]ational unity should be the basic objective of Uganda's educational system." In a statement at a Teacher's conference Mayanja emphasised the relevance of training Ugandans in citizenry: "It is up to our educational system to train the young to look upon these things [national flag, national anthem, and a nationally recognised parliament] as of greater fundamental importance. They must be brought up to feel as Uganda citizens."[157] The Tanzanian government, as well, stressed the importance of education on the path to nation-building. Tanzania's Minister of Education, Solomon Eliufoo, addressed teachers saying that by shaping pupils' character through moral values; teachers fulfilled their service for the nation. Eliufoo emphasised the importance of teachers when he said: "We want to build Tanzania with a strong people, and of good character. […] The government is dependent on teachers to make a success of our nation, and to fulfil this requirement all teachers ought to work hard."[158] In another case in August 1964 Eliufoo wrote to all heads of

[155] Letter to the editor Freedom of schools, by Joseph K. Shija in Tabora, *Tanganyika Standard*, 02 July 1962.

[156] Photo of University student, caption, *The Nationalist*, 22 August 1964.

[157] National unity should be aim of education, *Uganda Argus*, 15 December 1962.

[158] Translation by the author: "[T]unataka tuijenge tanzania yenye taifa lililo na tabia njema na lenye nguvu […] serikali inategemea walimu kuufanya umadhubuti wa Taifa letu, na kutimiza jambo hili

secondary schools and teachers' colleges claiming some of them "seem to be forgetting to instil in the minds of pupils and staff […] the spirit of building the nation." This example, illustrated by David Morrison, shows how the Tanzanian government tried to control and restrict the way its citizens thought about the state. Eliufoo expressed the desirability of students developing inquiring minds; however, some of them "are proving embarrassing to the government."[159]

The relevance of education in building the nation TANU leaders had envisioned is also revealed in Julius Nyerere's 1967 published text "Education for Self-Reliance" in which he stressed the role of education in forming active citizens as well as a sense of national and African identity:

> "The third action we have taken is to make the education provided in all our schools much more Tanzanian in content. No longer do our children simply learn British and European history. Faster than would have been thought possible, our University College and other institutions are providing materials on the history of Africa and making these available to our teachers. Our national songs and dances are once again being learned by our children; our national language has been given the importance in our curriculum which it needs and, deserves. […] civics classes taken by Tanzanians are beginning to give the secondary school pupils an understanding of the organization and aims of our young state."[160]

Tanzania adapted a more comprehensive educational policy in the 1960s with the attempt to Africanise the curriculum.[161] In Uganda, as there was a less clear vision for the nation compared to TANU's socialism comprehensive educational reform was not undertaken.

In Tanganyika/Tanzania, the use of Swahili continuously gained more support. This was also reflected in TANU's attempts to enforce Swahili as the medium of instruction in school.[162] In 1967, the Tanzanian government adopted a new policy which made Swahili the medium in most public primary schools from early 1968. The policy statement claimed: "The Swahili language will be the medium of instruction throughout the primary course, with English being taught as a subject only in those public primary schools whose present medium of instruction is Swahili."[163] However, exceptions were still permitted for schools which were visited by

yawapasa walimu wote kufanya kazi kwa bidi." in: Nyongeza kwa walimu – Utumishi wao bora, *Uhuru*, 11 January 1965.

[159] Quoted in Morrison 1976, 224f.

[160] Julius Nyerere: Education for Self-Reliance, *The Nationalist*, 10 March 1967.

[161] On Africanizing the curriculum: Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 216–20.

[162] Ibid., 163f.

[163] Lower schools to be taught in Swahili, *The Standard*, 18 March 1967.

"children of expatriates and children whose parents want them taught in English." According to the new plan, the transfer from English to Swahili in primary school should be completed by phasing through to Standard VII by 1973.

Language was not only relevant in the education system. As we have seen already, there were different approaches towards a national language in Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanzania, a substantial part of nation-building was to promote the Swahili language[164]. The government authorised a committee to review the ways the use of Swahili could be enforced in 1963. As result of this policy a great number of translations, work on grammar and dictionaries were published.[165] The use of English was viewed critically by many public commentators in particular because of its colonial character. Africans who continued using English were pilloried in the newspapers. In a reader's letter in the Swahili newspaper *Uhuru* the reader Habil Ndekia from Tanga complains about the English usage in offices influenced by the presence of non-Africans yet even practiced in the absence of any non-Africans:

> "[…] the amazing thing is that every [time] you visit offices, Asians, Europeans and even our African brothers keep on using this foreign language. If they continue to do so, will we really be able to achieve this? This "yes, yes" mentality has lulled our brothers as such that even when speaking to their fellow Africans, they cannot speak two sentences without using a word of English. One thing that I feel is setting Kiswahili back is these officers. For when he comes to a European or Indian or even a fellow African that they work with you will hear him say "Yes, Sir." and then continue with English. So this behaviour makes even those foreigners [*wageni*] tend to imitate this behaviour and continue to devalue Swahili. Brother, this is the time to value Swahili."[166]

[164] In fact, different to Uganda, in colonial Tanganyika even the British administration had promoted Swahili, see: Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa*, 62f. On Swahili as defining factor in the coastal region of East Africa: Mazrui, Alamin, and Ibrahim N. Shariff. *The Swahili: Idiom and identity of an African people*. Trenton, N. J.: Africa World Press, 1994.

[165] Lugha ya Kiswahili itakuwa muhimu, *Uhuru*, 06 January 1965. Julius Nyerere himself translated works by Shakespeare into Kiswahili.

[166] Translation by the author: "Lakini jambo la kushangaza ni kwamba kila ufikapo maofisini toka Wahindi, Wazungu mpaka ndugu zetu wa Kiafrika wanaendelea kuimarisha lugha hii ya kigeni. Je ikiwa wataendelea hivi ni kweli tutaweza kutimiza nia yetu hii? Yesi yesi imewapoozesha ndugu zetu hivyo kwamba hata wakizungumza na wenzao hawawezi kusema sentensi mbili bila kutia neno la Kizungu. Jambo ambalo nadhani linarudish nyuma kutumika kwa Kiswahili ni hawa Maofisa. Kwani akifika kwa Mzungu ama Mhindi au hata Mwafrika mwenzake wanaofanya kazi pamoja mahali pa kuzungumza utasikia akisema, "Yes Bwana". na kuendelea na umombo. Basi tabia hii inawafanya hata wale wageni huwa wanaiga tabia hii hii na kuendelea kukiponda Kiswahili. Ndugu wakati ni huu wa kukitukuza Kiswahili" in: Barua za Wasomaji, Yesi yesi imelemaza tunasahau Kiswahili, Habil Ndekia, Tanga, *Uhuru*, 24 April 1965.

However, there were other Tanganyikans like *Sunday News*' reader K. K. Mwandaji who thought that the introduction of Swahili as official language of Tanganyika was a bad idea: "Let us not under-rate the dangers of these swift changes. Especially those emotional politicians should try to keep their emotions in check for the benefit of their country."[167] Despite these concerns, Swahili as a national language became more and more important during the 1960s. In 1967, Tanzania's Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa announced that Swahili would be introduced as the language of all government business. With immediate effect the government issued an order to end the use of English "or any other foreign languages". *The Nationalist* reported about Kawawa's demand under the headline "Use Kiswahili now" and quoted the Vice-President:

> "But the practice of unnecessarily using English everywhere has become much too common and Kiswahili continued to be neglected. [...] The majority of application forms, commonly used by Tanzanians, are still printed in English, knowing, as we do, that most of the users of these forms cannot understand English."[168]

Because Swahili was an integral part of the new independent Tanganyikan/Tanzanian nationhood, not using Swahili in public was interpreted as disrupting the nation-building efforts. The issue of a universal African language was a double-edged sword for the Asian communities. The use of English (and other languages which were not Swahili) by Asians could brand them as foreign – like the language they were using – and disloyal at the same time. The perception of Europeans as temporary residents compared to Asians as permanent settlers here again disadvantaged Asians as an Asian's lack of Swahili would be far more likely to be perceived as disloyalty. It was certainly another indicator that Asian were not "real citizens."[169] On the other hand, by learning and using Swahili, Asians had an additional means of visible integration which could open doors to the African society.

In contrast, Ugandans were much more divided on the question of a unifying national language. The discourse on language again reflected the general division between kingdoms and/or ethnicities. While Swahili had also been used as *lingua franca* in Uganda, it was not perceived

167 The editor's postbag, Benefit of change doubted, by K. K. Mwandaji in Dar e Salaam, *Sunday News*, 14 January 1962.

168 Use Kiswahili now, *The Nationalist*, 05 January 1967.

169 This, in fact, did not only affect the Asian community. Emma Hunter has pointed out that the Sukuma were also criticised as a community for not using Swahili, as they were not able to "participate fully in the nation's development", see: Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 229.

as a local, and often not even as African language.[170] Especially Baganda were opposed to the idea of the universal usage of Swahili as they feared the decline of Luganda which was the most used African language in Uganda. Ugandan politicians had not promoted a universal language as TANU had done in the 1950s due to the focus on ethnical divisions in the political landscape in Uganda. Thus, the usage of Swahili had not been as widely spread and not perceived as a uniting element by the beginning of African self-governance. Baganda politicians rejected the use of Swahili to protect the influence of Luganda and therefore the dominance of Baganda culture in Uganda. Other local languages if considered for the role as national language were rejected by the representatives of other ethnicities. Therefore, English as national language seemed a compromise many in the public discourse supported. One *Argus* reader, Ham Kaime, argued that while English was not a local language in East Africa it was after all a global language. It was not chosen for "making our languages natural" but it would help Ugandans: "[English] is known in so many advanced countries. […] we can advance more than what we can do in the case of Swahili."[171] Sam Kabugo in Kiwoko, Bulemezi, wrote to the editor of the *Uganda Argus*: "It is obvious that our major problem is how to find unity in a country like ours. […] A good number believe that to attain unity, we should abolish all languages and leave only one and that is English!"[172] The choice of English as national language was certainly based on practical considerations. Many Asians spoke English to a certain extent, which meant that they did not have to adjust to a new language like in Tanganyika/Tanzania. MP D. A. Patel asked in 1963 for having Hindustani and Gujarati added to the television programme languages which included local languages like Luganda and Lango.[173] On the other hand, Swahili offered a path to integration, which was not racialised (and therefore closed to outsiders) but could be learned. In a way, having English as the national language made integration matters both easier (from a practical point) and harder (from a symbolic point of view) for Asians at the same time. In Tanganyika, in contrast, the introduction of Swahili as the introductory language in primary and later secondary school as well as establishing schools as a shared social space for Africans, Asians and Europeans led to stronger integration. The creation of Swahili as a joined language served as a new identifying factor, which had not only the potential to unify different ethnicities as was its main purpose but also to integrate non-African Tanganyikans/Tanzanians.

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170 Low emphasised how the lack of a lingua franca influenced the political fragmentation in Uganda: Low, *Political Parties in Uganda*, 7.

171 Letter to the editor, Swahili is not for us by Ham Kaime in Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 21 September 1962.

172 Letter to the editor, Education will lead to unity by Sam Kabugo in Kiwoko, Bulemezi, *Uganda Argus*, 28 April 1962.

173 D. A. Patel, Uganda Hansard, 02 April 1963, 451.

Another aspect in the making of the image of Asians as counter examples of the good citizen was the fact that the Asian minorities in Tanzania and Uganda stayed secluded. Even after independence the segregation of African and Asian lives continued. This included spatial aspects (most Asians lived in more or less secluded Asian boroughs), social life (clubs and other institutions although having been opened for all races by law stayed racially divided), and family life (interracial marriages remained rare occurrences). Apart from the economic sphere only few social spaces existed in 1960s townscape where Africans and Asians mingled. Despite pockets of social life which allowed interracial mixing mostly for a more elitist section of society such as certain clubs and bars, urban space as Edgard Taylor as pointed out for 1960s Kabale was not only racialised but equally gendered and classed.[174] However, in smaller towns like Kabale inhabitants had more freedom in controlling "those spaces in ways that did not always accord with planners' expectations."[175] Yet, segregation was another hindrance to a shared feeling of communality. Although Asians' social life was not only segregated along racial lines but equally along social, caste and class lines, segregation enforced the impression that Asians believed they were superior to Africans. While still leader of the opposition, Basil Bataringaya commented on social segregation in the Ugandan parliament:

> "[…] racial discrimination can take various forms, and those who practice racial discrimination can cover themselves and appear to be innocent. They can take cover in clubs – tennis, football, cricket and what have you. […] They can put up the fees very very high so that an ordinary African cannot attempt to become a member of that club, and those few Africans who can afford to become members of that club find that they are isolated even if they can afford to join – they find themselves one black face among a hundred European faces. This is a device, a very clever device, for practicing racial discrimination in this country. […] Let everyone know that today […] we are masters of our own house and if we see amongst ourselves racial discrimination of any kind […] I am very conscious that whereas I am against racial discrimination towards Africans, I would equally be against Europeans. We do not want a South Africa in reverse in Uganda […] While we are willing[,] we cannot force ourselves to co-operate with people who do not want to co-operate with us."[176]

MP Obonyo pointed out that his colleague MP Lwamafa who had demanded a stronger exclusion of non-Africans had a way of thinking which did not fit the new independent nation:

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174 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 203.

175 Taylor, Edgar. 'Claiming Kabale: racial thought and urban governance in Uganda'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 143–163.

176 MP Basil Bataringaya as reply to MP Arain, Hansard Uganda, 22 March 1963, 139.

"Because I know that the hon. Mr. Lwamafa is not an African; you have got a black skin but your mentality and your actions show that you are a South African white settler."[177] It is notable that the idea of institutional racialisation was perceived as something a real African could not want. It reflects on the notion that being African was more than just the colour of one's skin but a certain way of perceiving the world. This way of thinking was thought to be less discriminating, non-racial, than the European or white way of thinking. Yet, claiming as African that being African implied a non-racial way of thinking was, of course, a paradox in itself.

The emphasis on cooperation was also set by Mr Barisigara during the debate. While Barisigara's comment expresses an inclusive notion of nationhood, it can be at the same time in hindsight reversed by blaming the failed integration on the non-Africans due to a lack of effort: "We are all Ugandans. Anyone who does not want to be a Ugandan, let him leave soon, and he who wants to co-operate as a Ugandan let him stay with us and perhaps we will even inter-marry. Personally, of course, I am already married. (Laughter)"[178] This last comment hints at a major point of offence for Africans: Asians rarely married non-Asians. The issue of intermarriage was frequently brought up when Africans argued that Asians felt superior towards Africans and especially believed that African men were not good enough to marry Asian girls. Indeed, those Asians who married Africans were often exposed to social disdain from their own communities.[179] When, at the end of 1962 the Ugandan politician Ignatius Musazi demanded that Asian fathers should allow their daughters to marry Africans, the proposal induced a vivid discussion by readers and commentators in the local newspapers. Some readers emphasised that marriage was a private matter in which the state should not interfere. E. L. M. Kibuka-Serunkuma from Masaka wrote:

> "Why does he [Musazi] want to destroy our beloved race and make the land a country of half-castes? Worried Asian parents can rest back in their sofas over this matter. For those girls who have failed to find partners here, they should do the same as with their money, ship them back to India where, if lucky, they may find boys of their choosing."[180]

Asian newspaper readers were outraged by Musazi's suggestions.[181] In Zanzibar, a number of Arab and Asian girls were forced into marriage with, and therefore effectively kidnapped and

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177 MP Obonyo, Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 175.

178 MP Barisigara, Uganda Hansard, 25 March 1963, 169.

179 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 191.

180 Letter to the editor, "You are wrong, Mr Musazi" by E. L. M. Kibuka-Serunkuma in Masaka, *Uganda Argus*, 20 December 1962.

181 Ibid.

raped, by members of the Revolutionary Council, in consent with Zanzibar's President Abeid Karume who pushed an increasingly anti-Asian policy in the years between 1970 and his assassination in 1972.[182] Even on the Tanzanian mainland, where Julius Nyerere continuously stressed that no one was excluded from the nation-building project due to the colour of their skin, Asians were mainly seen as the counter example of *mwananchi*. Nyerere could not convince his fellow Tanzanians to judge actions – such as the exploitation itself – and not the people who participated in exploitation: "To divide up people working for our nation into groups of good and bad according to their skin colour or their national origin, or their tribal origin, is to sabotage the work we have just embarked upon."[183] Yet, as much as social segregation dominated everyday life, it is not true that Asians and Africans did not interact in private life. This was particularly the case for African and Asian Muslim communities who occasionally celebrated religious holidays together.[184] And while interracial marriage and relationships were uncommon and perceived as scandalous, they occurred.[185] *Citizenship culture* was highly gendered and mostly ignored Asian women as autonomous actors. When Asian women were the topic in public debate it was in the context of interracial marriage. However, the discourse circled around whether Asian men allowed their family members to marry Africans and whether African men should marry Asian women. This objectification of Asian women replicated the gendered way *citizenship culture* was debated and was also reflected in patrilineal *citizenship legislation* of the time (beyond East Africa).[186]

Getting by: Asians' *citizenship practice*

The *citizenship culture* as discussed on the previous pages was directly intertwined with the *citizenship practices* of Asians. While Asians realised that the *culture* surrounding notions of citizenship was much more exclusive than the actual *citizenship legislation*, they became reluctant to apply for local citizenship. At the same time, this reluctance made Africans think even more restrictively about ideas of citizenship. The following discusses the variety of *citizenship practices* East African Asians used and what drove them to do so. In reference to Aihwa Ong's

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[182] "Marry Africans", *Uganda Argus*, 22 November 1967; Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 202; Clayton, Anthony. *The Zanzibar Revolution and its aftermath*. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981.

[183] The Nationalist, 14 February 1968.

[184] Taylor, 'Claiming Kabale: racial thought and urban governance in Uganda': 152.

[185] Ibid.

[186] There is limited historic research on the issue of citizenship and gender, an exception is Candice Bredbenner's work on citizenship in the US: Bredbenner, *A nationality of her own*.

concept of Flexible Citizenship, we assume that individuals will always utilise laws and regulations to reach, in their eyes, the best possible outcome by using loopholes and shortcuts among other things:

> "In their quest to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize, and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and repositioning in relation to markets, governments, and cultural regimes. These logics and practices are produced within particular structures of meaning about family, gender, nationality, class mobility, and social power."[187]

The inclusive *citizenship legislation* was welcomed by leading figures in the Asian communities, some of whom had fought for it in political office. The most prominent members of the Asian communities promoted local citizenship, like the Ugandan Speaker of the House and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Narendra Patel, who had applied as one of the first non-Africans and had been granted the first citizenship certificate.[188] Despite the generous new *citizenship legislation* which allowed most Asians in Tanganyika and Uganda to register or apply for citizenship after independence many Asian families were hesitant to pursue local citizenship status. Consequently, fewer applications were filed than expected. This was because of multiple reasons, most of which were related to the fragile state Asians found themselves in. Many Asians anticipated their already fragile position in East African society might deteriorate in the coming years of independence. These feelings had been amplified by anti-Asian rhetoric in some cases culminating in anti-Asian protests and open violence.[189] A British passport was believed to offer a safety net should the situation in the region worsen and one needed to go somewhere else. This reaction to the inclusive *citizenship legislation* was seen as proof of a deeply ingrained distrust of many Asians towards the new African state apparatus. In a contemporary study, Adams and Bristow asked a sample of Asians from Uganda for which reasons they had chosen local citizenship. Economic advantages (obtaining work permits, trade licensing etc.) were mentioned most often and constituted two thirds of the total advantages mentioned. Fewer respondents stated that citizenship would guarantee equality and the right to stay in Uganda. However, the disadvantage of local citizenship holders being treated as second-class citizens was named more often. A further listed disadvantage was the uncertainty, as it was not clear if local citizenship would mean safety from expulsion. Some of the participants

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187 Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 6.

188 'Six ask to be citizens', *Uganda Argus,* 24 November 1962.

189 See chapter I.2.

of the study expressed the fear that local citizens could be forced to marry Africans.[190] This is likely a reaction to the forced marriages of Zanzibari girls and women of Asian origin to members of the Zanzibari government discussed earlier. While the survey by Adam and Bristow was conducted in 1973 and some answers might have been influenced by the shock of the Ugandan expulsion it gives a good impression of thoughts and incentives of East African Asians in the early time of independence which can also be supported by primary sources mirroring the debate on *citizenship practices*. There was one notable exception already mentioned: the religious community of the Ismaili Asians in Tanganyika as well as in Uganda had been invoked by their religious leader, the Aga Khan, to take up local citizenship and to become full members of the new state.[191] The Aga Khan further called on his East African followers to get active in nation-building and to support local charities, which resulted in the high ratio of Ismaili charitable organisations and projects in East Africa.

According to Gijsbert Oonk one third of the 75,000 Asians in Uganda had received Ugandan citizenship by 1969. In Tanzania, the number was slightly lower with 25,000 Asians who had attained citizenship out of a total of circa 85,000.[192] These figures roughly match the estimates by the British, the Ugandan and Tanzanian governments at the time. However, those numbers were later challenged by the Ugandan government when calling attention to alleged severe misconduct by Asians during the application process for citizenship and devaluing citizenship status of thousands of Asians.[193]

The application process was complicated and often tedious. Three steps were involved: registration; taking the oath of allegiance, a declaration of intentions concerning residence and renunciation of citizenship; and the registration at the Home Office as a non-citizen of United Kingdom and Colonies.[194]As dual citizenship was not permitted, local citizenship was only granted once the applicant had renounced their old citizenship. Problems could occur in any of those steps but were most likely when it came to the renouncement process. The applicants were only given a three month period in which they had to fully finish all steps entailed in the renouncement process which was often practically impossible due to the time it took to post forms to Britain or India/Pakistan and (in the most common case of British passport holders) the processing time within the Home Office.[195] Additionally, by the end of the 1960s many

190 Adams and Bristow, 'The Politico-Economic Position of Ugandan Asians in the Colonial and Independent Eras': 160.

191 Imamat Day, *Tanganyika Standard*, 12 August 1961.

192 Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 217.

193 See chapter III.2.

194 Report on citizenship submitted by research Secretariat Office 1970, PO 4/8, UNA, 9.

195 This potential problem had been addressed during the negotiations between the British and African governments about the new citizenship laws. However, the African governments were able to adopt

applications had not been processed by the respective authorities in both countries. African officials often pointed out Asian names as a major problem for the application process.[196] The MP for Jinja North, S. N. Odaka, argued in parliament in February 1968 that the Asian names were one reason why application processes for passports and citizenship took so long:

> "Odaka: We happen not to be very conversant with one of our communities here, especially the Patels. (Interruptions) It is just a combination and a permutation of names. So you cannot know whether this is A. D. Patel or D. A. Patel. (Laughter)[197] You cannot just quietly give a passport without knowing.
> An Hon.Member: Even the D. A. Patels are many."[198]

These lengthy processes led to many unprocessed applications which exceeded the two-year grace period, and sometimes – often with even worse consequences for the applicant – to the situation that an applicant was issued with a document which they understood to be the proof of local citizenship, but which was later declared void by the respective East African government. This left the people concerned in a legal limbo and enforced fears and uncertainty which then again prompted reluctance by Asian residents to push for more legal and cultural integration.

Asians tried to adapt to the new situation which independence presented. While a local passport often gave access to more economic opportunities and meant fewer restrictions due to new Africanisation policies,[199] in the eyes of Asians, a British passport promised more security in the long run as it offered an exit strategy in case restrictions were to increase. Many Asian families therefore used complex citizenship strategies, attempting to secure both the right of entry to the UK as safe haven with its access to British schooling and healthcare, as well as access to economic and social opportunities in East Africa. Consequently, members of the same families often held different passports,[200] in some cases up to three as Oonk explains:

> "[…] in some families it was decided that the man of the house would take up local citizenship, while the woman would remain a British subject. In due course, this enabled the woman to travel to Britain easily. If the woman was pregnant on a visit to the United

three months instead of a longer period.

196 Report on citizenship submitted by research Secretariat Office 1970, PO 4/8, UNA, 7.

197 D. A. Patel was the MP for Kampala South, who earlier in the debate had complained about the long processing times.

198 S. N. Odaka, MP for Jinja North, Uganda Hansard, 08 February 1968, 2750f.

199 More on Africanisation, see: chapter II.2.

200 For the Goan case, see: Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 225f.

> Kingdom, the child would automatically become a full British citizen. This child would then be raised in East Africa, but had free access to British education and health care. Therefore, it became very common for a South Asian African family to have members with African citizenship, British subjects and British citizens, all with different set of rights and duties."[201]

These citizenship practices which offered Asians loopholes and shortcuts did not stay undiscovered by the African public, who believed that this behaviour was further proof for Asians' perceived selfishness and sole interest in their own benefit. It was further perceived as Asians' disloyalty to and distrust in the African nation as they were keeping a back door open which the African population did not have.

Similar to the late colonial time, Asian political behaviour varied from activism to apathy in both Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda alike. At the eve of independence most political parties had a small number of well-known Asian members who were often MPs in predominantly Asian constituencies. However, a *citizenship culture* shaped by ideas of ethnocentrism (Uganda) and socialism (Tanzania) closed political space for more and more Asians.

Recent historical research has analysed the closing of political space in East Africa of the 1960s particularly in the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian case. James Giblin has demonstrated that TANU defined and supervised "the spaces in which the exercise of political rights would be sanctioned," formulated "the discourses in which political ideas would be expressed," and specified "the norms of proper personal behaviour by political actors."[202] The call for active citizenship by what was labelled "nation-building" was widely made by politicians and bureaucrats. Yet, Andreas Eckert has shown that due to the Tanzanian elites' fear to lose control, power became more and more centralised which meant that bottom-up civic participation decreased while any form of criticism of or resistance against state and centralised programmes were perceived by state actors as a threat to national unity.[203] Furthermore, those actors labelled any other form of participation differing from TANU's official line as illegitimate. Those who dissented as Leander Schneider illustrated were not only branded

[201] Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 213f.

[202] Giblin, James. 'Creating Continuity: Liberal Governance and Dissidence in Njombe, Tanzania, 1960–61'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40, no. 1 (2007): 27–50.

[203] Eckert, Andreas. 'Useful Instruments of Participation? Local Government and Cooperatives in Tanzania, 1940s to 1970s'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40, no. 1 (2007): 97–118. This happened at the same time while Nyerere extending TANUs influence by declaring Tanganyika a one-party state in January 1963.

enemies but "tools of neo-colonialism."[204] Schneider stresses the relevance of this rhetorical usage:

> "Here I want to suggest that the vocabulary of the "colonial enemy" signifies more than a merely rhetorical move. In the first instance, it indicates a pervasive trend toward intolerance, vilification, and action against "opposition" (compare Brennan 2005). The reasons behind this were many, but one may have been a conception of politics as a Manichean struggle. In this the ubiquitous trope of the "(neo)colonial enemy" was perhaps not entirely incidental. It may be seen as an indication that the style of anticolonial politics, conceived as a struggle of right against wrong, perpetuated itself beyond independence. In this scheme, the nationalist/ruling party continued to be cast as the (only) representative of all Tanzanians. Thus criticism became treason, the Party's right to rule unchallengeable, and critics enemy No. 1; they had to be squashed in part because the old Manicheanism continued to be the prism through which political experience was interpreted."[205]

Moreover, it alienated dissidents as foreign and not truly local ergo African. While Schneider's observation applied to non-Africans and Africans alike, it still showed a direct terminological relation between the political dissident and foreignness. The readiness of perceiving Asians as foreign and the idea of the alienated dissident were consequently closely interlinked. While in the early stage of independence several Asians had tried to voice policies and to openly take part in the political process of their respective countries, the numbers of Asians who were able and willing to do so at the end of the 1960s had rapidly decreased, which can be seen exemplarily in the falling numbers of Asian MPs in the Ugandan and Tanzanian parliament.[206] When the good citizen and *mwananchi* was defined as African with the Asian as counterexample, the public discourse shaping a locally specific *citizenship culture* had concurrently determined the political space where citizens could become active as intrinsically African.[207] In the following chapter, we will see how not only the political space narrowed for Asians but at the same time their stronghold – the economic space, too.

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[204] Schneider, Leander. 'Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism in Tanzania: Connects and Disconnects'. *African Studies Review* 49, no. 1 (2006): 93–118.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Nanjira, *The Status of Aliens in East Africa*, 110.

[207] James Brennan has demonstrated that while the notion of *taifa* (Swahili for nation) was formed along socialist norms, it still was racially defined: Brennan, *Taifa*; Brennan, James R. 'Nation, Race and Urbanization in Dares Salaam, Tanzania, 1916–1976'. Doctor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2002.

After the two-year grace period which Asians had been granted to apply for Tanzanian and Ugandan citizenship and to renounce their old one, many Asians had kept their British passports. Fewer Asians accepted the offer of local citizenship because they increasingly felt they had no future in East Africa; this was inter alia due to anti-Asian rhetoric and being depicted as exploiters and enemies of nation-building. Africans felt vindicated by their original feeling that Asians were lacking loyalty towards the African state. Those who picked up local citizenship were in most instances overlooked and were subsequently judged the same way as Asian non-citizens. While in theory and *de iure* Asians had the chance to become Tanzanian or Ugandan citizens, the widespread public image of Asians as colonial middlemen and economic exploiters hindered a real integration of those Asians who were interested in it. Asians were often left without a chance to show that they were real citizens – a request raised still during the peak of the expulsion of Asians from Uganda.[208]

In a letter to the editor of the *Uganda Argus*, Nagjibhai L. Pa from Kampala invited his fellow Asians in Uganda to step back and make space for Africans: "Our greatest guarantee of safe and happy stay in this country could be nothing else than conceding the rightful place to the African tactfully and thus earning the most precious commodity from him namely the African good-will."[209] Nagjibhai L. Pa anticipations, however, fell short. To actually be accepted as real Ugandan or Tanzanian citizens, Asians were expected not only to be good citizens but better citizens than their fellow African neighbours: on the one side they were expected to actively oppose exploitation, give up their privileges and involve themselves in nation-building, but at the same time if they tried to get involved in local politics they were often accused of interfering with African issues. Becoming "real citizens" therefore was a balancing act which was hardly possible to achieve.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, within the three layers of citizenship – *legislation, culture* and *practice* – there are many different aspects which played a crucial role during the shaping of a distinct notion of citizenship. When it came to citizenship there was an obvious discrepancy of *de iure* and *de facto* concepts of citizenship, especially in regard to the Asian population. While both countries offered very inclusive access to legal citizenship, the general ideas and

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[208] Amin had asked all remaining Ugandan Asians to show that they were really committed to Uganda by intermingling with African Ugandans: "Show that you are real citizen", *Uganda Argus*, 01 November 1972.

[209] Letter to the editor, Confusion among the Asians, by Nagjibhai L. Pa in Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 03 September 1962.

imaginations of the ideal citizen exceeded those legal requirements by far. We could see that in Tanganyika/Tanzania questions on race in the context of citizenship were more vividly debated often clearly directed by the nationalist government, than in Uganda where the debate often focused on issues of national unity which was believed to be under threat from tribalism. Therefore, Asians in Uganda were often left largely invisible in the discourse on citizenship and nationhood.

An active debate surrounding obligations, rights and affiliation formed a specific *citizenship culture* which was shaped on the one side by the distinct moment of early independence in the new African nation-states and on the other side by the *citizenship practice* of the Asian minorities, who used strategies to achieve the best possible outcome within their position of political fragility. After the two-year grace period, disappointment over the low numbers of applications by Asians enforced the impression of Africans that Asians were less interested in the new post-colonial society. The discourse within the public about the Asians' role in the society circled around their economic predominance and the everyday life experience of economic inferiority by many Africans, and was often filled with anti-Asian rhetoric, which was sometimes based on biological terms. Within the first decade of independence and the consolidation of post-independent state formation, legal requirements were adapted more than once to the public imagination of what a citizen was, as could be seen when either state started to withdraw citizenship from Asian citizens in large numbers due to bureaucratic formalities or petty crimes. Especially in Uganda, the state started to challenge the citizenship of Ugandan Asians on the basis of race. As Ong has argued, flexible notions of citizenship can not only be used by individuals but by governments alike to accumulate power and capital.[210] The part III of this book will show how this development led to a restrictive legal form of citizenship, which in the case of Tanzania is reduced to individuals who are willing to embrace *ujamaa* and TANU's socialist agenda and in the case of Uganda is defined by being racially African.

[210] Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 6.

II.2 Africanisation and its limits

Independence meant first of all the introduction of African self-government on the political level. The economy was in the hands of Europeans and Asians originating from former British India and Goa. Wealth and economic ownership stayed untouched for now.[1] Likewise, despite some slow improvement within the civil service, job distribution as well as the level of education still reflected the strata of colonial society, with Europeans in the top positions and with the highest education, Asians in the middle ranks and Africans on the bottom, often with little or no education working as unskilled labour or being officially unemployed.[2] The African majority had hardly any economic influence at the eve of independence. Africanisation became the number one buzzword used in debates surrounding economic entitlement and opportunity. Africanisation programmes had started off in the late colonial time in the context of the second colonial occupation and continued into the 1960s with a stronger enthusiasm, initially concentrating on the public service sector. Soon Africanisation within the public discourse as well as in policy making underwent a process of mainstreaming influencing more or less successfully all major economic sectors and many areas in people's everyday life. Africanisation became a symptom and at the same time a potential solution to the widespread economic and social grievances outlasting the achievement of political independence. It expressed the need to extend African independence to the economy. Africanisation was also a mode of expression of the locally developing *citizenship culture* and was an answer to the question who was entitled to take up space in the economic sphere. With the mainstreaming of Africanisation this was later extended to space in the national context in general. Africanisation in its concept was highly contested in the public debate. The shift in terminology from Africanisation to localisation a few years after independence reflected the ongoing search for clear definitions to express who was part of the community of equal citizens and who was not.

Africanisation and subsequently localisation was highly contested in the public discourse both in Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda and produced a variety of winners and losers both in practical as well as symbolic terms. While Africans saw Europeans in Tanganyika and Uganda, unlike Kenya, as intermediate expatriates who typically left the country after a while, Asians were considered permanent settlers without the willingness to fully integrate. Furthermore, Asians held positions which were more realistic for Africans to attain. Therefore, Asians and not the wealthier Europeans were the main target of Africanisation policies.[3] The

[1] Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 245.

[2] Ibid., 221.

[3] Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 197.

colonial administration had already tried to promote Africanisation in sectors such as retail trade and cotton ginnery business as chapter I.1 has shown. Most African nationalists had fought colonial rule under two main claims: African empowerment and anti-racialism. But in the following decade African empowerment and the African entitlement to access of opportunities often contradicted the rejection of racialism and some nationalist hardliners defended the position that African entrepreneurship should be favoured due to its Africaness. By trying to balance economic inequality inherited from colonialism the new governments contradicted the claims made by the same governments of a general rejection of any form of discrimination and partly led to what Gijsbert Oonk calls the reproduction of colonial legislation.[4]

In practice, Africanisation meant, that when recruiting for a new role, the recruiting company or institution was supposed to give preference to African candidates even if their qualifications were not as good as the those of a non-African candidate. Nevertheless, the East African governments realised that their economy and services would suffer if they follow this rule too ruthlessly. It did not apply to very high skilled positions which were mostly held by Europeans, but rather to the middle ranks which were occupied by Asians and were easier to aspire to for Africans.

Taking over the economy through policies of Africanisation became a vital aspect of domestic policy in the region. It targeted mainly Asians (local citizens and foreign passport holders alike), their access to positions and their property. The time until 1967 was subsequently characterized by the Africanisation of the job market with a focus on the public service, the introduction of entry quotas to higher education and a stronger promotion of the African co-operative movement.

This chapter will analyse Africanisation policies following independence and the debate surrounding the redistribution of economic opportunities and the initial attempts of the African governments to implement Africanisation policies in crucial sectors, including the upcoming obstacles which needed to be tackled. This chapter illustrates the interrelation of the public debate on Asian integration and economic policies. Early on, a new debate started about the question if – rather than Africanisation – a form of localisation which would give preferential treatment to local citizens should be the new agenda. Yet, what the two concepts Africanisation and localisation meant was a matter of individual interpretation. In this chapter, the public discourse surrounding those terms will be analysed and linked to following policy shifts. We will see the mainstreaming of Africanisation in which Africanisation was quickly not simply understood as a labour market measure anymore but became a widely used term for all forms of change within other areas such as education, housing and urban space as well as culture and social life. The following further discusses how Africanisation programmes affected Africans,

[4] Oonk, *Settled Strangers*, 34.

Asians and Europeans on an everyday basis and how individuals negotiated the new terms of those policies, and why Africanisation often failed or was perceived to have failed. While the general policies in Tanzania and Uganda resembled each other, the implementation differed between the two countries as well as in different sectors and even within the different departments of the civil service. The power structure in Uganda, created by the division in different kingdoms led to specific rivalries in party politics. The Obote regime's discrimination of the Baganda for those reasons meant that the diminishment of Asian economic and vocational opportunities was subordinate to the restriction of Baganda from the same opportunities. This resulted in a slower Africanisation process in Uganda and paradoxically even increased Asians chances in the civil service for the first years after independence. Addressing economic grievances through Africanisation policies ultimately was not as successful as anticipated, especially in the private sector, and led to a policy shift starting with the Tanzanian Arusha Declaration in 1967.

This chapter distinguishes Africanisation programmes as practical tool to provide Africans access to economic opportunity and the mainstreaming of Africanisation as economic ideology which defined symbolic access to take up space in the economy and in national space. I argue that while Africanisation programmes often failed to improve the economic situation of most Africans, Africanisation as ideology was successful in limiting the imaginary and symbolic space non-Africans were allowed to take up.

Africanisation: Claiming opportunities

Africanisation programmes had two evident goals: to take control of the economy and to dispose post-colonial society of the colonial economic system of inequality. Many politicians and Africans who partook in the public debate argued that real independence would only be achieved if the new East African states were not only politically self-governed but if the economy was also in African hands. Africanisation policy was a crucial part of the contemplated plan to achieve economic independence. Issa Shivji, a contemporary socialist intellectual, pointed out:

> "The important question within this context is: "'Who controls Tanzania's economy?' For, it is that class which controls the economy – the nerve centre of a society – who in the final analysis will be a decisive factor against socialist struggle."[5]

[5] Shivji, Issa G. *Class Struggles in Tanzania*. London: Heinemann, 1976.

An additional aspect of the Africanisation programmes was to even out economic inequality and to economically empower the whole of the African majority. An unnamed journalist in the moderate Tanganyika Standard explained that the Tanganyikan plan of Africanisation had nothing to do with resentment:

> "The Government's determination to iron-out "the obvious differences" in the standard of living of Africans, Asians and Europeans was not based on jealousies or a thought that prosperous Asians or Europeans were wicked but just the feeling that Africans could and should be better off."[6]

Africanisation was clearly understood differently depending on the individual's experience (including *being African* or *being Asian and European*) and political alignment. The idea behind Africanisation was first of all to give Africans access to jobs and economic opportunities. John Kakonge, the General Secretary of the UPC party in Uganda, promised not only a reversal of economic power structures but a comprehensive change in the way economic opportunities were distributed by offering progress for the majority. He is quoted in the *Uganda Argus* as followed:

> "Independence did not meant [sic!] the mere replacement of white faces by black ones, nor the acquisition of mansions and cars by a few top leaders while everything else in the country remained unchanged. We must raise the social and economic status of the Africans to the level which has for long been enjoyed by the dominating races […]. No African will tolerate or remain contented in an inferior economic status under the flag of independence."[7]

In Tanganyika, the African National Congress (ANC) – the only but weak opponent of TANU in the 1962 Presidential Election – argued persistently for radical Africanisation: "Africans can not [sic!] progress unless special privileges and protections are given to them so as to enable them to catch up with the progress of non-Africans. […] Unequals cannot be treated equally."[8] By taking up a more radical stand on economic policy the ANC hoped to be able to gain support from trade unionists. Despite the fact, that this form of party mobilization stayed

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6 Tribute to all-race unity, *Tanganyika Standard*, 26 July 1961.

7 'A greater struggle ahead', *Uganda Argus*, 02 August 1962.

8 National Archives of Tanzania, Accession 561, 17, quoted in: Aminzade, Ronald. *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa: The case of Tanzania*. Cambridge studies in contentious politics. 2013.

unsuccessful, trade unions were some of the strongest advocates for a comprehensive and fast approach towards Africanisation policy. Even within TANU itself there was a diverse range of political opinion on that topic. While Julius Nyerere and his closer circle believed in a moderate Africanisation policy with a long-time outlook, others such as the first Prime Minister of Tanganyika and a former trade union leader himself, Rashidi Kawawa, were supporters of a rapid and comprehensive Africanisation policy.[9] Kawawa ordered a cabinet reshuffle and replaced non-citizens and non-African Sir Ernest Vassey as Minister for Finance and C. I. Meek as head of the civil service with Paul Bomani and the African Dunstan Omari respectively. Kawawa further appointed Rowland Mwanjisi, the editor of the more radical newspaper *Uhuru*, and Elias Kisenge who supported the expulsion of foreigners as Junior Ministers.[10] Trade union members and lower ranked TANU politicians as well as the local TANU office representatives were, in general, more often for a radical approach and disagreed with the official party line of Nyerere. Those were also the first to word protests over the slow progressing Africanisation programme a few years after Tanganyikan independence. Nyerere's cautious approach to Africanisation had built up pressure within TANU. During a party meeting Nyerere resigned as Prime Minister on 22 January 1962 under pressure from middle ranks in TANU and "up-country" members who demanded a more rapid and comprehensive Africanisation process and the end of reserved seats for minority races in the Assembly.[11] The contemporary, Robert Manners, attributed the demand for rapid Africanisation to what he called the *Kesho*[12] suffering:

> "All Africans have suffered long from what one might call the colonial Kesho (tomorrow). They have been told repeatedly that the fruits of development would be theirs when they were "ready" for the harvest; now that they have gained official – if reluctant – recognition of their readiness to enter into Dr. Nkrumah's "political kingdom," they are determined to be deflected no more."[13]

Manners addresses a certain impatience by Africans, yet Africanisation was not only about economic questions but equally an externalisation of pressing questions of identity and

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9 Crawford Pratt stated that Rashidi Kawawa showed greater responsiveness to the mood of the rank and file: Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 125.

10 Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 84.

11 Leys, Colin. 'Tanganyika: The realities of independence'. *International Journal* 17, no. 3 (1962): 251–268.

12 *Kesho* is the Swahili word for tomorrow.

13 Manners, Robert A. 'Africanization, Neo-Racialism and East Africa'. *Africa Today* 9, no. 9 (1962): 4–6+15.

belonging. While Africanisation was in its initial appearance about economic control and inequality, Africanisation programmes were also a mode of expression of the locally developing *citizenship culture*. This becomes apparent whenever the discourse on Africanisation shifts away from setting incentives to support the employment of Africans to forms of exclusion of non-Africans from certain opportunities to space in general. The citizenship discourse and the general development of local *citizenship culture,* as discussed in the last chapter, was defined by the overriding question of who was entitled to take up space in the public sphere. Africanisation discourse picks up at the same point with a stronger focus on the question of who has the right to take up economic space and subsequently is entitled to economic opportunities. Following the logic of local *citizenship legislation,* anyone who held local citizenship was entitled to an equal space in the economic sphere. Yet, the problem lay with the fact that the economy was an unequal playing field created by the colonial state. Despite the rejection of racialism by both Tanganyika's and Uganda's leading politicians being an integral part of the struggle for independence during the 1950s, African economic empowerment and the African entitlement to access of opportunities often contradicted the rejection of racialism due to its favouritism of Africaness. In many sources, we can find the assumption that Africans were now, after independence, entitled to the access of economic opportunities and that this entitlement resulted directly from their identity, as Africans who had the right to claim the country they were originated from and with it all chances it would offer. In a way this logic was simply a reversal of the former colonial claim of European superiority.[14] The discourse on an African image in the economic sphere shows how Africanisation was strongly influenced by racial thought.

In Tanganyika, one often raised argument for Africanisation was that of balanced representation of the Tanganyikan population as a whole, particularly within the structure of the civil service. A couple of months before the official date of Tanganyika's independence, Julius Nyerere, at this time Chief Minister, demanded:

> "[…] the composition of the civil service should broadly reflect the racial pattern of the territory's population as a whole and thus that the great preponderance of posts should be held by indigenous Africans. Indeed anything else would be artificial and unhealthy."[15]

Some years later, the balanced representation – or how the debater argued a "Tanzanian look" (*sura ya Kitanzania*) – was still used as one of the most used legitimisation for the Africanisation

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[14] This is a claim Mahmood Mamdani has made regarding the legal status of the different racial groups after decolonisation: Mamdani, Mahmood. 'Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001): 651–664.

[15] Address of the Chief Minister, Julius Nyerere, Hansard, 19 October 1960, 375.

programme of the civil service. In a parliamentary debate in July 1968, Rashidi Kawawa, at the time Second Vice-President, anecdotally illustrated his perception of the early 1960s:

> "What we wanted […] was for our offices and our country's affairs to reflect a Tanzanian image – at that time in Tanganyika. That you should not enter the inside of an office; it is like an office in Bombay, like you are in Bombay. When you enter the inside of a Bank: like you are in Bombay. When you stood outside in those days at 4 pm, when people were coming out [of their offices] you saw a crowd of people, you wondered if you are in Tanzania, you thought you are in Bombay. This was the situation we were facing. Now […] our first thing was to remove discrimination and to bring a Tanzanian image. This is not discrimination. […] They [the Africanisation commission] worked to remove discrimination and give balance so that it [the civil service] reflects a Tanzanian image. In Tanzania most of us are black and we want that everywhere where there is work we can do and there are indigenous Tanzanian [*Watanzania wa asili*], they should be given the job."[16]

The argument of balanced respresentation – or as Kawawa called it *sura ya Kitanzania* – brought up the sensitive question of race. Representation as we could see from Kawawa's interpretation was to be understood as representation of the visible differences within the Tanzanian society, this is pointed out by comparing street scenes in Tanzanian cities with Bombay which implied that Kawawa believed too many Asians were working in white-collar jobs. Africanisation, according to Kawawa, was helping the indigenous Tanzanian (*mtanzania wa asili*) and had foremost nothing to do with legal aspects of citizenship but with biological heritage.

In an opinion piece in the *Mlezi* section of the Tanganyikan newspaper *Uhuru* the unnamed writer claimed as its title already showed that citizens should hold all the posts in Tanganyika.[17] He suggests that no-one in Tanganyika was happy to see the children of Asians do the

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16 Translation by the author: "Tulichotaka […] ni maofisi yetu na shughuli zetu za nchi zionyeshe sura ya Kitanzania – wakati ule Tanganyika. Kwamba usiingie ndani ya ofisi inakuwa kama kwamba uko ofisi ya Bombay, kama kwamba uko Bombay. Ukiingia ndani ya Benki, kama kwamba uko Bombay. Ukisimama nje siku zile saa kumi watu wakitoka unaona umati wa watu unashangaa kwamba uko Tanzania, unafikiri uko Bombay. Hiyo ndjyo hali tuliyokuwanayo. Sasa […] jambo letu la kwanza lilikuwa ni kuondoa ubaguzi na kuleta sura ya Kitanzania. Si ubaguzi. […] Wakaifanya kazi ya kuondoa ubaguzi na kuleta balance yaani ionekane sura ya Kitanzania. Tanzania tulio wengi ni sisi watu weusi na tunataka kila mahali ambapo kazi sisi tunaiweza na wapo Watanzania wa asili, wapo wanaoiweza wapewe kazi.", in: Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), Tanzania, Taarifa Rasmi, Mkutano wa kumi na tatu, sehemu ya tatu, tarehe, 09 July 1968, 1526f.

17 Afrikanaizesheni – Wananchi washike kazi zote nchini, Mlezi, *Uhuru*, 16 December 1961.

work one's sister and fellow citizen could do instead.[18] By making reference to kinship, the writer clearly linked labour recruitment to race. It further suggests that despite the sometimes stated view that Asians could become fellow citizens and therefore become part of the nation – in the *ujamaa* philosophy an extended family of equals – Asians were in the eyes of this writer excluded from any form of constructed national kinship ideas. Yet the author mainly stressed the significance certain roles played for the full control of power in post-independence Tanganyika:

> "Now we are in rule ourselves, those who were given jobs [by favouritism] no longer have a place. […] Another benefit is that for the country's security it is necessary; some things should not be in the reach of any foreigner. […] The policy of the government of the people is to give citizens work with responsibility, not only in the government, even in companies."[19]

The author refers to an important aspect which was expected from Africanisation – to actually take control of the administration and in the long run on the writer's last note to also take control of the economy.

The high profile which Africanisation programmes were ascribed to nurtured divisive ideas of Africans as "us" and non-Africans as "them", and focussed on the still existing racialised class system. Facing Africanisation, Nyerere warned all expatriates in the civil service "who were not prepared to serve under Africans to leave the territory as soon as possible."[20] Here, Nyerere played with the prevalent opinion that Europeans and Asians alike felt superior towards Africans and treated them with disrespect. This opinion was certainly not baseless. The attitude had been developed during decades of a segregated civil service where Africans, Asians and Europeans did not even use the same facilities.[21] Shortly after independence the MP for Bukedi North, O. K. Omadi, complained about the fact that many forms of discrimination were still at place:

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18 "Hakuna mtu anayefurahi kuona vitoto vya Ki-Asia vinafanya kazi ambazo dada zetu wananchi wangaliweza kushika." Translation by the author: No one is happy to see the children of Asians do work which our sisters and fellow citizens can do. In: Ibid.

19 Translation by author: "Sasa tunajitawala, wali waliokuwa wanapeana kazi hawana nafasi tena. […] Faida nyingine ni kwamba kwa usalama wa nchi ni lazima mambo fulani fulani yasifike kwa mgeni yeyote. […] Siasa Serkali [sic!] ya Wananchi ni kuwapa wananchi kazi za madaraka sio katika serikali tu, hata katika makampuni.", in: Ibid.

20 Tanganyika Intelligence summary. May 1960, Political intelligence reports Tanganyika, 1960–61, CO 822/2061, UKNA.

21 Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 118.

> "[…] as far as the administration is concerned, there is a great deal of discrimination. These days we read of toilets for junior staff, toilets for senior staff. But that is a pretext. Junior staff means Africans, senior staff means Europeans and Asians. […] Now, I happened one day to go to one of the offices dressed in my plain shirt and my shorts and when there, I wanted to see the Manager there. What happened? The Secretary shouted at me "go out, who told you that Africans are allowed in this office." I said "What" and she said "Africans. Go out." […] this is the treatment we are receiving, even if we are Members of this august House. There must be a reshuffle in the administration of these offices run by the so-called technicians in electricity."[22]

This example shows the continuous resentment felt by many Africans after independence as being still treated as inferior within the workplace and the economic sphere which contradicted the idea of a nation of equals in a post-colonial society. It retained the question of how to create such a community of equals and who was part of it.

From Africanisation to localization

The shift from a policy of Africanisation to localisation reflects the ongoing search for clear definitions of the community of equal citizens. One general point of the discussion around Africanisation was the question of whether the major redistribution of opportunities should follow a strategy of Africanisation or something in its definition rather different: Ugandanisation or Tanzanisation – forms of localisation. The question was whether chances should be granted by racial origin (Africanisation) or by national membership which would apply to all citizens regardless of race. The latter would include non-Africans who had used the chance of registering or applying for local citizenship during the two-year grace period after independence which they were granted by the local governments. At the same time, it would exclude African non-citizens e. g. from neighbouring East African countries.

In Uganda, the distinction between Africanisation and localisation had started to be discussed already before independence and before there was any legal form of local national citizenship. In September 1962, an Africanisation commission published the statement that the term Africanisation needed to be replaced by Ugandanisation as Africanisation "is no longer suitable for it is not clear just what it means."[23] In the future Public Service Commission was supposed to give "clear directions to indicate precisely what a "Ugandan" is." This Ugandaness

22 O. K. Omadi, MP for Bukedi North, Hansard Uganda, 1962–1963, 17 December 1962, 961.

23 Speed-up in Ugandanisation, *Uganda Argus*, 19 September 1962.

was according to the commission supposed to be linked to the conception of Ugandan citizenship, yet the report followed up by saying that the exact definition of who was eligible for consideration of appointment was still to be given. While race was nowhere explicitly mentioned as a defining factor, the former comment suggested that citizenship alone was not sufficient to make someone eligible for recruitment based on Ugandanisation.[24] The report further specified the "appointing indigenous people in ever-increasing numbers" which was another indicator that citizenship was supposed to be tied in with race, as only Africans counted as indigenous. This suggested change from Africanisation to Ugandanisation was therefore seemingly in no way a means to include Asians with Ugandan citizenship in the future. It was more likely directed at the high number of non-Ugandan African workers, especially from Kenya, who were a direct competition for Ugandan Africans on the job market.[25] The specification of the discussed report of the Africanisation commission is indicating an even tighter focus from Africans to Ugandan Africans. In a parliamentary debate in 1968, the MP for Kyaggwe North East, Abu Mayanja, defined and specified the terms Ugandanisation and Africanisation and by doing so embraced the racial aspects of the Africanisation process:[26] "[…] it is not only Africanisation, it is Ugandanisation cum Africanisation. We are interested in Ugandan Africans, the blacks born here in Uganda to take the jobs."[27]

Yet, not everyone understood the term Ugandanisation as a further narrowing of opportunities towards the Ugandan African. A commentator in the Uganda Argus saw the attempted introduction of the term Ugandanisation as the proof that the government had moved away from the "racial implication, and so is in line with the introduction of a Uganda citizenship which will not discriminate against people on the ground of race."[28] The commentator further requested that it should be clear where the reduction of standards was acceptable to speed-up the move to a fully local civil service.

A very upset reader of the Uganda Argus, Chango Machyo, complained that the new "infamous term [Ugandanisation] had been coined to substitute the well-known and unambiguous term "Africanisation!"[29] The reader insists that the term African was not to be understood racially:

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[24] Putting Africans in civil service, *Sunday News*, 18 February 1962.

[25] Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 238ff. Regarding a number of strikes, the Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, A. A. Nekyon blamed Kenyans who had allegedly incited the strikes. The *Uganda Argus* quoted Nekyon, saying "I am irreconcilably convinced that Kenya workers, especially Luos and Baluhya, are too many and their excessive numbers tend to create big problems.": Too many Kenyan workers, *Uganda Argus*, 06 November 1962.

[26] This comment was made only a few months before his arrest.

[27] Abu Mayanja, *Uganda Hansard*, 05 February 1968, 2644.

[28] Ugandanisation is the word, *Uganda Argus*, 19 September 1962.

[29] Letter to the editor, Ugandanisation, by B. Chango Machyo in London, 10 October 1962.

> "[…] we are referring to all those people who are willing to live in Africa and throw in their lot with us in our struggle to conquer poverty, disease and ignorance and thus lift up our standards of living. These are the people regardless of their colour or race, who will be willing to suffer when we suffer and to prosper when we do."[30]

Yet, the reader with his own place of residence in London continues by condemning any form of outside influence:

> "[…] all over Africa, Africans are determined to run their own affairs and no amount of hideous propaganda by the pedlers [sic!] of neo-colonialism will dissuade us from struggling to achieve this end. So, all the neo-colonialist agents and their hirelings know that whatever gains they may buy today through some trickeries, blackmailing, etc. they are only temporary."[31]

Chango Machyo concludes that there should "be no doubt, what the overwhelming majority of Africans want is NOT "Localisation" or "Ugandanisation" by [sic!] AFRICANISATION."[32]

Equally in Tanganyika, the differentiation between Africanisation and localisation was vehemently discussed early on. After Derek Bryceson (at that time Minister of Labour) had suggested a form of localisation – meaning the employment of local people of any race – some TANU members opposed Bryceson's statement during a Legislative Council debate on 13 October 1960. MP Munaka pointed out that "Africanisation means Africanisation, it does not in any way suggest localization."[33] The majority of the African population in Tanganyika supported rapid Africanisation over localisation and were therefore in line with the middle-ranked TANU leaders and local party branches.[34]

While in both states the government stuck to the term and the philosophy of Africanisation, the terminology discussion was reopened by Nyerere himself, in early January 1964, when he famously announced that "Africanization is dead". He was referring to the point that all Tanganyikan citizens should enjoy the preferential treatment in public recruiting, not only African Tanganyikans. This claim was based on symbolical and pragmatic reasons. First, non-Africans living in Tanganyika had had the chance to apply for local citizenship during a two-year grace period which had now come to expire. Nyerere argued that all non-Africans (and this was

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30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Quoted in: Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 80.

34 Ibid., 119.

mainly directed towards members of the Asian minority) who had decided to attain Tanganyikan citizenship had in doing so proved to be loyal to the new country and therefore deserved to be fully integrated; not colour but citizenship should be the key to different rights and opportunity. Second, a few years into self-governance, Tanganyika, like most newly independent states, still struggled with the outflow of expats from its territory and needed more skilled workers to provide state services than there was in the slow growing educated African work force. In his statement, he tied the pragmatic cause elegantly with a statement on the universality of citizenship:

> "The nation must use the entire reservoir of skill and experience … The skin in which this skill is encased is completely irrelevant. […] This means that discrimination in civil service employment as regards recruitment, training, and promotion must be brought to an end immediately […] We cannot allow the growth of first- and second-class citizenship. Africanization is dead."[35]

This statement refuelled the debate on the question of what the new recruitment policy in the public service was supposed to achieve. There were advocates on both sides; those who supported Africanisation, which in general meant racialized Africanisation policies, and those who backed the idea of localisation which included non-Africans with local citizenship but at the same time excluded Africans with foreign citizenship. The debate on Africanisation versus localisation entailed a crucial question: how to define who was *local* and how to define who was *African*.

After Nyerere's "Africanization is dead" announcement, Tanganyika's official policy changed from Africanisation to localisation in 1964 which meant that preferably Tanganiykans – and after the union with Zanzibar Tanzanian citizens – were employed and promoted regardless of their race – at least in theory. However, the shift was never fully implemented; official government reports This policy shift did not find a mutual consent in the TANU party.

A petition of the organization for Uganda Railway African Employees from 1961 shows that Africanisaiton policies not only had racial implications but was affecting foreign Africans from neighbouring states in East Africa early on. It further shoes how individual workers dealt with the new reforms on the local level and how they tried to negotiate Africanisation in their respective sectors. In December 1961, a delegation of the Uganda Railway African Employees stationed in Kenya wrote a letter to Ben Kiwanuka, at the time Chief Minister of Uganda, to complain about the different treatment of African employees of the Uganda Railway compared to Ugandan civil servants. The letter was signed by five Railway employees: John Bukenya,

[35] Julius Nyerere, Letter to all ministries 07 January 1964, in: ibid., 86.

Michael Magino, Ferezi G. Gonja, I. W. Wandera, M. Kibirige, Mayanja. They wrote that they had already made a written request to the Uganda African Railways Workers Union in February of the same year but did not receive a reply: "Our logical conclusion is this that the U. A. R. W. U. is Kenya dominated and as such cannot cater for our interests." The complainers stated that they were on board with the Ugandan Government's endorsement of Africanisation policy over the Localisation approach: "[…] we are, therefore, totally at variance with the so-called Railway Localisation policy; as this puts us at a terrific disadvantage in comparison with our counterparts serving in the Uganda Civil service." The employees complained that from the Africans who were recently appointed only one was from Uganda. "We can here state unreservedly that among the Uganda Railways Employees there are capable men and women, by virtue of their education and experience, to be at par with the rest for rapid promotion to higher responsible posts in the Railways and Harbours." Due to the "political and economically uncertainty in Kenya" the Ugandan employees demanded to be transferred collectively back to Uganda. The writer pointed out that this already happened with Tanganyikan employees working in the same position in Kenya shortly before Tanganyikan independence: "Indeed therefore our request is not extravagant nor impracticable. […] we appeal to your honour to take appropriate steps to redress our grievancies [sic!] and to liberate us from the perpetual exploitation and domination of the Kenya whites and black [sic!] alike."[36] The sources unfortunately do not tell us what happened with this request, but this episode shows how both – Africanisation as well as localisation policies – were perceived, negotiated and contested within the labour force.

Like Tanzania, Uganda had switched to an official policy of Ugandanisation. A political commentator E. R. Rado in the East African Economic Review explained this switch in 1967 as follows:

> "The Uganda Plan is also careful to talk of Ugandanisation and not Africanisation. Brave words, it will be remarkable if they are followed by equally brave acts. It would appear that currently only in Tanzania are "citizen" Asians being actively recruited into government service."[37]

The new approach also stopped replacing current officers without Ugandan citizenship who did not receive any overseas addition and who were already employed; those

36 Uganda People's Congress National Headquarter 1961–62, Letter from Michael Magino, Statistical Department, East African Railways & Harbours, Nairobi, Kenya to Ben Kiwanuka, The Chief Minister of Uganda, Entebbe, Uganda, 16 December 1961, PO 9/23/1961, UNA.

37 E. R. Rado, "Manpower Planning in East Africa", The East African Economic Review (New Series), Vol. 3 No 1, July 1967, 7; quoted in: Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 260.

employees were now allowed to stay in their posts until retirement and were even eligible for retirement payment.[38] Yet, it seemed that the intention behind the switch to Ugandanisation was rather to reduce the high number of African Kenyans from the job market than to include Ugandan Asians in the measurements. This went along with a wider exclusionary process of Kenyan workers in Uganda who were finally expelled from Ugandan territory.[39]

The result of shifting from Africanisation to localisation was not what Nyerere had intended to be a sole focus on nationality but a stronger narrowing of the notion of who was part of the community of equals and therefore was entitled to economic success. We could see in the debates surrounding the terminology of Africanisation and localisation that the shift to localisation was not so much aimed at including citizens of Asian origin but at excluding African non-citizens, mostly Kenyan workers. What Abu Mayanja had defined as Ugandanisation cum Africanisation became the new demarcation of entitlement. While being African was still in the mind of most prerequisite to post-colonial entitlement, localisation added the legal status as citizen to the list and therefore further enforced a more inward-looking form of nationality moving away from pan-Africanist notions. Thus, Africanisation helped to shape a narrow form of national belonging enforcing mental national boundaries by combining the legal definition of citizenship with the racial affiliation as African, consequently excluding non-Africans and African non-citizens alike. With the mainstreaming of Africanisation, the subsequent exclusion of non-Africans and non-citizens compassed wide areas in the economy and local space.

Mainstreaming Africanisation

Africanisation had its roots in colonial time and became increasingly attractive to British administrators in East Africa during the 1930s which saw for the first time a British initiative against the progress of Asian business in the region.[40] In Uganda, it specifically aimed at Asians in the ginnery business. Africanisation therefore had the restriction of Asian economic

[38] This benefited many Asian civil servants and especially the Goan minority who were represented in high numbers in the Ugandan civil service: Frenz, *Community, Memory, and Migration in a Globalizing World*, 16f.

[39] Mazrui, Ali. 'Casualties of an Underdeveloped Class Structure: The Expulsion of Luo Workers and Asian Bourgeoisie from Uganda'. In *Strangers in African Societies*. ed. Shack, William/Skinner, Elliott P., 261–78. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1979.

[40] Africanisation of departments and devolution of activities of Natives 1937, Secretarial Topical, Box 21, C.2108/156, UNA.

opportunities at its heart.[41] It started to become particularly relevant as a policy programme during the second colonial occupation after World War II. Africanisation was driven by different actors over time, initiated by British administrators with a focus on restricting Asians in business. It was quickly picked up by African nationalists in the 1950s who demanded more radical ways of Africanisation which included claims for spaces initially held by Europeans and Asians. While the Africanisation debate in the 1950s had primarily a strong focus on structures in the civil service,[42] debates about Africanisation did not stop with public administration. Soon after independence, mainstreaming Africanisation in all economic sectors became a popular demand within the political class as well as in the public discourse on Africanisation. This included the co-operative movement, Africanising trade, the transport business,[43] health service, education, curriculum, language, media, but also leisure time as Ned Bertz has shown for the Tanganyikan example, analysing the question of Africanising cinemas.[44] Mainstreaming the process was supposed to create an African controlled economy as well as stronger representation of Africans in all areas of economic and social life. In each of the East African states these policies looked slightly different, yet the Tanzanian and Ugandan government searched for new ways of Africanisation beyond their own borders. For Kenya, Sana Aiyar pointed out:

> "Relying on rhetoric rather than policy, Kenyatta was unwilling to implement a blanket policy of Africanization in the private sector, refusing motions by members of the National Assembly to Africanize private companies and prevent the employment of Indians in managerial positions."[45]

In Tanzania and Uganda, equally, there was never a uniform streamlining of Africanisation policies within all sectors. While there was an African consent that in the long run, the whole economy should be controlled by Africans the initial Africanisation programme was in principal directed at the local civil and public service. The colonial administration had started Africanisation programmes of the civil service mostly in the 1950s. Yet, despite the shy attempts

41 In 1930s Uganda, the British launched anti-Asian campaigns to confine Asian businesses by introducing cotton-zoning and other controls: Adams and Bristow, 'The Politico-Economic Position of Ugandan Asians in the Colonial and Independent Eras': 153f.

42 Bustin, Edouard. 'L'africanisation des cadres administratifs de l'Ouganda'. *Civilisations* 9, no. 2 (1959): 133–150.

43 Amar Maini, 'Asians and Politics in Late Colonial Uganda: Some personal Recollections', 116; Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 200f.

44 Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean*, 179f.

45 Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 271.

of Africanisation in some sectors since the 1930s and an increasing Africanisation outlook in the 1950s, at the eve of independence Africans had still limited opportunities in free enterprise as well as the civil service. Africanisation during the 1950s was directed mainly at the lower and medium-ranked positions within the civil service. While some Africans were promoted to the higher grades during this time the dominance of Europeans' in the higher rank of the service was not seriously questioned.[46] Very few Africans held senior positions in state employment. According to a Tanganyikan report on Africanisation, by 31 December 1961, there were still 316 non-Africans serving on local terms and 2,966 non-Africans serving on overseas leave terms in senior and middle grade in permanent posts in the Tanganyikan civil service compared to 1,170 Africans in the same positions.[47] In Tanzania out of 245 officer posts in the police force only 28 were occupied by Africans in 1960. In the civil service, in 1961, only 1,170 Africans held positions in the senior or middle grade ranks out of a total of 4,452. Outside of the civil service the numbers were even more misbalanced. In the year of Tanganyika's independence only 16 Africans were physicians (out of 184), only 2 of 57 lawyers, and only one of 84 civil engineers were Africans.[48] In Uganda the numbers did not look much different. In 1960 the Ugandan civil service had in total 78 Africans on scale A (the highest scale) of the civil service (up from one in 1954), and 611 Africans on scale B and C (up from 322 in C in 1954). The number of Asians in the civil service on scale A to C had already declined from 700 in 1958 to 457 in 1960. Yet, the number of Europeans in the higher ranks of the civil service stayed fairly even.[49]

In early 1962, the new Tanganyikan government convoked an Africanisation Commission to speed-up Africanisation efforts in the local civil service. The work of the new commission was to review every post currently held by an expatriate, which required detailed work. This review process shows that, in contrast to what Mahmood Mamdani stated in his book Class formation 1976 on the case of Uganda, the Africanisation of the civil service was anything but "relatively easy."[50] In Tanzania, the government appointed 600 Africans, the majority of whom were active TANU supporters, to the civil service after firing 260 non-Africans from their jobs in the civil service.[51] However, criticism about the pace of the process came increasingly from various parts of society, most loudly voiced by the unions as discussed later.

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46 Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 204.

47 Many more government top posts are Africanised, *Sunday News*, 28 January 1962.

48 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 573.

49 Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 222.

50 Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 238. Mamdani stresses that in the higher positions of the civil service Europeans were easily replaced with Africans: "Civil servants retained their colonial salaries and benefits, befitting their objective position as members of the ruling class."

51 Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 84.

Apart from the civil service, a major project was the attempt to Africanise trade. Some contemporaries called the introduction of the Ugandan Trade Licensing Act in the combination with its twin Act the Immigration Act 1969 (and two years earlier with similar legislations in Kenya) the moment when Africanising trade started.[52] Yet, the attempts to Africanise trade had begun much earlier in the East African region with the introduction of the co-operatives in the 1930s and continued with policies clearly directed at this aim. Although the concept of co-operatives had been imported from Europe, the co-operative movement in East Africa was initiated by the local rural population and as Andreas Eckert stresses for the Tanzanian case can be described as a movement from below.[53] Yet, shortly after World War II the British administration used co-operatives as instruments in colonial development policy.[54]

While Asians were still dominant in commerce and trade at independence, they had already lost a substantial part of their former share in those sectors especially in the rural retail business due to Africanisation efforts of the British administration.[55] The co-operative movement had grown substantially, due to support by the colonial administration, from the end of the Second World War on. The membership was far above 300,000 in 1960 in Tanganyika. There were 77 registered cooperatives in Zanzibar and 691 in Tanganyika.[56] In Uganda, the number of co-operative movements grew from 401 societies with 36,620 members in 1951 to 1,622 societies with 252,378 members in 1961.[57] The increase was, inter alia, due to the great numbers of African soldiers returning from World War II using their gratuities to establish shops.[58]

In the first years after independence, the Tanzanian government on the mainland was committed to increase private African enterprise, yet its only focus in this matter was the extension of the co-operative movement.[59] The new independent Tanganyikan government promoted the extension of the consumer co-operatives of which only a small number existed before

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52 Parson, Jack D. 'Africanizing Trade in Uganda: The Final Solution'. *Africa Today* 20, no. 1 (1973): 59–72.

53 Eckert, 'Useful Instruments of Participation?': 102. See for more information on the relationship between co-operatives and state: Erdmann, Gero. *Jenseits des Mythos: Genossenschafren zwischen Mittelklasse und Staatsverwaltung in Tanzania und Kenia*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, 1996.

54 However, their function was perceived as more social and political by the colonial administration than as economic. In this context co-operatives were believed to be effective ways of social-engineering: Eckert, 'Useful Instruments of Participation?': 103.

55 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 75.

56 Ibid., 74.

57 Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 200; Commission of Inquiry into Cotton-Ginning Industry, Uganda, 1962.

58 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 448; Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 200f.

59 Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, 70; Eckert, 'Useful Instruments of Participation?': 113.

independence. Those co-operatives were supposed to compete with Asian traders but most of the time failed in doing so. As African traders had not been able to fall back on a fully established supply chain for their shops, they still relied on buying their consumer goods from Asian traders and then – to make some profit – had to put them up for sale for higher prices than the Asian trader, who therefore would sell his produce and consumer goods more successfully.[60] In the Tanganyika News Review, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, George Kahama, is quoted to accuse the Asian business community to influence price policies to push out African traders and co-operates:

> "He [Kahama] said that in many places where Africans have gathered to participate in wholesale or retail trade, in co-operatives or in such kind, Asian businessmen would also show up but with intention of undermining the effort of the Africans. For their aim to succeed, many Asian businessmen deliberately lower the price to compete with the new set-up arrangements. […] This means that the price of items in the shops that are already established end up suddenly being lower than the original price that they [the shop owners] paid for the item [when they bought it for resale]."[61]

Early on, the Tanganyikan government tried to extend African participation in trade by supporting the growth of co-operatives as well as establishing of the Cooperative Supply Association of Tanganyika (Cosata) in 1962 which served as the wholesaler to the co-operative shops offering consumer goods. Two years later the parastatal National Development Corporation (NDC) was established which was supposed to offer African businessmen financial support to enter trading or industry.[62] Statistics showed a substantial increase in cooperative shops (857 in 1961 to 1533 in 1966) as well as the volume of produce (145,000 tons in 1960 to 496,000 tons in 1965) traded by those cooperatives.[63]

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[60] The same issues occurred in Uganda: Committee Report Africanisation Industry Commerce, Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1968.

[61] Translation by the author: "Alisema [Kahama] kuwa katika sehemu nyingi, ambako waafrika wamewahi kujikusanya ili kistawisha biashara yao ya jumla au ya reja reja, ushirika au aina kama hiyo, Waasia wafanya biashara nao hukusanyika lakini wakiwa na nja [sic!] ya kupinga juhudi hiyo ya [sic!] Waafrika. Ili shabaha yao ifaulu, Waasia wengi wafanya biashara wanashusha bei makusudi ili kushindana na mipango mipya iliyowekwa. […] Imekuwa na maana kuwa bei ya vitu katika yale maduka yaliyokwisha kuendelea, ghafla inakuwa chini kuliko bei ambayo mewenye [sic!] duka aliilipia mali hiyo." In: Kahama alauma Waasia, *Tanganyika News Review*, 19 September 1963.

[62] Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 83.

[63] Report of the Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1966, 5, quoted in: Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, 73.

As the Buganda Boycott at the eve of independence had shown, a stark African grievance had been built up, especially when it came to the Asians' role in the cotton ginnery business and in local trade. In Uganda, the cooperative policy broke the Asian cotton monopoly. In 1966, marketing cooperatives controlled 42 of the 115 Ugandan ginneries, which produced 75 per cent of the cotton crop. The Ugandan government intensified its attempts to fully oust Asian involvement in the cotton industry after the new constitution 1966.[64] By 1963, 315 traders' associations had formed in Uganda which established the Uganda National Traders' Association. This association represented African traders and helped extend African tradesmanship. By 1966, 42 per cent of the retail business was controlled by African traders, compared to 18 per cent in 1958.[65]

The attempts to Africanise trade, while partly effective in establishing small retail traders, remained ineffective in replacing the expansive trading networks between *dukawallah* and Asian franchise business. When Uganda sent a delegation of businessmen to India which consisted exclusively of Asian entrepreneurs, a UPC Secretary, Wadada Musani, complained to the Trade Commissioner V. V. Dev. In his reply Dev explained the lack of African businessmen in the delegation with the practicalities of the trip. The trip had been organised in a short period of time and members of the delegation would have had to cover their own travel expenses from East Africa to Bombay and back (while the Government of India would have paid for the expenses during the stay in India):

> "We made some efforts through the Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Government of Uganda, Hon'ble Mr. C. K. Patel, to get an African businessman from Uganda included in the Delegation but no one came forward on the terms offered. Similarly our efforts in Kenya and Tanganyika also proved unsuccessful in so far as inclusion of African businessmen in the Delegation was concerned. […] I can assure you that nothing would have pleased us more than the inclusion of some Africans in the delegation as we are fully aware that the future of our trade with these territories rests on African goodwill and is dependent on the African market."[66]

This example shows that often pragmatism beat ideology mainly like in this case because of the lack of finances and even more often because of the lack of skilled African staff. It also shows how politicians were keen on extending African representation in key political and economic functions was an important issue.

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64 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 84; 297f.

65 Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 236.

66 Letter by V. V. Dev Trade Commissioner for India to Mr Wadada Musani, Secretary, UPC, 23 January 1962, UPC National Headquarters, 1961–62, PO 9/13, UNA, 28.

Obstacles and a shift in the economic agenda

Soon the implementation of Africanisation programmes shaped up as complicated for a few entangled reasons. Although as the analysis of the public discourse has shown, most Africans believed that Africanisation was necessary to create a fair economic system in which Africans had a chance to progress, only a small proportion of African society profited directly from Africanisation. Questions arose about the merit of those new African recruits. Some individuals addressed the problems which followed the recruitment of African staff, such as poor work ethics of the new recruits, as we can see from an opinion piece in the radical newspaper *The Nationalist*:

> "The low morale that now exists in the civil service resulting in part from its rapid Africanization and the discouragement suffered by enthusiastic young officers who worked hard but were unable to compete with their counterparts in terms of years of service; the situation wherein a civil servant […] lost interest in further study simply because he could expect promotion through so-called brotherization, or because he was a friend of politician so and so, or alternatively because he had spent so many years in the civil service; the distinction between civil servant and politician; these are conditions which cannot be allowed to continue any longer if our Development Plans are to succeed."[67]

The author urged the new head of the civil service to introduce a "completely new spirit" into the civil service as the solution for the lacking work ethic: "eliminating the civil servant politician mentality; and now that our civil service is almost entirely Africanized, institute promotion on merit alone." The writer emphasised the important role the civil service played in the effort to fulfil the Five-Year and Three-Year Plan in Tanganyika and Zanzibar, at the same time he pointed out the civic duty every citizen had to work towards universal success for Tanzania.[68]

A new term for this kind of profiteer of independence had been introduced in the socialist language of post-independent Tanzania which derived from the term nationalisation and indirectly also from the more and more controversial term Africanisation: *Naizesheni* or in the short form *naizi*.[69] The term *naizi* comprised the few Africans who had actually profited from

[67] Our civil servants, *The Nationalist*, 05 August 1964.

[68] Our civil servants, *The Nationalist*, 05 August 1964.

[69] In a TANU leaflet the term *naizi* is explained as: "It is a high-ranking [well-off] person or someone promoted to a higher rank." *Naizi* stood in contrast to *kabwela*, which was translated to "It is a person of lower rank." Yet, both terms implied more than just ranking within society, but also a certain attitude: Translation by the author: "Ni mtu wa hali ya juu au mtu mwenye cheo fulani."; "Ni mtu

independence and was mostly used for the new civil service elite who had replaced the British officials in the senior roles in government. The recruitment in the higher posts were often believed to be handed out on the basis of nepotism.[70] Those *naizi* were claimed to not have worked hard for their success and had instead of distributing the wealth of the new nation among all Africans enriched themselves at the expense of the majority of the African population who continued to be poor. Not surprisingly, this new elite class became another counter example of *mwananchi,* the good citizens, and were thought to be damaging for nation-building. *Mweusi mzungu* literally meaning a "black white" or black European was referring to those who now lived at the expense of others in the same style as the colonial elite had previously.[71]

Nepotism and profiting from existing unequal economic structures were similarly big problems in Uganda, where the leading figures in the ruling party UPC had benefited from structures which had survived independence.[72] Unlike TANU in Tanganyika which drew its support from all parts of the population, in Uganda the UPC support base originated mainly from Africans with higher skilled professions such as white-collar workers in Kampala or outside of Buganda, the Africanisation scheme for the public service was directly serving its supporters.[73]

The problem of nepotism within the new elite clique was brought up early in the Ugandan context. One Uganda Argus reader pled to the members of the new ruling UPC/KY government to not hand out the higher positions simply to their allies without making sure they had the qualification for it:

> "Don't fall in the same mistake [as the Democratic Party]; use all the able men that are here, irrespective of whether they're friends or not. […] Never sacrifice efficiency and fairness to all on the altar of political expediency. Above all, never wreck the country's stability and progress for the sake of tribal or worse still, personal prestige and considerations."[74]

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wa hali ya chini." In: Mafunzo ya azimio la arusha na siasa ya TANU Ujamaa na kujitegemea, PP. TZ.TANU 22, ICS.

70 Brennan, *Taifa*, 173f.; Mueller, Susanne. 'The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class'. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1981): 459–497.

71 Brennan, *Taifa*, 173f.; Mueller, 'The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class'; Vijiji vya Ujamaa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, PP.TZ.TANU 36.

72 Jorgensen, Jan. *Uganda: A modern history*. London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1981.

73 Ibid., 215; In contrast in Tanzania with the implementation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and the official adoption of African Socialism (*ujamaa*) TANU implemented a strict leadership code which was supposed to stop forms of nepotism and personal enrichment as discussed in chapter III.1.

74 Letter to the editor by Insignificant Undergraduate from Kampala, Civil service is next, *Uganda Argus*, 15 May 1962.

The debate around nepotism as a recruitment factor instead of merit points at the main challenge of Africanisation which was to keep the balance between a rapid implementation and the maintenance of the quality and the standard of the civil service itself. The pre-existing lack of education which would hinder a sufficient number of Africans to fill the gaps in the civil service was the main obstacle which thwarted the rapid and comprehensive Africanisation of the civil service in the first years after independence in both countries.[75]

In 1961 Tanganyika, only 16 per cent of African adults could read and write.[76] Not even half of all Africans in Tanganyika were visiting primary schools (only nine per cent were at upper and 45 per cent at lower primary schools). When it came to secondary and tertiary education the statistics were even more sobering. Just fewer than two per cent attended secondary schools in the same year. Only 17 Africans from Tanganyikans had graduated from Makerere and the college in Nairobi in 1961.[77]

These numbers in Uganda did not look very different: in 1958, only 3,153 Africans had been admitted to the 19 Ugandan senior secondary schools which accepted African students. This figure rose substantially over the next decade: in 1970 there were 73 senior secondary schools with 40,691 African students. Yet, Jorgensen has criticised that the rush on education meant that there was no time for the Ugandan government to reform the school system and curriculum which was still colonial in its form and therefore produced bureaucratic administrators rather than technically skilled or manually skilled labour which were in high demand at the time.[78]

Sufficient training needed time. In Tanzania, five years after independence, this shortage of local skilled staff was not solved. The lack of education in the sectors where skilled labour was sorely needed left the new governments in a predicament. Expatriates were still believed to be indispensable.[79] Especially for the higher ranked civil service posts and in the professions there were not enough qualified African candidates to take over the roles which were available or could be made available due to Africanisation policy. But Africanisation policy was more than simply a job creation scheme for African workers; it was in fact a strong symbol for a newly decolonised society and an important mean to empower Africans.

75 On training African civil servants and high-skilled staff see: Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 129f.

76 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 573f.

77 Ibid.

78 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 240.

79 The author of an opinion piece in *The Standard* points out: "[…] in the meantime, the technical and administrative skills of expatriates are necessary for the efficiency and progress of the country. It has been acknowledged by the nation's leaders that efficiency should be the sole yardstick for the occupation of posts.", in: CLA speeches, *The Standard*, 19 January 1967.

While there was the urge of implementing Africanisation policy quickly, at the same time the governments were concerned to lose highly skilled expatriates too rapidly to be able to compensate.

Shortly before and after independence, the fear of a rapid expat outflow was omnipresent as the newspapers of the time show. This was for a couple of reasons: first, the expat communities similar to the Asian communities in East Africa became increasingly aware of the racial tensions in the region, which had been fuelled by events such as the Buganda riots, the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, the massacres in Zanzibar 1961 and 1964 as well as the Congo Crisis. Second, the official commitment of African states to Africanisation programmes signalled to the expats who had been working for the colonial state that they would be replaced in the foreseeable future and therefore hindered long-term perspectives for Europeans in East Africa. The number of European administrators and technicians leaving civil and public service in Tanganyika was according to a policy paper from 1962 "nearer 50 per cent, and some government services were visibly running down."[80] Similar signals, if not stronger ones, were given to Asian staff, but as the Asian minority had settled more permanently in East Africa than most expatriates in Tanzania and Uganda there was no instant outflow of Asian employees from the region.[81]

More conservative voices in Uganda and Tanganyika tried to lower expectation for Africanisation by warning of a drop in public services in the case of quick and radical Africanisation. In an opinion piece in the *Uganda Argus* some month before Ugandan independence, the anonymous writer referred to the interrelatedness of the two issues: "There are twin aims here – to convince African civil servants, and the country as a whole, that all opportunities for Africanisation are being taken, and to show just which posts will need to continue to be filled by expatriates, and for how long." The writer further requested to set emotions aside:

> "[…] it involves the hard and practical problem of keeping services running in a time of great political change. […] The present supply of local candidates is not sufficient to meet all Uganda's needs, and efforts have therefore to be concentrated on advancing people who are fitted for more senior jobs, using training schemes to produce people for posts where they are most needed, and simultaneously attracting and retaining the services of expatriates with the necessary skills."[82]

80 Leys, 'Tanganyika: The realities of independence': 252.

81 However, many Asian had sent their assets abroad or even had spent some time abroad during the early months of transition in case of any riots or unrests as discussed in chapter II.2.

82 Reassuring the civil servants, *Uganda Argus*, 18 January 1962.

A reader of the Uganda Argus who called himself Insignificant Undergraduate asked his government to keep the standard of the service running and not overeagerly Africanise despite the lack of skilled African candidates:

> "Please don't force an expatriate to leave and then go on to replace him with an inferior type of African just for the sake of Africanisation. […] On the other hand, don't hesitate to replace any expatriate, however nice or able, as soon as a Uganda citizen of the same standard is available."[83]

A feared exodus of expatriates would leave posts open for which there were no local candidates with the necessary skillset available claimed another opinion piece in the same newspaper a couple of months later. The chances of recruiting "from the traditional sources, particularly Britain" showed to be rather difficult according to the author.[84] The commentator pointed out that one of the reasons it became increasingly difficult to recruit foreign personnel was due to the paid salary which remained too low (despite a recent increase) and therefore did not compare to the standard salary for skilled staff from abroad.[85] Some saw a serious threat to the functioning of the state after the outflow of expatriates following independence,[86] like another unnamed Uganda Argus journalist who writes: "For the present, however, the problem of retaining sufficient expatriates to serve over the next few years is at least as great as that of placing local people in more of the senior Government posts."[87]

Likewise, in Tanganyika, the government stressed that the decision to Africanise could not be made on an emotional level. Nyerere claimed that he tried not to put the colonial racist system upside down through radical Africanisation but that he wanted to abolish discrimination and keep standards. Yet, pressure within TANU, and in the population forced him to accept preferential treatment of African applicants to the civil service.[88] The Tanganyikan government approached Africanisation with an eye on training and education, trying to maintain civil service standards. It was important, the Minister for Local Government and Administration, Job Lusinde, emphasised in August 1962 in Iringa that a realistic programme of training would be put up: "During this difficult interim period councils must ensure that the work […] is carried out efficiently and in many cases it is inevitable that this will involve the continued

83 Letter to the editor, Civil service is next, by Insignificant Undergraduate in Kampala, *Uganda Argus,* 15 May 1962.

84 How big an exodus, *Uganda Argus*, 08 March 1962.

85 Ibid.

86 Stemming the exodus, *Uganda Argus*, 07 April 1962.

87 Ugandanisation is the word, *Uganda Argus*, 19 September 1962.

88 Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, 573f.

employment of non-Africans who, after all, have served your councils faithfully and well in the past."[89]

Africanisation in the civil service as central focus of national programmes did not affect every non-African civil servant the same way. Asian civil servants' livelihood was much more under threat than Europeans in Tanganyika and Uganda. They often did not fall under the category of highly skilled expats. They mainly held middle ranked positions whose requirements were most likely for Africans to achieve in a shorter timeframe. Additionally, Asian civil servants counted as local staff and therefore were not eligible for the generous compensation scheme the British had set in place for European staff. While European expatriates were compensated, it continued to be unclear if Asians were eligible for any form of compensation due to job loss in the process of Africanisation. An unusual letter to the editor by a European civil servant reached the *Tanganyika Standard* pleading for a similar compensation for Asian civil servants. The writer, who called himself JUSTICIA and according to his statement was European, questioned the administration's intention by suggesting the decision that compensation should only be paid to European expatriates was racist:

> "I know how essential they [Asian colleagues] are to the smooth working of the administration of this country. It is difficult to understand why I, threatened with an abrupt ending of my career and supersession without regard to merit, should be given thousands of pounds while my brown colleagues get a kick in the pants. Is it because they are brown? […] My Asian colleague was recruited from overseas to serve the colonial government just as much as I was, and his livelihood is endangered just as much as mine, if not more. He should not be denied equal treatment for spurious reasons."[90]

In July 1961, two Asian Tanganyikan civil servants representing the Tanganyika Asian Civil Servants' Association and the Tanganyika Overseas-Recruited Asian Government Servants' Union petitioned the UN Trusteeship Council for seeking compensation guarantees for Asian civil servants who would lose their job due to the new Africanisation scheme. The compensation so the petitioners should equal those which had already been granted to European civil servants in Tanganyika.[91] This example shows how individuals tried to negotiate the terms of Africanisation.

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89 Africanise in orderly fashion, *Tanganyika Standard*, 09 August 1962.

90 Letter to the editor, Equal treatment for Asian civil servants' plea, by JUSTICIA from Dar es Salaam, *Tanganyika Standard*, 26 September 1961.

91 Asians plea to council, *Tanganyika Standard,* 14 July 1961.

Another issue which was already raised by the commentator in the Uganda Argus was the salary scale inherited from colonialism. In the early days of independence, the income distribution between Africans, Asians and Europeans within the civil and public service was still on average highly out of balance:[92] while the average annual per capita monetary income of Africans in Uganda in 1963 was at £ 12, the per capita income of Asians was £ 288 and this of Europeans £ 990. This income gap was even wider in Tanzania, with a per capita income for non-Africans of £ 413 and Africans £ 8.7.[93] The vast misbalance in upper and lower levels of salary scales had been criticized by Nyerere before independence in May 1960. He further announced that apart from removing this misbalance, the new independent government would also reduce the salaries of elected Ministers.[94]

Higher European civil servants had substantially higher salaries which were comparable with what they would have earned in similar positions in Britain, and pensions which had been covered by the British state. Once self-governance was introduced, these pensions had to be covered by the new Tanganyikan and Ugandan government which had to consequently borrow money from the UK to be able to cover its colonial civil servant pensions.[95]

While keeping European expatriates in the higher ranks of the civil service meant that the new independent governments had to cover the high European salaries to prevent a dangerously rapid outflow of well needed expatriates, lowering salaries in higher posts once Africans occupied them would have been a clear discrimination of their own local African staff and would have contradicted everything Africanisation was supposed to accomplish. Nevertheless, both, Tanzania and Uganda did not have the financial capacities to be able to pay European salaries to all civil servants over a longer period. In the Ugandan parliament, the Minister of Mineral and Water Resources, J. W. Lwamafa argued that paying higher salaries for expatriates had nothing to do with discrimination but was born out of pragmatism:

> "As the House is well aware, the Government also finds it necessary to pay a higher salary to expatriates. We may not like it but it is a matter of economic reality and sometimes of necessity. (Laughter). In considering allegations of racialism, figures are so easy and so damaging to make and are all too often made without foundation on fact."[96]

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92 Ramchandani 1976, Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 227; 339.

93 Ibid., 339. This only reflects the monetary income without the subsistence sector income.

94 Tanganyika Intelligence summary. May 1960, in: Political intelligence reports Tanganyika 1960–61, CO 822/2061, UKNA, 3.

95 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 238.

96 MP Lwamafa, Hansard Uganda Vol 9, 1963, 161.

Still, the Obote government in Uganda decided to pay high-ranked African civil servants the equivalent to what their expatriate counterpart would have gained. The UPC further increased Minister salaries in 1964 from Shs. 60,000 to Shs. 103,000, which was strongly criticised by the opposition leader, Benedicto Kiwanuka of the DP: "Is it not [a] shame that a country with a total Annual Revenue of about £ 45,000,000 should have Ministers drawing salaries like [a] Minister in the United Kingdom where the total Annual Revenue is £ 12,875,000,000, i. e. about 321 times higher than ours?"[97]

These salary adjustments significantly increased public spending and rising state debts.[98] It also created an African bureaucratic elite which quickly became out of touch with the majority of the African population: the annual income of an Ugandan higher civil servant in the 1960s was 36,000 Shs.or more, while 60 per cent of the African labour force made not more than 18,000 Shs. per year.[99] Africans in the lower ranks also benefited from salary rises which were, however, not anywhere near as high. In Tanzania subordinate staff in the civil service profited from a salary increase of 28 per cent. In total it increased Tanzanian government spending by £ 1,100,000. It also maintained the salaries in the higher ranks of the civil service which had been originally held by non-Africans and now were slowly taken over by Africans.[100]

After half a decade of independence, grievances still persisted towards Asian and European employees. In 1966, in the Ugandan civil service, Africans comprised 76 per cent of scale C and 72 per cent of scale B, however, only 39 per cent of scale A. This was a remarkable increase, yet, the highest posts in the public sector were still held by non-Africans (49 per cent by Europeans and 12 per cent by Asians). The representation of Asians had dropped in 1966 to 17 per cent in scale B and 21 per cent in scale C.[101] At the same time, Asian firms started to give more jobs to Africans.[102] Yet an over proportionate amount of the management positions were still occupied by Asians and Europeans: according to the High Level Manpower Survey of Uganda from 1967, 154 Non-Ugandan Asians and 244 Europeans & Others held Senior Management positions and 429 Non-Ugandan Asians and 187 Europeans & Others held roles in Junior Management compared to 638 Ugandans in Senior Management and 2,284 Ugandans in Junior Management. The category Ugandans further does not differentiate between Africans and non-Africans and therefore comprises Ugandan Asians alike. As the report shows, non-Ugandan Asians were also overrepresented in most university skilled professions,

97 Benedicto K. M. Kiwanuka, 08 March 1969, Press Statement 1969, ICS Senate House, PP.UG.DP 11, 9.

98 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 239.

99 Ibid.

100 Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 218–21.

101 Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 258.

102 Ibid., 259.

especially in accounting, law and medicine.[103] Yet, because Asian students were often sent abroad to the UK or India to follow a university degree, despite their on average higher level of education, Asians were comparably underrepresented in the East African tertiary education system. The University of Dar es Salaam for instance, only had 31 Asian members of academic staff out of a total of circa 300.[104]

In the first year of Tanganyikan independence, the number of Africans in Senior and Middle Grade Posts in the civil service increased from 1,170 to 1,821 while the number of non-Africans dropped from 3,282 to 2,902. This number shows that Africanisation was often not necessarily implemented by replacing non-Africans with Africans but by creating more positions in the higher ranks of the civil service which resulted in a swelling of the bureaucratic sector.

The Ugandan Africanisation report from 1968 summarised the ongoing struggle, especially when it came to the Africanisation of trade:

> "It is a well-known fact that Uganda's commerce and industry is predominantly in the hands of non-Africans most of whom are non-citizens. This fact also accounts for the non-indigenous character and appearance of our towns and trading centres, which to a first visitor to the country would look like a transplanted Bombay, Calcutta or Madras, except that they would perhaps be tidier and less populated."[105]

This quote shows again that appearances and therefore the general perception of urban space played a central role in the continuing grievances. It shows that many Africans did not feel in charge of their urban space due to the overrepresentation of Asians in the urban centres. This was believed to be mainly due to the Asian dominance in retail trade.

As main obstacles of Africanisation in the trade sector the report names various factors: lack of know-how, lack of capital, lack of co-operative spirit, lack of true wholesale companies, lack of dynamic policy for advancement of African business, lack of a shared market. According to the report, the Asian trading community had a part in this situation by exploiting the lack of knowledge[106] as well as preventing Africans from renting retail property in profitable areas.[107] Most African traders further bought their goods from the same Asian traders they stood in

103 High Level Manpower Survey of Uganda (1967) quoted in International Department Uganda Asians, Ref I003, 23 August 1972, in: CA2/A/31 SOAS Archive.

104 Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa*, 233.

105 Committee Report Africanisation Industry Commerce, Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1968, 3.

106 Asian traders were accused of off-loading their dead stock to African traders.

107 This was a debate continued when Asian landlords were attacked about allegedly unfair methods like rent increase.

competition with, as they were the nearest produce suppliers: "The Asians must make a profit on their wholesale/retail sales and so the African traders must pay more for these goods. If they are to make some profit on these goods, the Africans must charge higher prices than the Asians. Thus, the consumers are attracted back to the Asian centres."[108] The report, furthermore, claimed that the lack of capital was rooted in the reluctance of commercial banks to give credit to African businessmen, "probably because of the lack of tangible securities."[109]

The Africanisation report summarised that in general European companies did better in Africanising their staff as family structures in Asian firms prevented them from employing non-family members. Yet even the large Asian-controlled companies which all belonged to the Madhvani enterprise or Mehta Group, still performed worse regarding Africanisation. In the large European-controlled firms 15 per cent of senior executives were African; in the large Asian firms only six per cent of senior executive positions were held by Africans. While the number of Africans in leading roles in medium-sized European-controlled companies was even higher than in large companies (19 per cent), in medium-sized Asian firms the ratio was only two per cent for Africans in senior roles.[110] This was easily explained by the fact that medium-sized and smaller Asian companies were even more embedded in family structures than enterprises. Employing Africans in high-level roles therefore would result in job losses of family members. The economist Dharam Ghai saw a slow shift in behaviour by Asian businesspeople when writing in 1965:

> "[…] the old attitudes and habits are gradually breaking down in the face of pressure form African leaders and – only occasionally – in the pursuit of enlightened self-interest. Some Asians have started business in partnership with Africans; many of the larger commercial and industrial firms have initiated policies of Africanization."[111]

However, as the Ugandan Africanisation report has shown these signals were not able to drown the issue of family structured Asian business. Many Africans worked for Asian *dukawallah* or in other employment relationship to a wealthier Asian businessman. Asian employers were often blamed for being far stricter and unpleasant than European or African employers while paying lower wages. A reader of the East Africa wide published Baraza complained: "A person works from early morning until 6 pm the evening without resting or receiving overtime. You

[108] Committee Report Africanisation Industry Commerce, Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1968, 5.

[109] Ibid., 4.

[110] Ibid., 20.

[111] Dharam P. Ghai, 'An economic survey', 105.

do many jobs here, he [the Asian employer] treats you like a dog. Also, you even work on Sundays without pay."[112] The long hours can be explained by the fact that Asian *dukawallah* usually had their *duka* open long hours even on weekdays.

In a report on Africanisation of the civil service Uganda's Governor Philip Mitchell wrote in 1937 that Uganda's civil service should be Africanised within 50 years. Of course, this timeline was not acceptable for African politicians after independence anymore and the pace of Africanisation programmes became a central bone of contention carried out in the public debate. Some African readers believed that Africanisation should be a straightforward process. A *Tanganyika Standard* reader, G. S. Magombe from Mbeya, suggested that there were enough Africans "who have no formal University training but who have a store of experience behind them – the experience that can be adjusted to a changed Tanganyika." In this case, "Mr. Nyerere can Africanise many establishments overnight."[113] Yet, as discussed, the lack of education was one of the main obstacles to rapid Africanisation.

After a couple of years of self-governance, many Africans were not satisfied with the state efforts to implement Africanisation. Protests formed, especially within the different African unions. The Tanganyika Railway African Union pressed for speedy Africanisation of all posts (with the exception of highly technical jobs) in February 1963. The unionist in general complained about the reluctance to put Africans in charge of the higher ranks in the public service.[114]

The pace of the Africanisation programme left many Ugandans and Tanganyikans discontented. The general claim was that Africanisation did not go far enough and/or fast enough. According to its critics Africanisation should not only be reduced to the public service but to all sectors of the economy.[115] Their grievances rooted in the colonial economic inequality had not been tackled fast enough. In Tanzania, trade unions played a crucial part in this opposition, urging protests and strikes all over the early years of independence.[116] This protest reified in army mutinies in early 1964 in Tanganyika and Uganda. Soldiers who mutinied on 19 January

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[112] Translation by the author: "Mtu anafanya kazi kutoka asubuhi hadi saa kumi na mbili jioni bila kupumzika ama kupata ovataimu. Unafanya kazi nyingi huku anakutukana kama mbwa. Pia unafanya kazi hata Jumapili bila malipo.", in: Maoni yetu: Dai Mhindi hamwamini Mwafrika, A. Z. W. Imbuga, Nakuru, *Baraza*, 16 February 1967.

[113] Letter to the editor, Africanisation, *Tanganyika Standard*, 12 September 1961.

[114] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 85 quoting Aminzade 2013, 85 quoting: *Tanganyika Standard*, 09 February 1963.

[115] By nationalising big parts of the economy after the Arusha Declaration, TANU therefore followed indirectly the claims as the nationalisation automatically put those sectors under the control of the government. The jobs within these sectors became public and consequently targets of localization (rather than Africanisation), see: Mueller, 'The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class'.

[116] Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 85f.

in Tanganyika initiated from Dar and on 22 January in Uganda from the barracks in Jinja demanded higher pay and more career opportunities which they believed to be diminished by the presence of too many Europeans in commanding positions.[117] In Tanganyika, some trade unions joined the protests and extended the soldiers' grievances to other parts of the job market. After the mutinies had been put down, the TANU-government consequently closed down the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), one of the biggest Unions in the country at that point and established the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) which served as a single union which was directly put under the control of TANU.[118] This reorganisation cut down the power of the unions significantly. It was a further step by the TANU party and government to secure power in the aftermath of the army mutiny of January 1964. Apart from the trade unions, some "splinter groups (parties)" as Issa Shivji calls them had formed over the issue and demanded full Africanisation of the economy.[119] Vehemently restricting workers' rights to strike organised by unions and implementing a one-party-state were crucial steps towards TANU's power consolidation in the direction of a more authoritarian regime.[120]

The winners and losers of Africanisation

It is evident that Africanisation had different agents with different driving motifs from the colonial state before independence and African nationalists to unions and individuals who took part in the public discourse. Likewise, the ways individuals negotiated the terms of Africanisation in the public sphere had varying forms. While Africanisation was mostly targeted at non-Africans the beneficiaries and losers of Africanisation were not solely categorised by racial lines.

For the Ugandan context this becomes clear looking at the way Africanisation affected Baganda. Due to their collaboration with the British, male Baganda had predominantly enjoyed better education during colonial time than non-Baganda. This made them the obvious

[117] Jackson, Dudley. *The disappearance of strikes in Tanzania: Incomes policy and industrial democracy.* Birmingham, 1978. The 1964 army mutiny, *Daily Monitor*, 14 August 2012; Parsons, *The 1964 army mutinies and the making of modern East Africa*.

[118] Jackson, *The disappearance of strikes in Tanzania*, 13–6; Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, 68; Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 88; Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 189–94.

[119] Shivji 1976, 68.

[120] The disappearances of strikes in Tanzania, 1978, 19; Shivji points out the rather unsocialistic character of this policy as banning strikes "meant that objectively it was capital rather than labour which was being assisted.": Shivji 1976, 78.

candidates for the Africanisation recruitment scheme and also could have over-proportionately benefited them if it came to the Africanisation of other sectors such as trade.[121] Ethnicization – as discussed by Holger Brent Hansen – had been used to structure Uganda's polity in the 1960s.[122] Despite the claim for a balanced ethnic representation in the civil service, the UPC government in fact decreased the relative number of Baganda in the Ugandan civil service. The beneficiaries were ironically Asian employees who were the only other candidates who could offer the required skill sets for those positions: Asians in the higher ranks of the civil service climbed from 5.7 per cent in 1959 to 13.4 per cent in 1967, while Asians only comprised of 0.8 per cent of the total population.[123] Similarly to the situation in the civil service, Baganda were better educated than most non-Bugandan Africans and therefore predestined to take over the role of Asian traders in Uganda. The Uganda People's Congress (UPC), with its main agenda of keeping Bugandan political and economic influence as small as possible, prevented this by keeping the class of wealthy and influential Asian wholesaler and industrialists in their roles.[124] Asians, therefore, at least until the complete marginalisation of Buganda by the new constitution in 1966, profited from the discrimination of Buganda during the phase of Africanisation.

In Uganda the replacement of non-Africans with Africans was not the highest priority of the government in those years. Preventing Baganda from taking over too many key positions in the civil service and economy was counterproductive for Africanisation attempts. Only after Obote and the UPC had fully marginalised the power of Buganda by the introduction of the new 1966 constitution, Africanisation – by that point re-branded Ugandanisation – took up speed. Until then, Asians had profited from the reluctance by the UPC to recruit African Baganda to the civil service. The same constitution restricted the purchase of land, property or business in certain areas to citizens of African blood.[125] In general, despite the re-branding, the focus stayed on Africanisation policy – defined by replacing non-Africans no matter if citizens or non-citizens with Ugandan Africans. This shows the Committee Report on Africanisation in Industry and Commerce[126] which still in 1968 suggests a favouritism of Ugandan Africans over any non-African.

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121 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 247.

122 Hansen, 'Uganda in the 1970s: a decade of paradoxes and ambiguities' Richard Reid has analysed how Ugandan history writing has been politically instrumentalised over time: Reid, *A history of modern Uganda*.

123 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 248.

124 Ibid., 247.

125 Ramchandani, *Uganda Asians: The End of an Enterprise*, 261f.

126 Committee Report Africanisation Industry Commerce, Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1968.

The radical way of Africanisation conducted by the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar left many non-Africans impecunious. Africanisation proceeded more rapidly and radically and resulted not only in new job recruitment measurements but directly in expropriation and nationalisation of property owned by non-Africans. After the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964, the new rulers took over urban and rural properties of many of the Arab and Asian elite, including the properties of leading Asian merchant families like the Jevanjees and the Karimjees. Most of these appropriations happened violently in February and March 1964 by threatening the former owner at gunpoint.[127] Further, a land reform was planned to reallocate the mainly Arab owned plantations. While the Marxist section of the new Revolutionary Government, the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (ZRC) under the direction of Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, aimed for a comprehensive nationalisation policy of land under state management. Newly installed President of Zanzibar, Abeid Karume, enforced only the nationalisation of the larger Arab estates which were then taken on by African peasants.[128]

In Zanzibar, the British staff in the civil service were all ordered to leave the country by May 1964. Asian civil servants were replaced by hastily promoted often unskilled Africans.[129] While the staff on overseas terms (mostly European and some Arabs) were compensated by the UK, the former Asian civil servants' as well as the majority of Arab staffs' claim for compensation of their pension liabilities were rejected by the ZRC.[130] Specifically Asian and Arab schools were closed by the new government. Non-African students of state and grant-aided schools were ejected and replaced by African pupils.[131] After the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the making of Tanzania on 26 April 1964, Zanzibar still remained mainly autonomous, keeping its own budget and economic, trade, and educational policy as well as judicial administration. This enabled the Zanzibari government under Karume, who became Vice-President of the Union, to pursue a highly restrictive economic policy towards the Asian (and Arab) minority compared to the slightly more inclusive policy on the mainland. In the four years after the revolution, commercial and industrial sites were all taken over. Smaller Asian and Arab-owned plantations, shops or businesses were taken over forcefully while the owner was prevented from re-entering the premises. The bigger European companies were forced to stop production and their trade reverted to a legal monopoly run by a new state institution. Asians were further targeted by a decree from May 1971 which finally prohibited all private business after June 1971. Breaking the new decree would have led to severe penalties

[127] Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its aftermath*, 100.

[128] Ibid., 100f.

[129] Ibid., 101.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Ibid., 110.

such as high fines and imprisonment. Despite the decree, non-Asian small co-operatives which were run like family businesses, stayed unaffected which showed the racial intention of the decree.[132] Zanzibari Asians had to further suffer from school quotas which were implemented in March 1965 and required an even distribution of students depending on the representation in the population. This meant that only four per cent of the spots available in schools went to Asian pupils.[133] This hit the Asian population hard who had always been very keen on making sure their children would get a good education. Furthermore, the education system in Zanzibar was lacking teachers, after many of them (British and Zanzibari) had been expelled or had left after the revolution.

Although the initial motif for Africanisation at the end of the Second World War was to reduce Asians access to economic opportunity as well as to posts in the civil service, Africanisation did not target all East African Asians in the same way. Depending on the national context and the professions Asians held the effect could vary widely. For instance, the Goan communities were much more affected than other parts of the Asian community in East Africa by Africansation, as Goans were overrepresented in the civil service. Likewise, Asians, who held middle-ranked jobs which were more attainable for Africans than higher skilled jobs due to Africans' more limited educational background, were more likely to lose their job than highly skilled staff. European civil servants who were also affected by Africanisation programmes in the civil service often could fall back on a compensation scheme. Furthermore, they were affected to a lesser extent as candidates with higher skill sets were rare. In trade, the co-operative movement threatened smaller retail traders almost exclusively while leaving the wide Asian business networks of successful enterprises in place.[134] Consequently, the disbalance of wealth within the East African economy remained high. This also counted for most manufacturing companies, with the exception of Uganda's Asian ginnery owners whose cotton monopoly was crushed by marketing co-operatives. In fact, business families like the Madhvanis were able to grow their business during the first years of independence even more.

As some examples have indicated, the national context determined in many ways who profited and who was deprived by Africanisation programmes. The power struggle in Uganda between Baganda actors and the ruling UPC resulted in government policies which consciously marginalised Baganda in recruitment programmes. Yet, as Bagandas had profited over decades from the colonial education system which favoured them over other ethnicities, the exclusion of Baganda in Africanisation programmes slowed down the process considerably and in some respects even led to ramifications which led to an increase of Asian recruits in the Civil Service

[132] Ibid., 140–2.

[133] Ibid., 143.

[134] Bharati, Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru, 114.

during the first few years of independence. Due to UPC's clientele policy a small defined number of supporters profited from Africanisation programmes which quickly formed an African elite; the broader masses of the population remained economically marginalised. The early Africanisation programmes in independent Tanganyika/mainland Tanzania saw a similar rise in an African elite attitude illustrated by linguistic evolution in the public discourse of terms such as *naizesheni,* yet the economic progression of Tanzanian Africans was less dependent on ethnic factors than in Uganda.

Comparing Africanisation programmes and its economic and social implication in Tanganyika/Tanzania yields some interesting findings. While both governments leaned towards socialism, TANU under Nyerere demonstrated a more comprehensive approach towards a socialist society. In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere introduced the term *ujamaa* – a social-political concept based on the Swahili word for familyhood. It reflected the idea that society should be understood as an extension of the basic family unit. According to Nyerere *ujamaa* represented a Tanzanian or further an African form of socialism. When he describes African socialism, Nyerere claims that "the idea of "class" or "caste" was non-existent in African society" before colonialism. "We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our own past – in the traditional society which produced us."[135] However, in postcolonial Tanzania, classes evidently existed and Nyerere's idea of socialism meant therefore the return to the status quo ante, to remove classes from the Tanzanian society. The categories "class" and "race" in this debate clearly correlated as James Brennan and Roland Aminzade have shown for the Tanzanian example.[136] The idea that class structure was a European import, was crucial for the proceeding rhetoric of African Socialism. In principle, this meant that Africa simply needed to go back to pre-colonial social structures to restore *ujamaa*. It also labeled everything capitalist automatically as foreign and this meant in return that Asians as social class of traders, businessmen and manufacturers were inherently foreign and imported. This is one reason, why TANU implemented a leadership codex which tried to prevent the strengthening of an African elite and officially aimed at empowering the masses rather than the individual. Not least because as the contemporary Mark Sansumwa pointed out in the East African Journal *Transition* a new African elite "is likely to resist any move toward socialism."[137]

135 Nyerere, Julius. *Ujamaa: The basis of African Socialism*. 1962.

136 Brennan, *Taifa*; Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*.

137 Though, Sansumwa further stressed that not placing the means of production into the hands of Africans would leave them with foreign capitalitss: Sansumwa, Mark. 'Foreign Investment and the Dilemma of African Socialism'. *Transition*, no. 18 (1965): 43–44.

In Uganda, the paradigm of a fair and equal distribution of economic opportunities was not shared by all Africans within the public discourse. Not everyone thought that the wealth which non-Africans had accumulated and the opportunities they had profited from over the years of colonial rule should be equally shared between all Africans in a socialist fashion. Especially in Uganda, there was a substantial number of politicians who did not express a problem with an African elite enjoying those peaks, the problem was that the wealth was enjoyed by non-Africans. This shows a comment by Grace Ibingira who had been Obote's right hand at independence, he writes about the early time of independence in his book from 1973: "It suddenly became humiliating that all the towns in the Protectorate should be inhabited and owned by Indians; and that they should be the people with the money, the big cars, and the mansions."[138] Criticism against UPC's clientele policy and the new elite was voiced by the Democratic Party (DP), Uganda's main opposition party and in the public discourse as discussed.[139]

Africanisation not only served as catalyst for expressing existing economic grievances along racial lines, the policies also created new rifts within the post-independent society by benefiting only a limited number of Africans and disappointing the high expectations of Africans regarding their own economic opportunities.

The TANU report "Tanzania ten years after independence" depicts Africanisation retrospectively as a deliberate policy which had been pursued "in the full recognition that this was itself discriminatory." The report continues by giving the reason for following a policy despite its discriminatory character:

> "For before all citizens could be treated equally, it was necessary to rectify the position in which the nation's civil service was dominated by non-Africans, and to make it reflect in some measure the composition of the society. […] The urgency of this Africanisation policy arose out of the need to build up the self-confidence of the people of Tanganyika. Once we had demonstrated – to ourselves and others – that being an African did not have to mean being a junior official, the nation was able to accept that in some fields we can, without shame, hire the skilled people who are needed."[140]

Apart from the point of representation and equal balance according to the composition of the society, it is even more interesting to see that the report states the urgency to boost the confidence of Africans in the country. Here, we can see that Africanisation was strongly based

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[138] Ibingira, Grace. *The Forging of an African Nation: The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Uganda from Colonial Rule to Independence*. Viking Adult, 1973.

[139] DP Press Statement 1969, ICS, PP.UG.DP 11, 9f.

[140] Tanzania ten years after independence, TANU report, Dar es Salaam, 1971.

on emotional motifs and perceived injustices which were hard to come by with statistics and pragmatic approaches as had been tried by Tanzanian and Ugandan governments. The reader's letter in the *Uganda Argus* by an author calling himself Aggrieved African consists a similar theme when he complains in 1969 that foreign banks still send foreigners to Uganda to work as managers while they could hire Ugandans instead:

> "The public will agree with me that apart from the Bank of Uganda, almost all commercial banks here in Kampala have non-African managers, or non-Ugandan managers to be more specific. This in we [sic!] citizens or common people creates assumptions which may either be true or false. These are that Africans are not trust-worthy. […] The whites should remain and work in their country, or be assistants of Africans. This question of posting someone from overseas means we the Ugandans are stupid and therefore cannot hold the responsibility. Uganda is going ahead, and Ugandans should do things for themselves."[141]

Here, the letter writer draws a direct connection between the absence of African employees in higher positions in the banking sector to a general mistrust of non-Africans towards Africans. He refers to colonial prejudice regarding the alleged unreliability of African staff. Again, this shows how the question of Africanisation was strongly entangled with emotions rooted in deep seated grievances.

Africanisation was therefore more than simply a technical recruitment programme; it rather was loaded with notions of belonging. It attempted to answer if non-Africans belonged in East Africa in the concrete question of who was entitled to economic space in the region. Similar to the debate on a Tanzanian look in the civil service, this connection becomes apparent in the debate about Asians' place in the urban space. In Uganda, most Asians had left the countryside before independence. This was partly because of colonial regulations which attempted to protect African rural trade in the 1930s and on the other side because of events which included anti-Asian violence like the Buganda Trade Boycott which had made clear to Asians that they were safer in towns than in the countryside.[142] Dharam Ghai further linked the fact that Asians were restricted from owning land to the lack of an Asian rural population.[143] Yet, as a consequence Asians were overrepresented in cities. Especially in the ur-

141 Letter to the editor, by Aggrieved African in Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 28 March 1969.

142 Bharati, *Asians in East Africa: Jayhind and Uhuru*, 114; Twaddle, Michael. 'Was the Expulsion inevitable?'. In *Expulsion of a minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. ed. Michael Twaddle, 1–14. Commonwealth papers 18. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975.

143 Dharam P. Ghai, 'An economic survey', 100.

ban trading centres Africans complained that they would dominate the urban townscape. Politicians like MP Eria Babumba (Masaka North-West) demanded a stronger representation of Africans in towns like Kampala:

> "[…] our Asian friends and other non-Africans should know that we encourage them to start businesses here, but they should look on the side of helping the Africans because we shall not accept that the towns remain only non-African."[144]

His neighbouring MP from Masaka South-West, P. N. Serumaga, believed that this "Bombay look" was yet difficult to remove.[145] Uganda Argus reader, C. C. Obel-Omia, described a night in the town where he as African felt out of place and overlooked:

> "So one evening I thought of participating in Africanizing the town. As such I went to Norman Cinema for a film show. Near and around me were Europeans and Asians. I looked like fulfilling my aim for at least I was a black dot amongst whites. […] [After the movie] I waved my hands in vain to a stream of cars owned mostly by either Asians or Europeans. Very few African cars based by, but none of the chauffeurs or bwanas had the courage to pick me up, fearing perhaps that I was a smart burglar! […] I thought of the mockery the Asian teenagers, who were walking to and fro, would inflict on me, were I to keep on begging for a lift without success. […] Surely, no Kampala patriot would like to experience my venture of that night."[146]

These experiences led to the demands to Africanise towns. How this could be achieved, was controversial. During a National Assembly debate, the MP for Busoga Central, Z. Munaba demands more space for Africans:

> "Room must be found in the towns for Africans. […] It does not mean that other people will be pushed out. […] It is a question of finding the money for the ground premium and putting up the buildings. It is not for the Government alone. I think private African developers should come forward […] and put up buildings, either for commercial or residential purpose."[147]

144 Eria Babumba, Uganda Hansard, 03 April 1963, 493.

145 P. N. Serumaga Uganda Hansard, Vol. 9, 03 April 1963, 480.

146 Letter to the editor, "Kampala an African town? Not at all!", by C. C. Obel-Omia from Lira, Uganda Argus, 08 September 1962.

147 Mr Munaba, Hansard Uganda, 03 April 1963, 487.

B. Byanyima, the MP for Ankole North-East, painted a different picture as he believed it was necessary to remove Asians from towns yet not forcefully: "I feel that it is not necessary to eject Asians from towns forcibly so that Africans may take their places. I feel that more humane ways of dealing with the subject are available."[148] Byanyima's comment shows that while he rejects the idea of forceful ejection he takes the option into consideration. In this debate, Africanisation is discussed in the context of Asians' physical removal from urban space. This comes after they had already no space in the rural areas and leaves open where they could move as a consequence. The debate clearly concentrates on Asians as a racial category and includes Asian local citizens. Denying Asians the right to take up space in the urban centres, rejects the inclusive citizenship legislation which had been recently adopted and embraces an idea of citizenship and national membership along racial lines. This shows how Africanisation debates were decisive parts of forming a narrow form of racial *citizenship culture* which defined national space no matter if economic, social or political as African.

Africanisation programmes were perceived as unsuccessful or flawed and raised by many as the mutinies in both Uganda and Tanganyika have shown. After half a decade of independence, Uganda's and Tanzania's politicians thought of new ways to take control of their economies.

Conclusion

As we could see, not everyone was satisfied with the Africanisation programmes of the early 1960s. During the implementation process, obstacles such as the lack of education and skilled labour as well as expatriate salaries and compensation and the drop in quality of public services had to be addressed. With the establishment of local citizenship a policy shift from Africanisation to localisation (Ugandanisation/Tanzanisation) was highly controversial: in theory it opened up new opportunities for Asians with local citizenship, however, especially in Uganda it became evident that localization brought along a further narrowing of the economic entitlement to African citizens excluding not only non-Africans but African non-citizens alike. The shift to localization is a strong indicator about how relevant the Africanisation issue was for the wide-reaching citizenship debate was which shaped a narrow idea of national belonging. Furthermore, Africanisation developed from being a programme for the civil and public service to a more comprehensive idea of taking back control which was continuously discussed during the first decade of independence. Yet, attempts to Africanise the private sector were flawed and did not entirely reach its goals.

[148] B. Byanyima, Uganda Hansard, 03 April 1963, 481.

Analysing the process of Africanisation has shown that the grievances of East African societies lay deeper than something that could be solved by providing more jobs for Africans. Africanisation was much more than simply a labour market instrument; it was supposed to tackle deep sitting grievances which had built up in colonial time. Africanisation – while it had started as official policy with the civil and public service as the main target – gained for some of its defenders a deeper ideological meaning and was supposed to be extended to all sectors of the economy and to all parts of social life. It became a symbol for African ownership, representation and self-reliance. This becomes apparent in the parliamentary debates in which MPs are demanding a more African look within urban centres. Moreover, one of the biggest challenges of Africanisation programmes was to balance inequalities inherited from the colonial structures without returning to a form of racialism which the independence movements had so openly rejected. Africanisation policies failed to fully cure those long-lasting grievances. The earlier quoted Uganda Africanisation Report was a direct lead-up to the Trade Licensing Act a year later, suggesting further means to take control of the economy.[149] Around 1967 economic policies by the Tanzanian and Ugandan government started to shift towards a more socialist outlook in Tanzania and a more restrictive trade policy towards Asian traders with a stronger link between immigration and economic policy in Uganda. This policy change addressed the flaws of the Africanisation programmes, especially regarding the failure in Africanising trade and industry.

[149] Committee Report Africanisation Industry Commerce, Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1968.

III 1967–1972: African Socialism and Nationalism as interacting means of exclusion

III.1 Taking over the economy: Nationalisation and Trade Licensing

After half a decade of self-governance, the economy remained mainly in Asian and European hands despite the ambitious Africanisation efforts. While many middle-ranked jobs in the public sector were now occupied by Africans, most Africans struggled to benefit from the economy. After the initial euphoria of independence, the lack of economic control triggered frustration within the African population and politicians alike. Asians still held the higher positions especially in private enterprise. Most Africans stayed deprived from access to opportunities and capital. Those few Africans benefiting from the post-colonial economy were often part of the new establishment and political elite which raised criticism and the call for the masses to profit from independence. In both Tanzania and Uganda, many claimed that colonialism would not end until the economy was fully under African control. *Uganda Argus* reader J. O. Olwedo from Jinja believed it to be a civic responsibility to fight for economic freedom in the process of nation-building:

> "We fought to achieve political independence, and now that we have got it we must dedicate ourselves in building strong and prosperous Nations. The next fight must therefore be to achieve economic freedom in order to eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance. To fight effectively so as to get lasting results, the economy of our respective countries must be controlled by people who are truly devoted to carry the burden of nation-building without fear […]. Such people can only be found among Citizens, because non-citizens can only work hard to exploit the citizens."[1]

[1] Letter to the editor by J. O. Olwedo from Jinja, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1969.

Likewise, commentators in Tanzania claimed that "the economy must be ours":

> "Every country, whether it be capitalist, Communist, socialist or fascist, wants to control its own economy. It does not necessarily exclude foreign participation in economic life but it does insist as soon as it can, that the major means of production, distribution and exchange are in the hands of its own nationals"[2]

Foreign domination of the economy was claimed to be a sign of ongoing economic imperialism and meant an ongoing struggle for independence. In this context, the term foreign domination was used for everything non-African and thus also included any form of property and industry owned by Asians, even if those Asians held local citizenship. In many ways, this reflected a restrictive *citizenship culture* as portrayed in chapter II.1 which excluded East African residents with Asian origin from the nation-building project. Although the economic situation was a similar one, the approaches of the Tanzanian and Ugandan government differed on many levels. The following chapter will show how the public discourse around the economic imbalance between Africans and Asians was framed in Tanzania and Uganda and how politicians in both countries tried to redistribute wealth and take control of the local economy.

The limited success of Africanisation policy was one of many reasons why the Ugandan and Tanzanian governments turned to other means to take control of the local economy. This chapter discusses those two differing trajectories of economic policy. As the economic rhetoric was impregnated with a dichotomy of foreigness and Africaness, the context of citizenship and national belonging is crucial to understand the radicalisation of economic measures also as contribution to the process of defining local space as African. *Citizenship culture* therefore continued to strongly influence the debate on economic opportunities. The following illustrates how Tanzania used a socialist narrative to exclude Asians from economic opportunities and restricted their economic reach. At the same time, Uganda defined economic space as racially African and started to systematically shut Asians out of economic and then national space in general. This chapter shows that, despite Tanzania's strong emphasis on socialist rhetoric and policy, the country still followed a racial logic of exclusion. While Tanzanian rhetoric and policies were in their form less radically, Asian individuals were still targeted and affected by the limiting of national space. The analysis of the entanglement of economic policies and the construction of the nation is attended with stories about how individuals used their own – often restricted – agency to react to the changing world around them.

This chapter follows a broadly chronological structure discussing the differences between the nationalisation waves in Tanzania and Uganda as well as its theoretical base of the Arusha

2 The economy must be ours, *The Standard*, 01 March 1967.

Declaration and the Common Man's Charter. Comparing the two cases highlights the processual differences especially between the Tanzania's longer-term strategic economic policy and Uganda's reactive tactical actions. In the following, I will discuss the divergence of Ugandan and Tanzanian ideas of socialism. It further will illustrate how economic policies in both countries affected Asians and how those policies were related to and intertwined with other legislations on or developments of citizenship issues. I argue, that while Tanzania followed a socialist approach ideologically and portrayed African socialism as the remedy for colonialism, Uganda used selected socialist policies to implement a form of nationalistic economy which was based on racial distinction and was supposed to benefit (some) Africans.

The Arusha Declaration and Tanzania's first Nationalisation wave

In Tanzania, Nyerere had already introduced the political concept of *ujamaa* – the Tanzanian version of socialism – in 1962 which was supposed to serve as a guideline on how to build the new nation.[3] What had been discussed on a more theoretical level had not been implemented politically. In the Tanzanian public debate, many therefore believed the way forward towards real independence could be achieved by embracing socialism in practice:

> "It is true that Tanzania is politically independent, but this alone is not enough. Political independence is just the beginning of a long and difficult period. […] Political independence is an important factor towards total liberation from all forms of dependence and exploitation by capitalists' monopolies. For Tanzania to be fully economically independent, we must be sure of the correct road to be followed in order to put an end to our economic dependence on imperialism, and we must do away with our outdated economic and political structures. The only correct road is therefore the non-capitalist road and that is 'SOCIALISM'."[4]

The most iconic cornerstone of Tanzanian socialism was certainly the Arusha Declaration announced on 29 January 1967 by the National Executive Committee of TANU. The Arusha Declaration had two main policy pillars: the Leadership Code and the nationalisation of the economy. Firstly, the Declaration aimed at internal party issues of enrichment and corruption of African elites within the government and TANU; secondly, by introducing a nationalisation

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3 Nyerere, Julius. *Ujamaa: The basis of African Socialism*. 1962. Dar es Salaam. See also chapter II.2.

4 Letter to the editor "Economic Independence", D. R. Mlangwa from Dar es Salaam, *The Nationalist*, 26 January 1967.

policy the Tanzanian government tried to introduce a trend reversal to reduce foreign influence on the local economy. The two policy pillars sprang from the socialist approach to equality and were supposed to address two urging issues which crystallised in the first five years after independence. As discussed in the previous chapter, independence had only opened limited space for Africans in the economic sphere. Only few Africans economically profited from the new post-colonial order. This was mainly because the means of production and capital were still in the hands of Europeans and Asians. At the same time, the few chances which arose from the new circumstances were occupied by few Africans with political influence within TANU. Nyerere saw the blending of political and economic power by few TANU-party leaders and government officials as problematic and feared a gradual creep in nepotism and favouritism into state structures.[5] Some of TANU's most prestigious leaders like Bibi Titi Mohammed, the leader of *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (TANU's women's union) and the female face of TANU, stepped down from her posts within the party to protest the ban for party leaders on owning rental property.[6]

The new Leadership Code, a guideline for good socialist leadership, restricted TANU leaders from holding company shares, from owning rental property and other business-oriented actions. That way the first prerequisite of good socialist leadership would be maintained: "Every TANU and Government leader must be either a Peasant or a Worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of Capitalism or Feudalism."[7] Arusha was a wider reform than simply nationalisation of foreign property. It was rather a realignment of economic and party politics. Arusha targeted Asians as sole personification of capitalistic and imperialistic exploitation and in their position of social in-betweeners in an urban sphere. As Brennan has shown for the case of Dar es Salaam, for TANU African socialism was specifically embodied by African rural life. What the urban industrial worker[8] was for East European socialism the farmer (*mkulima*) was for Tanzania's version of socialism. This meant that everything rural was intrinsically good while everything urban had to initially be faced with some suspicion. The Asian minority had been an urban minority from the start of its manifestation in East Africa and was therefore characteristically seen as a problem for a new rural African society.

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5 Pratt, Cranford. 'Nyerere, Julius Kambarage (1922–1999)'. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004). https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/73082.

6 Geiger, *TANU Women*, 172–179.

7 Nyerere, Julius. 'The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance: Appendix II: Socialism is not Racialism'. In *Self-reliant Tanzania*. ed. Knud E. Svendsen and Merete Teisen, 205–8. Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1969.

8 The worker (*mfanyakazi*) was in socialist Tanzania still a positive figure, however, in principal all Tanzanians should aspire to build the nation by becoming farmers.

Nation-building and the socialist project merged in the 1960s.[9] This becomes apparent when Nyerere claims that socialism is the means to take over control of the national economy and calls it a nationalistic move.[10]

The Arusha Declaration in February 1967 seemed to come hasty.[11] Apparently, neither the Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Paul Bomani, nor the Minister of Finance, Amir Jamal, knew about the plan to nationalise banks.[12] Most of the cabinet had been left ignorant. British sources claimed Nyerere had admitted that "after he had declared nationalisation he was as shocked with what he had done as anybody outside Tanzania, but having done it, he then summoned his Ministers and Advisors around the Cabinet table to endeavour to iron out the thousand and one consequences that had come about as a result of this decision." According to those sources, Nyerere offered as a reason for the Declaration his preceding roundtrip through the country "when he had seen what he had feared – a complete disparity between one section of the nation in the capital and the other in the country. This disparity and the high living of senior TANU and Government officials had convinced him that drastic action was essential."[13] Other observers believed that the Arusha Declaration had its roots in an internal power struggle within TANU: "There is, of course, nothing unusual in Nyerere being one step ahead of his extremists, although not out of harmony with them. […] we do not wish to see the Tanzanian economy fall into chaos, nor Nyerere's government to fall (there is still not better alternative government for the West in view)."[14] In a speech in the end of February 1967, Nyerere gave insight in his official motivation behind the Arusha Declaration and the following nationalisation. He claimed that he was mainly acting out of "nationalist purpose; it was an extension of the political control which the Tanzania people secured in 1961."[15] With this reasoning Nyerere

9 The Arusha Declaration and its socialist follow-up political moves had identified a range of internal enemies to socialist nation-building, which, apart from Asian businessmen and *naizisheni,* also included the urban unemployed (*wahuni*) and single women, who were working as prostitutes or were otherwise not complying with moral standards: Brennan, *Taifa*, 172–5.

10 Speech by Nyerere at the opening of the Tanzania Breweries extensions, 28 February 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

11 Record of meeting between the Minister of state Mr George Thomas MP and Mr Humphrey Berkeley at the Commonwealth office on Monday 27 February 1967, FCO 31/72, UKNA.

12 Ibid.

13 The Tanzania Situation (Part 3) Sir Kenneth Madocks, accompanied by your representative, visited Dar es Salaam from 20 to 24 February 1967, FCO 31/72, UKNA.

14 Reply Eric G. Norris to Edward Peck, 20 March 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

15 Speech by Nyerere at the opening of the Tanzania Breweries extensions, 28 February 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

addressed the economic grievances and the critique within the African population to take control of Tanzania's economy.

The Tanzanian government did not hesitate in starting to implement the Arusha Declaration. Only one week after Nyerere's announcement a preliminary list of companies which were targeted by the government had been drafted. Most companies were European owned. However, some Asian firms were also affected. The focus of this first nationalisation round were banks and insurance companies. Asian business owners were mainly threatened by the nationalisation of millers and the anticipated nationalisation of the sisal industry. The Tanzanian nationalisation wave of 1967 included a compensation offer which was negotiated between the Tanzanian government, the business owners and – where it affected British owners – the British government. The Tanzanian government promised full and fair compensation and expressed that this was the price a rightful government had to pay for economic freedom.[16] Already at the end of February 1967, the Tanzanian government declared that the nationalisation policy was now completed with the only uncertainty lying with the sisal producing industry.[17] In this context, the Tanzanian government also had nationalised 60 per cent of the shares of K. B. which stood under the management of the Madhvani enterprise.[18] The local government could also apply pressure by prohibiting expatriates who wished to leave the country to take bigger sums of money with them. Thus, the Tanzanian government limited the amount any non-citizen was allowed to take out of Tanzania to £ 5,000 and then £ 2,000 per year in the subsequent years.[19] Zanzibar's government under Karume had self-sufficiently announced the nationalisation of all private industry and the control of all trade on the archipelago in January of the same year. The Zanzibari government "would investigate properties which had been illegally confiscated by the Capitalists and return them to their respective owners."[20]

In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration and its aftermath of nationalisation was publicly perceived as mostly positive. Yet, behind the scenes criticisms was raised by some closer allies.[21] As Gregory Maddox and James Giblin illustrated, the sphere for political plurality had already

16 Derek Taylor, Interview with Julius Nyerere, Gemini News Service, February 1967, FCO31/73, UKNA. The Tanzania's ability to pay adequate compensation was seriously doubted by the British government: The Tanzanian situation, 24 February 1967, FCO 31/72, UKNA, 3.

17 The sisal industry was on the nationalisation list but without clear indication of which companies to which percentage would be nationalised. The East Africa and Mauritius Association: Nationalisation in Tanzania, 24 February 1967 (49), FCO 31/72, UKNA.

18 Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth Office, Telno 711, 21 July 1967, FCO31/74, UKNA.

19 Visit by Mr H W Hunwick, FCO 31/72, UKNA.

20 Local Business & Conditions, letter from National and Grindlays Bank Zanzibar to National and Grindlays Bank London, 25 January 1967, FCO 31/72, UKNA.

21 Brennan, James R. 'Julius Rex: Nyerere through the eyes of his critics, 1953–2013'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 3 (2014): 459–477.

substantially narrowed in the previous years which contained open opposition of Arusha.[22] Some criticism can be found regarding the way the Arusha Declaration was being implemented in some of the more conservative media such as the Asian owned *Standard*. This criticism focussed mainly on the fact that Tanzania would further need private investment for its economy to thrive:

> "So the Government cannot be criticised for its essential action. But there is room for argument when it comes to the method of execution. Could not the same end have been achieved but with less shock to the commercial and industrial sector and to foreign confidence? […] This [the socialist programme] must not be baulked. But a review could be made of the various ways open to achieve future take-overs. […] we are still in need of investment, both local and foreign."[23]

As a direct reaction to the nationalisation policy Tanzania's internal and external trade fell from 15 to 18 per cent of the normal average.[24] Part of the reason was that due to the nationalisation of banks the flow of capital became restricted. Furthermore, the Asian traders who still functioned as economic middlemen were the main vehicle for trade. Not only nationalisation but also expulsion decrees which had been handed to hundreds of Asian traders ordering them to leave Tanzania[25] were responsible for the rapid decrease in trade:

> "This slump was primarily the result of the loss of confidence of Asian traders who were uncertain of their personal futures in this country in view of the pre-Arusha Declaration investigations into their entry permits, unwilling to extend themselves financially by purchasing their normal stocks from the wholesalers and manufacturers and unable in any case to arrange their normal 30-day credits for such purchase."[26]

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[22] Maddox, Gregory, and James Giblin. 'Introduction'. In *In search of a nation: Histories of authority & dissidence in Tanzania*. ed. Gregory Maddox and James Giblin, 1–12. Oxford: James Currey, 2005. Giblin previously addressed the closing dowin of political plurality within TANU in the early 1960s: Giblin, James. 'Creating Continuity: Liberal Governance and Dissidence in Njombe, Tanzania, 1960–61'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40, no. 1 (2007): 27–50.

[23] Nationalisation, *The Standard*, 08 February 1967.

[24] Report from D. Stuart (British Interests Section, Canadian High Commission Kampala) to J. G. Wallace East Africa Department, Volume of Trade: Tanzania, 25 April 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

[25] See chapter III.2.

[26] Report from D. Stuart (British Interests Section, Canadian High Commission Kampala) to J. G. Wallace East Africa Department, Volume of Trade: Tanzania, 25 April 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

Tanzanian trade recovered slightly in March to 35 to 40 per cent of the normal extent. However, Asian shopkeepers and traders were kept out of the loop regarding their future in the country. Moreover, credit was still limited: "Asian traders are still buying their stocks on a very short-term basis (e. g., weekly instead of monthly), largely because they cannot get credit or will not extend themselves if they can."[27] The Arusha Declaration and this first wave of nationalisation symbolises a critical caesura in Tanzania's as much as in the region's history. The agenda set out by Arusha was as much an economic one as much as it was dealing with racial divisions in society.[28] Arusha, while introducing an economic socialist strategy, connected the economy with the wider question of nationhood and belonging and directly intertwined with local ideas of citizenship. The ideas, which built the cornerstones of Arusha, were in no means limited to a national debate, but found resonance in the East African region and beyond.

At the same time, political leaders in Kenya and Uganda were upset about Tanzania's political solo effort without prior warning. They feared investors would stay away from the whole region and believed Nyerere's move had damaged the reputation of the East African states as locations for investment.[29] On a meeting in Kinshasa, the Under Secretary of the Ugandan Foreign Ministry, Mr. Adimola, explained to the British High Commissioner in Kinshasa "it was generally understood that, when Tanzania sneezes, East Africa catches [a] cold: Obote thought that Nyerere might at last have had the courtesy to say 'Excuse me, I am about to sneeze'."[30] According to Adimola, the Ugandan government showed no intention to follow the Tanzanian example. The Ugandan cabinet was "almost unanimous in the decision to maintain the present structure."[31] One of the reasons was that the Uganda Development Corporation "already played a major part in industry and that Uganda had far more prosperous farmers and land owners than her neighbours and was consequently less interested in socialism.[32]" Kenyan representatives likewise were expressing the view that their government was not interested in going down the socialist route. They, however, admitted that pressure was rising: "There was now a very strong feeling that Africans must get into trade and this was leading to growing hostility to the Asians."[33] Kenya followed a different approach, which was supposed to

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27 Ibid.

28 Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75': 404; Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 211.

29 Supplementary Report on East Africa: Reaction to the Tanzania Situation, 01 March 1967, FCO 31/72, UKNA.

30 Letter J. R. Cotton to W. Wilson, 25 April 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

31 Supplementary Report on East Africa: Reaction to the Tanzania Situation, 01 March 1967, FCO 31/72, UKNA.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

lead to more control over the local economy by further pushing Africanisation policy and concentrating mainly on the retail trade and some other middle-class professions. Thereby Kenya's legislation became a blueprint for the Ugandan government. Later in 1967, Kenya had adopted the Kenya Trade Licensing Act which worked in the combination of a restrictive Immigration Act to reduce the number of Asian non-citizens from Kenya.[34] A couple of years later, Uganda followed suit.

Uganda's attempted "Move to the Left"

By 1967 Uganda's political outline had been occupied by the constant power struggle between the supporters of a strong widely independent Buganda and the unionists.[35] The Ugandan public discourse in the first years of independence was therefore dominated by the kingdom question and the political influence of different ethnic groups. Mahmood Mamdani has pointed out that the dealing with the Asian petty bourgeoisie was of secondary interest for the Ugandan state after independence.[36] The question of Asian integration and Asians' role in nation-building was not nearly as often discussed as in the Tanzanian public. Only by consolidating power through a unitary constitution which deprived Buganda of its original special political influence was the Obote regime able to put the conflict between the different kingdoms at rest (for the moment). This made it possible for the government to open a new flank by targeting the Asian economic monopoly. Until the constitutional crisis 1966–1967 and the increasing power grab by Obote in the following year, not much had happened in Uganda regarding attempts of balancing the unequal distribution of wealth and economic opportunities between Africans and Asians. A few Africans, most of which with a connection to the ruling elite, had successfully established businesses and had therefore profited from independence. Most Africans, however, stayed economically marginalised. Africanisation policy within the public sector had been implemented slower than in Tanzania.

By pushing through the new constitution and introducing a new unitary, republican state with a de facto one-party system ending the constitutional crisis of 1966–1967, Obote consolidated his power and essentially cut down the influence of Baganda politicians. This was mainly possible through the support from the military which showed allegiance to Obote. After consolidating his power, Obote proclaimed a new agenda, the "Move to the Left", during a

[34] See Chapter III.2.

[35] See Chapter II.1.

[36] In the lights of socialist literature, Mamdani differentiates between a "Indian commercial bourgeoisie" and an "Asian petty bourgeoisie": Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 260.

speech in front of students at Busoga College in November 1968. Many East African Observers claimed that Obote's "Move to the Left" took impulses from Tanzania's recent adoption of the Arusha Declaration which had proved to be popular with the African masses. Unlike Tanzania, however, Uganda's move to socialism was reluctantly and inconclusively implemented. A whole year past until the president would pick up on the announced move and would publish a theoretical framework for Ugandan socialism, *The Common Man's Charter*.[37] The charter embraces a "socialist strategy" which it claims the UPC wanted to be implemented in Uganda. Still, *The Common Man's Charter* circled in its content around the question of Ugandan national unity surrounding the conflict between the different kingdoms which was provisionally resolved by the introduction of the new Ugandan constitution and the erection of the first Ugandan Republic.[38] Thereby, *The Common Man's Charter* seems in part more a retrospect of the past than a vision for the future as it does not include the clear policy directions which the Arusha Declaration entails. At the same time, it does not endorse socialism as ideology but rather approves it as a practical means of policy. Feudalism not Capitalism (although named) is identified as the prime enemy of Uganda's nation.[39] Yet, the charter goes as far as to list nationalisation as a legitimate way to place the major means of production into the hands of the people.[40] More importantly *The Common Man's Charter* differs from the Arusha Declaration namely when it came to implementation. The Obote regime never had wide public support and the UPC was unlike TANU never a mass movement. Obote relied on a clientele network, which he had to feed, and which had profited highly from independence. Hence, an effective control of the political elite and therefore a consistent redistribution of wealth towards the masses – or as the charter claimed the Common Man – was not viable.

The prototype of the Common Man resembles in many ways the image of the Tanzanian *mwananchi*, the good citizen, which was certainly not a coincidence. The Common Man – like the *mwananchi* – was the victim of exploitation and the legitimate beneficiary of nation-building and socialism. However, unlike the *mwananchi*, the Ugandan public appeared to have problems to identify themselves with this somehow shapeless image. Obote claimed that the common man should benefit from economic growth. Yet, he did not define who the Common

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[37] Obote, A. M. *The Common Man's Charter*. Entebbe: Government Printer, 1970.

[38] There is a stark emphasis on the threat of feudalism and tribalism through the whole document, claiming that feudalism continued after independence and needed to be suppressed in the process of nation-building: ibid., 2f.

[39] The Arusha Declaration mentions feudalism as a problem briefly as well: Julius Nyerere, 'The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance', part 1 (a).

[40] Obote, *The Common Man's Charter*, 11: "The fulfilment of this principle may involve nationalisation of the enterprises privately owned."

Man was. The expression was further used in a humorous or cynical way to criticise personal enrichment within government ranks.[41]

Nyerere himself followed a modest lifestyle[42] and asked his fellow TANU leaders to abstain from any form of luxury or profit-seeking – the Leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration underlined economic modesty. Whereas Obote was himself criticised for his lavish lifestyle. Further, without a wide political base, UPC's leaders where perceived as elitists lacking a proximity to the Common Man who they now claimed to have put in the centre of their policy. The Democratic Party (DP), for a long time the only serious competition for the UPC, criticised in a statement in 1969 the extensive government spending and enrichment of cabinet members while the government at the same time preached socialism:

> "How sincere was the President about this? He has sung this song for the last 5 years but what has he done so far? […] all along the President's conduct has been through this period one of an accomplished capitalist. He has acquired property in Kampala worth hundreds of thousands of shillings. He has had his salary more than doubled. He has intimated a desire that [the] state should provide him with a variety of the most expensive […] cars in the world. *Government Ministers have been allowed to amass wealth in a manner which would shock even the most hardened capitalist of the West.* Their salaries as Ministers have been almost doubled, as we have already shown. Is this what is meant by moving to the left? […] Take the farmer. How has he been helped by our independence? Has anyone in this Government ever thought about these questions? […] We are not saying that we prefer that this country should have abolished capitalism in its entirety at the beginning of 1964 [the year of the break-up of UPC-Kabaka Yekka (KY) coalition] as Obote had announced. Far from it. He had no mandate to plunge us into communism, a system he seems to prefer. But at least, if he is an honest man, his own behaviour should have reflected that announced policy of his. […] He should have insisted on spending more on the common man than on Ministers, as is the policy at present. […] It is not right, therefore, to say that the new slogan "moving to the left" means anything good for the common man."[43]

Open expression of doubts about the credibility of the new socialist agenda like the DP statement shows that the Ugandan Move to the Left was received differently by the population than

[41] Ryan, Selwyn D. 'Economic nationalism and socialism in Uganda'. *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 11, no. 2 (1973): 140–158.

[42] Pratt, Cranford. 'Nyerere, Julius Kambarage (1922–1999)'. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004). https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/73082.

[43] DP Press Statement 1969, PP.UG.DP 11, ICS, 9f.

the Arusha Declaration had been in Tanzania. This was mostly due to a discrepancy between words and deeds by the people in power as well as the reluctance and contradiction in policy implementation.

As the Obote regime could not deprive its power basis from access to wealth, it concentrated to restrict its new socialist policies to certain areas, while diverting the new emerging economic opportunities towards its clientele. Starting in 1968 and taking up speed in 1969, actions against the Asian economic dominance started to emerge – these policies, however, were only directed at certain pockets of the economy. Asians were economically as diverse as they were culturally distinct. Those policies therefore affected some Asians (especially those in retail trade and public service) more than others.[44] The government's policy to reduce the influence of wealthy Asian wholesalers and industrialists remained ineffective. By introducing a National Trading Corporation (NTC) and a Produce Marketing Board (PMB) in 1968 the Ugandan government had aimed at replacing the Asian wholesalers with African parastatal agents. Here, the Obote regime – unlike in Tanzania where TANU prohibited economic participation of party leaders and leading politicians – allocated those sought-after positions to his supporters and government employees.[45] Therefore, only a small, handpicked number of Africans profited from the new parastatal organisations. The PMB was supposed to control food trade in Uganda and replace Asian wholesalers in buying food produces from the producer/cooperatives to then sell it to the retailer/distributor. The Asian wholesaler, however, were the only businessmen in Uganda who had enough capital to be able to buy produce in bulk and stock produce over a longer time. This is what many Asian wholesaler did to preserve their economic position thereby producing a scarcity and creating a monopoly which enabled them to sell their stocks at a higher price. This meant food prices were rising substantially. Additionally, the profit margin now had to be divided between three parties (PMB agent, Asian wholesaler, cooperatives) instead of the former two. PMB agents offered lower purchase prices to the African producer who were thereby hit twice: once by increasing consumer prices and a second time by declining income.[46] This evidently added to the grievance of the Common Man, while a small number of influential Africans were able to secure a piece of the cake. The DP criticised that the new Marketing Board was rather a means for the government to deprive the population from wealth: "It will be completely improper, amounting perhaps to political fraud, to start these new ventures in the name of the farmer when what is intended is to hamstring him instead of boosting him in business."[47]

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44 Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 262f.

45 Ibid., 262.

46 Ibid., 264.

47 DP Press Statement 1969, PP.UG.DP, ICS, 11, 15.

While failing to restrict wealthy Asian traders from the wholesale business, the Obote government was successful in reducing economic opportunities of Asian *dukawallah* and petty traders as well as Asian civil servants through Africanisation policy which had already been introduced. The introduction of the Uganda Trade Licensing Act (1969), which completely resembles the Kenyan Act from 1967, restricted economic access for Asian *dukawallah,* who held foreign citizenship. Like the Kenyan blueprint, the Uganda Trade Licensing Act was legally tightly interwoven with an Immigrants Act and was in its combination directly aimed at reducing the number of Asian non-citizens on Ugandan territory.[48] The Kenyan legal role model from 1967 had resulted in a major exodus of Asians from Kenya. Because the Ugandan legislation was almost identical to the Kenyan one, the Ugandan government could not have been in doubt that its new economic policy, paired with the Immigration Act, was an effective Act to exclude Asians from the economic sphere before excluding them from the Ugandan territory by making them illegal immigrants. In fact, speeches of cabinet members and President Obote himself indicate that this, and not a redistribution of economic opportunities to the African lower class was the policy's purpose.[49] The Trade Licensing Act together with its twin legislation, the Uganda Immigration Act, was rather a reaction to tightening immigration laws in the region and in Britain.

The Trade Licensing Act introduced special trading zones where non-citizen traders were prohibited to do their business.[50] Those areas were established all over the country including some selected areas in the bigger towns of Kampala, Jinja, Masaka und Mbale. In four districts (Bugisu, Kukedi, Madi, and Sebei) all trading centres were affected, while in the whole of Bunyoro all trading centres apart from one were included in the new legislation.[51] This included almost the entire Ugandan countryside.

The Trade Licensing Act further introduced trade licensing for retail shops and licenses for certain professions predominantly held by Asians. Those licenses were not easy to get. The issuing of licenses was arbitrary. Application fees were high and licenses were only issued for a maximum of two years. Additionally, the applicant had to prove that they held sufficient capital as assets on a Ugandan bank account.[52] Contrary to public opinion, the

48 The question of immigration restriction and restriction of residence for Asian non-citizens will be further discussed in Chapter III.2.

49 Milton Obote addressing heads of Uganda's Overseas Missions in Kampala on the 19 March 1970, quoted in: Report on citizenship submitted by research Secretariat Office 1970, PO 4/8, UNA.

50 Only an estimate of 25,000 out of 80,000 Asians held Ugandan citizenship. See Chapter II.1.

51 Citizens only, *Uganda Argus*, 18 November 1969.

52 This number could get up to 200,000 UShs. for non-citizens who applied for a trading or manufacturing license: Letter by Brian Lea, British High Commission Kampala, to FCO, 21 October 1969, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

majority of Asian *dukawallah* were not rich, therefore the new policy excluded primarily poorer Asian retailers from their former access to trading opportunities.[53] This was affecting those traders even more, who had to move away from their home village to the towns. There they had to set up a new business, which, together with applying for trading licenses, carried high costs.

Those new policies were implemented accompanied by a wave of nationalistic propaganda by government ministers. Basil Bataringaya, Uganda's Minister of Internal Affairs, e. g., claimed that "Ugandans come first":

> "The act, together with the Trade Licensing Act, will work to bring back trade in the hands of the Ugandans. The board would allow non-Ugandans to do only that work which cannot be done by Ugandans at present. […] it was the primary duty of the Government to look after the interests of Uganda people first."[54]

The Trade Licensing Act, according to the government line, was supposed to support Africanisation and help African traders enter into business by reducing Asian competition on the retail market. *De iure* the Act excluded non-citizens from certain trading areas, in which only citizens were allowed to trade. The legislation therefore officially excluded based on citizenship and not race. The newly exclusive areas were called African trading zones. This indicates that the public understood the Act as a direct attack on Asian traders. During the implementation process of the act, it became quickly apparent that politicians aimed to exclude all non-Africans, as the Ministry of Commerce ordered that non-Africans should only be granted a maximum of one licence, this included non-African citizens. The Ministry's Permanent Secretary Katagyira further instructed that applications from those who tried to transfer their business to another premises (as consequence of the Trade Licensing Act) should be rejected.[55] The Act also affected non-Ugandan African traders. The new work permits process affected Kenyans and Tanzanians as much as other nationalities.[56]

Despite the government's using of Africanisation as legitimisation, the debate in the National Assembly shows that the intention of the Trade Licensing Act was always to reduce numbers of Asian non-citizens on Ugandan soil. MP Eli Nathan Bisamunyu complained about the sharpness of the new legislation:

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[53] In fact, the Trade Licensing Act affected smaller African non-citizen traders insofar that they also had to apply for permits and therefore had to pay application fees for every new license.

[54] "Ugandans are first" says Minister, *Uganda Argus*, 12 September 1969.

[55] Ibid., 249f.

[56] Letter to the editor, by G. B. K. Madigo in Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 19 September 1969.

> "We are civilized and ways and means must be found of seeing that our up-to-now good neighbours and friends, when time comes for them to leave this country, they leave it with some kind of regret; that they have left friends behind not enemies; and I want to regret [sic] people who have been using words like 'kicking people out of Uganda.' It is rude."[57]

The MP for Lango South East, A. A. Nekyon, explained that "the Bill would not have been brought [up] for debate had the Asians not exposed themselves too much. Anywhere one went, one would see a fleet of Asians; any street one passed in Kampala, was full of Asians."[58] In public debate, many Africans, such as the director of the National Trading Corporation, E. Muntuyera, blamed Asians for not taking up local citizenship: "Non-Uganda businessmen could only blame themselves if they were refused permission to trade in areas earmarked for Ugandan traders. Ample time had been given for them to acquire Ugandan citizenship."[59] However, those Asians whose citizenship application had not been completed also lost their licence even though they in some cases had already renounced their old citizenship. Asians' *citizenship practice* of holding various citizenships in one family not always paid off either, as the government also targeted family businesses in which only one family member, the licence holder, held Ugandan citizenship.[60] Others in the public debate pointed out the necessity of putting the local economy into the hands of citizens while it often remained unclear if that included non-African citizens,[61] as the terms African/citizen and Asian/non-citizen was often interchangeably used:

> "The act aims at putting the country's trade in the hands of Ugandan citizens, and he [Mukombe-Mpambara, Chairman of the National Trading Corporation] asked non-Ugandan traders to appreciate the Government's action in trying to put the country's trade in the hands of Ugandan citizens. […] Mr Mukombe-Mpambara told a meeting of Asians that the Government is not prepared to extend the time given to non-citizens to remove themselves from areas reserved for citizens."[62]

Minister for Commerce and Industry, William Kalema, connected the new policy to the socialist guideline President Obote had recently announced:

57 Eli Nathan Bisamunyu, MP for Kigezi East, Uganda Hansard, 29 April 1970, 214.
58 The aim is effective Ugandanisation", *The People*, 06 March 1969.
59 These traders can blame themselves, *Uganda Argus*, 17 January 1970.
60 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life*, 247f.
61 Letter to the editor, by J. O. Olwedo in Jinja, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1969.
62 These traders can blame themselves, *Uganda Argus*, 17 January 1970.

> "Mr Kalema appealed to citizen traders who will benefit from the new measures and who have the means to gain to see that they do not exploit others. The measures should not be used to build up more capitalists as it would be contrary to the aims of the Common Man's Charter."[63]

In practice the legislation led to a multitude of issues as Edgar Taylor discussed for the case of Kabale. Although, many Asian *dukawallah* lost their livelihood, the Trade Licensing Act did not promote African retail trading effectively. The retail shops, which Asian traders had to give up, remained empty or were occupied by African traders, who had no trading network to offer for most of the demanded consumer goods. Prices of goods were rising. Also, as the shops were often still owned and the domestic area of the property was still occupied by the previous Asian shopkeeper, the new African traders did not have access to all facilities. Some Asians requested such high rent that the retail part of the premises stayed unoccupied.[64]

In the countryside, Asian traders had vacated their shops. The shops closed and African producers were not able to exchange their crop for cash anymore.[65] As a direct effect of the new legislation, more Asians arrived in the bigger towns like Kampala, Jinja and Kabale where this created an even stronger demographic concentration of Asians and increased the impression for urban Africans that Asians dominated the cityscape. Inflation and produce scarcity were further accelerated by the fact that many Asians felt their own position in Uganda became more and more insecure and therefore most Asian traders who were still active reduced their stocks in anticipation of a sudden exodus.

The Act contributed to the general animosity against Asians by three relevant effects: first, an increase in prices due to shortage of goods were directly felt, for which the African consumer blamed the Asian *dukawallah*. Second, the introduction of special trading zones for citizens and the subsequent forced move of Asian *dukawallahs* to the major towns away from the countryside exacerbated spatial segregation as most Asians moved to Asian neighbourhoods, the only places where they were allowed to continue trading. This amplified the uneven geographical distribution of Asians within Uganda. Third, Asians felt more and more persecuted and therefore stopped investing in Uganda; instead they were sending their assets abroad in anticipation of a worsening of their situation. Yet, the wealthiest Asian businessmen like the

63 Citizens only, *Uganda Argus*, 18 November 1969.

64 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 251–253. Taylor further illustrates how individuals including town clerks, district commissioners and civil servants interpreted the new policy and implemented it in light of specific local circumstances which meant that Asian traders experienced varying degrees of restrictions across the country: Ibid., 245–262.

65 Ugandans' shops do good business, *Uganda Argus*, 06 January 1970.

Madhvanis and the Mehtas who had extensive economic influence had not been affected by any of the socialist agenda policies so far.

The Nakivubo Pronouncement: Nationalising the Ugandan economy

Only hesitantly and after criticism against the inaction following the proclaimed Move to the Left did President Obote start targeting economic monopolies by superficially copying the first Tanzanian nationalisation wave. This move was introduced with the president's May Day speech in 1970 and was later referred to as the Nakivubo Pronouncement, after the stadium, where the speech was held. In his speech, Obote announced the nationalisation of banks, the Uganda Company as well as insurance companies.[66] Like in Tanzania, the decision mainly affected foreign companies. Different to the Tanzanian nationalisation in 1967, the members of the Ugandan government including President Obote himself had assured businesses and foreign governments in private conversations that Uganda did not intend to confiscate foreign companies and banks – the last time only a couple of weeks before nationalisation announcement.[67] A few days after the Nakivubo Pronouncement, during a ceremony at the headquarter of the Bank of Uganda, the Ugandan president confirmed the new policy by linking it to Ugandanisation rather than socialism, when he claimed that trade and industry "should have a strong Ugandan base and effective participation in it by citizens, either as individuals or through the co-operative movement and parastatal bodies." He further pointed out that "where the people of Uganda are able to run a particular service or undertake an industrial enterprise, arrangements will be made and negotiations undertaken with the foreign private firms in these fields, so that a share of the business is Ugandanised."[68]

Staff at the British High Commission believed that most of Obote's cabinet had not known about the content of the upcoming May Day speech:[69] "[…] all reports confirmed that Mr. Akena Adoko, Mr. Kalimuzo and Mr. Kyemba were practically the only persons who had any knowledge of his speech before it was delivered."[70] Barnett Deakin, a British business representatives for the East Africa Mauritius Association, compared the nationalisation with the Tanzanian policy in 1967, but had its doubt whether Uganda was ready to manage most of the companies which were about to be nationalized:

66 Kampala to FCO, Telno 384, 02 May 1970, FCO 31/720, UKNA.

67 Kampala to FCO, Telno 385, 02 May 1970, FCO 31/720, UKNA.

68 Letter from Mr. Kalule-Settala, Minister of Finance, Uganda, 16 May 1970, FCO 31/721, UKNA.

69 Telegram Kampala to FCO, Telno 385, 02 May 1970, FCO 31/720, UKNA.

70 Booth to Howell, 26 May 1970 Nationalisation: German attitude, FCO31/722, UKNA.

> "The whole pattern is not too different to what happened in Tanzania in 1967, and my word that was done on the spur of the moment, but this seems to be far less professional. […] Uganda certainly could not run any of these businesses except into the ground."[71]

Most commentators saw in Obote's long latency over the rhetoric of *The Common Man's* charter the reason for the sudden move towards nationalisation, as the charter was "increasingly criticized as meaningless words"[72]:

> "In retrospect the decisions are not altogether surprising. Obote was in a dilemma. The Common Man's Charter was becoming increasingly open to criticism as a meaningless document. He had sought in vain for means of giving it validity other than by a further encroachment on the private sector: and he knew that to do this legally (i. e. subject to payment of proper compensation) would mean waiting for years with the risk of progressive erosion of his political position."[73]

Some saw in the nationalisation a move motivated by the general elections which were scheduled to happen in the next twelve months. The nationalisation of industry had proved to be a popular means to please the African masses in other African countries (like in Tanzania). A Telegram from the High Commission in Kampala predicted:

> "[…] the elections will be over before the Common Man discovers how little there is in them for him. It can now be claimed that the move to the left and the Common Man's Charter are a reality – indeed the Foreign Minister was overheard, immediately after the President's speech, to say Quote Now we have moved Unquote."[74]

It seems very likely that Obote felt that he had to move towards at least a superficial socialist economic policy as a sign that he was willing to implement the Move to the Left.[75] Despite

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71 Private and confidential note prepare in Kampala by Mr. Barnett Deakin of the East Africa Mauritius Association after his recent meeting with the Minister of Finance, 13 May 1970, FCO 31/721, UKNA.

72 Note of meeting held in Sir John Johnston's Office 04 May 1970, FCO 31/720, UKNA. Booth from the British High Commission described it as "totally lacking in flesh on the skeleton": Booth to Howell, 26 May 1970, Nationalisation: German attitude, FCO31/722, UKNA.

73 Telegram Kampala to FCO Telno 385, 02 May 1970, FCO 31/720, UKNA.

74 Ibid.

75 Some British observers claimed that the mentally unstable state of the president and/or his lavish alcohol consume was responsible for the displacement activity: "Obotoe [sic!] is heavily on the bottle drinking large quantities of Sherry. He is very unpopular but is still determined to have elections before April 1971 in order to demonstrate before Africa that he is President with full democratic

guarantees in the constitution,[76] the Ugandan government was lacking the money to do so and to pay adequate compensation as it originally had planned. The government therefore needed to change the wording in the constitution to legalise the planned nationalisation. The amendment was pushed through in a single parliamentary session. The following report insinuates that Obote used a certain intimidation strategy to ensure the success of the amendment:

> "On the 6 May it took the Government 12 ½ minutes to tear up this bit of the Constitution. There has to be a Division when the Constitution is changed. The President entered half a minute before the Division, and did not return to the House. The whole pantomime would have been laughable if it had not been so serious."[77]

The same report documented how the Nationalisation Bill did not list the import and export business which was then quickly in the same session added in an extra clause which automatically replaced the former External Trade Act:

> "[…] in effect [the new clause] says that no person other than Government or some other public body authorized by the Minister shall import or export goods of any description. […] It means that in effect all companies who are importers have been given notice that they will in due course be out of business. […] it is the clear policy of the Government to put these private enterprise Companies out of business as soon as the statal body has sufficient experience to do without them."[78]

The announcement, the adoption of the legislation as well as the successive implementation of the nationalisation were done in a great hurry and ad-hoc action but did bot demonstrate a socialist masterplan. The policy seemed little thought through, consequently its implementation presented itself as complicated. Most of the firms at which the government had aimed were under foreign ownership with representatives outside of the country. Only a few owners were Asians and some like the Madhvani Group were actually owned by Asians with Ugandan citizenship. Similar to the first nationalisation wave in Tanzania, the Ugandan expropriation of industry

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support": FCO 31/722, UKNA. This way of delegitimising Obote's political decision by British civil servants can be observed in the case of the Arusha Declaration and Julius Nyerere's mental state: The Tanzanian Situation, Part 3, 24 February 1967, FCO31/72, UKNA.

[76] This part of the constitution was in fact always used as assurance by representatives of the Ugandan government towards businesses that their investments were safe: "Report on Uganda: May 1970", FCO 31/720, UKNA.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

had little to do with diminishing Asian economic influence. Further can be argued, that – if it had gone through – the policy would not have resulted in state control of former foreign owned industry: “Nationalization was a political catchword for what was in fact a negotiable demand for partnership.”[79] Such partnerships were nothing unusual in western economies and do not necessarily only appear in socialist systems. Nevertheless, the announcement of the decision to nationalise triggered a withdrawal of foreign investment which increased the shortage of funds and a rising drain of money from Uganda. Again, like in the Tanzanian case, the Kenyan government saw foreign investment at risk in the whole region: “Kibaki [Kenyan Minsiter for Finance], for instance, is absolutely livid at the action that Uganda has taken, and we must do everything possible to help the responsible Ministers in our Government here in Kenya.”[80]

Obote appointed Jayant Madhvani, the most influential of the Madhvani brothers, to the Head of the Export and Import Cooperation, a parastatal institution, which was newly responsibly for the export and import businesses. The decision to install “the biggest capitalist” of the country as the new representative of a state body triggered protest within the countries left, while it reassured foreign governments and investors with the British High Commission in Kampala calling it a wise choice.[81] Both sides interpreted the move as a sign that the Ugandan government was not seriously attempting a socialist turn. In fact, originally Madhvani’s enterprise was like the Metha empire – the two biggest Asian owned enterprises in East Africa at the time – on the nationalisation list.[82] However, the Madhvani business was dropped from the list in the course of the negotiations. Enterprise owner, Jayant Madhvani, who had close connections to the Ugandan Government, had offered the Government 49 per cent of its enterprise at once.[83] He tried to convince the government to settle so the Madhvanis could keep the majority of shares. Madhvani himself described the nationalisation policy’s aim to be the Africanisation of business.[84] He assured British representative R. Dickinson that he would try to retain harmony and expertise in markets, a resolution which according to Dickinson Madhvani followed during the meeting of the Board of the Corporation.[85] He believed “business must be done by

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79 Mamdani expressed the view that this partnership would have the state as junior partner: Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 267–9.

80 Letter Barnett Deakin to Michael Rose Director and Secretary of The East Africa and Mauritius Association, 11 May 1970, FCO 31/721, UKNA.

81 BHC Kampala to Commercial Department, 29 May 1970, FCO 31/722, UKNA.

82 “Report on Uganda: May 1970”, FCO 31/720, UKNA.

83 Letter Barnett Deakin East Africa and Mauritius Association to Michael Rose Director and Secretary, East Africa and Mauritius Association, FCO31/721, UKNA.

84 Visit [by R. A. Dickinson] to Uganda – 24–31 May 1970; Nationalisation of Export-Import Trade; 11 June 1970, FCO 31/723.

85 Ibid.

those who can do it best and most efficiently; it must be conducted on a profit making and not an ideological basis."[86]

Negotiations about acceptable compensation and the scheme of the planned nationalisation happened on a case by case basis between government and the affected companies. In most cases the Ugandan government was not interested in taking over all shares but aimed at achieving a 60/40 (state/private) share, while the companies were not interested in giving up the control over business decisions if they were still holding shares.[87] This was one of the main contested points, which let the negotiations to drag on. In the end, similar to Obote's take on the residence rights of Asian non-citizens discussed in chapter III.2 his nationalisation policy was interrupted abruptly by the military coup executed by General Idi Amin on 25 January 1971. The new regime decided to go through with the nationalisation only on a few individual cases, those were merely the companies and banks whose representatives had previously been able to agree with the Ugandan government on a nationalisation scheme.[88] All other nationalisation intentions by the old government were dropped. The new government argued that the country needed the little funds it had to invest in other more important development policies and was praised for this decision by most Western diplomats and politicians.[89] In Tanzania, which condemned the Ugandan coup and continued to support Obote, this reversal was seen as a setback for African socialism. The Tanzanian TANU-loyal newspapers claimed that the capitalists had taken over Uganda and criticised Amin for enhancing imperial capitalism while depicting him as a puppet of Western imperialism.[90]

Shortly after Idi Amin took power in January 1971, the new government declared an economic war on exploiters and claimed that Asians sabotaged Uganda's economy. The term economic war was taken on by Ugandan media which were aligned with government policy. The war narrative implied the necessity of extraordinary means to fight exploitation. Amin summoned leaders of the Asian communities in Uganda in December and handed them a list of "Asian business malpractices."[91] However, until the expulsion order of 09 August 1972 the major news outlet, the *Uganda Argus*, did not increase or intensify its anti-Asian coverage or rhetoric compared to the years since circa 1967.

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86 Ibid.

87 In the talks, most companies stated a preference of either owning at least 51 per cent of the shares or a 100 per cent takeover by the government.

88 National and Grindlays Bank was the only bank with whom an agreement had been settled for a 60 per cent state takeover: Mamdani, *Politics and class formation in Uganda*, 268.

89 Telegram Kampala to FCO, Telno 405, 19 April 1971, FCO31/1047, UKNA.

90 Capitalists take over Uganda, *The Standard*, 24 May 1971.

91 Mamdani, Mahmood. *From citizen to refugee: Uganda Asians come to Britain*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Pambazuka, 2011.

Two points become apparent, when comparing Uganda's economic policy of the 1960s with Tanzania. First, there was a clear connection between economic policy and race issues in both cases. There was a wide understanding that access to economic opportunities should only be offered to those who were part of the nation while the definition of nationhood was shaped by a *citizenship culture* which was mostly defined by racial characteristics. Second, Ugandan politicians demonstrated a reactive approach using various policies which had been implemented by neighbouring states to address the issue of economic grievances. By combining openly racial policies with socialist ones, the Obote regime was clearly lacking a wider socialist strategy but rather demonstrated a nationalistic agenda.

Targeting Asian landlords: The Tanzanian Building Act

With the Arusha Declaration in place the Tanzanian government started with nationalising foreign banks and insurances in 1967. For Asians though the main concern was the announcement to address the Asian trade monopoly, the wholesale and retail business. In the same year, the government nationalised eight foreign owned import-export companies and later all sisal plantations which had also been partly in Asian hands. In this nationalisation process, the former owners of companies and banks were compensated. However, the first round of nationalisation had mainly aimed at foreign owned property and its main target was European companies. Another legislation would hit the Asian community far worse.

In the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration Asians increasingly had acquired real estate. There were three main reasons for this redistribution of investment. First, the nationalisation of companies and factories had affected a wide range of industries. This significantly reduced the number of economic sectors in which investors could still act unrestricted and unaffected by nationalisation policies. Second, with TANU leaders losing the opportunity to rent out property many economically successful Africans, who held high positions in the government or within TANU, sold their property.[92] The most obvious buyers were Asian businesspeople who had just started to look for new investment opportunities. The third reason shows the rather tragic element of this story: Asians, who had taken to heart that the African public had criticized them for sitting on the fence or having one foot in Africa and another one in India or Britain, wanted to prove their allegiance to the new Tanzania. They had increasingly invested locally in assets mainly real estate, which could not be easily

[92] Shivji points out that by removing the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (TANU leaders) as rivals from the property market, the market opened up even more opportunities for the commercial bourgeoisie (which was mainly constituted of Asians): Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, 81.

liquidated, to show they saw their long-time future in East Africa.[93] This largely concerned the biggest of the Asian communities, the Ismaili Khoja community,[94] whose spiritual leader, the Aga Khan, had appealed to his followers to fully integrate and invest in East Africa. The appeal was part of a wider attempt to prove the Ismailis' alliance with Tanzania which also included taking on local citizenship as discussed in chapter II.1. Hence, this community was hit hardest by the following second round of nationalisation which was directed at rental property.

Still after independence, Asian landlords were accused of being racist and dishonest: according to the public image they were asking for horrendous rents from Africans while often favouring fellow Asians.[95] Especially Asians who owned multiple rental properties were accused of being lazy and exploitative as they were believed to not work for their money:

> "The existence of so-called landlords with chains of expensive buildings in nearly all towns in this country is obviously such a remnant of capitalist exploitation. Buildings do not drop from the heavens. […] No resident of Tanzania – a citizen or otherwise – can say that he came with money from somewhere and built a house to rent here. No one can say that he labored along to build a mansion. No one can say he acquired money through ways other than exploitation and built himself an expensive building. […] This means that there has been only a handful of capitalist exploiters bent on turning themselves into perpetual landlords. Indeed, does it surprise anyone that in the whole of Dar es Salaam, all big private mansions for renting are owned only by about four families and one reliwious [sic] organization?"[96]

The Tanzania Acquisition of Buildings Act, adopted on 22 April 1971, allowed the Tanzanian president to confiscate any building which was fully or partly let and which had a value higher than 100,000 TSh. If a person owned multiple buildings whose values were less than

[93] In fact, one characteristic of economic middlemen is the liquidity of their assets. This makes minorities able to move assets quickly in situations of prosecution or discrimination. By taking the step of investing money in real estate, Tanzanian Asians attempted to shake off their role as middlemen. This was, however, not necessarily perceived as this by the African majority: Bonacich, 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities': 585; Bert Horselitz, 'Main concepts in the analysis of the social implications of technical change', 23f.; Voigt-Graf, *Asian Communities in Tanzania*, 10.

[94] The Ismailis constituted of ca. 20,000 people in Tanzania: Voigt-Graf, *Asian Communities in Tanzania*, 63.

[95] Tanu to vet trade licensing, *The Standard*, 07 May 1971.

[96] A timely step forward, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

100,000 TSh. but together exceeded the mark of 100,000 Ths., they were also affected by confiscation.[97] Because it not only affected fully let but also partly let buildings, this included buildings in which the owner lived with other parts of their family e. g. their son's, who occupied another part of the building with his family.[98] Following that logic, not the whole building was actually inhabited by the owner or their own dependants, the building counted as partly let, and could be put on the nationalisation list by the government.[99] The former owner would then also become a tenant of the government. More than 98 per cent of the almost 3,000 buildings which were confiscated in the context of the new Act had belonged to Asians, and specifically Tanzanian Asians (Asians with Tanzanian citizenship). Only 100 of the confiscated buildings belonged to British passport holders (of which again many were of Asian origin).[100] Thus, the Act – albeit not in the actual wording – carried a strong racial connotation which Asians and Africans alike comprehended as such.

While in the first round of nationalisation after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 most owners were reimbursed and were able to agree with the Tanzanian state on an adequate compensation, the compensation policy of the Acquisition of Buildings Act left most former owners empty-handed. They were either not at all or only limitedly reimbursed. Buildings older than ten years were fully excluded from any compensation scheme. Compensation for buildings built in the previous ten years was only paid proportionately by age of the building. At the same time, the property value was evaluated on the original purchase price or construction sum which most often did not match the current market price. Property owners were not always personally informed about the confiscation of their property, for instance by receiving a copy of the notice; the confiscation could also simply be published in any newspaper announcements or in the Government Gazette.[101] Confiscations were legally binding from the date the president had signed the Acquisition Act even though in many cases the owner was only informed days or weeks later.[102] Former owners were denied rent for April – rent was usually paid

97 Tanzania Acquisition of Buildings Act, 22 April 1971; State to take over big buildings, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

98 Family members who were not dependant of the property owner counted as tenants, even if they did not pay rent. Only children under the age of 18, a wife, a husband, or the father, mother, or grandparents could count as dependant: What the Act means, *The Standard*, 23 April 1971.

99 If the building was partly inhabited by the owner, the former owner would become a regular tenant of the building after confiscation, being required to regular rent: Ibid.

100 Summary Parliamentary under-secretary's visit to East Africa Tanzania Nationalisation, FCO 31/999, UKNA.

101 April rent must be paid to banks, *The Nationalist*, 05 May 1971; as example see: List of taken-over Buildings, *The Nationalist*, 29 April 1971.

102 "April rent must be paid to banks", *The Nationalist*, 05 May 1971.

subsequently in monthly rates – despite the fact that they had legally owned the building until at least 22 April 1971.[103]

A number of property owners objected to the confiscation or to the fact that they would receive no or in their eyes insufficient compensation. In general, they had three different options to oppose the new law: first to appeal to the Tribunal, second if the Tribunal appeal failed to petition to the president directly, third if the former owner suffered serious financial difficulties should the confiscation go through they could apply in front of the hardship committee.[104] The fee to appear in front of the Tribunal to appeal was 10,000 Ths., a considerable sum if one considers that buildings worth 100,000 Ths. and more would have already been confiscated.[105] Appeals were in general only successful if the owner could prove that their property did not fulfill the requirements for a confiscation (e. g. the property was in fact not let or worth less than 100,000 Ths.). In the other cases, the only option was the so called hardship committee which was established to investigate cases where "genuine hardship" had been caused by the Act and an exemption from confiscation was sensible.[106]

Martin Ewans, a diplomat at the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam, reported back to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about his experience at the Appeals Tribunal when he assisted the 83-year old Hope Trant[107] who was living in South Africa and could not travel herself to appeal in person. The Tribunal had given several appellants the same appointment time which resulted in long queues and often full days wasted for the appellants without reaching any result or even being able to speak to the Tribunal in the first place. Some individuals or company representatives had to start the appeal process over again, in some cases this happened multiple times for the same case.[108] Ewans concluded:

> "The whole set up is dilatory, ramshackle and ignorant, and it is quite clear to me that the Tanzanians just do not care how well or badly it performs its duties. I can only repeat that after making all allowances for current Tanzanian standards of

103 Ibid.

104 Dar to FCO Telno 161, 07 April 1972, FCO 31/1316, UKNA.

105 Even if appellants won the case in front of the Tribunal, they would be still only repaid half of the original fee by the government: State to take over big buildings, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971. One Standard reader complained about the impossibility for him to appeal due to the lack of money: People's Forum, Building appeal fee is too high, by Unhappy Shareholder, *The Standard*, 17 May 1971.

106 Dar es Salaam to FCO, Telno 146, 27 March 1972, FCO 31/1316, UKNA.

107 Hope Trant was one of the few British individuals, who were not of Asian origin, affected by the Act.

108 M. K. Ewans to Simon Dawbarn, 17 November 1972, FCO 31/1319, UKNA.

> administration and justice, after three years here I was not prepared for anything quite as bad as this."[109]

As the vast majority of people concerned by the Act were Asians, they had to deal with those stalling tactics of the Appeal Tribunal most frequently.[110] Different to the widow Hope Trant, in most cases they could not profit from assistance by the British High Commission. The Acquisition of Buildings Act had followed a rhetoric which defamed landlordism and categorised landlords as exploiters. To receive compensation or reverse confiscation via an appeal in front of the Appeal Tribunal or a direct petition to President Nyerere therefore was unlikely to be successful for persons who were professional landlords:

> "They [the Tanzanian government] would not admit the general right to compensation which I pressed, but conceded that some owners who are not "professional landlords" may have been penalized and be entitled to redress. However, this was up to the president. I found on the other hand little sympathy for property developers."[111]

This report confirms that the Building Act had a certain goal, namely to remove a rental industry from which only a limited number of people in possession of sufficient capital could profit and therefore consistently increased the economic imbalance between those and the average African citizen. Therefore, most of the submitted appeals missed the mark and were unsuccessful; only certain people had a realistic chance to object the confiscation, as a telegram from the British High Commission to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office shows:

> "We know that a few houses have been returned by administrative action to senior Tanzanians in cases where owner is influential (e. g. governor of Bank of Tanzania) or circumstances have been exceptional (e. g. houses let by Tanzanian diplomats while serving overseas). […] The appeals tribunal has been holding hearings and we understand that it

[109] Ibid. A year before his personal encounter with the Tribunal, the same BHC staff had positive things to say about the Appeal Tribunal: "It seems as if the Tribunal is taking cases on their merits and showing some degree of objectivity": M. K. Ewans (Acting High Commissioner British High Commission Dar) to B. T. Holmes (EA Department), 17 December 1971, FCO 31/1000, UKNA.

[110] While Ewans was representing a British citizen of British origin, he reported about many of the appellants being present being Asian: M. K. Ewans to Simon Dawbarn 17 November1972, FCO 31/1319, UKNA.

[111] Dar to FCO Telno 161, 07 April 1972, FCO 31/1316, UKNA.

> has ordered the return of a few properties in cases where hardship has been established, e. g. by widows whose properties were their sole source of income."[112]

It seemed that appellants were most successful if they were either politically highly influential or economically weak. The hardship committee received 546 applications of which by 15 February 1973 only 93 cases were successful.[113] Indeed, the chances for candidates petitioning in front of the hardship committee were still better than in front of the regular Appeal Tribunal, where the proceedings were described as "painfully slow".[114] With very few cases being successful in front of the tribunal, most former owners accepted the confiscation without appeal as they saw their chances shrivel:[115]

> "Tanzanians from the President down have made no secret of it from me that it was primarily such owners [owners of UK-Asian-owned houses or commercial/residential blocks specifically for letting] that the Act was designed to catch. I am certain that for political even more than financial reasons there will be no general concession in this field, even if World Bank aid is jeopardized."[116]

A month later, the government amended parts of the Act. Excluding buildings owned by religious bodies and revised its take on confiscation of property which were supposed to serve as a retirement fund for widows. Other cases where former owners were left homeless were also reconsidered.[117]

While most owners realised that they had little chance to avoid confiscation, some seemed to have tried to bypass the policy. *The Nationalist* reported that some property owners who possessed multiple buildings whose single values were less than 100,000 Ths. but together exceeded the mark of 100,000Ths. had transferred ownership of their buildings to different relatives after the act had been announced.[118] In another article of the same newspaper it was reported that some landlords in Mwanza had tried to evict their tenants so their properties would not be categorised as rental property and fall under the Acquisition of Buildings Act.[119]

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112 Dar to FCO, Telno 827, 12 November 1971, FCO 31/999, UKNA.

113 Handwritten note from 07 March 1973, in: Horace Phillips to Barry Holmes, EAD, 18 July 1972, FCO 31/1318, UKNA.

114 Ibid.

115 Horace Phillips to Barry Holmes, EAD, 18 July 1972, FCO 31/1318, UKNA.

116 Ibid.

117 Nyerere clarifies law on buildings, *Sunday News*, 30 May 1971.

118 Arusha ready with list of buildings, *The Nationalist*, 27 April 1971.

119 Saboteur exposed at Mwanza, *The Nationalist*, 14 May 1971.

One specific case of resistance left feelings run high: Various newspapers reported that the 35-year old tailor Habibu Mohamed Thaki from Mwanza who had allegedly distributed posters (in both Swahili and English) and had urged people in conversations to join a meeting and stage a protest to oppose the Acquisition of Buildings Act. *The Nationalist* accused Thaki of additionally spreading untrue rumours against the government: "He had further circulated rumours that all personal property including cattle and also wives would be taken over by the Government."[120] Thaki was arrested by the police and was brought before a mass rally[121] where the Regional Commissioner for Mwanza, Omari Muhaji, worked up the crowd defaming the Asian of sabotaging socialism and linking Thaki's current action to the latter's life story.[122] According to Muhaji, Thaki who had been educated in Tanzania and worked for a bank for 13 years had left his job after the nationalisation of banks and changed careers.[123] Muhaji then declared: "This clearly shows that Thaki was not interested in working for the state which had educated him. He wanted to be a stooge of the capitalists. Thaki is therefore a reactionary and a saboteur."[124] According to *The Standard* some people in the crowd called for Thaki to be "detained for life and flogged on the spot. Others said he should be displayed at the National Museum in Dar es Salaam."[125]

This individual episode illustrates the authoritarian character of the Tanzanian government at that point in time and the lack of space for any form of pluralism. According to the media coverage, Thaki had used for nowadays standard democratic means, i. e. freedom of speech and of assembly, stating his opinion on a specific policy, however, this was not only perceived as illegitimate protest but as illegal. The story therefore shows the boundaries of the speakable and unspeakable in the post-colonial Tanzanian society and indicates the restriction in the freedom of speech in this context. Questioning socialist policy was not perceived as an integral part of freedom of speech but counter-revolutionary and as sabotage of nation-building, and therefore as illegitimate and treasonable. Further, Thaki's action was depicted to be part of a wider plan of a conspiracy against Tanzanian socialism:

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[120] Ibid.

[121] *The Standard* reports about 40,000 people participating in the rally. This seems rather high considering that Mwanza itself only had ca 35,000 inhabitants in 1967: Rally forgives rumour-monger, *The Standard,* 14 May 1971.

[122] Protest march against saboteurs tomorrow, *The Nationalist*, 15 May 1971.

[123] It is striking that the article does not mention Thaki's citizenship status. This suggests that Thaki was Tanzanian, for if had he been holding foreign citizenship, it would have been most likely used against him in the rhetoric. It would have also been quite likely that he would have been expelled from Tanzania instead of simply being arrested.

[124] Saboteur exposed at Mwanza, *The Nationalist*, 14 May 1971.

[125] Rally forgives rumour-monger, *The Standard,* 14 May 1971.

> "Informed sources indicated that the authorities here are carefully watching the activities of a few rich persons recently expropriated as they believe these might have been the forces behind Thaki, who it is believed does not own much property."[126]

Thaki was released in the end,[127] after he had apologised in front of the TANU Regional Committee of Mwanza. The Party committee and not a judge decided to release him.[128] This alone shows the deterioration of any form of division of power. On 16 May 1971, the Mwanza TANU branch organised a protest against "counter-revolutionaries" triggered by the reporting of the Thaki case, thousands of protesters were expected according to the organisers.[129] Stories about Asians opposing the new Building Act not via the Tribunal but through means understood as being illegitimate were used by the authorities and echoed by the local media to confirm the image of Asians as exploitative landlord, who did not follow the rules, proving that the group affected by the act were enemies of socialism and nation-building. Although in this context their identity as Asians often stayed unmentioned, it was implied nevertheless either through the individual's name or the general context such as the individual's profession. By not highlighting their race but emphasising their role as capitalist state actors followed the narrative of post-colonial class struggle rather than using racial categories to justify discrimination against the Asian minority. The government thereby underpinned its action with more legitimacy, as the owners' behaviours simply seemed to prove the allegations in the first place. According to this narrative Asians were not being discriminated because of their race but because of their own exploitative behaviour and hence carried responsibility for state actions directed against them.

Every one of those stories therefore came in handy and was consequently built up by party leaders and government representatives. Following the Thaki incident, Minister Paul Bomani identified the troublemakers when he warned businesspeople and shop owners that they would lose their trade license should they stand in the way of future socialist policy. Bomani speaking at the "mammoth rally" in Mwanza, which had been organised to show support for the government's policy and was according to *The Standard* attended by 50,000 protesters.[130] He implied that those businessmen and shopkeepers were foreign or strangers by saying: "If these people

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[126] Saboteur exposed at Mwanza, *The Nationalist*, 14 May 1971.

[127] One author calls it a pardon, which underlines the rightfulness of the arrest as well as Thaki's misconduct: Protest march against saboteurs tomorrow, *The Nationalist*, 15 May 1971.

[128] Saboteur exposed at Mwanza, *The Nationalist*, 14 May 1971; Rally forgives rumour-monger, *The Standard,* 14 May 1971.

[129] Protest march against saboteurs tomorrow, *The Nationalist*, 15 May 1971.

[130] Again, numbers seem unrealistically high compared to the population numbers in the Mwanza region: Bomani sounds warning not to businessmen, *The Standard*, 17 May 1971.

who are opposed to our socialist policies are not happy with Tanzania, they should go now. If they do not have any fare, we shall give them."[131] By subtly suggesting that the people Bomani was talking about had a place to go to apart from Tanzania, he branded them as foreign. There is no doubt that the crowd understood that Bomani talked about the Asian communities without ever using the word Asian. He also used the relevant catchwords, which were connected to the Asian communities (businessman, sabotage, high prices etc.). *The Standard* quoted Bomani as follows: "He said many businessmen were working hard to sabotage the work done by the State Trading Corporation by saying that the high prices of goods were its result."[132]

The practice of Asian landlords was described as racist and advantaging Asians over Africans, as done by a chairman of the City Council in Dar es Salaam, Mr Chambuso: "Landlords who accept tenants purely on their appearance or colour came under fire for not working in line with the country's socialist ideals."[133] Whenever the act was described as inherently racist, most members of the African public as well as Tanzanian politicians denied this, often without giving a reasonable argument why the act was supposed to be non-discriminating: "Although it is true that this group is the most affected, it is not true that the law was aimed to suppress them."[134]

The Tanzanian government was eager to officially frame the Acquisition of Buildings Act along the lines of economic liberation aligning it ideologically to the Arusha Declaration. However, with 98 per cent of the former owners being Asians, the majority of which held Tanzanian citizenship, the act was targeting a certain group of the population by categorizing them as a class of capitalist exploiters. The act inherently contained a policy of racial discrimination and was understood as such by most Asians and Africans in Tanzania. This becomes notably apparent when looking into the practical implication of the legislation. In cases, where the act had unintendedly affected individuals originally not intended to be, the Tanzanian government intervened in the quiet:

> "While [the] Act is non-discriminatory in form and some Tanzanians of African origin have been affected, [the] vast majority of persons who have lost their properties have been of Asian origin, including British Asians. Moreover, we now know of some score of properties which have been quietly handed back for no proper reason to influential Tanzanian owners of African origin, mostly government servants (also to one British expatriate civil servant)."[135]

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[131] Ibid.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Tanu to vet trade licensing, *The Standard*, 07 May 1971.

[134] Letter to the editor, *The Nationalist*, 27 May 1971.

[135] Dar to FCO, Telno 34, 21 January 1972, FCO 59/758, UKNA.

As direct consequence of the act, the insecurity of Asians regarding their future in Tanzania was reflected in emigration numbers. The Asian population had halved after the Building Act. 40,000 Asians left Tanzania directly after the adoption of the policy. The Ismaili community had increasingly invested in real estate and was hit hardest by the new policy, less than one third of them stayed in Tanzania after the Building Act; most of those Ismaili who left immigrated to Canada.[136]

The Tanzanian Acquisition of Buildings Act of 1971 was part of a second wave of nationalisation and still "in full accord with [the] spirit if not letter of Arusha Declaration."[137] The responsible Minister for Lands, Housing and Urban Development, John Mhaville, called the new act a "bombshell against the exploitation by landlords."[138] The Building Act was not unanimously endorsed within Nyerere's cabinet. Most prominent opponents within the government were Paul Bomani, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mining, and Amir Jamal, Minister of Finance. Bomani was according to British sources overruled in cabinet, while Jamal was not able to express his view without sounding bias since his family was so widely affected by the legislation. In a letter from Barnett Deakin to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Deakin stated: "Needless to say, Bomani is absolutely against the actions taken by the President, but he was over-ruled in Cabinet."[139]

Ideologically, the effect the nationalisation of banks and industry was supposed to have on the Tanzanian economy, the Acquisition of Buildings Act was supposed to have on the individual citizen implicitly referred to as racially African: a removal of unequal power structures. Practically, the legislation symbolised activism after complaints had been raised by more radical TANU members and the government in Zanzibar as well as within the public that the Tanzanian government would not remove all former colonial structures in the economy sufficiently:

> "[…] its timing also suits the president's purposes well, in light of recent criticism, to which point has been given by utterances by Karume, to effect that he has been dilatory in progressing towards country's socialist goals and in curbing continuing economic power of [the] Asian community."[140]

British sources suggested that the Building Act was a way of showing activism without actually being forced to be put in action: "[the] Act has great advantage that while it will make

[136] Dar to FCO, Telno 320, 23 April 1971, FCO 31/997, UKNA.

[137] Ibid.

[138] State to take over big buildings, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

[139] Letter Barnett Deakin to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 May 1971, FCO 31/998, UKNA.

[140] Dar to FCO, Telno 320, 23 April 1971, FCO 31/997, UKNA.

maximum political impact, its implementation is at ministerial discretion and can be geared both to administrative capacity and to resources available for compensation (both of them limited)." Yet, in the end the Tanzanian government used the means of confiscation extensively. The fact that confiscation was at ministerial discretion helped to target Asian property owners with more precision.[141]

Housing had been a big issue in the months before the Acquisition of Buildings Act. The housing crisis manifested in a protest against the National Housing Corporation in the weeks before the act.[142] Apart from increasing rents, there was by far not enough housing available to cover the demand which had again an impact on the rent prices. Hence, the act also served as rhetoric relief for the pent-up criticism of the government's handling of the housing policy.[143] The author of a *Nationalist's* opinion piece endorsed the new policy because of the same reasons:

> "We are on the road towards the abolition of exploitation. If our struggle towards that goal is to have meaning, it must encompass all areas, including those which have come to identify a handful of people as owners of chains of expensive buildings. […] The new Bill will end exploitation by putting the speculators out of business; it will help the establishment of rationalization of housing policies; it will enable the nation [to] acquire some money for further re-investment into housing projects for the people; and it will also help end the present tendencies towards racial discrimination by the landlords."[144]

Although, the Act was supposed to signal activism and show that the government was fighting the housing crisis, the Act did not actually create more housing.[145] If anything, it prevented private investors to build new housing. Moreover, despite the argument that private landlords asked for horrendous rent prices the government did not initially consider decreasing the rents of the buildings it had confiscated,[146] although this was asked for by some newspaper readers:

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[141] Ibid.

[142] Trigger for the protest was the accusation that some members of the housing corporation occupied more than one house, while there was a high demand for housing by the public: NHC officials with more than one house to be dismissed, *The Standard*, 07 April 1971.

[143] At the time of the Building Act, in Dar es Salaam alone 18,000 unprocessed applications for NHC-housing were on the waiting list: Thousands cheer take-overs, *The Standard*, 24 April 1971.

[144] A timely step forward, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

[145] Among others, this was pointed out by an journalist of *The Nationalist*: Opinion, After taking over, *The Nationalist*, 27 April 1971.

[146] Leaders and relatives will not dodge Buildings Act – Mhaville, *The Standard*, 23 April 1971.

"Too often the landlords exploited the situation by charging extremely exorbitant rents. It is to be hoped that with the acquisition of buildings such rents will be removed."[147]

In the relevant parliamentary debate, the government described the Act to be in the tradition of the Arusha Declaration. Minister Mhaville explained that after nationalising banks, insurance and big business what "had remained were the buildings on which a few capitalists were collecting rent for their individual enrichment."[148] Some MP's thought the policy did not go far enough: the MP for Utengule/Usangu, D. O. Mfaume, expressed the opinion that the government should not pay any compensation whatsoever: "They have exploited the people in every way and we are talking about compensating them. No compensation and no Appeals Tribunal."[149] Another MP, P. M. Mnkondya from Mbozi, wanted to lower the threshold from 100,000 Ths. to 75,000 TSh. Both claims were supported by M. S. Nyang'anyi, MP for Bubu, who proclaimed that there should be no civilisation at war: "And we are in a war against exploitation."[150] Others did not see the need for an Appeal Tribunal or a threshold at all or suggested to increase the fee to appeal from 10,000 to 25,000 Ths. without any repayment even if the appeal was successful.[151] Only a few MPs asked for moderation like the representative for Dar es Salaam East, Sheikh Yahya, who proposed to relax the requirements "to reduce the pressure it imposed on people in his constituency."[152]

The act was welcomed by wide parts of the African society and bodies of the civil society. The University of Dar es Salaam Students' Organization (DUSO) drafted a statement praising the government for its policy and asking it to lower the threshold from 100,000 to 50,000 TSh.[153] The Standard reported that thousands of Africans had followed the government's call to show support for the new legislation by going to the street the day after the act was published.[154] In the reader's letters of the local newspaper, readers congratulated the government for its nationalisation policy.[155] In one case a reader even made suggestions for the government to

147 People's Forum, Don't forget retail business, *The Standard*, 04 May 1971.

148 State to take over big buildings, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

149 Leaders and relatives will not dodge Buildings Act – Mhaville, *The Standard*, 23 April 1971.

150 MPs cheer Gov't take-over of houses, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

151 This was suggested by the MP for Bukene, R. R. Nyembo: Leaders and relatives will not dodge Buildings Act – Mhaville, *The Standard,* 23 April 1971; MPs cheer Gov't take-over of houses, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

152 Leaders and relatives will not dodge Buildings Act – Mhaville, *The Standard*, 23 April 1971. Dar es Salaam was hit hardest by the confiscations due to the high amount of rental properties.

153 Students support houses take-over, *The Nationalist*, 06 May 1971.

154 Thousands cheer take-overs, *The Standard*, 24 April 1971.

155 People's Forum, Congratulations over buildings, *The Standard*, 03 May 1971; People's Forum, Take over Karimjees, *The Standard*, 04 May 1971; People's Forum, Well done!, by P. Masolo in Morogoro, *The Standard*, 05 May 1971.

confiscate property of a specific company (namely the long established enterprise Karimjee Jivanjee & Co.).[156]

In the reader's letters section of the newspaper a lively debate took place discussing the socialist future of Tanzania. Most readers agreed that the Building Act did not mean the end of the nationalisation policy. A variety of suggestions can be found: the nationalisation of cars,[157] of busses[158] and of doctors[159] – although it remained unclear how the latter should have been implemented. Another reader expected the nationalisation of retail business to come next: "It is further to be hoped that the next step forward will be to take over some of [the] retail business. […] We are too often charged exorbitant prices for goods which [we] do not deserve. […] Therefore I very anxiously and vigilantly await the next bold step."[160] The retail business and more precisely the Asian maduka still posed a major obstacle to economic equality in the eyes of many Africans. Only a few years later, in February 1976, the government would do exactly this: with the launching of the Operation Maduka it nationalised retail business.[161] Some readers still saw potential for improvement in the implementation of socialism. Mwe Tukupya Tulinkakoloboji from Dar es Salaam expressed that Asians were still profiting economically from exploitation:

> "Despite Africanization, Asians remained in their position as before independence. This means that the Arusha Declaration should have tackled this problem. The Arusha Declaration however, only attacked some areas of sources of inequalities leaving out some people to prosper. The Asians remained owners of dukas and some private small enterprises. Therefore the Arusha Declaration affected only those major means of production."[162]

Many who took part in the public debate believed that the Building Act was only one further step towards a socialist society with still a long distance to go to leave exploitation behind – while often at the same time arguing that exploitation increased: "This is yet another stride towards the narrowing of the ever increasing gap between the exploiters and the humble

156 People's Forum, Take over Karimjees by J. A. Maleto from Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 04 May 1971.

157 People's Forum, I feel like a foreigner, by Alistair E. Porthos in Kinondoni, *The Standard*, 05 May 1971.

158 Ibid.

159 People's Forum, A timely step by leaders, by A Watcher in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 11 May 1971.

160 People's Forum, Don't forget retail business, by Tom A. Mmari in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 04 May 1971.

161 Aminzade, *Race, nation, and citizenship in post-colonial Africa*, 229.

162 People's Forum, Some problems in building socialism, by Mwe Tukupya Tulinkakoloboji in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 26 May 1971.

exploited ones."[163] In this environment, despite her radical editorship the South African Asian editor of *The Standard*, Frene Ginwala, became the target of an attempt to replace her with a Tanzanian editor in the spirit of full Tanzanisation staged by a number of *Standard* editorial staff.[164]

Beside the great number of Tanzanian Asians affected by the act, a limited amount of British passport holders was concerned, of which again the vast majority was of Asian origin. Yet, from the evidence available in the files of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British approach towards British passport holders varied depending on the person's race. Moreover, the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam was apprehensive of helping Asians as they feared this could hinder them at a later date from protecting the British European farmers:

> "It seems paradoxical that these [the rescue of British farmers] and other wider United Kingdom interests should be jeopardized for the sake mostly of a number of blocks of flats which have been profitably let over the years by owners who for the most part have contributed little if anything to the United Kingdom."[165]

According to this logic, the British administration used the same notion as East African politicians by stating that while legally holding a British passport, British Asians lacked an emotional connection and a certain loyalty to Britain while profiting for a long time from the status of in-betweeners which now collapsed over them. At the same time, they did not define in which way Asians did not contribute to the UK especially in comparison with British farmers living permanently in East Africa. That this "contribution" was defined by their racial affiliation therefore seems likely.

Exploitation in the public discourse

The public discourse about the Asian minorities at the end of the first decade of independence was still profusely influenced by images which had manifested during colonial time and were rooted in the economic dominance of Asians in East Africa. Asians were mainly described within their economic role and common images of Asians as *dukawallah*, landlord, owner of

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163 People's Forum, Identify buildings, by Ibrahim M. Msham in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 11 May 1971.

164 Ginwala lost her job shortly after for other reasons: Roberts, *Politics, decolonisation, and the cold war in Dar es Salaam,* 196f.

165 Dar to FCO, Telno 474, 18 September 1972, FCO 31/1319, UKNA.

capital, and employer were universal and connected to exploitation. Those images followed a clear pattern and the categorising of Asians in stereotypes was an effective means to legitimise policies which were directed against the Asian minorities. For instance, the Trade Licensing Act was justified by Ugandan politicians by the stereotype of the *dukawallah*, while the Asian landlord was the target of the Tanzanian Acquisition of Buildings Act. This generalisation, however, ignored the fact that Asians were also overrepresented in occupations which would be in general seen as beneficial for a society such as physicians and teachers.

In general, Asian businesspeople – the main Asian stereotype – were perceived as exploitative and were believed to use unfair and dishonest methods within business. Those devices in the context of socialism opposed as capitalist methods. The Asian "merchant class"[166] was contrasted with "farmers and wage earners who form the broad masses."[167] *The Nationalist* described them as "a class whose inordinate grip on the economic fate of the country is something we are out to destroy rather than to build."[168] The same commentator called them "middlemen capitalists"[169] combining the colonial context of Asians' role as economic middlemen with the post-colonial socialist context of Asians as enemies of socialism. Asian exploitation was sometimes compared to slavery: "I would like our Government to approach these things to save us from slavery of exploitation by the Indians."[170] Zanzibar's President Karume legitimised the withdrawal of trading licences for Tanzanian Asians by accusing them collectively of exploitation:

> "He [Karume] pointed out that in Tanzania there were 35,000 Indians with Tanzanian citizenship while none of them had tilled the land. They just exploited the peasants by paying them very little money. This type of indirect exploitation must come to an end, he said. Mr. Karume reiterated that Indians would not be issued with trading licences in future. He called upon all Tanzanian citizens to obey the laws of the country. He said that Indians only obeyed laws which were in their favour."[171]

Following the narrative of African socialism, capitalism was a form of western imperialism and therefore underlined the Asians' foreignness. Making Asians strangers, othering them, was a form of further distancing them from the rest of the population and legitimising

166 Ending exploitation, *The Nationalist*, 17 January 1967.

167 Ibid.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Maoni yetu, A. Z. W. Imbuga, Nakuru, *Baraza*, 09 March 1967: "Mimi ningependa Serikali yetu tukufu iingilie mambo haya ili ituokoe kutooka utumwani wa kunyonywa damu yetu na Wahindi."

171 Africans must run economy, *The Standard*, 11 November 1970.

discrimination against them.[172] When the Tanzanian government had decided to take over mostly Asian rental property, MPs used this form to legitimise the new policy: "There should not be any delay as this people have exploited us for far too long."[173] African politicians talking about Asians as "this" or "those" people, rhetorically pointing the finger at them and thus excluding them from an imaginative collective "we" was an expression of this form of othering: "I think the socialist revolution will have a lot to do to these people. If they do not agree with the policy of this country then they are on the wrong piece of land."[174] In Uganda, Asians' foreignness was often stressed by differentiating them by emphasising racial differences: "Mr. Wakiro [Managing director C. M. Wakiro National Trading Corporation] said imported goods were still passing through too many non-African hands before reaching African traders and consumers."[175]Asians were usually depicted as outsiders – either through their class (Tanzania and Uganda) or through their race (Uganda) – who were an alien element and not full members of the local society. The media or politicians spoke about how Asians abused "our hospitality"[176] or implied that Asians have another place to go to – their original home.[177] This was linked with the idea that capitalism was a form of imperialism and was heteronomous. Moreover, the association of Asians with capitalism in a presumable socialist environment, as drawn in the public discourse, made Asians saboteurs of socialism, and as socialism was often equated with nation-building, Asians were portrayed as enemies of nation-building – the most antagonistic role in decolonised East Africa.

James Brennan has convincingly shown that socialist propaganda in Tanzania used biological rhetoric to depict anti-socialist behaviour and stereotypes.[178] This rhetoric was targeted at any form of exploitation. The propaganda in Tanzania stayed abstract when it came to race, Asians were rarely explicitly named, however, always – next to some other categories of exploiters – included in the imaginary. Thus, the stereotype of the (foreign) exploiter was always associated with the Asian minority. Official language used by TANU

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[172] Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent, 'Introduction: Citizenship and its Casualties in Africa'.

[173] MPs cheer Gov't take-over of houses, *The Nationalist*, 23 April 1971.

[174] Letter to the editor, Do Africans feel 'at home'? by P. H. Mbuya (observer) in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 22 February 1967.

[175] New Uganda firm to cut out foreigners, *The Standard*, 19 January 1967.

[176] Ending exploitation, *The Nationalist*, 17 January 1967.

[177] Bomani sounds warning not to businessmen, *The Standard*, 17 May 1971; Eli Nathan Bisamunyu, MP for Kigezi East, Uganda Hansard, 29 April 1970, 214.

[178] Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75'; Brennan, *Taifa*.

leaders and reproduced in the press equated exploitation to parasitism[179] by calling exploiters "ticks to live on the labour of others."[180] Other terminology, often in Swahili, was used to highlight the parasitism of certain groups. Exploiters (*wanyonyaji*) were attributed with *mrija*, Swahili for straw or tube, to hint to the process of bloodsucking – exploitation and bloodsucking was occupied by the same word in Swahili: *unyonyaji*. An info brochure about the Arusha Declaration published by the government/TANU provided a comprehensive list of the new terminology. *Mrija* is described as "a tool which is used to siphon the sweat of other people."[181] Newspaper readers picked up the same rhetoric and used them in their letters to the editor:

> "The Government's decision to acquire buildings whose value is not less than Shs. 100,000/- has come at a time when we, the wananchi were getting rather desperate with these blood-sucking capitalists, who as Mwalimu has repeatedly told us could fly off to the moon and sting us from there, through their numerous long mirijas [straws/tubes]. For after the nationalisation of some of the major companies, banks and other means of production, this was just about the only effective mirija left to them. […] This is the time to be more vigilant in our struggle to free our mother continent from both political and economic enemies. We must keep both our ears and eyes wide open, in fact more so than ever been before. The Government has done its job; now it remains for you and I to see to if that the mabeparis [capitalists] and makabailas [landlords] do not sabotage our development and that they don't make a come-back. We don't want any "Aminism" here."[182]

The image of capitalists as bloodsuckers became so popular that even statements which did not include the term directly reminded the audience of the allegedly parasitic element, this was supported by the use of related terms such as mirija (straws/tubes):

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[179] Comparing humans to specific animals which were perceived as parasitic is known as an instrument of dehumanisation, which has been effectively used in the past in cases of ethnic violence and/or genocide. Tutsi in Rwanda were compared to cockroaches. In Nazi Germany, Jews were continuously described as parasitic in varying form: Moshman, David. 'Us and Them: Identity and Genocide'. *Identity* 7, no. 2 (2007): 115–135.

[180] Nyerere hits at exploiters, *The Nationalist*, 14 January 1967.

[181] Translation by the author: "Mrija: Ni chombo kinachotumika kwa kunyonyea jasho la mtu au watu wengine.", in: Mafunzo ya azimio la arusha na siasa ya TANU Ujamaa na kujitegemea 1967, PP. TZ.TANU 22, ICS.

[182] People's Forum, Work hard to beat the blood suckers, by (Mrs.) H. F. Saeedia in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 06 May 1971.

> "The President said the aim of these mopping up operations was to cut the straws through which the capitalists have been exploiting us and to do away with poverty. The best way of getting rid of poverty was to wipe out the tendency of amassing wealth because there was no other way of being richer than others without exploiting them."[183]

A reader of the newspaper *Baraza* congratulated Nyerere on fighting parasitism and that way achieving real independence:

> "The protests which have been conducted recently in Tanzania to support the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere regarding his intention to expel the capitalists [mabepari] who are sucking the blood [wanyonyao damu] of the citizens [wananchi] must be commended. In fact, the protests were very exciting. The protests were preceded by a Tanu vehicle while the crowd followed the procession. Every foreigner [mgeni] in Tanzania that day thought that this was actually the day Tanzania claimed its independence."[184]

The official narrative of Asians deliberately circled around the categorisation of Asians as class, not as race.[185] This way the Tanzanian government could hold on to the official TANU-party line of anti-racialism which had been propagated since the party's foundation in the 1950s. Uganda, while also from time to time using a biological rhetoric of parasitism – e. g. infamously when Idi Amin claimed that Asians were milking the cow but not feeding it – there was never a form of fixed linguistic template to depict economic exploitation. In fact, while in Tanzania the idea of African socialism wrapped in the mantle of *ujamaa* provided a convincing idea of the post-colonial future, in Uganda there was in general, a lack of a metanarrative which was universally accepted. While lacking a rhetoric standardisation of how to talk about exploitation in socialist terms, the Ugandan discourse on economic exploitation appeared in some cases as direct attacks against Asians based on their racial affiliation. The lack of consistent language offering a way to talk about exploitation reflected the lack of consistency in the

183 Thousands cheer take-overs, *The Standard*, 24 April 1971.

184 Translation by the author: "Maandamano yaliyofanywa hivi majuzi nchini Tanzania kumwunga mkono Rais, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, kuhusu azimio lake la kutaka kuwaondoa nchini mabepari wanyonyao damu za wananchi hayana budi kupongezwa. Kusema kweli maandamano hayo yalikuwa ya kusisimua sana, Maandamano yalikuwa yametunguliwa na motakaa ya Tanu huku umati wa watu ukifuata kwa mwendo wa arusi [sic!]. Mgeni ye yote aliyekuwa nchini Tanzania siku hiyo, alidhani kwamba hiyo ndiyo iliyokuwa siku ya Tanzania kujinyakulia uhuru wake.", in: Maoni yetu "Ampongeza Nyerere" by Shabani Hamis from Mbulu, Tanzania, *Baraza*, 23 March 1967.

185 In particular: Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75'.

economic approach which switched between nationalistic protectionist (Trade Licensing Act) methods and socialist tools (nationalisation).

In Tanzania and Uganda alike, the fight against capitalism and exploitation was often illustrated by including images of cleanliness and using metaphors of cleaning up to describe political action. The Tanzanian Building Act was likewise described as "mopping up operation".[186] Those narratives of cleanliness resemble the rhetoric Idi Amin used in Uganda.[187] At the same time, the ridding of political opponents is often depicted as clean-up. Exploitation and the people who were accused of committing it were thereby implicitly called dirty. Language of illness and contagious diseases was frequently used in this context: "The undesirable should not be allowed to spread their plague to cripple this nation."[188]

The measures to increase Africans' opportunities and "fight exploitation" were regularly described as war which not only allowed but required special means. At the same time resistance by the exploiters was expected and warned against:[189]

> "At that stage, socialization measures seemed easy to implement as they mainly affected foreigners and alien institutions, like the banks, insurance firms and commercial houses. Local exploiters seemed quite happy as their own domain had not been touched. But the advance of the revolution has carried it into the places where it begins to affect the pockets and privileges of the local bourgeoisie. Resistance to socialism will now intensify. […] we have no doubt that there are those with larger vested interests who have yet to be identified. […] This is why it is imperative that we prepare for the war which capitalism has unleashed against us. Our enemies are arming themselves ready for the offensive."[190]

Zanzibar's President Karume used war rhetoric when he promised a "policy of liquidating of all sorts of exploitation in the country."[191] After Amin's power grab in Uganda, he declared a war on exploitation. The term "economic war" was taken on by Ugandan media which was aligned

186 Thousands cheer take-overs, *The Standard,* 24 April 1971.

187 Alicia Decker illustrates how Idi Amin's regime increasingly used a war against dirt to extend its control and rid itself from political opponents from 1973 on: Decker, Alicia. 'Idi Amin's Dirty War: Subversion, Sabotage, and the Battle to Keep Uganda Clean, 1971–1979'. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 43, no. 3 (2010): 489–513.

188 Letter to the editor, Do Africans feel 'at home'? by P. H. Mbuya (observer) in Dar es Salaam, *The Standard*, 22 February 1967.

189 Comment, *The Standard*, 06 May 1971.

190 Comment, *The Standard*, 17 May 1971.

191 Africans must run economy, *The Standard*, 11 November 1970.

with government policy. The idea of a war implied the necessity of extraordinary means to fight exploitation.

Socialism as post-colonial remedy

One of the most effective rhetorical and ideological framing in both countries but especially in Tanzania was the way the government and the state media contextualised Asian economic behaviour and the economic disparity with its population along the line of the global Cold War ideology, the continuous fight between capitalism and socialism. In this context, socialism became the remedy for decolonised Africa to heal itself from the everlasting wounds of colonialism. Tanzania's President Nyerere labeled socialism in the form of *ujamaa* as something intrinsically African opposed to capitalism, a foreign and imperial system. In a newspaper article of the Ugandan *The People* capitalism was used interchangeable with imperialism or colonialism, while socialism was believed to secure real independence in East Africa, when the author summoned Ugandans to fight "neo-colonialists and their agents" and fight for a "classless society" warning that capitalists were the real enemies of Ugandan independence.[192]

This way of framing had multiple interlinking reasons, which were more or less based on conscious rational decisions. First, East African politicians were like everyone else children of their time, a period of history, when ideas of socialism and capitalism in their antagonism were ubiquitous. Explanation patterns perceiving the economic misbalance between Asians and Africans within the garment of socialism was therefore most obvious. However, Nyerere followed the idea of socialism as the remedy for the post-colonial economic disparity to achieve the transformation into a fairer economy and society and claimed: "We shall never rest until our country is a socialist state."[193]

At the same time, Obote's government used socialist rhetoric only situationally. The Ugandan government spent its first five years of existence with pressing the question of how to politically structure the kingdoms and secure power. Therefore the state propaganda in the late 1960s continuously stressed that first feudalism in the form of Baganda separatists had to be fought, and that capitalism was only a secondary threat to the new Ugandan nation.[194] Both, feudalism and capitalism was depicted as sabotage of nation-building with a stronger focus on the former. At the end of the 1960s, exploitation and capitalist methods were blamed on the

[192] Classless society, *The People,* 02 April 1969.

[193] Nyerere hits at exploiters, *The Nationalist*, 14 January 1967.

[194] Obote, *The Common Man's Charter*, 3f.; Classless society, *The People*, 02 April 1969.

Asian business community but increasingly also the few powerful Africans who had quickly accumulated wealth by singularly profiting from independence. This development was also used as a reason to introduce broader socialist policies, like in the Ugandan National Assembly, when discussing *The Common Man's Charter*:

> "[…] we used to see Asians getting rich, and it was on this line that we fought for our Independence. We knew then that the people who were getting fat pay were non-Africans and we fought for our Independence basing our arguments squarely on that line. […] But now our own black Africans are cropping up. The Charter says that there are some Ugandans with black faces who are now becoming capitalists."[195]

In Tanzania, D. R. Mlangwa from Dar es Salaam claimed in *The Nationalist* that a comprehensive approach to socialism was needed which included the removal of all "leaders and other individuals who either become steeped in the bourgeois mentality or in other ways constitute obstacles on the road to build socialism."[196]

While the Ugandan government under Obote, just as the Tanzanian government, claimed to have adopted a socialist agenda and "moved to the left", there are significant ideologically and practical differences between the forms of how the socialist agenda was shaped and implemented by the two administrations. Nationalistic rhetoric was mixed with some aspects of socialism; however, the major goal of these policies was to single out an outsider group, the Asian minorities and making them into strangers. In Uganda, economic exclusion was used to integrate the different ethnic groups in one nation as one people – in contrast to people of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, Busoga, Acholi etc.[197] Selwyn Ryan suggested that the fact that the major focus of Uganda's policy since independence as well as *The Common Man's Charter* emphasised the question of national unity indicates that the Obote regime only used socialism as a rhetorical means to consolidate its power as representative of Ugandan nationalism in opposition to for instance Baganda nationalism:

> "The behaviour of the educated and business elite certainly indicates that racial, national, and vocational considerations were of major importance and that socialism was

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[195] H. M. Luande, MP for Kampala East, Uganda Hansard, 29 April 1970, 193.

[196] Letter to the editor, Economic Independence, by D. R. Mlangwa in Dar es Salaam, *The Nationalist*, 26 January 1967.

[197] Dorman, Hammett and Nugent discussed how this form exclusion was part of the nation-building process in many African states: Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent, 'Introduction: Citizenship and its Casualties in Africa', 9.

> something to which only ritualistic obeisance was paid if any concern was expressed about it at all."[198]

The practical implementation of Uganda's socialist agenda indicates that socialist policies and narratives were understood as one means to implement nationalistic protectionism: There was never a comprehensive scheme of socialism, the Ugandan cabinet under Obote rather used selective socialist policies when it believed it would reach the goal of restricting foreign and Asian economic dominance. The Trade Licensing Act, which effectively promoted the strengthening of African petty capitalism,[199] is a good counterexample, which shows that there was no comprehensive socialist strategy. On the contrary, a nationalistic approach, which the Trade Licensing Act was a result of, was at the core of the political strategy of the Obote regime long after the Buganda crisis 1966 and the introduction of the new constitution. This is unlike Tanzania, where we find a comprehensive approach embracing socialism on all levels, starting with the political elite by introducing the leadership code.

In both countries, the economic policy of the late 1960s was rhetorically legitimised by a socialist narrative, which went back to the two socialist documents, the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania and *The Common Man's Charter* in Uganda. Both documents insist on the necessity of moving the economy towards a more socialist path. The Arusha Declaration further points out the importance of rural development and of the peasant as the central figure to implement socialism. One major difference to *The Common Man's Charter* is the leadership code which indicates a commitment of TANU leaders to socialism starting with cutting their own privileges to get on with socialism. *The Common Man's Charter* is characterised by the question of Ugandan national unity surrounding the conflict between the different kingdoms which was provisionally resolved by the introduction of the new Ugandan constitution and the erection of the first Ugandan Republic.[200] Thereby *The Common Man's Charter* seems in part more a retrospect of the past than a vision for the future as it does not include the clear policy directions which the Arusha Declaration entailed. At the same time, it does not endorse socialism as ideology but rather approves of it as a practical means of policy. Feudalism not Capitalism (although named) is identified as the major enemy of Uganda's nation.[201]

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198 Ryan, 'Economic nationalism and socialism in Uganda': 152.

199 Ibid., 151.

200 There is a stark emphasis on the threat of feudalism and tribalism through the whole document, claiming that feudalism continued after independence and needs to be suppressed in the process of nation-building: Obote, *The Common Man's Charter*, 2f.

201 Julius Nyerere, 'The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance', Part 1 (a).

Regarding the implementation of socialism, Tanzania and Uganda differ in the intensity. While it can be claimed that Tanzania used a more or less comprehensive strategy, which step by step touched on all major economic sectors, Uganda started out to combine initial socialist policies with the support for private entrepreneurship which followed the logic of Africanisation rather than socialist ideas. The way Obote implemented socialist policies – reluctantly and only situationally but never comprehensively – suggests that even without the Amin coup in 1971 it is unlikely that the Obote regime would have aimed at a radical socialist reform process. There is much to be said for this, e. g. that the Obote government already started to back paddle on the nationalisation of industry only a few months after the Nakivubo Pronouncement. Further, economic policies partly contradicted each other: Nationalising industry and banks stood in a crass contrast to the implementation of the Trade Licensing Act which was mainly addressing Asian petty traders and aimed at regulating non-African residency rights by redistributing economic opportunities unevenly between African entrepreneurs. Of course, due to the lack of time, the Obote government had to implement its Move to the Left, one cannot predict, how this policy would have continued.

Another major difference of how the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments used socialism as agenda for its transformation process of the economy was the fact that TANU leaders openly addressed the question of racial discrimination as a possible obstacle to a socialism for all. Since its foundation, TANU and Nyerere as its major figure had fought colonial racism and had insisted on equality between the races. Now the party found itself in a position where its policies clearly favoured a certain part of the population while discriminating another along racial lines. To align their policy of nationalisation with TANU's overriding principles was therefore a necessary move. The Arusha Declaration was called racist by critics mostly from abroad, as it targeted Asians and Europeans as the main owner of capital. Nyerere defended his policy when he published an article called "Socialism is not racialism." There he claimed that Tanzania's socialism would treat people in accordance to the effort they showed in building the nation:

> "To try and divide up the people working for our nation into groups of 'good' and 'bad' according to their skin colour, or their national origin, or their tribal origin, is to sabotage the work we have just embarked upon. We should decide whether a person is efficient in a particular job, whether he is honest, and whether he is carrying out his task loyally."[202]

Nyerere further explained that although countries had in general the chance to control their economy either through domestic private enterprises or through a state or some sort of collective institution, this mostly did not work for African states:

[202] Nyerere, Julius, Socialism is not Racialism, 01 March 1967.

> "The pragmatist in Africa the man who is completely uncommitted to one doctrine or another, but claims only to deal with the situation as it is – will find that the real choice is a different one. We will find that the choice is between foreign private ownership on the one hand, and local collective ownership on the other. For I do not think there is any free state in Africa where there is sufficient local capital, or a sufficient number of local entrepreneurs, for locally-based capitalism to dominate the economy. Private investment in Africa means overwhelming foreign private investment. A capitalistic economy means a foreign dominated economy. […] The only way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the economic institutions of socialism."[203]

In an interview, Julius Nyerere himself raised the question whether socialism in the post-colonial African context could actually be compared to European socialism. He argues although Tanzania entered the socialist path, this caused a deeply nationalistic belief that socialism was the only effective way of reaching economic independence, since a western economic system would automatically result in dominance of foreign ownership in industry and trade as the first few years of independence had shown. By this Nyerere pointed out that socialism and nationalism did not automatically have to contradict one another. To a local journalist, Nyerere explained that neither Asians nor Africans were immune to indulging in exploitation and that it was simply a historical coincidence that *wabepari* and *wanyonyaji* were mainly Asians and Europeans:

> "Anything else, such as the skin-colour of those who manned these bourgeois and exploitative establishments is academic to it. But in Tanzania, as in all formerly colonized parts of the world, such people happen to be of European origin. In East Africa, moreover, the Asian, who occupied the middle place in the racial stockpile during colonial times, has been an accomplice. Hence a dangerous situation has obtained that the economic line has coincided with the race line. But it is an accident of history."[204]

Socialism therefore was not only ending Asian and European exploitation but also preventing a possible rise of exploitation by Africans:

> "Africans, he [Nyerere] told me, have every right to quit their leadership posts and join "Wakabaila" [landlords]. By the same token, a man of European or Indo-Pakistani origin

[203] Speech by Nyerere at the opening of the Tanzania Breweries extensions, 28 February 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

[204] Those parasites and parastatals, The way I see it, Philip Ochieng, *The Standard*, 13 November 1970.

> who has been "mbepari" [a capitalist], can become a leader. […] But "wanyonyaji" [exploiters] die hard. And the war in Tanzania – which is a universal war – is a war between bourgeois capitalism and socialist leadership. […] before it is too late we must prevent the birth of an African bourgeois class in Tanzania. […] Mwalimu's remark's quoted earlier means that Africans can always decide to join the exploiters. Many had already done so, and many more partook of the loot during the post-colonial scramble for personal wealth. It means that Arusha will deal with them as it deals with any other parasite."[205]

Nyerere further defends the discrimination of Asians and Europeans as a result of the new economic policies by pointing out that despite an incidental correlation between race and class, the class system was the actual target of Tanzanian socialism, not race: "It is regrettable that the economic war we are waging here happens to take racial lines. But the truth is that it is war against a system not against races."[206] In an earlier speech of 1967, shortly after the Arusha Declaration, the Tanzanian president endorsed once again his believe that Africanisation policies meant the promotion of all Tanzanian citizens including non-African citizens: "Certainly we are interested in the Africanisation of management – a term which incorporates all Tanzania citizens regardless of colour."[207]

With this rhetoric Nyerere elegantly managed the racial radicalism within the middle ranks of TANU and the moderate line of his own cabinet and foreign press. While he confirmed clichés of Asian exploitation, he at the same time soothed the minorities in Tanzania as well as a moderate audience by at least theoretically dissociating race and class. This way, Nyerere successfully balanced a wide range of opinions within his own party about the right approach of dealing with economic inequality, without rejecting any.

Tanzanian leading politicians used the socialist framing to justify their policy which was in its effects highly racial. They claimed that the Arusha Declaration and its aftermath had nothing to do with racism as it never targeted Asians due to their race but rather due to their economic position within society. TANU rhetorically embedded its own policy in a global fight against capitalism and reminded the African public as well as the foreign observer of the global interconnectedness of the ideas of socialism. However, both in Tanzania and Uganda Asians were step by step excluded from economic opportunities. This narrowing of economic space was not limited to Asian non-citizens. It also affected Tanzanian citizen of Asian origin especially in the two nationalisation waves. In fact, Tanzanian Asians with local citizenship

[205] Ibid.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Speech by Nyerere at the opening of the Tanzania Breweries extensions, 28 February 1967, FCO 31/73, UKNA.

were most affected by the Tanzanian Building Act since that they were more likely to own rental property. The shaping of local *citizenship culture* in the early years of independence, as analysed in chapter II.1, was strongly reliant on racial affiliation rather than legal status. This enabled Tanzanian and Ugandan politicians alike to progressively restrict the access of Asians with local citizenship as well as Asian non-citizens to various sectors of the economy.

Conclusion

While Tanzania ideologically and practically followed a comprehensive socialist agenda, Uganda's economic politics were characterised by a nationalistic protectionism which selectively used socialist policies as means to restrict economic access for constructed outsiders such as Asians, Europeans, and other non-Ugandan Africans. Tanzanian policy restricted the access to former Asian privileges and excluded Asians from their former economic monopolies. In contrast, the Ugandan policy actually aimed to exclude Asians physically from Ugandan territory, starting with the countryside by introducing African trading zones and continuing by linking residency to the successful application for work permits. However, Tanzanian socialist policies in particular the Acquisition of Buildings Act of 1971, likewise urged tens of thousands of Asians with and without local citizenship to leave East Africa.

After 1972 almost no Asians were left in Uganda, and the Asian minorities in Tanzania had more than halved. In Tanzania, the sharp reduction of Asian residents goes almost solely back to economic restrictions which were implemented between 1961 and increasingly after 1967. The nationalisation of nearly all sectors of the economy meant that the vast majority of Asians did not see a future in Tanzania although the country had not targeted Asians through similar immigration laws as in Uganda – let alone had ordered them all to leave the country at once. Uganda followed a nationalistic approach, using nationalist slogans such as "Ugandans first" and tried to reduce the actual number of Asians in the country using race as the main category. At the same time, Tanzania built its nationalisation policy on a strong socialist ideology with the main goal to diminish class from Tanzanian society, thereby including Asians in the main class of exploiters.

III.2 Closing borders: From immigration laws to the 1972 expulsion of the Ugandan Asians

While the years succeeding independence were defined by a search for national self-conceptions and forms of nationhood together with a very pragmatic ad hoc approach to handle pressing issues such as Africanisation, the late 1960s present a more organised overall approach including medium to long-term policies on how to deal with the Asian minority and their economic monopolies in trade and industry. When it comes to secondary literature about the Asian minority especially in Uganda, the year 1972 is often named as the historical caesura. For it was the year in which Asians in Uganda were expelled from their East African home. I argue, however, that the year 1967 should be identified as this watershed moment which directed the policies regarding the Asian minority in East Africa in the coming years. Two main events during 1967 – if not determined – so at least steered the subsequent immigration and economic policies as well as state propaganda in the East African countries: the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania and the Kenya Immigration Act (KIA) in tandem with the Kenya Trade Licensing Act (KTLA). They were both key events in the region: the KIA led to new immigration regimes implemented by multiple countries while the Arusha Declaration and the notion of *ujamaa*, the specific Tanzanian form of socialism, shaped Tanzanian political decisions regarding concepts and ideals of citizenship but also influenced the direction that other East African economies were taking. Uganda's Common Man's Charter of 1969 calling for a "Move to the Left" echoed the trend the Arusha Declaration had set. By analysing how Asians were situated within the early independent state and society, we can see a tangible shift from a focus on the imaginary to physical space. Creating a national imaginary space which excluded Asians from national space by defining them as non-citizens as shown in chapter II.1 in the years leading up to the shift in 1967, was the prerequisite for excluding them more and more from economic opportunities. This trend was inflated after Arusha by the nationalisation of Asian property as well as the exclusion of Asians from physical space which was in particular discernible during the 1972 expulsion of Asians from Uganda. The following chapter will reflect on regional and global trends in immigration policy and discuss the amendment of citizenship law and how it resulted in the final expulsion of Ugandan Asians from East Africa.

This chapter will illustrate the exclusion of Asians from the political and consequently physical space and ultimately from Ugandan soil as a process influenced by multiple state and non-state actors rather than an impulsive event by a single authoritarian leader.[1] Moreover, I will

[1] Peterson and Taylor have reminded as to write history about the Amin time from a more critical angle: Peterson and Taylor, 'Rethinking the state in Idi Amin's Uganda: the politics of exhortation'.

demonstrate that this process of exclusion was not a unique, self-contained event but part of a wider debate surrounding imperial and national belonging which concerned most newly independent societies not only in East Africa but on the whole African continent and in other post-imperial states. Thus, the exodus of Asians from East Africa must be understood as only one example of post-imperial demographic unmixing as well as in the context of *citizenship making*. The muddled citizen status of Asians in East Africa can only be understood by contextualising it within the evolution of imperial citizenship in a decaying British Empire. This chapter will therefore illustrate how the British Nationality Act of 1948 and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 played into the status of Asians in East Africa. Following this, we will discuss how the Tanzanian government tried to expel some hundreds of Asians from Tanzanian towns in an initial attempt to use the blurring lines of belongings in favour of unmixing the Tanzanian urban space and how resistance – globally, in civil society as well as in TANU – hindered this expulsion order from going through. The various and entangled forms East African states as well as the UK experimented with new legislations to lock out Asians from their state territory will be analysed, highlighting specifically how Uganda's new policies were influenced by the UK's and Kenya's shifts to restricted immigration regimes. Finally, we will see how with Idi Amin's coup d'état the speed-up of unmixing led to the withdrawal of citizenship of Ugandan Asians and the expulsion of almost all Asians from Uganda in 1972.

Brubaker's concept of unmixing as a long-term process based on the reconfiguration of political space can be applied to the exclusionary process of the Asian minority in East Africa. I argue that the exclusion of Asians from political space while not founded on a long-term strategy by the East African governments still followed a logical pattern and a distinct rationale, which comprises three consecutive steps, each step targeting one specific group of people. At the end of those three steps stands the absolute exclusion of all Asians from East African society and effectively from East African soil: (1) the exclusion of non-citizens who were accused or convicted of "cheating" or smaller criminal offences (often due to highly restrictive laws targeting Asians); (2) the exclusion of non-citizens in general, (3) the exclusion of non-African citizens.

Disentangling the colonial legacy of British imperial citizenship

To understand the crisis surrounding immigration within the Commonwealth, we must look back to the first legislation which dealt with the question of national and imperial belonging in the slowly decaying British Empire. In 1948, a year after Indian and Pakistani independence, the British parliament passed the British Nationality Act (BNA). Yet, the BNA was not a direct reaction to the independence of British India, it was rather a response to citizenship

legislations in the Old Commonwealth namely Canada and Australia. The BNA was supposed to give answers to the burgeoning questions of belonging and state responsibilities concerning former empire subjects:

> "The BNA constituted an attempt to reconstitute a pre-war definition of British subjecthood, and a related system of imperial migration that had been threatened by a unilateral action on Canada's part. The act was a fundamentally backward-looking document reaffirming the status quo as it had existed for decades."[2]

The idea of citizenship outlined in the BNA was a highly inclusive one and formed a multiracial and multinational imperial citizenship.[3] Consequently, most inhabitants of former British colonies could choose the British passport adopting Commonwealth and UK citizen status (CUKC) and thus state their relationship to the Empire. The BNA also put in writing what had long been common practice; it sanctioned by law the open-door policy as essential part of the British immigration regime, which basically meant that former and current subjects of the colonies could enter and stay in the UK with their British passports. 1This form of imperial citizenship is unparalleled in history at the time of writing and allowed 800 million subjects of the British Empire unlimited freedom of movement in a geographical construct which consisted of one quarter of the earth's surface.[4] However, those implications had not been anticipated by either the civil servants in the administration nor British lawmakers. The legislation was in fact part of a wider reconfiguration of Commonwealth identity mainly considering the old meaning "white" citizens of the Commonwealth. It was a reaction to a new citizenship law in Canada in 1946 which was seen as a threat to the Commonwealth being the main identity forming factor. Shortly after Canada, Australia adopted similar legislation. Other states, for instance South Africa, were expected to follow. A break-off of the Old Dominions was dreaded, as they were central to British foreign and economic policy.[5]

With more and more colonies achieving their independence, the British government wanted to boost the idea of a Commonwealth identity to protect British influence in a decolonised world and tried to show that all British subjects were entitled to the same privileges and

2 Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 35.

3 Hampshire, James. *Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the politics of demographic governance in postwar Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

4 Joppke, Christian. *Immigration and the nation-state: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

5 Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 43f.

protections which came along with the CUKC and their relationship to the British sovereign.[6] The influx of people from the New Commonwealth in early post-war Britain was therefore surprisingly unexpected and accidental rather than encouraged by British politicians. The BNA only legally determined what had already been convention before 1948. However, until 1948 only a small number of colonial subjects had actually used the option to enter the UK.[7] Indeed, imperial Britain had previously known migratory practice mainly from Britain to the colonies and not the other way around.

Hansen points out that, while a commitment to an open-door policy within the Commonwealth existed, this system of inter-imperial migration was intended to include the Old Commonwealth, thus migration between the UK and its Old Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.[8] Migration from the "New Commonwealth" was tolerated in limited numbers but it was neither the purpose of the BNA nor was it even broadly anticipated when the BNA was adopted.[9] Any subsequent legislation on the British migration systems and citizenship reforms had to take the BNA into account.[10] The BNA formed the basis for all ensuing legislation and "proved extremely complicated to reform […]. In this sense, while the British Nationality Act did not create a right where none had existed, it amounted to more then [sic!] a mere formalization of past practice."[11]

When Africa started to gain independence the unplanned repercussions of the BNA had become a burden for the British government which saw racial tensions within British society rising. During the 1950s, Britain experienced what many members of the white British communities understood as an "unstoppable influx" of people from the Global South. In fact, the numbers of people with Asian or African (mainly African-Caribbean) heritage had decupled. Racism was growing and protests by members of the white majority were audible and visible. The Notting Hill Race Riots of 1958, during which gangs of youngsters and neo-fascist groups attacked mostly West Indian residents, jolted British society. Migration became a leading topic in British news coverage and public opinion turned against the government's open-door

6 Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*, 23.

7 Hansen has analysed the parliamentary debates in advance of the adaptation of the bill and has shown that the possibility of a bigger influx from colonial subjects to Britain was overlooked: Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 53.

8 Ibid., 36.

9 Ibid.

10 In fact, the afterpains of empire and the imperial citizenship established by the BNA can be felt far beyond the 20th century with members of the Windrush generation who were rightful British citizens having suffered from wrongful deportation orders to leave the UK which came to light during the Windrush scandal in 2018.

11 Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 37.

policy. The attacks committed by white youths against immigrants of different races raised the question of whether British society had reached its tolerance threshold towards immigration.[12] This was the beginning of the reoccurring narrative that "good race relations depended on tight controls on migration."[13] Informal controls in the colonies which were supposed to lead to a lower rate of emigration were a first attempt by the UK government to reduce immigrant numbers while at the same time still affirming an inclusive Commonwealth citizenry.[14] However, as this only had a limited effect, the Conservative Government turned to another strategy.

Parliament adopted the first Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 (CIA 1962) which revoked the rights of millions of people with British passports who themselves had not been born or whose parents had not been born in the UK. The CIA of 1962 introduced the division of subjecthood:[15] a "differentiation of citizenship rights according to belonging and, eventually, the redefinition of citizenship in terms of descent."[16] The main incongruity of the CIA was that it was introduced without a reform of the British Nationality Act and therefore without any reform of citizenship. The CUKC status was maintained, no legal distinction had been made between the official status of inhabitants of the British Isles and of inhabitants of the British colonies. Yet, at the same time, although they had equal status, there were differentiations in their rights.[17] This inconsistency shaped forthcoming immigration policy for the following decades.[18] It divided CUKCs in first- and second-class citizens.

Commonwealth and UK citizens, who had not been born in the UK and did not hold a passport issued by the UK government, were subject to immigration control. This also affected

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[12] Ibid., 83.

[13] Ibid., 90.

[14] Randall Hansen points out, that informal controls were not supposed to undermine the established open-door policy but rather to keep it alive by fighting back categorical restrictionism of an exclusive immigration law. Some members of the Conservative government, specifically in the Colonial Office, actually believed the introduction of formal migration control would mean the end of the Commonwealth: ibid., 95; 98. Hansen also illustrates the debate surrounding the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and shows the unpopularity of the bill even within the governing Conservative party: "Whatever credit the Conservatives may have taken for the act later in the decade, the legislation was viewed as a distasteful necessity of which they were not proud.": Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 111.

[15] Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 123.

[16] Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*, 25. On the debate surrounding Irish exemption see: Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*, 26–9. On the Irish issue: Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 115–8.

[17] The Colonial Office, having lost their fight against immigration control, kept advocating a privileged role of people with CUKC status over alien citizens: Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 105.

[18] Ibid., 101.

people who held passports which were issued by a colonial government but did not concern CUKCs who held a passport under the authority of the London government (which did include British High Commissions). Thereby, British lawmakers succeeded in maintaining the ties between Britain and the Old Commonwealth. Everyone else with CUKC status had to apply for an entry permit which was based on a voucher scheme that favoured skilled workers and allowed between 30,000 and 40,000 immigrants to enter the UK per year.[19] Yet, when allowing a substantial number of immigrants through the voucher system into Britain, the government had not anticipated the numbers of secondary immigration by spouses and dependents.[20]

British Asians in East Africa, however, held a special status after African independence. While the countries they lived in were still under colonial rule, they were not exempt from the CIA 1962. However, once the East African states became independent, Asians could bypass the CIA of 1962.[21] Responsible for this loophole was the clause which exempted passport holders who held passports issued under the authority of the British government. When they went to the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam, Kampala or Nairobi and reapplied for a new British passport the issuing authority was now the UK Government and no longer a colonial government since the High Commission was a British government institution. Hence, their new passports would give them unhindered access to British territory. Furthermore, the British government had largely overestimated how many East African Asians would apply for local citizenship. With the numbers anticipated outreaching the actual numbers of naturalisations and registration, there was a significant number of British passport holders left in East Africa, who were linked to the UK by imperial affiliation. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 would have been so far successful in the eyes of the British legislators if all CUKCs in the colonies had adopted local citizenship, however in case of the Asians this was clearly not the case. For this reason, the end of the 1960s, the British and East African governments started counting and actively grouping East African populations into defined categories of responsibility to prepare their governmental departments for the looming battle of belonging. Due to increasingly restrictive policy targeting the economic monopoly of the Asian minority, many East African Asians had emigrated in the years after independence with Britain as the main destination. But then again, the major exodus of Asians from East Africa was still to come,

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[19] Those CUKC, who were subject to entry control, were also subject to deportation if they committed a crime and were at least 18 years old: ibid., 110; 119.

[20] Ibid., 124.

[21] On the controversy about whether this backdoor was kept open deliberately or incidentally for Asians from East Africa by the British government, see Hansen discussion on the topic: Hansen, Randall. 'The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968'. *The Historical Journal* 42, no. 3 (1999): 809–834.

when the policies targeting Asians in East Africa became more stringent later in the decade and at the start of the 1970s.

Criminalising Asian Traders: Tanzania's expulsion attempt

In East Africa, over time, non-citizens with originally valid entry and work permits were criminalised by the implementation of laws or regulations which were often part of the overall Africanisation policy. By Africanising jobs, non-citizens lost their work permits and with their work permits regularly their right of residence. They became prohibited immigrants; this way their deportation was legitimised. The first more organised expulsion of non-citizens (mainly of Asian origin) took place in Tanzania. Already in April 1966, the British Interests Section of the Canadian High Commission in Dar es Salaam[22] warned the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that the Tanzanian Government planned to review the residence permits of all non-citizens.[23]

The expulsion of non-citizens who were convicted of serious crimes is a standard procedure of most nation-states and follows widely accepted international norms.[24] In Tanzania and Uganda, this procedure shifted over time to expelling non-citizens who were charged or only accused of smaller offences as well as of actions which were interpreted by the public as wrong-doings. Those wrong-doings could be anything from what was commonly termed as cheating – some sort of economical or administrative misconduct – to insulting a Tanzanian or Ugandan citizen as shown in chapter II.1. This way of specifically targeting individual non-citizens had appeared sporadically from independence on but was extended over time to targeting certain groups of non-citizens.

One of the first cases of systematic expulsion which gained international attention occurred in Tanzania in 1967, when the government expelled hundreds of non-citizen traders from its territory. In January 1967, the local police had started to perform unexpected and extensive permit checks including round ups, house to house and shop to shop checks

[22] In 1964, Tanzania had broken off diplomatic relations with the UK due to the UK's Rhodesia policy. During this period, British interests in Tanzania were looked after by the Canadian High Commission, particularly by the British Interests Sections of the Canadian High Commission. Britain was able to re-establish an own British High Commission in Dar es Salaam only in 1968. More on the erosion of diplomatic relations between Tanzania and Britain see: Pratt, *The critical phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968*, 147.

[23] Letter from B. H. Heddy to Miss Ellie, 08 February 1967, FCO 47/46, UKNA.

[24] However, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 stated that not only non-citizens but even CUKCs, who were subject to immigration control, would be affected by deportation in case of imprisonment following a conviction.

particularly in Dar es Salaam but also in Mwanza, Arusha and other Tanzanian towns. In the course of those permit checks, up to 500 non-citizens – the vast majority of which were of Asian origin – were found to have no valid entry permits and were therefore declared prohibited immigrants. They were given two months to leave Tanzania. The government claimed they were "permit dodgers" who had bribed immigration officers to receive a residency permit.[25] The British Interests Section of the Canadian High Commission in Dar es Salaam, however, reported that allegedly two Asians had their entry permits torn-up by police.[26] The following weeks saw further increasing checks by the immigration office and the police mainly concerning Asian non-citizens with the exception of a few Arabs and only one or two Europeans.[27] At the same time there were reports about 20 Kenyans in Mwanza who equally got expelled from Tanzania being told they were "undesirable people." They had to leave the country at short notice and had no chance to take their savings with them.[28]

According to a conversation between the Canadian High Commissioner Alan McGill and the Principal Secretary of the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ernest Mulokozi the reason for the operation was a "completely corrupt" division in the Tanzanian immigration department which had issued residence permits without authorisation often acquired by Asians who had bribed the officers:[29]

> "Finally, Mulokozi admitted there had been growing political pressure on authorities to do something about alien merchants said to be preventing Africans from getting ahead in business. All these factors culminated in [the] decision by [the] Minister [of] Home Affairs that a house to house check for illegal residents would have to be made."[30]

Mulokozi explained to McGill that the permits which had been torn apart were illegally acquired and therefore invalid. He also assured Canadian High Commissioner McGill that should there be any persons who were confronted with becoming stateless, that Tanzania would follow its international obligations and treat them sympathetically, "if necessary allowing them to stay."[31] What becomes apparent from Mulokozi's statement is, however, that the

25 Permits, *The Standard,* 26 January 1967.
26 Dar es Salaam to CO, Telno.110, 26 January 1967, FCO31/177, UKNA.
27 McGill, Dar es Salaam, to London, 06 February 1967, FCO31/177, UKNA.
28 20 Kenyans expelled from Mwanza, *The Standard*, 21 January 1967.
29 McGill, Dar es Salaam, to London, 06 February 1967, FCO31/177, UKNA.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.

expulsions indicated a strong sentiment of Asians not being entitled to have economic success and consequently take up space in the context of the new nation state.

The situation calmed down in the end of February 1967. The Canadian High Commissioner McGill, the Indian High Commissioner N. V. Rao and William Wilson from the Canadian High Commissioner of the British Interest Section met with Mr Niakyi from the Tanzanian Foreign Affairs Ministry. Niakyi informed the three diplomats that the Tanzanian government intended to review all cases of invalid entry permits and considered dropping some of them under the condition of discretion by all concerned. According to Wilson, Niakyi was especially anxious that any of those plans could be leaked to the press.[32] Wilson notes that he "was left wondering whether in fact the Tanzanian Government is on the point of a complete *volte face*."[33] The reason for such a change of mind in Wilson's eyes lay in the disputes within the government:

> "It seems fairly sure that Sijaona's [Minister for Home Affairs] man-hunt has much displeased his colleagues including, I suspect, the President, and that efforts are being made to bring him to heel without loss of face."[34]

Shortly after the meeting, on 28 February 1967, the Tanzanian government publicly announced the plans of reviewing all recent expulsion orders by a four-man National Committee and conceded that "it is possible that in the process […] hardship has been caused or that some people have been treated unfairly."[35] This committee would review the circa 500 expulsion orders which had been issued so far and would consider certain non-citizens who were affected by those for Tanzanian citizenship.[36] Two weeks later the committee had decided, that some of the people who were affected by the expulsion orders would be granted additional three to twelve month extensions to leave the country.[37] Of the 170 cases that were heard; all but three had been granted extensions to follow the expulsion order.[38] However, for many people the government's

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32 Niakyi talked about discretion, "[a]t this point he looked meaningly at Mr. Rao who giggled nervously." Rao had embarrassed the Minister of Foreign Affairs by having released information to the press before. Letter from the Canadian High Commissioner, William Wilson, to Reginald H. Hobden, East African Political Department, Commonwealth Office, 22 February 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

33 Ibid. Underlining in original source.

34 Ibid.

35 Telegram, Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth Office, 01 March 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

36 Expelled traders may become citizens, *The Standard*, 16 March 1967.

37 Quoting an article in *The Standard* of the same day, Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth Office, 15 March 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA; Material for supplementary questions, 27 April 1967, FCO 47/46, UKNA.

38 Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth Office, 18 March 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

back peddling and the review process came too late. Many – 300 of 500 according to an article in the British newspaper *The Guardian*[39] – had by then left or had sold their businesses and were about to leave East Africa with their travel already paid for.[40] The expellees did not leave alone but most of the time took their families with them. Until 01 February 1967, 543 bookings to India had already been made, the Tanzanian newspaper *The Standard* reported.[41]

The case of M. L. Dhir, a police officer, who had acquired Tanzanian citizenship after independence and was stripped of his citizenship and ordered to leave the country on 27 May 1967, drew particular attention: by losing his citizenship Dhir became stateless. He had left Tanzania on a plane for London.[42] The British authorities, however, denied British responsibility for Dhir. His wife on the other hand had a British passport. This was another case where *citizenship practices* within families led to very messy legal statuses of families as entities, which could turn out to be very useful for the individual. The UK finally admitted Dhir into the country on the grounds of his wife's nationality. The expulsion was followed by criticism in the moderate newspaper *The Standard*. Although the policeman had allegedly committed a felony, the government did not explain what they accused him of. Instead of charging him with a crime, the Tanzanian authorities prompted his deportation. In an opinion piece the anonymous author criticised that once a government accepted a person as its citizen, the responsibility for this person could not simply be shaken off by stripping them off their citizenship. Rather the government would need to deal with the naturalised citizen the same way as with any other of its citizens:

> "[…] we do suggest that as a citizen must accept all the duties imposed on him, he must also receive the rights that citizenship implies. One of these is that he must be governed by the same laws. In which case, if this man's offence warranted it, he should have been brought before a court of law."[43]

The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office was particularly worried that by accepting expelled Asians from Tanzania the Tanzanian government could assume that the UK government

39 Asians leave before review, *The Guardian*, 04 March 1967, Newspaper clipping, FCO 47/46, UKNA.

40 This led to a spike in prices for certain services like haircuts in Arusha, as many barbers had left the country: Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth Office, 13 March 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA; Many Asians on the way to India, *The Nationalist*, 11 March 1967; Expelled Asians leave Arusha, *The Standard*, 11 March 1967.

41 Bookings for India soar, *The Standard*, 01 February 1967.

42 The case also caused confusion in the different departments as it was passed on between Passport Control, General and Migration Department, as none of the departments felt responsible for the case: Handwritten notes between 06 June 1967 and 11 July 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

43 Deportee, *The Standard*, 30 May 1967, newspaper clipping in FCO 31/177, UKNA.

would generally take in all future deportees: "The local governments could well be encouraged to further expulsions if they could rely on us to remove the victims."[44] Hence, no British diplomat approached the Tanzanian government regarding the case of the expelled policeman to not raise awareness of the fact that the UK had accepted him into the country:

> "We have as yet no settled policy on what to do if there are mass deportations of Asian British subjects, and would not want the Tanzanians to make false inferences by our issuing disclaimers in this particular instance."[45]

The statement of the Indian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, N. V. Rao, that India would not allow non-citizens into India led to further consternations from the British government and within the Asian communities. Travel to India was much cheaper than to Britain – by sea £ 26 to Bombay compared to £ 140 to Britain[46] – and it was easier and cheaper to take one's belongings on a boat than on a plane. Therefore, most Asian non-citizens who were affected by the expulsion orders decided on going to India. This also applied to those British passport holders who could not afford the journey to Britain for their whole family (at such short notice and with spiking prices due to increased demand).

The expulsion of mainly Asian non-citizens from the Tanzanian mainland was still ongoing, when the Zanzibari government declined re-entry to non-citizen residents who had left the archipelago with existing re-entry permits. Those permits were announced to be invalid, and the persons concerned needed to re-apply for new permits.[47]

Local and international newspapers reported on the expulsion of those hundreds of non-citizens. The Tanzanian press commented in a favourable manner like in an opinion piece in the more radical *The Nationalist*: "Surely time has now come when an iron broom should be used to sweep all non-citizens enjoying the fruits of Uhuru to the detriment of *Wananchi*. After all it is better for a country to live with principled people than to harbor hypocrites."[48] *The Nationalist* further called on the Tanzanian government to expel Asian non-citizens who worked in jobs which could be performed by locals.[49] Special criticism was directed towards non-citizens

44 Letter from A. D. Laing to Mr Jones, without date, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

45 Letter from A. D. Laing to Canadian High Commission Dar es Salaam, 25 July 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

46 Ca. £ 480 compared to ca. £ 2,600 in 2020, according to the Bank of England inflation calculator: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator.

47 Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth Office, 21 April 1967, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

48 A most welcome step, The Nationalist quoted on 26 January 1967, telegram no. 110, FCO 31/177, UKNA.

49 Ibid.

who had allegedly left the country directly after independence and had taken their assets with them "when the country needed money most" and then returned to Tanzania later on when they had "learnt of Tanzania's economic progress."[50]

The attempt of expelling Asian non-citizen traders coincided with the Arusha Declaration which subsequently shaped the future strategy towards the Asian minority. This strategy of restricting economic opportunities by closing the economic space for Asians made expulsions ultimately unnecessary. However, for British authorities in 1967 the development in Tanzania indicated an expulsion of all Asian non-citizens was most likely in Tanzania and least likely in Uganda.[51] This of course turned out to be a wrong assessment, as the Ugandan state dealt in the most extreme manner with its Asian population. In the same year the focus quickly shifted, and Kenya became the main trouble spot regarding the treatment of the Asian minorities.

Tightening immigration legislation: Regional and global trends of restricting national space

The situation for the Asian minorities in East Africa aggravated further in July 1967 when the Kenyan government passed the Kenya Immigration Act (KIA) and shortly after, in October 1967, the Trade Licensing Bill. The former entitled the government to complete control over entry and work permits. Most importantly it ruled that permanent residency which used to be proven by respective certificates did not entitle non-citizens to work in Kenya anymore.[52] The Trade Licensing Act of October 1967 forced all businesses run by non-citizens as well as self-employed non-citizens in professions, which were dominated by Asians, to apply for new trade licenses and work permits.[53] The KIA and the Kenyan Trade Licensing Act implemented correlating policies, which were only effective in combination and aimed to exclude non-Kenyan citizens.

The new pieces of legislation were influenced by domestic policies as well as global developments. Kenya, like the other East African states, had struggled with the economic legacy of colonial rule after independence. The Kenya Immigration Act was part of a wider Africanisation project which aimed to give Africans access to key positions in the local economy. Moreover,

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50 Expulsion net widened, *The Nationalist*, 18 January 1967.

51 Repatriation to United Kingdom of Asian United Kingdom citizens from East Africa, 27 July 1967, FCO47/46, UKNA.

52 Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 276.

53 It affected 9,000 traders without Kenyan citizenship and their dependents. They had to pay £ 25 as application fee and provide a £ 150 security bond. Because the permits were only valid for a few months, the traders had to repeatedly reapply for an extension, which was again costly.

the KIA reacted to the tightening immigration control at British borders and the reduction of entry visas to Britain, as well as to the swelling fear of the Kenyan government that the British government would pass on their legal responsibility for the British passport holders of the c.176,000 Asians living in Kenya to the Kenyan state.[54] The KIA in combination with the Kenyan Trade Licensing Act had the desired result: between September 1967 and February 1968, 33,000 people left Kenya which accounted for 18 per cent of the Asian population in Kenya. The majority of them left for the United Kingdom.[55]

The influx of increasing numbers of migrants from East Africa led to an outcry in the British population and bred the political atmosphere in which Enoch Powell, Conservative Member of Parliament, would make his infamous River of Blood speech.[56] The British government felt the need to act quickly and close the loophole which the CIA 1962 had created, before more and more migrants from East Africa entered Britain. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 was adopted on 01 March and halted Asian migrants from entering British soil with immediate effect. It was supposed to ultimately close the door on unwelcome, particularly non-white, immigrants from East Africa. The CIA of 1968 was the final piece of the British legislative puzzle which effectively overrode the highly inclusive open-door policy the British Nationality Act of 1948 had legally sanctioned.[57] Not only did the CIA 1968 exclude members of the Commonwealth and the former colonies to enter their former motherland, but it also effectively devalued the passports of all passport holders who had not been born in the UK and whose parents had not been born there either.[58]

James Hampshire points out that while the CIA of 1962 was already redefining belonging by origin, the intensification of the CIA in 1968 made this distinction explicit.[59] The CIA of 1968 closed the loophole which was incorporated in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and had kept access to the UK open to East African Asians. By including a qualifying or

54 No. from 1963, 2 per cent of the population, see: Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya*, 266, 266.

55 Ibid., 262; 277.

56 Brooke, Peter. 'India, Post-Imperialism and the Origins of Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' Speech'. *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 3 (September 2007): 669–687. Smithies, Bill, and Peter Fiddick. *Enoch Powell on Immigration*. London: Sphere, 1969. Hansen, 'The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968'.

57 Successive immigration legislation like the UK Immigration Act 1971 and the British Nationality Act 1981 further strengthened the exclusivity of citizenship of British born in the UK as compared to those born in Overseas Territories: Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 224.

58 Coincidentally, this affected not only the targeted Asians from East Africa but some not considered groups of British passport holders like wives of members of the Diplomatic Service whose passports were not issued by the Passport Office in the UK: Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, Circular, 21 March 1968, FO612/341, UKNA.

59 Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*, 34.

"substantial connection" to the UK as a condition to be exempted from immigration control, the vast majority of Asians from East Africa were included in border checks. A substantial connection applied to all those who were born in Britain or had parents or grandparents who were born, naturalised or adopted in the UK.[60] Because the existing passports did not show this type of connection (apart from the passport holder's birthplace), it was tricky for British immigration officers to distinguish people who were exempted from control and those who were not. As the new Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 automatically exempted any person from immigration control who had a British passport issued in the UK, only passports issued overseas before 01 March 1968 were ambiguous.[61] After the first control following the CIA 1968, British authorities were prompted to put the new endorsement in the old passports, while new passports would already include the relevant endorsement.[62] In practice this meant, as the Home Office admitted, that immigration officers had to use racial profiling to select persons for more intensive checks at the border: "[…] this means that issuing officers will look more closely at claims for exemption from coloured people who, prima facie, would seem unlikely to have connections by birth with this country."[63] The situation since 1948 had changed. The increased influx of immigrants from the New Commonwealth had altered British public opinions. Equal treatment of all British subjects seemed politically less attractive now. The CIA of 1968 justified the exclusion of people with legal citizen status from the New Commonwealth stating: "[…] immigration control should be extended to citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who did not belong to this country in the sense of having any direct family connection with it or having been naturalized or adopted here."[64] In this attitude, we find a similar expression of citizenship as in East Africa of the same time: the notion that citizenship was more than just a legal regulation but grounded in a *citizenship culture* which set the rules of what sort of connection between citizens and the nation was expected.

British border control allowed the last East African Asians arriving from Kenya to enter the country without visa requirements on 01 March 1968 only because their plane had left Nairobi before midnight – which served as the cut-off time for the new CIA rules – and therefore the

[60] Letter from G. G. to L. E. Webb, 27 February 1968, FCO 612/341, UKNA; Hansen, *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*, 163.

[61] Letter Home Office to L. E. Webb, 27 February 1968, FO 612/341, UKNA.

[62] Following had to be written into the passport: "Holder is subject to control under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act", Circular, 02 March 1967, FO 612/341, UKNA.

[63] Letter Home Office to L. E. Webb, 27 February 1968, FO 612/341, UKNA. The checks would rely on the statement of the passport holder. Only when in doubt, the immigration officer should ask for documentation, which would prove the passport holders claims: Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, Circular, 02 March 1968, FO 612/341, UKNA.

[64] Conclusion of a meeting of the Cabinet held in 10 Downing Street, 15 February 1968, CAB128/43/13, UKNA, 7.

passengers were already "in the pipeline."[65] Others who had previously booked their flights from East Africa to the UK for the weeks after the bill was passed, were often stranded without a place to go, as their British passports had lost value and would not permit them to enter its issuing country. Britain had finally shut the door into the face of an estimated 200,000 East African Asians who held British passports and therefore belonged as CUKC via the muddled way of imperial subjecthood to the remains of the political entity of the British Empire.

A further difficulty for any Asian man with East African citizenship who was married to a British passport holder looking to enter the UK at this time was that citizenship and immigration laws were prone to discrimination based on gender. Thus, there were many clauses which made it easier for British husbands to bring their wives to the UK than the other way around. These legal frameworks were based on a traditional patrilineal notion of descent, which determines citizenship through the descent of the father or husband.[66] The close connection which was needed to be exempted from British immigration control could be by birth, descent or marriage. However, the close connection by marriage was exclusively valid for women who had married a man with qualifying connections, while a man who was married to a British woman with qualifying connections would not benefit from his wife's status.

The East African press took the CIA of 1968 as another proof that Britain was not willing to take responsibility for a complex situation which had risen from imperial migration under British control. While Asians were not necessarily pitied by local readers and journalists, the general opinion was that the UK should take responsibility for British passport holders and allow them to enter the UK.[67] Asians in East Africa and mainly Kenya, where the situation had worsened after the KIA, felt trapped between two states, neither of which they fully belonged to: "'The trouble,' says Mr. Priya Patel, 'is that we are too black for Britain and not black enough for Kenya.'"[68]

African politicians became concerned that with the CIA 1968 the UK would decline any support for British passport holders in East Africa, which could result in a situation where it became increasingly more difficult for the African governments to rid themselves of their local

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[65] Last Asians beat deadline, *East African Standard*, 04 March 1968.

[66] There are several states, which have a system of patrilineal citizenship; female citizens can lose their citizenship by marrying a foreigner. Candice Bredbenner has discussed the historical example of the US: Bredbenner, Candice L. *A nationality of her own: Women, marriage, and the law of citizenship*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1998. James Brennan examined patrilineal descent for Tanzania: Brennan, James R. 'Realizing Civilization through Patrilineal Descent: The Intellectual Making of an African Racial Nationalism in Tanzania, 1920–501'. *Social Identities* 12, no. 4 (2006): 405–423.

[67] Letter to the editor, Support for Kenya over Asian issue, by A. G. Okurug, 36 Wadham Road, *The People*, 11 April 1969; Asian pressure on Britain, *Uganda Argus*, 12 February 1970.

[68] How the immigrants are faring in Britain, *East African Standard*, 04 March 1968.

non-citizens. While the situation for Asians in Kenya and passport controls at the British border tightened, the Ugandan government therefore thought likewise about a way of releasing itself of any long-term responsibility for the local Asian minorities. The fact that the UK had not consulted Uganda but only Kenya when implementing the CIA 1968 had especially angered Uganda's President Milton Obote.[69] Although, Uganda finally implemented the Uganda Immigration Act in 1969, the new legislation was preceded by more than a year of consideration and drafting which worried the British government as files of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office suggest:[70]

> "We believe that the Uganda plan will be to prepare legislation and then introduce it very rapidly without advance warning; and subsequently to operate their new measures so as to exclude 20,000 Asians in the first 6 months, and a further 40,000 over the succeeding 4 ½ years, so that after 5 years only 20,000 would be left. The first wave would be those of least value to Uganda's economy – mainly shopkeepers, labourers and clerks."[71]

A report published by the Africanisation committee in Uganda supported the rumours that the Uganda government would be taking on the challenge of dealing with the Asian dominance in the Ugandan economy and the slippery status of Asian non-citizens.[72] However, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office was unaware of when the Ugandan Government would adopt a new immigration legislation and what it would mean for Asian emigration from East Africa. Richard Tallboys employed by the East African Department described the overall uncertain situation of the time: "[…] the clouds are gathering although we are unable to say just when the deluge be upon us (or whether *instead of a deluge* it will be a steady downpour)."[73]

President Milton Obote had declared that his government intended to pass a new immigration bill during the opening ceremony of the parliamentary session on 11 February 1969.[74] During the second reading of the UIA in March 1969 the Minister for Public Service and Cabinet Affairs, Joshua Wakholi, stated that it was time for non-indigenous people in

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69 Kampala to CO, Telno 838, 03 October 1968, FCO50/267, UKNA.

70 Telegram (838), Kampala to Commonwealth Office, 03 October 1968, FCO 50/267, UKNA; R. Slinger to Croft, 07 October 1968, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

71 Note Commonwealth Immigration. U. K. passport holders in Uganda, October 1968, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

72 Commonwealth Immigration, U. K. Passport Holders in Uganda, The Uganda Government's intentions, October 1968, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

73 R. G. Tallboys to Michael Scott "Uganda – Report of Committee on Africanisation", 08 October 1968, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

74 Kampala to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telno 5, 11 February 1969, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

Uganda to decide: "They would either have to follow Uganda wholeheartedly or […] become non-citizens."[75] In his speech, Wakholi as with many other Cabinet members and political figures diffused clear legal categories such as citizen and non-citizen, blurred categories of belonging such as non-indigenous or non-Africans and thereby indicated that legal definition were not so clear after all. At the same time, he criticised non-citizens for profiting from the country without giving something back: "The mere fact that somebody filed a piece of paper and paid for a permit was not enough to share the fruits of independence."[76]

The parliamentary debate of the Uganda Immigration Act reflects in many ways the issues raised in the Tanzanian Parliament eight years earlier when the Tanganyika Citizenship Bill was debated. Back then, East African politicians initially discussed the question of citizenship and belonging to the new independent states. By 1969, notions of citizenship and imaginaries of national belonging had become more rigid. The UIA debate furthermore echoes a certain frustration about ongoing economic inequality and social exclusiveness practised by many Asians in East Africa.

However, the government's standpoint was not shared by everyone: the MP of Ankole North-East and Democratic Party members, Boniface Byanyima while still voting for the adoption of the UIA dismissed a general defamation of Asians as the *Uganda Argus* reported:[77] "Mr B. Byanyima […] said that he did not support any statement which condemned a race as a whole. Anybody who said that a community should not be trusted was a person who should not be trusted himself." He called Wakholi's statement about Asians "not very responsible" and continued by saying there "were good Asians and bad Asians in the same way that there were good Africans and bad Africans." Samuel Odaka, Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as Basil Bataringaya, Minister of Internal Affairs, both denied that the bill was discriminatory on racial grounds, yet Bataringaya confirmed the legislation would mainly affect Asians while Odaka called it a "cruel necessity" to implement Ugandanisation also affecting "the small man."

As British observers had assumed, the Ugandan government combined the Immigration Act with a new Trade Licensing Act mirroring the two pieces of legislation passed in Kenya two years earlier. Finally, in the summer of 1969, the adopted policies started to take shape: Ugandan authorities stopped extending temporary employment passes and informed candidates that they had "no right to remain in Uganda" after their current pass ran out.[78] On 11 Septem-

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75 House approves Bill on immigration, *Uganda Argus*, 11 March 1969.

76 Ibid.

77 Immigration Bill – country's watchdog, *The People*, 11 March 1969.

78 One example was Mr Doshi, a British passport holder born in Kenya, who worked for East African Glass Works in Uganda and whose temporary employment pass was about to expire on 07 August 1969: "Application states that Immigration Department informed him that all T. E. P. [temporary

ber 1969 Minister Basil Bataringaya announced that an Immigration Control Board would be set up as part of the new bill to assess citizenship applications.[79]

Although the Ugandan parliament had already passed the two pieces of legislation in March 1969, they only published the exact new terms in September 1969 while still not having announced when non-citizens had to start applying for work and entry permits. By the beginning of November 1969, the new Immigration Control Board had finally been set up and the application forms were at last available for non-citizens to file their application. The new immigration act required all non-citizens apart from citizens of Kenya and Tanzania to apply for entry permits which were effectively work permits as non-citizens needed them to be able to work.[80] The permits were only valid for a limited time and cost 200 USh per person (plus 50 to 100 USh per dependant). This hindered non-citizens from planning a permanent stay in Uganda and created financial restraint on their families.

The reaction to the UIA by the African public was mainly positive. *Uganda Argus* reader J. O. Olwedo from Jinja drew a connection between the UIA and the still ongoing fight for independence: "The next fight must therefore be to achieve economic freedom in order to eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance. […] Such people [who are devoted to carry the burden of nation-building] can only be found among Citizens, because non-citizens can only work hard to exploit the citizens."[81] This mistrust towards non-citizens was prevalent.

A general anti-Asian attitude by the majority of Africans was also observed by Roy Billington, the representatives of the Church Mission Society (CMS), in Uganda. In the late 1960s, the Church Mission Society in Uganda got involved in campaigning for the plight of the Asians and addressed the issue with Ugandan church representatives as well as with CMS members at home in Britain. Part of the campaign CMS was sending another member, David Mason, to Uganda to write a report on the situation of the Asian population in late 1960s Uganda. The correspondence between Britain and Uganda offers us inside in the way individuals were affected by the new legislation. Billington writes on the Africans' attitude towards the Asian minorities in Uganda: "Last of all, there is the longstanding suspicion between Africans and Asians in East Africa, and African Christians are as much influenced by this as their secular

employment pass] holders will be treated similarly as their passes expire." Telegram (459) Kampala to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 09 July 1969, FCO 50/267, UKNA; Brian A. Lea, British High Commission Kampala to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 August 1969, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

79 Brian A. Lea British High Commission Kampala to Alma Rutter, Nationality and Treaty Department, 16 September 1969, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

80 Implementing the new immigration law, *Uganda Argus*, 09 January 1970.

81 Letters to the editor, by J. O. Olwedo, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1969.

brothers."[82] In the following months, Billington, nonetheless, tried to mobilise African members of the Uganda churches to oppose the restrictive policy, but failed in getting church leaders on board:

> "Church leaders have many other problems on their minds which seem more importand [sic!] than this one. There is a natural feeling that this is Britain's problem, which the British Government could easily solve. And again if the Uganda Government has a policy about the phasing-out of non-citizens from the country, it is better for ordinary Uganda citizens not to interfere. Nevertheless, the Social Service Committee of the Joint Christian Council met and resolved to show true humanitarian concern for British Asians. […] There are encouraging responses. Naturally they only represent the view of a small minority of Christian people."[83]

Billington and Mason's correspondence shows a further problem: the reluctance of the public to oppose government policy in general, because it could be interpreted as universal opposition to the independent state:

> "I believe that the chief difficulty is the natural reserve of Uganda Churches to express even the mildest criticism of the Uganda Government, for fear of any repercussions. This is natural enough, because organised Christianity in Africa tends to be identified with Colonialism, Europe, and the past mistakes of the West."[84]

Indeed, the public discourse about the issue of British passport holders with Asian origin in Uganda and in East Africa in general was repeatedly linked to British imperialism and colonial rule in East Africa:

> "If it is good and fair for England to reject her own citizens, how much more good [sic] and fair is it for others to reject foreigners and keep their own citizens? What is good

[82] Letter from David Mason to Roy Billington, 14 July 1970, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S, AA Makerere. The crisis for British Asians in Uganda, Report by David Mason 1970 Correspondence 1970–1972.

[83] Letter from Roy Billington to Jesse, Africa Secretary CMS, 23 September 1970, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S, MUL; The crisis for British Asians in Uganda, Report by David Mason 1970 Correspondence 1970–1972, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S, MUL.

[84] Letter from David Mason to Roy Billington, 14 July 1970, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S. The crisis for British Asians in Uganda, Report by David Mason 1970 Correspondence 1970–1972, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S, MUL.

> for the goose is also good for the grander. England has no right to sell her problems and over-burden others."[85]

However, some newspaper readers opposed the strict racial distinction between Asians and Africans, as did J. Lubega from Kampala: "[…] surely any person born in Africa can call himself Ugandan, and the Government should have no objection to this. If, on the other hand, the Government objects to it, then it would be throwing out its own people."[86] This narrative was buoyed by the editors of Uganda's main newspaper the *Uganda Argus*, which regularly reported on the UK mistreating Asians from East Africa with British passports.

While most African Ugandans agreed when it came to Asians with British passports, there was a wider range of opinions when it came to Ugandan Asians. An opinion writer for *The People,* a pro-government newspaper, distinguished the two groups and proposed two different courses of action: "If repatriation is the key problem about non-citizen Asians, for the citizen Asians, it is integration."[87]

For Asian non-citizens the situation had worsened after the introduction of the Uganda Immigration Act as the example of Manilal Mohanlal Kotadia from Mbale shows. In July 1971, Kotadia sought assistance from CMS representative Roy Billington in Uganda who helped Asian British passport holders with their voucher applications which enabled them to enter Britain. Kotadia who used to be an accountant in a shop lost his job in November 1969 after he had unsuccessfully applied for a Ugandan entry permit due to the new legislation. He thereafter applied for a quota voucher to leave for Britain but in summer 1971 he was still waiting for reply. In Mbale, while holding out for a positive message from the British High Commission in Kampala, Kotadia stayed with his brother at the latter's expense. In the UK, however, a job and housing were waiting for him, without him knowing when he would be able to enter Britain. We do not know when Manilal Kotadia finally was able to enter the UK, the last time the sources mention him is in autumn 1971, when the British High Commission informed him, that he should not expect any positive response before November 1971, two years after he lost his job and had applied for a voucher.[88]

Losing one's job, subsequently living in poverty and/or being dependent on support from one's community was not the only threat to British passport holders after the implementation

[85] Letters to the editor, Support for Kenya over Asian issue, by A. G. Okurut in 36 Wadham Road, *Uganda Argus*, 11 April 1969.

[86] Letters to the editor, J. Lubega from Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 15 December 1969.

[87] Asian morals, *The People*, 10 April 1969.

[88] Letters between Roy Billington, Manilal Kotadia and the British High Commission Kampala, 14 June 1971 until 27 September 1971, CMS Correspondence 1970–1972, MUL.

of the UIA. An entry permit was now required by all non-citizens and whoever did not possess such a permit could not only lose their job but also might have to pay a fine of 2,000 USh or worse, be threatened with expulsion or imprisonment of up to two years. A particularly bizarre case was the British passport holder Harkisan Mulji from Soroti: the 55-year-old tailor was ordered to leave Uganda but his voucher application was not processed in time by the British High Commission and therefore he could not leave the country. He was then charged with staying in Uganda illegally and sentenced to one month in prison only one day after the four weeks which the government had given him to leave had expired. The magistrate, Emmanuel Mbazira, himself seemed to have doubts about sentencing Mulji for an offence which the latter was not fully responsible for. Mbazira asked the prosecutor Mr Tiwangye "what would be the position if, after serving a jail sentence, Mulji could not leave Uganda because of having no entry voucher to Britain. 'He will be charged again,' Mr. Tiwangye explained."[89] Six days after Harkisan Mulji was imprisoned, he received a UK entry voucher from the British High Commission. However, he still had to serve his one-month sentence and could only leave Uganda after he was released to finally embark on his journey to Britain where his wife and family were already waiting for him.[90]

The Mulji case also reveals how many families were separated by the interlinking of the UIA and the CIA of 1968. This was often due to complex citizenship status within one family which stemmed from *citizenship practices* by many Asian families that were initially used to protect their status in East Africa. Even Asians who had applied for Ugandan citizenship came increasingly under fire. Either their citizenship application had not been processed at all or there were now claims that registration or naturalisation as citizens had not been completed although they had been issued citizenship registration certificates.

Most often, the renunciation of former citizenship constituted the biggest obstacle. This also affected Asians who had been an active part of political life after independence: "14,000 or so applications from Asians for Ugandan Citizenship which have been held in abeyance since about 1962. The question of dates of renunciation is now critical for many prominent members of the Asian community, including two Asian Members of Parliament."[91] Not long after the UIA came into force, Milton Obote began to tackle this issue more strategically. In a speech in Parliament, he set the agenda for the upcoming month and elucidated the Government's attitude towards the Asian minority:

89 Asian tailor jailed for illegal stay, *The Nation*, 20 August 1970, quoted in: Report by David Mason 1970 Correspondence 1970–1972, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S, MUL, 11.

90 Report by David Mason 1970 Correspondence 1970–1972, AR CMS 122 9 C. M. S, MUL, 12.

91 Brian A. Lea to Alma Rutter, 30 September 1969, FCO 50/267, UKNA.

> "[…] as far as Uganda is concerned, these people are not Uganda citizens and are not entitled to remain in our country at their own will or because they cannot be admitted into any other country. They have never shown any commitment to the cause of Uganda or even to the cause of Africa. Their interest is to make money, which money they exported to various capitals of the world on the eve of our Independence. They are, however, human beings and much as they have shown every sign of being rootless in Uganda, we would like their departure not to cause either them or others dear to them, or even ourselves, any human affliction."[92]

More and more Asians who had been initially granted citizenship became subject of renewed vetting of their Ugandan citizenship and due to formalities during the application process got their citizenship withdrawn.[93] Uganda's President Obote commissioned a report to clarify the status of tens of thousands of Ugandan Asians who had applied for citizenship or even had received a registration certificate as he had advertised in speeches on different occasions. In the speech mentioned above, Obote had advocated a "comprehensive exercise" "in a two-pronged dimension" in front of the Uganda National Assembly. Those two dimensions were "the documentation of all non-citizens living in Uganda and a detailed documentation of persons popularly known as "Asians holding British passports". When the two exercises were completed", the Ugandan Government then would "arrange for a systematic manner through which these persons are to disengage themselves from this hold on and continued residence in our country."[94]

The commissioned report categorised Asians in Uganda in two main groups: citizens and non-citizens. However, the report summarised a categorisation process which also re-evaluated the citizenship of thousands of Ugandan Asians who had applied for local citizenship in the grace period between 1962 and 1964 and were granted citizenship as well as those applicants whose application process was still pending. Data for the report was gathered from immigration files:

> "The purpose was to try to establish as far as available facts could allow, how many persons had endeavoured to secure Uganda Citizenship in accordance with Uganda Laws, how many eventually did obtain citizenship, and how and why others did not."[95]

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92 Milton Obote on British passport holders of Asian origin in Parliament on 20 April 1970, in: National Assembly Official Report, Fourth Session of the second Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 12.

93 Brian A. Lea to Alma Rutter, 30 September 1969, FOC 50/267, UKNA.

94 National Assembly Official Report, Fourth Session of the second Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 12.

95 Report on citizenship submitted by research Secretariat Office 1970, no reference no., 4.

The report estimates the Asian population in Uganda as 91,400 in 1967 and as 106,700 in 1969 and states that 28,000 Asians applied for citizenship of which 15,000 had been granted Citizenship Registration Certificates.[96] These people were left to believe they had acquired local citizenship. The remaining applications had not been processed.[97] The authors of the report found that carelessness by immigration officers as well as ignorance of the law by the applicants resulted in incomplete applications in many cases. This led to missing information or signatures, multiple applications by the same persons or incomplete applications.[98] Moreover, Asian names led to further confusion either because the applicant had four to five names of which they occasionally dropped some or because applicants changed the name sequence on the forms, which then did not match their documentation.[99] Due to this and other "abnormalities" the report questioned the validity of many registration certificates. The biggest problem – as had already been discussed during the negotiations on citizenship before independence – was the renunciation of the old citizenship, and especially the short period of three months which was granted in the Ugandan Constitution to renounce the old citizenship after the applicant had received their registration certificate.[100] While the procedures were complicated and dragging, we don't know how many applicants might have consciously refrained from renouncing their old citizenship as a strategic *citizenship practices* following the logic which Aihwa Ong has set out in the context of Flexible citizenship.[101] The report lists three main groups of people affected by the issue of renunciation: first, those who "mistook the act of Registering as Uganda citizen to be final. […] there is no evidence that such people took steps to renounce. Yet they have been displaying Registration Certificates as evidence of their being Uganda Citizens." (According to the report approximately 4,500). Second, those who "took the oath of allegiance, made declaration concerning residence and renounced their citizenship and went as far as lodging their documents with the British High Commission. However, for unknown reasons, there is no evidence that their papers were lodged with the British Home Office" (approximately 790). Third, those "whose particulars went as far as the Home Office but dates on their Home Office Certificates are outside of the statutory three months. These people are now stateless."[102]

96 Ibid., 3.

97 Ibid., 13.

98 Ibid., 5f.

99 Ibid.,7.

100 The time overlap between the old and the new citizenship was necessary to avoid statelessness as it was required in the UN convention: UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, Article 7, 2.

101 Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 6.

102 Report on citizenship submitted by research Secretariat Office 1970, no reference no., 9; The report does not state an estimated number for the last group.

Concerning the third group of people the report states that the Ugandan government should think about making special considerations: "Firstly some of them were out of time for only a few days. Secondly, they had no control over the processing of their papers at the British Home Office."[103] The government therefore should have considered giving them a chance to reapply. Minors whose parents had applied for citizenship on their behalf and who had become of age without renouncing their other citizenship, the authors write, were also not Ugandan citizens (approximately 447). The report concludes that only a very small number of those who received citizenship registration certificates were actually Ugandan citizens, namely 5,145 people:

> "This proves the point that have [sic!] been made time and again that many Asians living in this Republic have remained on the fence and have never shown any commitment to the cause of Uganda or even to Africa because the clearest indicator of commitment is citizenship of a country. […] The fact is that far from identifying themselves with the national cause, they have engaged in self-enriching activities and continued to owe their allegiance to some other countries."[104]

This statement shows that here *citizenship legislation*, in this case the interpretation of an individual's legal citizen status by administrators, was directly implicated by the narrow *citizenship culture* which had been established in the preceding years. By reducing the numbers of people who legally attained Ugandan citizenship significantly, the report sees the disloyalty of Asians as proven and ignores the fact that circa 28,000 Asians had sought citizenship but failed due to a number of reasons often rooted in the complexity of the application process. The report goes on stating that "it now remains for the Cabinet to decide on the methods of disengaging these people from their hold on and continued residence in Uganda."[105]

With increasing numbers of people whose citizenship was withdrawn by the Ugandan state due to formalities during the application and renunciation process, the British government had to deal with the question of whether they would restore CUKC status if the person would otherwise become stateless. Finally, the UK decided that it would not take responsibility for stateless persons who had been stripped of Ugandan citizenship: "Since that period we have adopted a stonewall attitude to questioners who […] want to know if […] they can recover their U. K. Citizenship or are stateless." Off the record, British civil servants acknowledged their responsibility for the Asians with British passports and even accepted the fact that the British administration was accountable for the delay of the Home Office Certificates proving

[103] Ibid, 10.

[104] Ibid, 15f.

[105] Ibid, 16.

the renunciation of British citizenship.[106] Although, it was completely different to confess this responsibility in public and consequently to be held accountable for those individuals. Besides, accepting British reliability towards the Asian British passport holders in Uganda would have resulted in accepting all British passport holders in East Africa, more than 200,000 people. A rapid expulsion of non-citizens from Uganda therefore was a big worry within the British government: "We are certainly at the threshold of increased expulsion from Uganda and to control the situation, using the experience of Kenya, is my major preoccupation at the moment."[107]

Outside of Africa, the strict immigration and trade licensing legislation was controversial. There was a sense of African racism in the air which painfully contradicted the attempt by East African governments to fight South African Apartheid and the racialist regime in Rhodesia.[108] After the UIA had been adopted, there had been various attempts by the Ugandan government to spruce up its own image by blaming either the British government for not taking responsibility for their citizens or the Asians themselves for either cheating and exploiting their African neighbours or exaggerating their situation by discrediting their African governments:

> "The British Asians themselves have engaged in the dramatization of their lot by carrying out demonstrations, threatening hunger strikes, shuttling across the continents, attempting queue-jumping, and most recently, participating in the now infamous "Lea Affair"[109] type of activity."[110]

In November 1970, President Obote approached the British High Commission in Kampala with what seemed at first a generous offer: all Asians who had applied for Ugandan citizenship during the grace period between 1962 and 1964 but whose citizenship application either had not been processed by the Ugandan authorities or whose renunciation of their old British

[106] Brian A. Lea to Alma Rutter, 30 September 1969, FOC 50/267, UKNA.

[107] Brian A. Lea, British High Commission Kampala to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 August 1969, FCO 50/267.

[108] On Tanzania's support for African liberation movements see: Chachage, Chambi/Cassam, Annar, ed. *Africa's liberation: The legacy of Nyerere*. Nairobi: Pambazuka Press, 2010.

[109] Brian Lea was a British passport officer at the British High Commission in Kampala. He disappeared for two days between 2 May and 04 May 1970 from the High Commission. After his reappearance, he claimed he had been abducted by three Asians. It soon transpired that he had staged his abduction together with Asian acquaintances "to highlight the plight of British Asians in Uganda who could not obtain entry visas to Britain." An inquiry was set up by the Ugandan government to investigate the case and the British High Commission asked Lea to resign: Kidnap of British Consul in Uganda: Brian Lea, FCO 31/737 UKNA; Weinraubaug, Bernard: Briton in Uganda: A tangled drama, *New York Times*, 11 August 1970; Diplomat who faked a kidnap in Kampala, *Daily Monitor*, 29 June 2014.

[110] Report on citizenship submitted by research Secretariat Office 1970, PO 4/8, UNA,1.

CUKC had not been processed in the three month time period for renunciation would be accepted by Uganda as Ugandan citizens after all and not become stateless. When he submitted his offer, Obote stated that he did not want those applicants in Uganda but thought it was the humanitarian thing to do. He further pointed out that the decision was unpopular with his own cabinet. At first, the British High Commission and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office welcomed the offer.[111] Yet, the UK diplomats and civil servants later realised the offer only came with a trade-off: the Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Obote expected to combine the offer with a British assurance to increase the number of entry vouchers for East African Asians with British passports into Britain and the guarantee that in the long-term the UK would take responsibility for all non-Ugandan Asians in Uganda in return. That way, Obote suggested, the matter would be solved once and for all. In his reasoning, Obote proved to have a racialised understanding of citizenship by referring to Enoch Powell: "I agree with Enoch Powell. You have got to keep your race relations under control, otherwise we Ugandans will suffer."[112] As Taylor has discussed, the seems that the UK and the Obote regime were close to an agreement on how many individuals Britain would accept as their responsibility just before Obote's trip to Singapore in January 1971.[113] The negotiations between Obote's cabinet and the British government concerning the suggested trade-off came to an abrupt end when General Idi Amin staged a military coup on 25 January 1971 while Obote was abroad.

The blurring lines of belonging and the withdrawing of citizenship: The expulsion from Uganda, 1972

The news of the coup was welcomed by many people in Uganda prominently by Baganda who hoped their marginalisation of the past decade would come to an end.[114] Western governments first and foremost Britain and Israel – both of which were allegedly involved in the putsch to overthrow Obote – joined in the praise of the new Ugandan leader, despite the bloody coup and subsequent massacres of the Acholi and Langi. While Amin emphasised the friendship between Britain during the first six months of his rule, the relationship abruptly shifted to open

111 Citizenship, Letter from Charles Booth, British High Commission Kampala, to Eric Le Tocq, East African Department, 24 November 1970, FCO 53/153, UKNA; Kampala to FCO, Telno 1101, 24 November 1970, FCO 53/153, UKNA.

112 Kampala to FCO, Telno 10, 06 January 1971, FCO 31/1065, UKNA.

113 Taylor, *Asians and Africans in Ugandan Urban Life,* 279.

114 More on the Buganda policy under Obote I see: Hansen, Holger B. 'Uganda in the 1970s: a decade of paradoxes and ambiguities'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 83–103; Mutibwa, *The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics*, 139.

hostility when Britain refused to supply the Ugandan military with arms. Instead, in February 1972, Amin turned to General Muammar Gadhafi of Libya for support. Closer relationships with Libya was accompanied by Amin launching the Islamisation of Uganda (despite Uganda being predominantly Christian), which led to a marginalisation of churches.[115] The first victims of this political U-turn in foreign affairs were Israelis in Uganda who were expelled suddenly in March 1972. By turning his back on his former British ally, Idi Amin also started to target the Asian minorities whose presence in East Africa was widely associated with British imperialism and whose members were thought to be the responsibility of the UK government by most Africans.

It is certainly right to point out that the expulsion of Asians from Uganda, which Amin ordered via decree on 09 August 1972, was related to deteriorating Ugandan-British foreign relations.[116] However, in the general process of exclusion, Amin's government did nothing else but to follow a general path of exclusion, which had been laid out by its predecessor starting at the latest in 1969 with the Uganda Immigration Act. Yet, it is fair to say that the way of exclusion which the Amin regime chose was a more radical one and even left Asians with Ugandan passports with almost no chance to stay in Uganda.[117] It therefore did not offer Asians a voice in Ugandan society as alternative to exit.[118] The expulsion came not as suddenly as it is often portrayed by mass media. Amin followed in his predecessor's footsteps and took a variety of actions before the decree: on 18 October 1971, the Amin government held a census which only counted Asians[119] and in December that year, he ordered leading Asian businesspeople and community leaders to attend a conference where he discussed "Asian business malpractices."[120]

During his journey from the South Karamoja region to Kampala on 04 August 1972, Amin stopped in the southeastern town of Tororo to address officers and soldiers of the Airborne Regiment. He announced that he would ask the UK to take over the responsibility for Asians

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[115] Huliaras, Asteris. 'Qadhafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. *African Affairs* 100, no. 398 (2001): 5–25.

[116] Hansen, 'Uganda in the 1970s: a decade of paradoxes and ambiguities': 92–5.

[117] On the few exceptions and their survival strategies during Amin's Uganda see: Kaur Hundle, 'Exceptions to the expulsion: violence, security and community among Ugandan Asians, 1972–1979'.

[118] Brubaker, 'Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives': 204.

[119] Ibid.; Sathyamurthy T. V., *The political development of Uganda: 1900–1985*, 612.

[120] Mamdani, *From citizen to refugee*, 13. During the first year of the Amin regime, local newspapers did not target Asians or portrayed them as exploiters more often than before. When it came to the coverage of anti-Asian resentments, it mainly concerned the rising sugar price: Sugar situation 'becoming worse', *Uganda Argus*, 06 May 1972; Letter, Timely action over oil and sugar, by J. M. B. Mukasa-Saalongo in Jinja, *Uganda Argus*, 20 January 1972; Manager denies trader's claim – sugar shortage, *Uganda Argus*, 11 January 1972.

with British passports as they were sabotaging Uganda's economy. He further stated that there was no room for Asians in Uganda. The *Uganda Argus* reported about the speech on the next day with the headline "The future of the Asians in Uganda – It will be Britain's responsibility."[121] British High Commissioner Richard Slater wrote a telegram to London informing the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, that Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Paul Etyang in response to Slater's request for clarification stated he had no further instructions.[122] As usual, the Asian community was left mostly intimidated and uninformed. One day later, on 05 August 1972, Amin concretised his claims during a Co-operative International Day event. He outlined the conditions of what later turned out to be an expulsion decree: Asians with British passports had three months to leave Uganda. Amin inferred once more that Asians would sabotage the country's economy using a rhetoric which referred to Asians as parasites and exploiters and was similar to the socialist language of parasitism used in Tanzania:[123] "They only milked the cow, but did not feed it."[124] Amin further blamed the Asian minority for not opening up the country's economy to allow Ugandan Africans opportunities in business. The statement of 05 August 1972 only targeted Asians with British passports. However, the upcoming weeks and month would see the blurring of categories which meant that in the end all Asians in Uganda, even those Ugandan Asians who had gained citizenship after independence were somehow affected – a strategy which had been tried and tested in the years before by the Obote government. The intervention in and tightening of *citizenship legislation* referred to and therefore at least partly resulted from a local *citizenship culture* which had been established in public discourse and through *citizenship practices* in the first decade after independence and entailed a narrow notion of citizenship defined by racial affiliation.

Amin's infamous announcement of 05 August 1972 displays the strong connection of foreign and domestic policy. By claiming that Britain was responsible for the Asians in Uganda Amin emphasised that the issue had international implications and at the same time grounded his claims on the legacy of the Empire. When the British High Commissioner searched for a reason for the sudden acceleration in Uganda's policy towards the Asians, he considered the role of foreign policy in the decision-making process:

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121 Despite the title, the article itself covers a mélange of different topics which Amin had brushed during his speech in Tororo: The future of the Asians in Uganda, *Uganda Argus*, 05 August 1972.

122 Telegram Slater to FCO, 05 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

123 James Brennan has found similar rhetoric in the description of Asians in the urban space of Dar es Salaam during the decade after independence: Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75'.

124 "Asians milked the cow, they did not feed it", *Uganda Argus*, 07 August 1972.

> "It is impossible at present to say whether Amin's move […] stems from a genuine belief that the Asians are bleeding the economy, or from a desire to find a scapegoat for the economic ills of Uganda or to court popularity; or whether he is out to embarrass Britain as part of his current "anti-imperialist" crusade, the main object of which seems to be to extract the maximum assistance from the Arab world. Amin is probably too power-drunk and muddle-headed to analyse his motives, but even he must have some idea of the effect this is bound to have on Anglo-Ugandan relations."[125]

Slater was most likely right in pointing out that the motives to expel the Asians were complex and not one-dimensional. Even today, there are many rumours circling around the intention of Amin's action. Some go as far as claiming a rejected proposal made by Amin to marry a member of a renowned Asian family was the reason for the expulsion.[126] Although those rumours have yet to be confirmed. However, Slater might have underestimated the public indignation about Asians with British passports in Uganda. Even if it is true that the Ugandan President dreamt God had ordered him to expel all Asians from Uganda, as he dramatically claimed in various interviews of the time,[127] historians still have to look for rational reasons for the expulsion decree and not give in to the common pattern of reinforcing long-lasting narratives illustrating African politics and policies as irrational, arbitrary and unpredictable.

Despite the fact that the expulsion order was introduced without extensive administrative preparation or planning, it follows a rhythmic process of exclusion. This process had been fortified from the immigration laws in the end of the 1960s on and had loomed since the eve of independence.[128] It had been prepared by the exclusion of Asians from the imaginary space of the nation when shaping an exclusive local *citizenship culture* based on being racially African. In 1972, the Amin regime was very actively consolidating its power. It is therefore not implausible that Amin used the expulsion as a tool to strengthen his rule – domestically and internationally – enforcing a "we" (African Ugandans) and "them" (Asians, Britain). On the domestic level, the expulsion was highly popular as will be shown later. At the same time the deprivation of Asian property flushed money into the treasury at least for the short-term and rewarded

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[125] Richard Slater, Kampala High Commission, to FCO, Telno 924, 06 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

[126] Although the rumour is unclear about who Amin had exactly proposed to, the most mentioned names were the daughter of hotel owner and politician Sherali Bandari Jaffer and the widow of Jayant Madhvani, Anirudha Gupta, 'India and the Asians in East Africa', 137.

[127] Munnion, Christopher, The African who kicked out the Asians, who said Hitler was right, who has made his country a state sinister, *New York Times*, 12 November 1972.

[128] Edgar Taylor has described this as "attempts to decisively intervene in Uganda's racialised urban politics": Taylor, 'Claiming Kabale: racial thought and urban governance in Uganda': 156.

loyal supporters of the Amin regime. While the expulsion was damaging for the economy in the long term, the short-term monetary benefit was substantial: before the expulsion, despite previous nationalisation efforts, Asians still held 60 per cent of the wealth in Kampala, 70 per cent in Jinja and almost 100 per cent in Soroti.[129]

Amin's foreign and domestic policy was widely entangled as Holger Bernt Hansen has shown.[130] This also becomes clear when looking at state propaganda of the time. This is specifically so when it comes to Ugandan-British relations. Therefore, many observers surmised that the Asian expulsion correlated with the deterioration of those relations after Britain had refused to grant the delivery of weapons in early 1972. Amin, known for his anglo-enthusiasm, felt betrayed by the UK whose government had originally endorsed his coup. After meeting Amin on 09 August 1972, the day of the expulsion decree, High Commissioner Slater reported that "the atmosphere during our private interview however certainly lacked the warmth which marked our previous encounters."[131] However, on the same day Amin had stated "that the British were quote his best friends."[132] British representatives in Uganda became frustrated over Amin's reluctance to use diplomacy, as a comment by Geoffrey Rippon in August 1972 shows after being denied a meeting with Amin: "It is clear that no possibility of having useful discussions with him in his present stubborn mood, still less of persuading him to reconsider the expulsion decision.[133] During a later meeting between President Amin and Richard Slater in October 1972, Amin demanded that Slater should leave Uganda together with the last group of British Asians.[134]

The expulsion was accompanied with harassment of non-Asian British nationals. At the start of the expulsion, the Ugandan government still restrained itself and tried to uphold the impression of good Ugandan-British relations. With more and more negative international press for the Ugandan regime and open criticism from the British House of Commons the atmosphere became more hostile.[135] When British officials complained over the sudden expul-

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[129] Kiem, Christian. 'Zur Bedeutung einer ethnischen Minderheit im Strukturanpassungsprozeß: Die Asiaten in Ostafrika'. *Africa Spectrum* 31, no. 3 (1996): 277–294.

[130] Hansen, 'Uganda in the 1970s: a decade of paradoxes and ambiguities': 92.

[131] Slater to FCO, Telno 952, 09 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Kampala to FCO, 13 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA.

[134] British envoy told to quit, *Uganda Argus*, 13 October 1972.

[135] British MPs were likewise concerned about negative response in their constituencies regarding the increasing immigration rate: Letter MP John Stoke to PM Alec Douglas-Home, 08 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA. Following letter calls the immigration of Asians from Uganda an invasion: Letter from John W. Collins to Joseph Godber, MP, 07 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA.

sion of British passport holders of Asian origin, Uganda fired back. Uganda's Foreign Minister Wanume Kibedi expressed anger:

> "They have the callousness to bar the door to their own citizens because they are not white and then have the impudence to turn round and point an accusing finger at Uganda, a state which is doing no more than asking Britain to take care of her citizens. […] The anti-Uganda filth that has spewed from the mouths of the members of the British Cabinet in the last few weeks has been sickening to the utmost degree."[136]

In Uganda, conspiracy theories were spread by the government and within the African population. The Ugandan government accused British citizens in the country of spying.[137] Furthermore, rumours cropped up that Britain was supporting an assassination plan targeting Idi Amin.[138]

Shortly after the decree, Wanume Kibedi denied any racial motivation for the expulsion, but threatened: "If they (the Asians) still remain they will soon see what happens to them."[139] When Britain tried to convince Uganda to row back on its ultimatum by threatening to freeze £ 4,550,000 in aid, Kibedi claimed the Ugandan government could not be bought to neglect the people's interest.[140] On 09 August, Amin met with Richard Slater and the Indian and Pakistani High Commissioners for a lunch meeting, at which members of the Asian communities and journalists were also present. Slater was given 30 minutes with Amin alone beforehand in which Slater passed on the UK Prime Minister Edward Heath's message to the Ugandan President. According to Slater, the Ugandan president had not shown any vivid reaction to the message and seemed "rather stiff."[141] After the lunch, Amin broadcasted a press conference in which he extended the ultimatum to all Asian non-citizens including people with Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi passports and gave those people who were affected three months to leave the country. He, however, announced that certain Asian professionals were exempt by

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[136] British racialism is exposed, *Uganda Argus*, 09 September 1972.

[137] New ruling on immigration, *Uganda Argus*, 26 October 1972.

[138] Assassination plan; Britain is accused, *Uganda Argus*, 06 September 1972. In fact, the Foreign and Commonwealth was informed of a coup planned by General Obitre-Gama. According to the informant, former Ugandan Minister of the East African Community Shafiq Arain, himself a Uganda Asian, 2,000 former Ugandan soldiers were stationed in Sudan and Tanzania close to the Ugandan border. Allegedly Obote, who was not directly involved, had approved the plans and Nyerere knew of them: Report by David A. Scott on meeting with Shafiq Arain, 11 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA.

[139] London threat to Uganda, *Uganda Argus,* 08 August 1972.

[140] Kibedi replies to Sir Alex, *Uganda Argus,* 09 August 1972.

[141] Letter from S. Y. Dawbarn, East African Department, to Mr Le Quesne, 09 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

the expulsion.[142] Amin mentioned that Asians with Ugandan citizenship, so called Ugandan Asians, were also exempt from the expulsion order. Yet, he insinuated that the last census result which listed 23,242 Asians with Ugandan citizenship seemed unrealistic and needed verification.[143] A few days later the Minister of Internal Affairs, Charles Oboth-Ofumbi, confirmed: "We are not satisfied with this number. And this is the reason why we have mounted another censurship [sic!]."

Asians, who claimed to have Ugandan citizenship, had to report to the Immigration Office by 10 September 1972 to verify their claim. By not complying with this deadline, Ugandan Asians automatically lost their Ugandan citizenship.[144] The government again changed directions when on 17 August 1972 Amin declared that from now on the professional Asians with foreign passports who had been previously exempted from the expulsion were now also to be expelled, "because they could not serve the country with a good spirit after the departure of their fellow Asians."[145] By 20 August 1972, it was still not known how much money Asians were allowed to take with them when leaving the country.[146] The next day, the *Uganda Argus* titled with the headline "*All* Asians must go"[147] reporting about Amin's newly change of mind. According to the article, the expulsion of all Asians with Ugandan citizenship should happen in a second move after all Asian non-citizens had left the country. As reason Amin stated "sabotage and arson the Asians had started or were planning to carry out."[148] When trying to legitimise his decision Amin fell back on traditional patterns of anti-Asian rhetoric portraying Asians as self-interested exploiters. He extended the accusations to Ugandan citizens of Asian descent and accused all Asians in Uganda even those with citizenship of having refused "to identify themselves with the people from whom they got all their riches."[149] Thereby, he fed into the narrative of paper-citizens who allegedly never fully committed to the African state and had no actual interest in the well-being of the Ugandan economy beyond their own profit. Consequently, we see how *citizenship culture* dynamically shaped *citizenship legislation*. At the

142 This included all employees of the Ugandan Government, the East African community, and the international organisations; professors and teachers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, chemists, accountants, and surveyors; owners of industrial and agricultural enterprises; managers or owners of banks; technical personnel employed in plant, animal, land or forestry production.

143 Letter from S. Y. Dawbarn, East African Department, to Mr Le Quesne, 09 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

144 These Asians are required to report, *Uganda Argus*, 15 August 1972.

145 Exemption clause deleted, *Uganda Argus,* 18 August 1972.

146 President still firm on deadline, *Uganda Argus*, 20 August 1972.

147 *All* Asians must go, *Uganda Argus*, 21 August 1972.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.

same time, the Ugandan government announced that it would establish a central institution, which would sell the remaining property of Asians in Uganda. The private sale of all property by the Asian owners would be prohibited with exception of personal clothing, furniture, and radios.[150] Moreover, foreign exchange allocations were stopped immediately.

Amin signalled that once the Asian non-citizens had left the country, the citizenship of those Asians who claimed they were Ugandan citizens would be thoroughly reviewed. On 22 September 1972, the Ugandan government decided, that Asian non-citizens who had been cleared by the Bank of Uganda and the East African Income Tax Department would have to leave within 48 hours after the clearance to speed-up the process. Any trade or work permits would be automatically invalid from the moment of clearance.[151] The Abandoned Property Custodian Board dealt with the resale of former Asian property. The word abandoned in the title made it sound as if Asians had recklessly left behind their belongings, while in reality they were not allowed to take any of it with them.[152] Those who tried to take their property with them often were stripped of it at the border by Ugandan soldiers or police officers.[153]

In October, the Ugandan government announced that members of the armed forces together with government representatives would begin to check every building in Kampala to see if any non-citizens were left in the city, confirming that all foreign owned assets should become property of Ugandans.[154] Amin declared, that once the deadline was reached, all Asians left in Uganda – non-citizens and citizens – were supposed to be counted in public places. During this count, the remaining Asians with Ugandan citizenship could also indicate which districts they would prefer to live in, "because they are going to be sent to the Districts to mix with Ugandans."[155] This plan was based on the resentment against Asians as segregated urban community similar to the Tanzanian opposition of Asians as urban class. Yet, in the Ugandan context this seems more contradictive, as policies like the Uganda Trade Licensing Act 1969 as well as the threat of violence against Asians in the rural areas had forced them out of the countryside and encouraged them to settle next to each other in restricted urban areas.

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[150] "Non-indigenous" property owners had to hand in forms stating their property by the end of August: Ibid.

[151] Not more than two days, *Uganda Argus*, 23 September 1972. For the appointment at the British High Commission Asians were advised to bring their income tax code number, which would make it easier to get clearance from the Ugandan Tax Department: British High Commission announcement, *Uganda Argus*, 09 October 1972.

[152] Abandoned property board set up, *Uganda Argus,* 30 October 1972.

[153] Adams, B. N., and M. Bristow. 'Ugandan Asian Expulsion Experiences: Rumour and Reality'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 14, 3–4 (1979): 191–203.

[154] Buildings will be checked, *Uganda Argus*, 05 October 1972.

[155] Asians to be counted – person by person, *Uganda Argus*, 07 November 1972.

Rumours of planned concentration camps were spreading within the Asian community. The strong link between belonging, biological heritage, and the construction of a *citizenship culture,* which excluded individuals, who were not racially African, becomes clear repeatedly during the months of the expulsion. For instance, when Amin used the upcoming Independence Day, on 09 October 1972, to ask the remaining Asians to mingle with their African neighbours: "I want to see Africans marrying Asians and vice versa. I will attend these weddings."[156] A month later, Amin assembled remaining Asians on the airstrip of Kololo to address them and demanded them to "show that you are real citizens" if they wanted to stay in the country.[157]

During the three months of the expulsion, the Ugandan government used language of exclusion which was grounded in the narrow *citizenship culture* which had sprawled over the previous decade. The official narrative was based on two already familiar pillars: exploitation and loyalty. First, the Ugandan government claimed that Asians used to be and still were the middlemen who channeled British and western interests:[158] Asians were exploiting the country within a bigger network of imperial economic exploitation. This rhetoric had a lot in common with similar statements made in Tanzania at the time regarding external enemies of African socialism.[159] Part of this rhetoric was to depict the Asians in Uganda as foreigners and therefore as a problem which was inflicted on Uganda from outside. In a statement in September 1972, Foreign Minister Kibedi accused Britain of racialism and claimed that the West was responsible for economic inequality in Uganda and that the Ugandan government only wanted "control of the economy of Uganda from the hands of unpatriotic foreigners and place it in the hands of the nationals of Uganda."[160] He continued in saying that Uganda's nationals "have, for years, been a subject of exploitation and plunder by the imperialists and their agents.[161] By constructing Asians as part of an imperial external enemy, the propaganda alienated Asians within Ugandan society further, while using an anti-capitalist narrative for the international audience, which referred to the non-alignment movement.[162]

[156] Racial isolation to end at Uhuru, *Uganda Argus*, 06 October 1972. However, after the expulsion Amin's regime targeted mixed-race people as "half-caste": Mamdani, Mahmood. *Imperialism and fascism in Uganda*. Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983.

[157] Show that you are real citizens, *Uganda Argus*, 10 November 1972.

[158] Exemption clause deleted, *Uganda Argus*, 18 August 1972.

[159] Roberts, George. 'Politics, decolonisation, and the cold war in Dar es Salaam'. PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2016.

[160] British racialism is exposed, *Uganda Argus* 09 September 1972.

[161] Ibid.

[162] For instance, with a reference to criticism of the British government in an article by Norway's Labour Party *Arbeiderbladet*: Letter to the editor, by Apollo wa Lihanda at the University of Nairobi, *Uganda Argus*, 16 August 1972.

Second, Asians were not just illustrated as part of a bigger external imperial enemy, they were also seen as internal enemies disloyal to the Ugandan nation who had only their own interest at heart and manipulated nation-building and therefore inflicted damage on every single Ugandan citizen. Both narratives claimed that Asians were not part of the Ugandan nation and excluded them from any form of political representation or civil rights. By interlinking citizenship once again with loyalty, the Ugandan government sometimes implicitly,[163] sometimes explicitly[164] denied Asians even those with formal Ugandan citizenship the right of being part of the Ugandan nation. State officials used a rhetoric which defamed Asians as being disloyal. The accusations often included even those Asians, who had acquired Ugandan citizenship, and blazed the trail for depriving Ugandan Asians of their Ugandan citizenship by claiming they were not citizens in the actual sense. Even though Joshua Kibedi and others in the Amin administration had claimed the expulsion was not based on racial motives, by targeting not only Asian non-citizens but even the ones with Ugandan citizenship, the government used clear racialised categories to exclude a part of its population.[165] The same interpretation of what was Ugandan was given by Amin when he time and again demanded the racial-mixing of Asians with Ugandan Africans so they could prove that they were real citizens.[166] This form of nationhood depicted by state propaganda left no space for Asians becoming Ugandans, as being Ugandan heavily relied on being racially African.

The fact that Asians who left Uganda tried to take their possessions and assets with them raised criticisms by the regime: "President Amin said that many Asians have been intercepted and arrested on the borders with Uganda while smuggling money in Uganda currency, dollars Zaire and currencies of other countries, together with gold."[167] The Ugandan government and above all Amin himself kept warning Ugandan Africans, that even when the Asians were leaving the country they would sabotage the economy by destroying their property which they had to leave behind. At one point, he accused Asians of "putting salt in their car engines before they

[163] By using phrases like "so called citizens", "paper citizens", "Asians who claim Ugandan citizenship", "real citizens": The Asians are required to report, *Uganda Argus*, 15 August 1972; Asians to be counted – person by person, *Uganda Argus*, 07 November 1972.; Show that you are real citizens, *Uganda Argus*, 10 November 1972.

[164] Amin suggested that even those Asians with Ugandan citizenship had to leave the country: All Asians must go, *Uganda Argus*, 21 August 1972.

[165] The British government already expected the expulsion of all Asians (not only British passport holders) from Uganda on 09 August 1972: Telegram Alec Douglas-Home, 09 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

[166] Racial isolation to end at Uhuru, *Uganda Argus*, 09 October 1972; Asians to be counted – person by person, *Uganda Argus*, 07 November 1972; Show that you are real citizens, *Uganda Argus*, 10 November 1972.

[167] Mobutu pledges to help Gen Amin, *Uganda Argus*, 04 October 1972.

were sold to Ugandans."[168] Those accusations intended to increase the anger within the African population and made them more supportive of the expulsion decree by drawing an increasingly deeper gulf between Africans ("us") and Asians ("them").[169] Stories about Asians smuggling money out of Uganda, which allegedly involved Asians from other East African countries as well, were given some attention.[170]

The majority of Africans welcomed Amin's move as a long overdue step. Opposition was rare and rather lenient. One of the few exceptions of open protest was seen at Makerere University. Shortly after Amin announced that he would expel all Asians, the student leader and President of the Student Guild, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile,[171] asked President Amin during an event at the university to exempt Asians with Ugandan citizenship from the expulsion order while accepting the expulsion of non-citizens in general.[172] The protest against the expulsion of Ugandan citizens was successful. Only two days after he initially announced the expulsion of Ugandan Asians, Amin withdraw his plan again and said that Asians with Ugandan citizenship could stay.[173] Amin's back paddling highlights the general notion that citizenship entitles the holder to certain rights, most notably the right to reside in the country of their citizenship. This makes any move to withdraw the residency rights of citizens so unpopular that it can, as it did in this case, lead to protest from members of the society.

Nevertheless, readers of the *Uganda Argus* congratulated Amin for his move to expel the Asians and expressed their wholehearted support.[174] Jack Osega Ekwarian called it "the greatest achievement in the economic development of our country."[175] Others called Amin a free-

168 President on economic plan, *Ugandan Argus*, 22 August 1972.

169 This is something Rogers Brubaker has termed group-making as project: Brubaker, Rogers. 'Ethnicity without groups'. *Archives Européenes de Sociologie* XLIII, no. 2 (2002): 163–189.

170 This caused another expulsion order targeting Asian non-citizens with Tanzanian, Kenyan and Zambian citizenship: Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia Asians to quit, *Uganda Argus*, 20 October 1972.

171 Tumusiime-Mutebile had to flee Uganda shortly after his criticism of the treatment of the Ugandan Asians: Badagawa, Philimon: Who is Prof. Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, Campus Time, 27 June 2014, accessed on 05 September 2019: https://www.campustimesug.com/who-is-prof-emmanuel-tumusiime-mutebile/.

172 President on economic plan, *Ugandan Argus*, 22 August 1972. However, because the situation was so insecure and the government changed its stands on Ugandan Asians so often, in a short period of time most Asians with local citizenship felt they had no other perspective than to leave the country for good. Only a very limited number of Asians stayed behind after the events: Kaur Hundle, 'Exceptions to the expulsion: violence, security and community among Ugandan Asians, 1972–1979'.

173 These Asians can stay, *Ugandan Argus*, 23 August 1972.

174 Letters of congratulations to President Amin, *Uganda Argus*, 16 August 1972; J. B. Wansera from Kampala, Live letters, Uganda Argus, 19 August 1972.

175 Letters of congratulations to President Amin, *Uganda Argus*, 16 August 1972.

dom fighter and said that history was on his side[176] or suggested he should receive an honours degree.[177] The many letters the Uganda Argus published in the three month time span did reproduce in essence state propaganda. The reader Kirizestom claimed that the Asians came as economic imperialists to suck East Africa for the benefit of their mother countries.[178] George Jersey Muwanga called the Asians parasitic and ungrateful and thanked Amin for finally exposing the "dangerous cover of imperialism in the form of reckless and unforgiving exploitation."[179] E. Mugabi from Kampala wrote that "British Asians have definitely been blood sucking Uganda."[180] Simpson Nature Ndabise, the Principal of the Blessed Martyrs College, Nansana similarly compared Asians with parasites "sabotaging, invading, eradicating, devouring and smuggling [sic!] the economy of Uganda esoterically."[181] Many readers accusing the Asians of sabotaging the country, copied the government slogan of an economic war of independence and called Asians imperialist agents: "The Asians had acted like jaguars which turn our legs crooked, so their leaving will enable our legs to go straight again, thus economic independence gained by the Africans."[182] The same letter writer demanded that 09 August, the day of the expulsion decree, should become a public holiday. Other readers condemned Asians' social and cultural exclusiveness and accused them of arrogance, irresponsibility, disloyalty, selfishness, and greed.[183] Kedi Karamojong from Kampala claimed the Asians were to blame for their own destiny as they had not attained citizenship. He further stated that the economic war meant "a challenge to all true Ugandans (Africans)" and a "chance to the Wananchi."[184]

S. K. Varma, an Asian from Kampala, was one of the few *Uganda Argus* readers who dared to publicly speak up against the government's policy. He claimed that the Asians were not at fault for their situation in East Africa. He also accused the government of conducting a policy motivated by racialism:

> "For make no mistake about it, the solutions that are currently being advocated, with their unfortunate undertones of racial intolerance and prejudice, often unashamedly open, are raising the frightful spectre of an evil which will not only grow bigger and

[176] Live Letters, by Kirizestom, *Uganda Argus*, 19 August 1972.

[177] N. Ebwonyu, by Kaberamaido, Letter to the editor, *Uganda Argus,* 09 September 1972.

[178] Live Letters, by Kirizestom, *Uganda Argus*, 19 August 1972.

[179] Live Letters, From George Jersey Muwanga from Makerere College School, *Uganda Argus*, 19 August 1972.

[180] Letter to the editor, E. Mugabi in Kampala, *Uganda Argus,* 25 August 1972.

[181] Live Letters, by Simpson Nature Ndabise, Principal of Blessed Martyrs College, Nansana, *Uganda Argus*, 19 August 1972.

[182] Live Letter, by Jemowor from Kampala, *Uganda Argus,* 19 August 1972.

[183] Live Letter, by George E. Kyamulesire from Kampala, *Uganda Argus,* 19 August 1972.

[184] Live Letter, by Kedi Karamojong from Kampala, *Uganda Argus,* 19 August 1972.

> bigger but will assume far more, and perhaps uncontrollable dimensions, unless checked right now."[185]

However, criticism in early independent Uganda and certainly after the Amin coup in 1971 was dangerous and difficult to air, as the media was in government control. Amin was famous for disposing of his critics. It is therefore not surprising that we find so little criticism of the Government in written sources. In a British documentary about the Asian exodus with reporter Johnathan Dimbleby[186] the Africans who Dimbleby tried to interview were reluctant to give their opinion in front of the camera. Many interviewees looked insecure or even intimidated by saying the wrong thing. A man on the streets in Kampala who first declines to answer but then comments on the question Dimbleby posed about whether the expulsion was good: "It depends on what the president feels about it."[187] A boy utters that he liked the Asians: "They can give us money in this market here, we carry for them baskets. They're giving us five shilling."[188] As reaction, the African crowd surrounding the boy is laughing uncomfortably.

Members of the Asian community in Uganda faced uncertainty about their future in East Africa and outside. The uncertainty affecting all Asians in Uganda was worsened by the government's constant revision of who was actually affected by the expulsion decree over the three months course. While the original decree exempted professionals, it was not clear if this also exempted their dependents and families. These exemptions later were nullified. The decree also did not give clear instruction of how the expulsion process should take place and how much each person was allowed to take with them and what had to stay behind. The first few weeks of the expulsion period was characterised by uncertainty and a lack of information. Some Asians in their attempt to settle in another country had to experience an odyssey lasting weeks, sometimes months of uncertain travel and being rejected by multiple states before a country would take them in.[189] A plane fare to Britain cost £ 70.[190] In the later stages of the expulsion period, flights to different locations were offered free of charge paid for by the respective governments.[191] Endless queues built up every day in front of the British High Commission where British passport holders applied for entry permits. During the earlier stage of the expulsion,

[185] Letter to the editor, by S. K. Varma, Kampala, *Uganda Argus*, 04 December 1972.

[186] Thames Televisions 'This Week', 14 September 1972.

[187] Ibid, 18:40.

[188] Ibid., 19:12.

[189] Air France helps stranded Asians, *Uganda Argus*, 31 August 1972.

[190] British Airlines unite on exodus, *Ugandan Argus*, 25 August 1972. According to the inflation calculator of the Bank of England £ 70 in 1972 is equivalent to £ 907.30 in 2018: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator.

[191] Flight to Montreal: Canada Charter, *Uganda Argus*, 14 October 1972.

those passport holders had to wait for a press announcement by the British High Commission asking Asians with the listed passport numbers to call on the High Commission. By late September this had changed: any Asian British passport holder could queue up for an appointment at the High Commission which exacerbated the onrush.[192] The vast majority of Ismaili Asians held Ugandan citizenship. However, after the withdrawn threat of the Ugandan government to also expel Ugandan Asians, most of them decided to leave the country or had their citizenship withdrawn by the Ugandan government and ended up stateless. Their religious leader, the Aga Khan, recommended his followers to settle in Canada.[193]

Although Amin affirmed to the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in an open letter published in the *Uganda Argus* that Asians who had to leave the country would not have to fear any harm or expropriation,[194] in reality, this was not true. Individual cases of harassment and robbery fueled rumours and fear within the Asian community: "He [an Asian Journalist in Kenya] also said that stories were already coming in from Uganda of beatings up [sic!] and especially rape, which could not be published for lack of substantiation."[195] On 10 August, the first reports were filed by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office stating that Ugandan citizens with Asian origin who had reported to the Immigration Office to verify their Ugandan citizenship, as had been asked of them, had their registration certificates of their naturalisation ripped apart and their passports withdrawn by the Ugandan immigration officers. The immigration officers said they had been British Protected Persons before registration; therefore they could not have become Ugandan citizens.[196] Despite various assurances by the Ugandan government,[197] Asians had to face harassment and had to fear violence by the executing soldiers and policemen during the expulsion process.

Because they were not allowed to take big sums of money with them when leaving Uganda – the Ugandan government finally set the amount at £ 50[198] –, many Asians spend their money, sometimes all of their savings, in a shopping spree, as the *Uganda Argus* called it, on clothing and other items they were allowed to take with them.[199] Others bought multiple refundable

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192 Asians in big rush on BHC, *Uganda Argus*, 23 September 1972.

193 Many Ismailis plan to settle in Canada, *Uganda Argus*, 16 September 1972.

194 Uganda replies to U. N. boss over Asian issue, *Uganda Argus*, 05 October 1972.

195 Letter from W L Allinson, Chancery, Nairobi, to Simon Dawbarn, East African Department, 09 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA.

196 Nairobi to Kampala, Telno 23, 10 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

197 Uganda will benefit, *Uganda Argus*, 15 August 1972.

198 Circa £ 700 at the time of writing: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator (28 January 2022).

199 This spending rush even led to shortages of certain goods: British Asians in shopping spree, *Ugandan Argus*, 25 August 1972.

plane tickets with Air Canada which they planned to reconvert to money once they had left East Africa. Asian pet owners who left the country were urged not to abandon their pet by an announcement, which offered the option to bring the cat or dog to the Faculty of Veterinary Science of Makerere University where the pets would be "humanely disposed of for a nominal fee."[200]

The expulsion affected members of the Asian community almost unanimously. This even included Asians who had fully committed themselves to Uganda in the preceding decade as the case of Ugandan citizen D. A. Patel, MP and former speaker of the Ugandan Parliament shows. Patel had renounced his British citizenship a few days after the three months renunciation deadline and was consequently made stateless by the Amin administration in the course of the expulsion. In general, even the few Asians who were exempt from the expulsion felt unsafe in Uganda and mainly decided to leave.[201] As Anneeth Kaur Hundle has stressed, those circa 500 largely male Asians who stayed in Uganda over the decade after the expulsion felt an "heightened sense of the self as a racialized self."[202]

While the Western press was highly critical of Uganda's move to expel the East African Asians and partly also disapproved of Britain's reluctance to take in British passport holders, the responses on the African continent differed somewhat. Many African governments welcomed Amin's decree as a step towards more independence from the imperialistic influence of the former colonial power and a sign of Africa's political and economic autonomy, an opinion which was replicated by African newspaper readers outside of Uganda as well. Apollo wa Lihanda from the University of Nairobi said that the best the Ugandan President could do was "to sail with the legal wind of Britain and change the immigration legislation."[203]

The governments of Tanzania and Zambia were the exception: President Nyerere who had held close ties with former Ugandan President Milton Obote condemned the expulsion explicitly. On 06 September 1972, following Nyerere's example, Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda made a statement in Lusaka disapproving of the Ugandan expulsion of non-citizens. The Ugandan government dismissed Kaunda's criticism by disparaging it as imperialistic propaganda.[204] Kenya's reaction was more ambiguous. Because Kenya had followed a policy of increasingly high restrictions for non-citizen Asians through the implementation of work

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[200] Don't abandon your dog or cat, *Uganda Argus*, 09 October 1972.

[201] Mr Geoffrey Rippon meeting/Richard Slater with India and Uganda Association: 13 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA.

[202] Kaur Hundle, 'Exceptions to the expulsion: violence, security and community among Ugandan Asians, 1972–1979': 165f.

[203] Letters to the editor by Apollo wa Lihanda at the University of Nairobi, *Uganda Argus*, 16 August 1972.

[204] Imperialistic propaganda, *Uganda Argus*, 08 September 1972.

and entry permits, they had already reduced the number of non-citizen Asians living in the country after 1967 and stated that they would not change their policy for now. Although, statements from Kenyan politicians, such as Vice-President Daniel arap Moi, who said that Kenya "wants British passport holders to go",[205] made East African Asians in Kenya nervous and led to emigration out of fear that they could face a similar fate to the Asians in Uganda. However, like Nyerere, Kenyatta's relationship with the new leader of Uganda was characterised by open antipathy. Embracing a similar policy as Amin therefore would have been humiliating: "The presidents of Kenya and Tanzania will firmly resist any pressure to take a leaf out of Amin's book. If only because of their strong personal antagonism towards him."[206] The Kenyan government had the chance to wait and see if Uganda's economy was able to compensate the exodus of Asian merchants and entrepreneurs. The subsequent economic collapse in Uganda put paid to Kenya adopting a similarly radical solution for its own Asian minority. In Nyerere's case the opposition towards the expulsion was understood as rooted in a deeper sense of humanitarianism:

> "Nyerere's humanitarian concern is genuine. But given the stresses and strains of his own Asian community […], and the more extreme views of some of his ministers, he cannot concede much. Our only hope of some Tanzanian action in Kampala lies in collaboration between him and Kenyatta."[207]

As the long process of exclusion indicates, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda cannot be broken down to one trigger or a singular reason. The expulsion rather follows the route which East African minority policy had already drawn in the first decade of independence. Uganda – even prior to Amin – had, different to Tanzania, targeted the Asian minority on racial grounds. With the inclusion of the Ugandan Asians in the expulsion decree, the Ugandan state reached the third and ultimate step of the exclusion of the minority from Ugandan territory after excluding Asian non-citizens without permits and Asian non-citizens in general. Therefore, the last step was to strip citizens of their rights and exclude them from national political space by withdrawing their citizenship. By stripping them of their citizenship first the Ugandan government was technically not excluding citizens. Daniel Nanjira pointed out that in most cases of exclusion beyond the Asian expulsion the withdrawal of citizenship had to come first as exclusionary measurements would otherwise be seen as illegitimate as the East African states in general acknowledged the international norm that no state had the right to expel its own

[205] Asians: Kenya may act, *Uganda Argus*, 09 November 1972.
[206] Richard Slater to FCO, Telno 963, 10 August 1972, FCO 31/1375.
[207] Philipps, High Commission Dar es Salaam, to FCO, Telno 387, 10 August 1972, FCO 31/1375, UKNA.

citizens.[208] This also happened during the expulsion of 1972. Many Asians lost their Ugandan citizenship due to formalities, often because they had renounced their CUKC citizenship too late.[209] Amin targeted only British passport holders at first, then all Asian non-citizens and at last he explained that Asians holding Ugandan passports were nevertheless no real citizens. He based this claim on a local *citizenship culture,* which excluded non-Africans from the idea of nationhood and the status as citizens. The public discourse surrounding loyalty and citizenship is central for the understanding of this method of exclusion. It corresponds to a notion of citizenship based on racialized loyalty. A person's perceived lack of loyalty defined by their racial belonging therefore reduces a person's status as a citizen; they then can be deprived of their status.

Unlike Uganda, Tanzania followed a different path when dealing with its own Asian minority. After an initial attempt to expel a number of Asian traders in 1967, Tanzanian policy was framing Asians as part of a class[210] – different to the working class most Africans belonged to – rather than racially. The Arusha Declaration, adopted at the same time, served as socialist framework for a policy of nationalisation. Asians as a group of people holding essential means of production and capital were deprived of their colonial inherited privileges and access to economic opportunities. By restricting the minority in an extensive way economically, Asians who had from colonial time on defined themselves in society via their economic success felt they had no place in a society branded by African socialism. The last nail in the coffin for a prosperous Asian future in Tanzania was the Tanzania Building Acquisition Act after which the number of Asians in Tanzania halved. For Asians, who fully identified themselves with Nyerere's socialism, there was, however, a place in Tanzanian society (at the same time Africans who did not identify themselves with the socialist policy had to suffer hardship alike); yet, only very few Asians did so.

Conclusion

The chapter has shown that the expulsion was not a self-contained event but part of a wider debate surrounding imperial and national belonging which involved the whole East African region, Britain and India. Besides illustrating an infamous side of East African history where formerly condemned racialism was used to deal with the colonial heritage of a divided society, the exclusion of Asians from East Africa illuminates Britain's shady role in this historical

[208] Nanjira, *The Status of Aliens in East Africa*, 129.

[209] Slater Kampala to FCO, 14 August 1972, FCO 31/1376, UKNA.

[210] See chapter III.1.

episode: the rejection of its own citizens based on the introduction of second-class citizenship and the reluctance of accepting its own imperial responsibility due to a rising racist atmosphere at home which sprung from the human remnants of Britain's decaying empire. The aftermath of empire did not only bring a reconfiguration of political space in the former colonies and therefore the introduction of immigration regimes. It also prompted the British former metropolis to adopt a new form of immigration control as the introduction of the CIA 1962 and 1968 has shown. In this context, the UK redefined its citizenship concept, moving away from its imperial foundation to a more national one.

Conclusion

Jennifer Nansubuga Makumbi's acclaimed novel *Kintu* first published in 2014 encompasses a family saga spanning the eventful time from late colonialism to the early 2000s in Uganda. At one point one of her protagonists, Miisi, a well-educated Baganda meets with an acquaintance Kaleebu, a Muslim from the working class. Their conversation about Uganda's history and politics is triggered by their opinions about the current President Yoweri Museveni:

> 'What has this president done for the country, seriously?'
> 'At least we can sit here and criticise him.'
> 'But only his tribal region is prospering and he has brought back the Asians.'
> 'At least one region's developing,' Miisi said evenly. 'I wish Obote and Amin had developed their regions: we would have fewer problems here in the south. As for the Asians, they have given the city a facelift. […]'
> 'But he's taking properties from Ugandans and giving them to Asians. How can that be right?' Kaleebu sat up.
> 'He's not giving them properties; he is returning their properties,' Miisi tried to explain. 'The international community will not invest in Uganda until all properties Amin confiscated from Asians have been returned.'
> Kaleebu kept silent. Finally he said, 'I know you'll think that I say this because I am a Moslem and that I stand by Amin blindly, but don't you think this president is taking us back to those old days of "*boy* this" and "*boy* that"? Who doesn't know how cruelly Asians treated us? Maybe you educated people don't but for us who worked in their shops or homes, the idea of having them back is sickening.'
> 'Those days are long gone. Asians return as equals. Besides, they learned to call us "*boy*" from the British.'[1]

This fictional conversation broaches three of the most relevant aspects of Uganda's history in the 20th century: Uganda's relationship with its colonial power; local and regional race relations which were grounded on a system of imperial migration and Uganda's struggle with its inner demographic design defined by ethnic categories. It clearly shows that during the time of early

[1] Makumbi, Jennifer N. *Kintu*. London: Oneworld, 2018.

independence those grievances were not resolved but that they lived on and were available to be used within a contemporary discourse about the distribution of wealth and opportunities decades later. A central complaint Kaleebu made about Museveni is the President's decision to invite Asians back to Uganda in the early 1990s to invest in the country's economy. The IMF and the World Bank had tied future aid and monetary support to the return and restoration of formerly Asian owned property. With a small number of Ugandan Asians returning and another group of people migrating directly from India,[2] it became apparent that the previous image of the Asian middleman had remained with Ugandans although most Asians shad left the country in 1972. Yet, the wealth some of the Asians had left behind did not trickle down to the wider African population. In fact, in both, Uganda and Tanzania, the exodus of Asians and the deprivation of Asian property in the 1970s fed into an economic development opposite to what had been propagated by state actors. Tanzania and Uganda drifted into economic crisis in the 1970s and had difficulty recovering. One main reason was that the countries struggled to compensate for the loss of skilled and experienced staff and their economic expertise. In the 1990s President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, called on the Asians to return to Uganda and resettle.[3]

The debates about belonging and the entitlement of rights surged in the late 1990s and early 2000s again, demonstrated not only by verbal and sporadically physical attacks against the Asians in Uganda and Tanzania. In Uganda, the returning Asians were actively fighting for comprehensive civil rights by seeking constitutional recognition of the Asian population as indigenous community in 2001, a claim which eventually failed.[4] While this surge for constitutional recognition deserves research in itself, it also reflects that individuals who are members of a minority see the need to be included in the notion of local citizenship and belonging which transcends legal arrangements of citizenship (*citizenship legislation*).

Patterns of racial thought which have been established during colonialism and the era of decolonisation are used to explain the world and justify opposition towards the settlement of Asians until today. However, these patterns are solely an available outline to deal with current affairs in a way that translates to a wider audience. This does not imply that East African social structures stay primordial and cemented. The re-emergence of debates surrounding citizenship and belonging in the 1990s and early 2000s again correlates with another reconfiguration of political space – this time the introduction of a multiparty-system, the push for democratic

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[2] Margret Frenz has discussed the varying identities of returning Ugandan Asians and the new wave of immigrants from India in: Frenz, 'Migration, Identity and Post-Colonial Change in Uganda: A Goan Perspective'.

[3] Forrest, Tom. 'Le retour des Indiens en Ouganda'. *Politique africaine* 76, no. 4 (1999): 76.

[4] Nyamnjoh, Francis B. *Insider and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa*. Dakar/London/New York: Codesria Books, 2006.

reforms and economic liberalization in the context of the Washington Consensus in the early 1990s. While one could easily overlook this wider political context in the case of the returning Ugandan Asians and associate the renewed debates solely with the return of Asians to Uganda, in Tanzania this explanation clearly falls short. Although Tanzania had lost a big part of its Asian population through socialist nationalisation such as the Building Act of 1961 and Operation *Maduka* in 1976, a smaller number of Asians had stayed continuously in the country until the 1990s. This suggests the sudden surge in anti-Asian rhetoric therefore again is a result of a changing political space.

The previous chapters have construed the issue of citizenship in its multiple layers: legal, imaginative, and practical. Through these different layers of *citizenship legislation, culture* and *practice* we were able to grasp the various aspects of citizenship in their local context and at the same time in the way they relate to more universal forms of *citizenship making*. It offered insight of how East Africans thought about citizenship within an imaginative space as well as how individuals practiced citizenship in the everyday life of their new reality, which independence had created. This approach further demonstrated how the interplay between these different layers of citizenship has constructed a specific local concept of citizenship. This local citizenship concept enabled state and non-state actors to argue for an exclusion of Asians from the economic and ultimately physical space of the new nation. We could grasp the way *citizenship culture* was shaped during the first decade of independence and how Asians reacted to external conditions and the evolution of local citizenship through strategic *citizenship practices*. In this, the strong interconnectedness between the three layers of citizenship became apparent. By defining the ideal citizen as being racially African local *citizenship culture* enforced the tightening of *citizenship legislation* partly as a consequence of Asian *citizenship practices*. *Citizenship culture* in East Africa was not only imagined in relation to the state but specifically in relation to fellow citizens in their role as fellow Africans. Yet, while only being racially African qualified someone to be a full citizen, the 1960s were characterised by increasing state isolationism, which not only led to the tightening of immigration and the exclusion of East African Asians but also of African non-citizens. By applying the three layers of citizenship and further expanding these ideas to the Ugandan case this book further developed the thinking about national citizenship in Tanzania while using previous research, in particular Brennan's observation of urban racial thought, as its starting point. Therefore, this book contributes to the broadening of the history of Ugandan citizenship but equally show the strong link between *citizenship legislation, culture* and *practices* in Tanzania and their evolution over time.

Here, *citizenship making* has been understood as a process which went through various changes in the period of investigation. As previous East African History writing has shown, ideas about citizenry did not suddenly emerge after independence but had deep roots in local

political thought.[5] Earlier questions on the role of the individual in the political space as well as the way locals thought about citizenship in the late colonial time (discussed in part I) influenced *citizenship culture* and *practice* in the time of early independence. It became apparent that these earlier experiences within the political sphere have impacted the way Africans and Asians thought about their role in the new nation. Despite some Asians who became active in the independence struggle, wide-reaching resentment by Africans and the experience of violence in the context of political campaigning mostly led to political apathy within the Asian communities in East Africa and hindered Asians' political participation in the long-term. However, by comparing the Ugandan and Tanzanian political development, we could see that some Asians in Tanzania profited from the collaboration between the Asian Association and TANU. Asians' participation in politics lasted longer and was more profound than in Uganda. The comparison between Uganda and Tanzania also highlighted the strong emphasis on ethnic divisions within Ugandan politics which postponed the discourse on local race relations until it became politically more urgent by the implementation of new immigration legislation by the Kenyan and British governments in the late 1960s.

Thinking about citizenship within these three layers has also explicitly offered an insight into the making of second-class citizenship as was the case for Asian British passport holders as well as Ugandan Asians, whose citizenship was later revoked. Second-class citizenship and *citizenship culture* linking legitimate citizenship to racial categorisation has only recently proven its timeliness in the light of the Windrush crisis and the revocation of British citizenship in the case of Shamima Begum.[6]

The first decade after independence was characterised by the construction of an imaginary sphere in which *citizenship culture* was defined and ultimately a notion of ideal citizenry was standardised. This has happened as James Brennan and Emma Hunter have shown for the case of Tanzania within a vital public sphere.[7] However, this public sphere was not simply a national one but represented debates on African and national citizenship which were taking place in the whole East African region and beyond.

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5 Glassman, 'Sorting out the tribes: The creation of racial identities in colonial Zanzibar's newspaper wars'; Glassman, 'Slower than a massacre: The multiple sources of racial thought in colonial Africa'; Glassman, *War of words, war of stones*; Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*.

6 Begum had joined ISIS and became stateless after having her British citizenship revoked while in a refugee camp in Syria in 2019. The UK government justified the revocation with Begum's prospects of receiving Bangladeshi citizenship (which she did not have at the time of revocation) due to her parents' country of birth. Begum herself had held British citizenship since birth. Begum's case stands for hundreds of cases of British citizens who had their citizenship revoked with numbers having increased substantially since 2010: Hundreds stripped of British citizenship in last 15 years, study finds, *The Guardian*, 21 January 2022.

7 Brennan, *Taifa*; Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*.

Comparing Tanzania and Uganda could also explain the different paths those two countries have followed in the way they formalised national belonging. In Uganda, the narrowing of *citizenship culture* which excluded non-Africans led subsequently to the tightening of legal citizenship regulation and the withdrawal of citizenship as well as the expulsion of Asians who had held Ugandan citizenship. In contrast, Tanzania's *citizenship culture* consisted of an additional layer: TANU membership.[8] While in both countries national space narrowed and access to the national in-group became more restrictive, only Uganda radically closed borders by withdrawing citizenship. In Tanzania (which had only tentatively tested expelling Asian non-citizens in 1967) the formalised way into the national in-group was already further restricted through the barrier of TANU membership. This made a tightening of national space through *citizenship legislation* redundant.

While citizenship legislation was not racialised, citizenship culture was – in Tanzania via a racialised classism, in Uganda more explicitey

Contextualising the status of the Asian minorities in East Africa with the wider reconfiguration of political space as consequence of decolonisation and nation-building, we were able to unveil a wider phenomenon of post-imperial demographic unmixing, a process affecting not only East Africa and the Asian minority but most new nations in the transition from an imperial system to independence. The case of East African Asians in the first decade after independence joined a pattern of demographic unmixing in the aftermath of empire as Rogers Brubaker has theorised.[9] We could see the attempt to exclude Asians from national space in a three step process: first, the expulsion of non-citizens who had committed a crime or had behaved disrespectfully towards an African citizen; second, the expulsion of non-citizens in general; third, the withdrawal of local citizenship and the subsequent expulsion of non-African citizens.

By contextualising the East African Asian case with the context of post-imperial demographic unmixing we have gained an additional perspective on the process of decolonisation in 1960s Africa and beyond, within the realm of empire. Considering demographic unmixing as an exemplification of the local understanding of and dealing with the muddle of imperial migration offers an additional explanatory for expulsion and ethnic cleansing in post-colonial settings within the longue durée perspective of (post)empire history. At the same time, it keeps the focus on the specific case of the East African Asian minorities. By observing the 1960s in East Africa through the lens of immigration legislation and the increasingly restrictive local ideas of citizenship, it poses a contrast to the image of the global 1960s. In fact, the history of

[8] Hunter, *Political Thought and the public sphere in Tanzania*, 200.

[9] Brubaker, 'Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives'.

citizenship and race relations of the 1960s in East Africa tells a story of isolationism and severing of older imperial connections, which followed a period of intense global networks between the region and other parts of the British Empire. Here, the book has followed a more recent way of "doing" Global History by not only focussing on the history of global connections but also examining disruptions within these connections over time.

The story of the Asian minorities is a local and at the same time globally entangled history, being affected by imaginaries, policies and events within the triangle of East Africa, the UK and the Indian subcontinent. Regional trends specifically in immigration legislations and economic policy had direct influence on the national situation of Uganda and Tanzania. This is further true on the economic level with the global implications of the Cold War and the ideological fight between Socialism and Capitalism. The strong regional influence of Tanzania's introduction of *ujamaa* as a system of political thought, moreover, implicated Obote's tactical manoeuvring of moving between a more nationalist and socialist economic approach. This interconnectedness of the global, regional and national also exists when it comes to the tightening of immigration legislations as a reaction to the Kenya Immigrants Act of 1967. Immigration regimes in post-independent states remain understudied; they are more than just legal texts and are – similar to *citizenship cultures* – a mirror of the way new nations perceive themselves and legally manifest interpretations of the national self. This has proved the abundance of immigration legislations as historical subject.

In illustrating the economic and political sphere of the late colonial time, we were able to understand in which climate Africans and Asians entered independence and see how late colonial power structures and political dynamics lastingly influenced ideas about national citizenship, belonging and political loyalty beyond the day of independence. By reflecting on the colonial and early time of independence, continuations within political discourse as well as the slow development of a distinctive local *citizenship culture* became visible. The structure of this book has followed the rhythm of change focussing on the relevant national spaces – economic and political – in which Asians and Africans saw themselves. We have seen that 1967 was not only a watershed moment for a rapidly changing East African economy but that it also reflected a rethinking of immigration policies.

Later in the dialogue between Miisi and Kaleebu in Nansubuga Makumbi's novel Kintu, Kaleebu ponders: "Of course Amin was a tyrant. […] but how much of Amin is myth?"[10] The expulsion of the Asians from Uganda has always been surrounded by various myths: the Asians who due to the expulsion had become twice migrants[11] told success stories of settling

[10] Makumbi, *Kintu*, 296.

[11] Bhachu, Parminder. *Twice migrants: East African Sikh settlers in Britain*. London, New York: Tavistock Publications, 1985.

down in yet another country away from Africa and building up new businesses. The expulsion itself often stands out as one shocking moment in history. Yet, it needs to be contextualised in the wider notion of *citizenship making* in East Africa.

By comparing the Ugandan and Tanzanian case we open up new viewpoints on the history of citizenship, race and immigration regimes in the era of decolonisation such as the shaping of racial thought in urban Tanzania and Uganda. This has offered a unique perspective when thinking about national history in an entangled web of connections. Approaching the national and the global at the same time can offer us insight we would otherwise not find. The development of national citizenship concepts and immigration legislation was strongly interlinked with the global issues of migration and the legacy of empire. At the same time, the global Cold War set the scene for national economic agendas and isolationist nationalisation. While the world of empires disappeared, and the world of nations emerged the individuals who lived during this transition never stopped drawing connections between the global and the national, and neither should we.

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Citizenship is a process in motion. When empires crumbled and nation-states arose, subjects became citizens. And as such, those who had arrived in East Africa via imperial channels of migration had to navigate a new world. Asians in Tanzania and Uganda found themselves out of place and out of space as their social and economic opportunities were shrinking. This book compares the process of citizenship making in 1960s Tanzania and Uganda, not just in the lead-up to the Asian expulsion from Uganda in 1972 but in a changing global context of migration systems.

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